Recent diplomatic differences among current and future European Union (EU) states and the United States may have helped those who favour a strengthened European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At a meeting in Brussels in April, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium demonstrated their interest in having a defence identity autonomous from NATO, while President Bush purposely omitted mention of these countries in his recent ‘thank you’ speech in Washington for standing by the United States during the Iraq War. The transatlantic alliance was tested earlier this year, not only by disagreements over the Iraq War, but also by longstanding trade and agricultural disputes. However, while it seems that the planning for a separate foreign and security structure in the European Union is going ahead, it is difficult to ascertain whether it will be viable.

Common European Defence – In Whose Interest?
Europe’s failure to prevent the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s and its dependence on the United States during NATO’s action in Serbia and Kosovo have moved many to argue that the EU needs to build defence structures capable of standing alone to deal with violent conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe no longer plans for a conventional or nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. Yet, there are ongoing conflicts and instability in Africa and elsewhere on the periphery of Europe, where the United States may not wish to intervene. Those in favour of an EU CFSP argue that although NATO and the United Nations exist for collective security, neither can fully protect European interests. Furthermore, CFSP supporters suggest that a common defence structure would utilise defence resources more efficiently and allow Europe to compete with the United States technologically. In spite of these arguments, however, is it the case that the majority of EU member states are truly interested in a European defence organisation, separate from NATO?

The mini-summit, last April in Brussels, attracted only four of the EU’s 25 current and future members. Staunch advocates of deeper European integration, such as Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, have carefully distanced themselves from such a process. Spain’s foreign minister, Josep Pique, stated that they “had no right to call their defence initiative ‘European’, since they represented a minority within the Union.[i] The Dutch foreign minister, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, remarked that he “cannot imagine a world order built against the United States”.[ii] Disruption to the NATO alliance is a major issue in Europe at the moment and there are reasons to be concerned. For example, almost all German forces have been assigned to an integrated NATO command with military planning subject to NATO. Without a general staff that exercises full command over its military forces, Germany could be considered too integrated with NATO to effectively contribute to a separate EU defence force.[iii]

While France is greatly in favour of further European integration through the CFSP, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has stated that although the EU must have its own military capability, it ought not to rival NATO.[iv] Unlike France, Germany has no nuclear capability and is dependent on the US nuclear umbrella. German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has firmly associated Germany’s commitment to be non-nuclear in their relations with the United States, which was “always based on our trust that the United States, as the leading nuclear power, would guarantee some sort of order”.[v] Theoretically, France could offer a nuclear umbrella to Germany, but security dependence on France would cause a radical change in the Franco-German alliance, which has always been centred on equality. Another alternative would combine the nuclear forces of France and Britain into common European nuclear forces. However, these options could violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Articles I and II prohibitions on nuclear weapons sharing.[vi] At the very least, these plans would cause great legal controversy and political upheaval especially among neutral states like Sweden and Ireland.

Furthermore, a common European defence policy may isolate Turkey and Norway and antagonise Russia. While the four EU countries attending the Brussels meeting in April insist that they were not trying to undermine NATO or create a rift in the Atlantic alliance, the view from Washington was unfavourable. After the EU meeting, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, pointed out that Europe should be focusing on forces and equipment, not on an alternative plan.[vii] This may be feasible, but getting the European public to support an increase in defence spending, especially during hard economic times, is going to be a difficult task.

Does Europe have the Euros (and Pounds)?
At the NATO Defence Ministers June 2002 meeting, many agreed that Europe lacks the defence capabilities needed for urgent deployment. However, not much has changed since then. Europe’s goal of creating a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) in less than six months proved to be far too ambitious. British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon said it was unlikely that such a goal would be met. When Britain had to deploy 45,000 troops to Iraq, “it took Britain 70 days to [meet this goal]”.[viii] Furthermore, the EU has failed to meet one-third of almost 150 capability targets it has set for itself and although EU officials say that military expenditure across the Union is roughly half of that in the United States, its capabilities amount to only ten percent of the US total.[ix]

European defence integration over the last three years has been wrought with difficulties. Rifts during the Iraq crisis, the recent economic recession and minimal increases in European defence budgets have all had a major impact on prospects for establishing a strong military component to the CFSP. Should Europe seek to match the defence spending of its Atlantic counterparts? Given the astronomical levels of US military spending, which increased by $48 billion for Fiscal Year 2003,attempting to play catch-up with the US military is likely to be futile and counterproductive (since the EU’s strengths lie elsewhere). The United States now accounts for 40 percent of total global defence spending and its proposed 2003 increase is larger than any individual European country’s total defence budget for the year.[x]  Nevertheless, Germany, along with France and Italy, have called for the relaxation of the EU’s strict public spending rules in relation to defence in order to boost Europe’s military spending, and its military capabilities.[xi]

