BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
16 March 2007
The Newest Anti-Satellite Contender: China's ASAT
Test
By David Isenberg BASIC Senior Analyst
This Paper is also available in pdf at: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN070316.pdf
Key Points
- China joins the United States and Russia as one of only three
countries to have successfully tested anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.
- China now has the potential capability to destroy some U.S.
spy and missile defense satellites, although most U.S. communications
and targeting satellites are at a higher altitude and remain out
of reach.
- Russian military, intelligence and communication satellites
are more vulnerable, however, since many are in low Earth orbit.
- The test is expected to double the density of space debris
larger than 1 cm at altitudes near 850 km for at least five years
- putting at risk even the Chinese satellite program, which is
carrying out about 10 launches each year.
- The test makes it more difficult for the U.S. to ignore China's
potential as a peer competitor in space and may have strengthened
the hand of U.S. hawks opposed to a treaty banning the deployment
of weapons in space.
- Some common sense 'rules of the road' for space-faring nations
are needed alongside a revitalization of the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) negotiations.
Introduction
On January 11, 2007, China successfully carried out its first test
of an anti-satellite weapon.[1] The launch was detected by the United States early that evening.
According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the test
appeared to employ a ground-based interceptor missile, launched
from a base in remote western China, which used the sheer force
of impact rather than an exploding warhead to shatter the target
satellite.[2] The Chinese test was the first time that a ground-based missile
has been launched successfully to destroy an orbiting satellite.
Thus China entered a very exclusive club, as only two nations,
the former Soviet Union and the United States, have previously damaged
or destroyed spacecraft in anti-satellite tests, most recently the
United States in the mid-1980s.[3] None of the Soviet tests resulted in a target's complete destruction.[4]
From an arms control perspective the Chinese test demonstrates
both China's ability to counter potential U.S. "defensive" space
technologies with asymmetric counteractions, and the need to develop
some common sense rules of the road for space-faring nations.
The test also illustrates the need to revitalize the longstanding
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) negotiations in
the United Nations' Conference on Disarmament (CD).[5] Otherwise the deployment of space weapons could destroy strategic
balance and stability, undermine international and national security,
and disrupt existing arms control instruments.
Restarting the negotiations will not be easy. The U.S. view is
that there is no place in the talks for arms control. Last June
the U.S. delegation to the PAROS negotiations at the CD said:
Our delegation is more convinced than ever that issues relating
to the supposed weaponization of space definitely do NOT command
consensus in this body...
...the United States does not have any weapons in space, nor
do we have any plans to build such weapons. On the other hand,
the high value of space systems long has led the United States
to study the potential of space-related weapons to protect our
satellites from potential future attacks. As long as the potential
for such attacks remains, our Government will continue to consider
the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting
our assets....
The cold war is over, and there is no arms race in outer space.
Thus, there is no - repeat, no- problem in outer space for arms
control to solve.[6]
The Chinese Test: Implications for U.S. Missile Defense and Space
Policy
The Chinese test was similar to the U.S. test of a kinetic energy
ASAT weapon that destroyed a U.S. scientific satellite in September
1985, the last time such a test was conducted by any country. The
U.S. test took place at an altitude of 525 kilometers. [7] In that test, a U.S. Air Force F-15 launched a miniature kill
vehicle propelled by solid rocket motors to impact and destroy the
USAF Solwind science spacecraft. Previously, the U.S. military had
used an air-launched missile to destroy a satellite and the former
Soviet Union downed a satellite with a launch from Earth orbit.
But earlier U.S. attempts to shoot down a satellite from ground-based
missiles failed.
The weather satellite hit by the Chinese weapon was orbiting at
an altitude of roughly 805 kilometers (500 miles). Other satellites
positioned at the same altitude are part of the missile defense
network that the U.S. military is assembling. Theoretically, the
test means that China can now also hit other American spy satellites
that orbit closer to Earth. Such satellites include most of the
imagery satellites used for basic military reconnaissance.
