BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
15 March 2007
The UK Trident Vote Explained
By Dr Ian Davis, BASIC Co-Executive Director
This Paper is also available in pdf at: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN070315.pdf
The Headlines
Introduction
- On March 14, after a six-hour debate in the House of Commons,
MPs voted 409 to 161 to replace Britain's submarine-based nuclear
'deterrent'.
- 87 Labour MPs (the governing party) voted against renewal,
as did a majority of Scottish MPs, reflecting greater opposition
'north of the border' where the Trident fleet is based and serviced.
- A move to defer "an early decision on renewal" (a position
backed by BASIC) was defeated by 423 to 167 votes; 95 Labour MPs,
the Liberal Democrats and nationalist parties (in Scotland and
Wales) supported this amendment.
- The scale of the 'rebellion' was larger than anticipated (given
the imposition of a three-line whip[1]) with almost half of all Labour MPs either voting against
or abstaining. This forced the Government to rely on the support
of the Conservative opposition to win the votes - as it had done
in 2003, when 139 Labour MPs opposed the vote to go to war in
Iraq).
- Former home secretary, Charles Clarke, and former Conservative
shadow defence and foreign minister, Michael Ancram, joined the
revolt, as did 16 former ministers, including four junior ministers
who resigned in advance of the vote.
- It was the first time MPs had been given the chance to vote
on whether Britain should remain a nuclear power.
- The vote will, in theory, keep Britain in the nuclear club
well beyond Hiroshima's centenary in 2045.
- However, in a last-ditch attempt to head off dissenters, Prime
Minister Tony Blair, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, and Defence
Secretary Des Browne, in a series of public statements and private
letters to Labour MPs, sought to downplay the significance of
the vote by suggesting that:
a) Parliament was simply being asked to sanction two years' work
on the design and concept phase of the new system;
b) the final 'main gate' decision on signing the expensive construction
contracts could be revisited by Parliament in 2012-2014; and
c) the renewal program could be cancelled "should there be a fundamental
change for the better in the strategic environment".
Analysis
The vote in the House of Commons on March 14 commits Britain to
build, in principle, a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines,
as set out in the December 2006 Defence White Paper.[2] In practice, however, this will not be the end of the matter.
A future parliament will face the choice of whether to build and
deploy those submarines, as well as two other crucial decisions:
whether three submarines will be sufficient (currently there are
four) and whether it will be necessary to develop a new warhead.
Responding to a question during Prime Minister's questions (prior
to the Trident debate), Blair stated that "... it is always open
to us to come back and look at these issues. ..when we get to the
gateway stage-between 2012 and 2014-when we let the main contracts
for design and construction, it will always be open to Parliament
to take a decision". Similarly, opening the Government's debate
on Trident renewal for Labour, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett
insisted that the decision was not irreversible:
Today's decision does not mean that we are committing ourselves
irreversibly to maintaining a nuclear deterrent for the next 50
years, no matter what others do and no matter what happens in
the rest of the world. That would be absurd, unnecessary and,
indeed, incompatible with the nuclear proliferation treaty.
The Foreign Secretary also confirmed that the issue would return
to Parliament in future:
We are not making any decision about the warheads in this
Parliament, so the matter will inevitably come before a subsequent
Parliament... Further decisions will in any case be needed on
the precise design of the submarines, on whether we need four
or three, on whether to renew or replace the warhead, and on whether
to participate in any American programme to develop a successor
to the D5 missile. It will fall to future Governments and Parliaments
to discuss the most appropriate form of scrutiny for those decisions.
As I have said, this Government will ensure that there are regular
reports to Parliament as the programme proceeds, and we will give
the Select Committee our full co-operation as it maintains its
regular scrutiny of these issues.
The large scale rebellion in the House of Commons also reflects
a wider shift in the UK debate. In addition to the usual polarised
positioning, there were significant debates within the media and,
to a lesser extent within parliament and among the public, on substantive
issues, such as the true cost of replacing Trident, the timing of
the decision, and the impact on proliferation and deterrence policy.
These concerns were shared by the House of Commons Defence Committee[3], which asked Ministers to explain what they meant by a "minimum
deterrent" and "what the concept of deterrence means in today's
strategic environment". It questioned whether the government's promise
to cut Britain's nuclear stockpile by 20% had any "operational significance"
given that a new generation of missile submarines would carry the
same number of warheads as their predecessors. Critical editorial
comments appeared many leading British newspapers, including The
Daily Mail, The Observer, The Financial Times,
The Independent, London Evening Standard and The
Guardian.
The timing of the decision proved particularly divisive, especially
following powerful evidence to the Defence Committee from US scientists
and BASIC demonstrating that it would be possible to defer this
decision some years without impacting upon Britain's ability to
field a nuclear deterrent.
However, there is no disguising the fact that Parliament has approved
replacement in principle. This represents a major failure on at
least three levels: a failure of British politics; a missed opportunity
to reassess Britain's place in the world in the 21st Century after
the debacle in Iraq; and a missed opportunity to breathe new life
into the moribund international non-proliferation architecture.
Britain's international standing and national security is considerably
weakened as a result of this highly premature decision.
A Failure of Politics
The decision to replace Trident now is a momentous failure of British
parliamentary politics. The Labour and Conservative front benches
have joined forces to push through prematurely a policy that is
uncosted, failed to give adequate consideration to all the available
options and rooted in the Cold War and outdated notions of national
prestige. It is a decision that is driven largely by domestic political
timetables and party political agendas rather than any operational
necessity. On the one hand, the Labour Party leadership has been
keen to underwrite the Prime Minister's legacy and burnish his successor's
security credentials. On the other hand, the Conservative leadership,
despite paying lip service to new thinking on the environment and
much else, provided knee-jerk 'support' for the Government position,
with at least one eye on exploiting Labour's historic divisions
over nuclear weapons. Will this decision turn out to be as misplaced
as their support for the war in Iraq? Only time will tell, but the
vote is likely to further widen the gap between politicians and
the public.
