BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
25 April 2007
Nuclear Terrorism: A U.S. Perspective
By Steven Monblatt, Co-Executive Director, BASIC[1]
This Paper is also available in pdf at: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN070425.pdf
Background
Al Qaeda-linked terrorists have explicitly announced their intent
to acquire and use nuclear weapons against the United States. As
early as 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a statement, "The Nuclear
Bomb of Islam," in which he declared it the "duty of Muslims to
prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God."
In August 2001 bin Laden asked two former Pakistani nuclear officials
for help finding other Pakistani nuclear scientists to build a nuclear
weapon. After the U.S. overthrew the Taliban, U.S. forces found
documentation, including crude bomb designs, at an al Qaeda safe
house in Kabul. Since 1992, al Qaeda representatives have been trying
to buy highly enriched uranium, and have actively recruited technicians
with at least some nuclear training, such as Adnan El Shukrjumah,
for whose capture the FBI is offering a $5 million reward.
There are three basic ways terrorists could stage a nuclear attack
on the U.S: by stealing or buying a nuclear weapon; by buying or
stealing weapons grade U-235 or plutonium and assembling a device;
by obtaining quantities of any of a variety of radioactive isotopes
and assembling them into a non-nuclear "dirty bomb." A successful
attack on a civilian nuclear power reactor could replicate the effect
of a dirty bomb.
Theft
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, thousands of nuclear weapons
were left in poorly secured military sites in four countries. Over
the years, there have been a number of reported attempts to obtain
nuclear materials from the Soviet armories. In November 2001, for
example, the Russian Defense Ministry reported two attempted break-ins
at nuclear weapons storage sites. In August 2003 the deputy director
of the organization that carries out repair work for Russian nuclear
icebreakers and nuclear submarines was arrested in Murmansk for
trying to steal nuclear materials. Russian tactical nuclear weapons
are a particular concern because of their portability. Russia still
has at least 3,000 of these small but still devastating weapons.
While theft of a nuclear weapon would be a grave problem for the
U.S., modern U.S. and Russian warheads are equipped with sophisticated
devices to prevent unauthorized use that terrorists would find extremely
difficult to bypass. The same cannot be said with certainty of devices
made by India or Pakistan, home of the notorious A.Q. Khan, father
of Pakistan's bomb and Godfather of an international nuclear proliferation
network. Should the current government of Pakistan be overthrown,
or chronic instability degenerate into chaos, control of that country's
devices might weaken, and terrorist groups might be able to buy
or steal a workable nuclear bomb from that country's inventory.
Build it yourself
It is commonly thought that building a nuclear bomb is a project
that would cost billions of dollars, take years of effort, and employ
thousands of people. In fact, a workable Hiroshima-size bomb could
be built by 20 people for less than $10 million, provided they
did not have to produce the weapons-grade fissionable material.
As far back at 1964, in an experiment devised at Lawrence Livermore
laboratory, two recent PhD students, with no prior knowledge of
nuclear explosives, using only information from a university library,
a machine shop, and conventional explosives, designed a workable,
Hiroshima-size bomb. Senator Joseph Biden reported in 2004 that
he had asked the heads of the national laboratories to build a nuclear
bomb using only off-the-shelf materials. They built one in a matter
of months.
The Dirty Bomb
Building a dirty bomb does not require highly enriched uranium
or plutonium. A dirty bomb, which uses conventional explosives to
spread radioactive materials over a given area, can be made with
any of a number of radioactive isotopes such as cobalt-60, cesium-137,
and iridium-192. These isotopes have important commercial applications
in everything from power generation to medicine; those most dangerous
are also the most useful. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
at least 1.8 million devices containing radioisotopes have been
licensed for use in the U.S. Internationally, the International
Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed 560 cases of unauthorized use
of isotopic devices since they began tracking this in 1993, adding
that most of these had a criminal dimension. Terrorists could also
attempt to replicate the impact of a dirty bomb by attacking a civil
nuclear power reactor. A successful attack could have an impact
similar to, or greater than, the Three-Mile Island or Chernobyl
accidents.
U.S. Responses
In an attempt to deal with the "loose nukes" left over from the
Soviet arsenal, the U.S. and Russia, subsequently joined by other
countries, signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement, commonly
known in the U.S. as Nunn-Lugar, under which the U.S. would help
the Russians retrieve and secure these weapons. With U.S. leadership,
this was followed by the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). The GP was dedicated
from its inception in 2002 to preventing terrorists or those that
harbor them from acquiring or developing WMD weapons, missiles,
and related materials, equipment and technology. In addition, at
the July U.S.-Russian summit, the two presidents announced a new
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, to continue and expand
international efforts to secure nuclear and radiological materials.
In the 15 years since the passage of Nunn-Lugar, almost 7,000 of
these weapons have been deactivated and destroyed, as well as hundreds
of missiles and delivery systems. Yet, these achievements notwithstanding,
the CTR Program has been hampered by administrative inconsistency
and under-funding.