In August 2006, President Bush authorized a new national space
policy, the first in nearly ten years, which ignored calls for a
global prohibition on ASAT tests. Among its principles the policy
said:
The United States considers space capabilities -- including
the ground and space segments and supporting links -- vital to
its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United
States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of
action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding
those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take
those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond
to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of
space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests;[8]
In fact, the U.S. has been pursuing policies to control and dominate
space for many years. The U.S. Space Command Joint Vision 2020
of June 2000 says:
Robust capabilities to ensure space superiority must be developed
just as they have been for land, sea, and air.
And according to the Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan
for FY 06 and beyond:
A viable, prompt global strike capability, whether nuclear
or non-nuclear, will allow the U.S. to rapidly and accurately
strike distant high-payoff, difficult-to-defeat targets. This
capability provides the U.S. with the flexibility to employ innovative
strategies to counter adversary anti-access and area denial strategies.
Such a capability will provide warfighting commanders the ability
to rapidly deny, delay, deceive, disrupt, destroy, exploit, and
neutralize targets in hours/minutes, even when U.S. and allied
forces have a limited forward presence.[9]
Space Debris
The target of the Chinese ASAT test was a defunct Chinese weather
satellite known as Feng Yun 1-C. Launched in 1999, the third in
a series, it was a cube measuring 4.6 feet on each side with solar
panels extending about 28 feet. It was due for retirement but it
still appeared to be electronically 'live', making it an ideal target.[10]
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), the satellite
had a mass of just under one ton. The collision would be expected
to completely break the satellite into fragments, the vast majority
of which would orbit the Earth as space debris. Because this breakup
took place at a high altitude where the atmospheric density is very
low, a large fraction of this debris will remain in orbit for decades.
UCS calculates that the number of debris fragments with size greater
than 1 mm that resulted from the breakup represents a significant
increase in the total estimated amount of debris of this size at
all altitudes up to 2,000 km, i.e., throughout low earth orbit (LEO).
By February 2, 2007, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network had already
cataloged more than 600 pieces of debris (presumably larger than
5 to 10 cm) from the Chinese test.[11]
UCS found that since the debris from this test is concentrated
at altitudes near 850 km, it would double the density of debris
larger than 1 cm in that region for at least five years. Moreover,
UCS's estimate of at least 800 large pieces of debris emanating
from the test is equal to the debris that would be added to LEO
in 30 to 40 years of space launches under "business as usual," and
70 to 80 years of space activity if strict debris mitigation measures
of the kind being discussed internationally were put in place.[12]
| |
Debris Size
|
|
1mm to 1cm
|
1cm to 10 cm
|
> 10cm
|
|
Total debris in LEO before the Chinese test
|
140 million
|
180,000
|
9,700
|
|
Debris from the FY-1C breakup
|
2 million
|
40,000
|
800
|
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists
China itself will be at risk from space debris. The Chinese are
launching about 10 satellites every year and expect to have 100
in orbit by 2010 and 200 by 2020. China has in the past five years
launched its first manned spacecraft, two remote-sensing satellite
programs (Ziyuan-1 and Ziyuan-2) and an oceanographic research satellite,
Haiyang-1 (HY-1). Moreover, China is also developing micro-satellites.[13]
A Ban on Space Weapons - Further Away Than Ever?
In 2002, China and Russia proposed a treaty banning the deployment
of weapons in space or attacks against space-based objects. China's
concern was that the American missile defense system would lead
to increasing use of space for military purposes and fuel an arms
race. The U.S. Government has refused to negotiate, saying such
a treaty would be unenforceable and would only give an advantage
to countries (i.e., China) that are trying hide their efforts to
develop weapons for use in space.[14]
If the intent of the Chinese in conducting the test was to pressure
the United States into more actively pursuing a treaty on the "Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space," which would ban space weapons,
they may have miscalculated. The test has certainly strengthened
the position of U.S. hawks who claim that China poses a strategic
threat to the United States. [15]
U.S. advocates of putting weapons in space feel vindicated and expressed
optimism for their own projects, which range from new kinds of defensive
satellites to space weapons and orbital battle stations able to
destroy all kinds of enemy arms.[16] Certainly the test makes it more difficult for the U.S. to ignore
China's potential as a peer competitor in space. As one commentator
wrote in the Wall Street Journal:
The Bush administration is sounding a muted alarm over China's
destruction, by means of an adapted ballistic missile, of an old
weather satellite 530 miles [853 kilometers] up in space. We'd
be better off treating the Jan. 11 test as a rare and useful gift.
