24 January 2003

Test Ban AWOL from Washington's WMD Strategy

By Kathryn Crandall

Critics rightly take issue with the counter-proliferation and pre-emption initiatives revealed in Washington’s ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’, but there is also an important element that is conspicuously absent - nuclear weapons testing.

The Biological Weapons Convention and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are highlighted in this document, even though the Bush Administration has not shown strong support for them, but the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s (CTBT) absence underscores its ‘endangered’ status in U.S. policy development.

The Bush policy has been to adhere to the nuclear testing moratorium, while refusing to pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT or support international efforts to achieve its entry-into-force. In the past year the Administration has undermined international efforts by refusing to fund parts of the CTBT’s verification inspection regime, by voting against placing the treaty on the United Nations agenda and by refusing to attend the Article XIV Entry-into-Force Conference.

At the same time, the Administration has sought funds to ‘enhance’ test readiness and shorten the time required to prepare for the resumption of full-scale test explosions.  Additionally, the Nuclear Posture Review called for development of new and modified nuclear weapons capabilities that could lead to a resumption of testing. Although many military and scientific experts disagree, some defense and weapons laboratory representatives have stated that testing may be required to address possible ageing problems in the existing stockpile. On the other hand, the Administration continues to declare that it has no immediate plans to test and most observers think that it is highly unlikely that the United States would resume testing during the current Bush term.

The United States’ ambiguous approach is very much at odds with its NATO allies, all of whom have ratified the CTBT and are committed to work for its entry-into-force. Nevertheless these governments have not yet directly confronted the Bush Administration policy. It is time they did.

A test ban is a security and non-proliferation goal that the world community has worked toward for over fifty years, primarily because prohibiting testing effectively curtails nuclear weapons program. As the world frets over North Korea’s weapons program, imagine several years down the road to North Korean nuclear tests. Also imagine China resuming tests to modernize and expand its arsenal, Russia testing to develop new nuclear capabilities and India and Pakistan testing again in the midst of escalating tensions.  The unleashing of a new arms race is an all too real and devastating possibility.

As part of a sound strategy to combat proliferation, the CTBT simply cannot be ignored. In addition to curtailing development of new, more sophisticated nuclear weapons, the CTBT would establish an unprecedented expansive international monitoring and verification regime to ensure compliance. The treaty would also prevent further compounding of the environmental and public health damage that has resulted from worldwide testing over the past decades. Those countries that have ratified the CTBT - most especially the UK, must work harder to ensure that the United States does not declare it redundant like the ABM Treaty.

UK nuclear weapons policy is closely aligned with that of the United States. The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston works collaboratively with the U.S. Department of Energy in striving to maintain the safety and reliability of their warheads. Because of the ‘Special  Relationship’, the Blair Government has a responsibility to raise concerns about U.S. policies that might undermine the CTBT or erode the global test moratorium.

The UK was obliged to follow the U.S. test moratorium in 1992 because Britain’s nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site. To its credit, the UK has signed and ratified the CTBT and worked for its entry-into-force. Most recently Jack Straw signed a Joint Ministerial Statement supporting the CTBT, which calls for all countries to sign and ratify the treaty and observe a moratorium on nuclear explosions. It concludes with “we will spare no effort in seeking to realize the vision of a ban on nuclear weapons test explosions. . .”

Unfortunately, AWE, is also charged with the responsibility to maintain the ability to design and develop new warheads. If new warheads are developed they will almost certainly require testing. Even if the time has not yet come to cross that bridge, AWE’s collaboration with the United States may be seen as participation in activities that could undermine the CTBT and the test moratorium. 

The UK participates in the U.S. sub-critical program, including an announced joint test in February 2002. One explicit purpose of sub-critical testing is to maintain the readiness of the Nevada Test Site for full-scale tests. Russia also conducts sub-critical tests. As preparations for sub-critical testing are very similar to preparations for a full-scale test, they have raised concerns about the actual nature of the tests and created tensions disruptive to the global test moratorium.

Presumably the UK does not intend to violate the CTBT by conducting full scale tests to certify the safety and performance of its current arsenal or to test new kinds of nuclear weapons. The United States is explicitly keeping these options open. However, the UK Government has given no indication that it would discontinue collaboration with the U.S. weapons program if it were to include full-scale nuclear tests. Some observers question whether continued nuclear weapons work at AWE contradicts Britain’s pro-CTBT policy and might aid and abet the resumption of testing in Nevada.

Kathryn Crandall is an analyst in the BASIC Washington office.