Despite pressure from elements within both NATO and the EU to increase military budgets, European countries are finding it hard to meet existing defence-spending targets. Germany’s defence spending, at 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for example, falls short of the NATO average of 2.3 percent, [xii] and total military expenditure in Western Europe remained almost constant between 1995 and 2001.[xiii] With the inclusion of the new EU members of Eastern Europe, defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP is likely to remain low in Europe for the foreseeable future. Although there could be the possibility of implementing a target percentage of defence spending, the contributions of the new EU members will be small. Whereas Germany has a GDP of $1.9 trillion, Estonia has a GDP of $5 billion.[xiv] In essence, it is difficult to see where the EU will find the money to finance large increases in defence expenditure.

NATO and The EU – Political Friction
The NATO Prague Summit in 2002 adopted proposals concerning global security issues, which may upset EU plans for the ERRF. The Alliance officially announced its intention to create a NATO Response Force (NRF), that will enter high-intensity combat situations between a week and a month after deployment is authorized is expected to be fully operational by 2006.[xv] While the ERRF is intended to conduct lower-level operations, such as the Petersberg Tasks of peacekeeping and crisis management, countries that offer their soldiers for ERRF deployment may also have soldiers with the proposed NRF. These overlapping demands may create tension and stretch resources within the Alliance.

In addition, the Prague Summit agreed to create different command and force structures within NATO to deal with new threats. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stressed the necessity of creating “command and force structures adapted to fulfil its new missions, not those of twenty years ago.”[xvi] NATO’s command structure will now consist of an Operations Command in Europe and a Transformation Command in the United States. However, while NATO is re-structuring itself to deal with threats outside its borders, how will this coincide with the EU’s plans for military intervention and crisis management?

With the expansion of its borders eastwards, the EU’s political and economic developments may create new problems, although whether such problems are best solved by military means is an open question. Jan Hoekema, former D66 parliamentarian and now Dutch Ambassador for International Cultural Policy, has stated that Europe has responsibilities beyond its borders that must be addressed.[xvii] Areas of conflict, such as in Africa and the Middle East, are geopolitical issues that Europe may wish to address militarily without the help of NATO. This is happening now with the French-led EU deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the recent decision by the United States to halt plans for the EU to take over the NATO-led mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Europe’s own backyard, surprised EU diplomats. Despite the fact that US officials brushed aside suggestions of creating another transatlantic dispute,[xviii] it is still difficult to ascertain whether NATO will see the EU-CFSP as an alternative or an ally across the street.

Christina Sklebar is an Intern with BASIC’s London office.

 

[i] “Undermining NATO?,” The Economist, 1 May 2003. 
[ii] “Undermining NATO?,” note 1. 
[iii] Soetendorp, B., Foreign Policy in the European Union (Longman: London, 1999). 
[iv] “Schroeder Sees Powerful EU”, BBC News, 4 April 2003. 
[v] Drozdiak, W., “Possible U.S. Missile Shield Alarms Europe,” Washington Post, 6 November 1999. 
[vi] Makhijani, A., “Nuclear Defence and Offence: An Analysis of US Policy”, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, vol. 8 no. 2 (February 2000). 
[vii] Black, I., “Collateral Damage”, The Guardian, 2 May 2003. 
[viii] Dempsey, J., “Call to Relax EU Rules to Boost Defence”, Financial Times, 20 May 2003.
[ix] Lungescu, O., “Partial Progress on ‘EU Army’”, BBC News, 19 May 2003. 
[x] Davis, I. and Lindborg, C., “NATO’s Defence Gap: More than Just Capabilities”, BASIC NATO E-Mail Series, Fall 2002. 
[xi] Dempsey, note 8. 
[xii] Connolly, K., “Germany Slashes Defence Spending”, The Telegraph, 6 December 2002.
[xiii] SIPRI Database, “Military Expenditure in Western Europe, 1992-2001,” Stockholm International Peace Institute. 
[xiv] Davis and Lindborg, note 10. 
[xv] Rayment, S. “No EU Rapid Reaction Force ‘For a Decade’”, The Telegraph, 13 January 2002. 
[xvi] Simpson, F. and Lindborg, C., “The Results of the Prague Summit and the Challenges Ahead”, BASIC NATO E-mail Series, Fall 2002. 
[xvii] Lindborg, C., “European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management”, BASIC Special Report, March 2002. 
[xviii] Dempsey, J., “US Puts Off EU Takeover of Bosnia Mission”, Financial Times, 4 June 2003.