Wittingly or not, the Chinese have put paid to four decades of
wishful thinking about the militarization of space -- and what
America should do about it.[17]
According to some news reports it appears that the Chinese leadership
may not have been fully informed about the test before it took place.
Bush administration officials said that they had been unable to
get even the most basic diplomatic response from China after their
detection of the test, and that they were uncertain whether China's
top leaders, including President Hu Jintao, were fully aware of
the test or the reaction it would engender.[18]
Subsequent remarks by a senior Chinese military officer predicting
that weapons will be deployed in outer space despite her government's
long-standing desire to prevent an arms race there did not do anything
to reduce their fears. During a World Economic Forum dinner, Yao
Yunzhu, a senior colonel in the People's Liberation Army, said "My
wish is we really want to keep space as a peaceful place for human
beings," adding that China would like all countries to come to a
consensus that space should be used only for peaceful purposes.
"But personally, I'm pessimistic about it," said Col. Yao, who directs
the Asia-Pacific Office at the Academy of Military Science in Beijing.
"My prediction: Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime."[19]
Some defense analysts say the test is part of a broader Chinese
effort to restrict the freedom of the U.S. military to maneuver
in Asia -- especially in the areas off the Chinese coast and around
Taiwan.[20]
It bears notice that it is not just the United States that feels
uneasy about China's ASAT test. Russia has many of its military,
intelligence and even communication satellites in low Earth orbit,
somewhere between 320 and 800 kilometers above ground. Such distance
puts them within easy reach of China's new capabilities. Furthermore,
while Russia has advocated many changes to its military doctrine
- including greater funding for its high-tech military assets -
it still operates many satellites that were put into orbit toward
the end of the Soviet Union or just after its breakup. Russia relies
on these for its security; especially for the huge open spaces of
Siberia and the Far East. Russia's sparse population in that region,
the need to monitor the borders, and the existence of high profile
military and R&D assets in Russia's eastern territory necessitate
constant surveillance and observation. The recent economic development
of the region - oil and natural-gas exploration and the importance
Moscow now attaches to such industries - makes it ever more necessary
to keep an eye on this expanse.[21]
In the aftermath of the Chinese test, some, such as James Hackett
of the Heritage Foundation, say that because satellites today are
crucial to the effective functioning of our society, we need weapons
that will deter others from threatening them.[22] Thus, they call for increased support for the U.S. program created
in the 1990s as a way to develop means of interfering with a satellite's
operations without destroying it and creating debris. That program
is known as Applied Counterspace Technologies (ACT).[23]
The counterargument is that most U.S. satellites are not vulnerable
to attack today nor are they likely to be in the years ahead. Therefore,
threats may often be handled through relatively passive measures
and through redundant systems rather than an all-out space weapons
competition. The Chinese anti-satellite test does put lower-altitude
reconnaissance systems in greater jeopardy, but not higher-altitude
U.S.-communications and targeting satellites.[24]
Conclusion: The Need for New 'Rules of the Road'
Recently, some of the most senior generals responsible for U.S.
military operations in space, including Marine Corps Gen. James
Cartwright, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, and Gen. Kevin Chilton,
head of Air Force Space Command, say they see a need for international
dialogue aimed at setting universal "rules of the road" for satellites
in orbit.
The officers argue such talks could pave the way for a global forum
to resolve ambiguous developments in space, helping the parties
distinguish hostile from benign acts. The contact would be aimed
at encouraging "transparency" and revealing less-than-peaceful uses
of space, officials say. Presumably it would stop short of addressing
an international ban on space weapons, which China proposed in 2002
and the Bush administration opposes.[25]
Endnotes
[1] For further detail
see Eric Hagt, "Chinas' ASAT Test: Strategic Response," pp. 31-51;
and Theresa Hitchens, "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of
Words" to Cold War in Space?," China Security, Winter 2007.