Bush Administration Funding for the CTR (Nunn-Lugar) Program*
|
Year
|
Requested
|
Appropriated
|
|
FY2007
|
$372,128,000
|
$372, 128,000
|
|
FY2006
|
$415,549,000
|
$411,394,000
|
|
FY2005
|
$409,200,000
|
$409,200,000
|
|
FY2004
|
$450,800,000
|
$450,800,000
|
|
FY2003
|
$416,700,000
|
$416,700,000
|
|
FY2002
|
$403,000,000
|
$403,000,000
|
|
FY2001
|
$458,400,000
|
$443,400,000
|
|
FY2000
|
$475,500,000
|
$460,500,000
|
* All figures taken from the LOC Archive for Status of Appropriations
Legislation. Further analysis and breakdowns of CTR funding can
be found at the Russian
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council budgetary assessment
page.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of
international efforts to halt - and ultimately reverse - the spread
of nuclear weapons. The spread of nuclear weapons to potentially
unstable states hostile to the U.S. will dramatically increase the
risk of one or more of these weapons finding their way into the
hands of terrorists. Nuclear weapons, technology and explosive material
will become harder to track; the resulting uncertainty will undermine
the credibility of U.S. claims to deterrence.
Yet the current NPT regime is being undermined by U.S. policies
that weaken our ability to bring other states into compliance. U.S.
plans to produce a new generation of nuclear warheads, and the new
nuclear agreement with India, coupled with U.S. reluctance to enter
into new, binding multilateral security arrangements such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, all make more difficult the task
of limiting the spread of nuclear materials and thus increase the
possibility that terrorist groups will acquire nuclear weapons,
material, and know-how. While U.S. initiatives such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) offer the potential to intercept individual
shipments of nuclear materials destined for rogue states or non-state
actors, the ad hoc nature of the program, its lack of a formal international
legal basis, and the lack of transparency surrounding its operations,
all limit the willingness of states to cooperate with it.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the U.S. (9/11
Commission) made 41 specific recommendations on ways to improve
U.S. ability to deter terrorist attacks. The report points out "that
al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction
for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would
be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons
warrants a maximum effort -- by strengthening counter-proliferation
efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program."
Recommendations
The key to keeping terrorists from attacking the U.S. with a nuclear
weapon or dirty bomb is to secure fissile and radiological materials
so as to prevent their theft or illicit sale. To do this, the U.S.
needs to:
- Secure our own stockpiles. It is more important to plug known
security weaknesses than to build new "tamper-proof" warheads,
when building those warheads weakens international support for
non-proliferation.
- Work with Russia to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons
that are most susceptible to terrorist use.
- Increase funding for the 9/11 Commission recommendations, particularly
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar).
- Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the 2005 International
Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism.
- Re-energize the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, a 2004
U.S. initiative to remove nuclear materials from vulnerable research
facilities and convert or shut down research reactors that operate
on weapons-grade materials.
- Complete the U.S.-Russian safe fuel project by no later than
2013.
- Help other nations improve their control of fissile and radioactive
materials.
- Strengthen the Export Administration Act. Develop a regime
to better control the commercial trade in radioactive sources,
both domestically and internationally with enforceable export
controls.
- Obtain a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing PSI.
- Assist other nations to effectively implement UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 which requires states to "develop and maintain
appropriate physical protection measures" for nuclear, chemical,
biological, and radiological materials.
Additional Resources
Allison, Graham, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable
Catastrophe, Times Books, 2004.
Perkovich, George, et. Al. Universal Compliance: A Strategy
for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, (Hans Blix, Chairman) Weapons
of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Arms, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006.
http://www.nuclearterror.org/blastmaps.html:
See the effect of a 10 kiloton blast in any ZIP Code in the U.S.
Annex 1: This Note was a taken from a 65-page briefing
book, which covers many difficult security issues on the new
Congressional agenda. It was developed by the Council for a Livable
World, supported by the Ploughshares Fund, and written by:
David Culp, Legislative Representative, Friends Committee
on National Legislation
Peter Gantz, Executive Coordinator, Partnership for Effective
Peacekeeping
Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.), Senior Military Fellow,
Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation
Alison Giffen, Policy Analyst, Open Society Policy Center
Susan Gordon, Director, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Christopher Hellman, Defense Budget and Policy Analyst, Center
for Arms Control and NonProliferation
Theresa Hitchens, Director, Center for Defense Information
Victoria Holt, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center
John Isaacs, Executive Director, Council for a Livable World
Terri S. Lodge, Coordinator, Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative
Mason Lowe, Operations Director, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Steve MonblattCo-Executive Director, British American Security
Information Council
Carah Ong, Iran Policy Analyst, Center for Arms Control and
NonProliferation
Miriam Pemberton, Research Fellow/Peace and Security Program,
Institute for Policy Studies
Marie Rietmann, Public Policy Director, Women's Action for
New Directions
Nickolas Roth, Washington D.C. Director, Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation
Victoria Samson, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
Nicole Sawran, Legislative Coordinator, U.N. Foundation
Lisa Schirch, 3D Security Initiative and Associate Professor
of Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University
Matt Schroeder, Manager, Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation
of American Scientists
Sherri Schultz, Words With Grace (www.wordswithgrace.com)
Travis Sharp, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Center for
Arms Control and NonProliferation
Ira Shorr, National Field Director, Physicians for Social
Responsibility
Scott Stedjan, Legislative Secretary, Friends Committee on
National Legislation
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, Center for Defense Information
Dr. Paul F. Walker, Legacy Program Director, Global Green
USA
Notes
[1] This Note was
a taken from a briefing book on national security issues developed
by the Council for a Livable World, funded by the Ploughshares Fund.
For further details see Annex 1 to the Note.
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