Indeed, it is a particular failure of English politics, where the
level of debate is more superficial and often tied to notions of
national prestige (and self-esteem among the Westminster political
elites) that are not necessarily shared throughout this union state.
In Scotland, for example, the decision is likely to further alienate
hearts and minds, since opposition to nuclear weapons is more deep-seated.
And if the nationalists succeed in making Trident a key issue in
the Scottish elections on May 3, and then win their promised referendum
for independence, rather ironically, Trident could held bring about
the destruction of the very nation-state that it exists to defend.[4]
A Failure to Reassess Britain's Place in the World
In a speech in January Tony Blair set out the case for why Britain
needs to be able to continue to project "hard power". He argued
that it was necessary both to defeat the terrorist threat and to
maintain an international lead on "soft power" issues, such as climate
change, Africa and diplomacy. Long-term increases in defence spending
on weapon systems, like Trident, the Eurofighter and the Type 45
destroyer, were also necessary, he said, to provide the capabilities
to project such "hard power". He also disparaged the view that Britain
might otherwise be forced to pull back into a more limited peacekeeping
role, a change that would prove "catastrophic" for Britain's world
power
These are all highly contentious observations and ought to have
been central to the debate about Trident replacement. In contrast,
for example, the 2006 Foreign Office White Paper outlines the security
priorities for Britain. These include global terrorism and counter-proliferation,
organized crime, conflict prevention, energy and climate security,
sustainable development and poverty reduction, and managing migration.
These have no relationship at all with Trident or its replacement.
Britain is already Europe's biggest spender on defence, and fourth
in the world. Yet still our army cannot cope. British troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq are under equipped because the MoD is still
buying ships to fight the Germans, planes to fight the Russians
and nuclear weapons as an insurance against an uncertain future.
It makes no sense to make a decision on Trident outside of a strategic
review of Britain's role in the world.
Undermining the Non-Proliferation Regime
Most damaging of all, however, is the impact of the decision on
Britain's commitments under, and standing within, the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty (NPT). The Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett attempted to
set the government's decision to renew Trident in the context of
a commitment to "take further steps towards meeting our disarmament
responsibilities under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty",
stating that the UK remained committed to the thirteen steps agreed
in the 2000 NPT Programme of Action. She also said that the 20%
reduction in Britain's nuclear stockpile announced in the White
Paper would be made by the end of this year, not held off until
the new Trident submarines were in place. But the government has
so far refused to release the legal advice it has received on renewal
and Britain's ambassador to the NPT discussions in May this year
will find it hard to talk his way around the cynicism that this
decision will engender.
Very few of the MPs who intervened in the debate were prepared
to acknowledge that the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent is
a tipping point with profound implications for global security and
non-proliferation efforts. Many who spoke in favour of renewal put
up the usual straw man that a unilateral decision to disarm would
have no impact on Tehran and Pyongyang. But it is as fatuous to
claim that a British commitment to a new generation of nuclear weapons
will have no impact on nuclear proliferation as it is to claim that
a decision to disarm would in itself convince others to disarm.
What is clear is that parliament has further undermined confidence
in non-proliferation by showing no faith in the very architecture
for restraint that it expects the majority world of over 180 nuclear
weapon-free states to abide by.
Conclusion
Britain sits in one of the most secure regions of the world, faces
no current military threats from other states and benefits from
the collective security of the EU, NATO and UN. Conventional deterrence
is provided through a military alliance that collectively accounts
for about 70% of global military spending. Independent expert evidence
suggested that, at a minimum, the decision to renew the British
nuclear fleet could have been deferred until after the next NPT
Review Conference in 2010, providing time for the UK Government
to help kick-start a new global initiative to build a framework
for a world free of the nuclear threat. There will be an opportunity
to re-visit many of these issues in the lead up to the next General
Election and during the next parliament, but a huge window of opportunity
for Britain to lead the world into a more positive future has been
squandered by narrow party political and outdated national security
interests.
Further reading
BASIC Green Paper on Trident replacement: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/beyondtrident/greenpaper.pdf
BASIC Briefing on timing: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/SB060725.pdf
BASIC briefing on non-proliferation implications: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/beyondtrident/briefing02.pdf
BASIC Briefing on opportunity costs: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/beyondtrident/briefing03.pdf.
BASIC Research Report, Oceans of Work, arguing for resources
to be diverted away from nuclear submarine manufacture to a 'national
needs' program of civil R&D and manufacture, including major investment
in off-shore renewable energy: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/beyondtrident/oceans.pdf
Additional background documents, parliamentary statements, comment
and media articles can be found on BASIC's website at: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/beyondtrident/index.htm.
Endnotes
[1] A three-line
whip is a written notice, underlined three times to indicate its
importance, to politicians belonging to a particular party that
they must attend a vote in parliament and vote in the way in which
they are instructed. Both Labour and Conservative parties applied
a three-line whip on the Trident vote.
[2] Ministry of Defence;
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Future of the United Kingdom's
Nuclear Deterrent, CM 6994, December 2006 http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf.
[3] Defence Committee,
Ninth Report of Session 2006-07, The Future of the UK's Strategic
Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper, HC 225-I, 7 March 2007 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/225/225i.pdf
[4] This is no idle
fancy. See, for example, William Walker, 'Scotland could go nuclear
over the retention of Trident', Financial Times, 9 March
2007.
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