[2] William J. Broad
and David E. Sanger, op. cit.
[3] William J. Broad
and David E. Sanger, "Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite In
Test," New York Times, January 19, 2007, Pg. 1.
[4] Wade Boese, "The
USSR's Past Anti-Satellite Testing," Arms Control Today,
March 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/ChinaSatellite.asp.
[5] For background
see Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) at the
United Nations, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html.
[6] Statements
made at the 2006 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/topics.html#paros.
[7] Shaun Tandon,
"China Shows Its Power With Anti Satellite Test," AFP, Jan 20, 20,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/
China_Shows_Its_Power_With_Anti_Satellite_Test_999.html.
[8] U.S. National
Space Policy, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive
Office of the President, The White House 31 Aug. 2006, released
Oct 6, 2006, http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf.
See also Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, Remarks to Center for Space and Defense
Forum Colorado Springs, Colorado, January 11, 2007, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/78679.htm.
For more detail on past U.S. space policy see http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/national/index.html.
For a Chinese perspective on the U.S. policy see Bao Shixiu, "Deterrence
Revisited: Outer Space," China Security, Winter 2007, pp.
2-11.
[9] Philip E. Coyle
III, "The Chinese Satellite Destruction: What's next?," Center for
Defense Information, Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?
DocumentID=3835&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=
D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&from_page=index.cfm.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Wang Ting and
David Wright, Space Weapons and Technical Issues: Debris from
China's Kinetic Energy ASAT Test, February 2, 2007, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/
debris-from-chinas-asat-test.html.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Patrick M Cronin,
"China targets more than a satellite," Asia Times, Feb 22,
2007, http://atimes.com/atimes/China/IB22Ad01.html.
[14] "Space invaders:
China's shooting down of a satellite may be an effort to show that
American supremacy in space is assailable," Economist.com,
Jan 22nd 2007.
[15] "US Hawks Bolstered
By China Weapons Test In Space," AFP, January 20, 2007, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/
US_Hawks_Bolstered_By_China_Weapons_Test_In_Space_999.html;
and Jeff Kueter, "Crossing the Rubicon in Space Again: Iacta alea
est," Policy Outlook, George C. Marshall Institute, January 2007.
[16] William J. Broad,
"Look Up! Is It A Threat? Or A Plea For A Ban?," New York Times,
January 21, 2007.
[17] Bret Stephens,
"China's Gift," Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2007, Pg.
18.
[18] David E. Sanger
and Joseph Kahn, "U.S. tries to interpret silence over China anti-satellite
test," International Herald Tribune, January 21, 2007.
[19] Edith M. Lederer,
[Associated Press], "Chinese Colonel Sees Arms In Space," Washington
Times, January 27, 2007, Pg. 1.
[20] Gordon Fairclough
and Jay Solomon, "China's Arms Test Unnerves Its Neighbors," Asian
Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2007, Pg. 3.
[21] "A nasty jolt
for Russia," Asia Times, Jan 23, 2007, http://atimes.com/atimes/China/IA23Ad03.html.
[22] James Hackett,
"Satellite Strike Protection," Washington Times, January
28, 2007, Pg. B1.
[23] Keith J. Costa,
"ASAT Technology Test Bed in the Works at Redstone Arsenal," Inside
Missile Defense, December 22, 2004; and "KE ASAT 4-Ever," March
11, 2005, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/474/ke-asat-4-ever.
[24] Michael E. O'Hanlon,
"A Space Weapons Race is Not the Answer for America," Financial
Times, January 22, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20070122.htm.
[25] Elaine M. Grossman,
"Spratt urges discussion with China: HOUSE DEMS EYE LEGISLATION
TO PRESS BUSH ON ARMS CONTROL FOR SPACE," Inside Defense News,
Feb 1, 2007.
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