BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
20 July 2006
Nuclear Deterrence: a tried and tested defence
strategy
or an elaborate belief system masquerading as scientific theory?
Tony Blair has turned a potential six year opportunity to discuss
whether or not to replace the Trident nuclear weapon system into
a six month rubber-stamping exercise glazed with a veneer of parliamentary
accountability without a hint of the promised open debate.
Some legacy, says Nigel Chamberlain
Nothing more rapidly closes down the opportunity for a debate on
the future of UK nuclear weapons policy than the introductory phrase
"should we renew the nuclear deterrent"? Assumptions that underpin
the question are rarely challenged. Subsequent commentary either
accepts the assumptions unquestioningly or struggles to suggest
an alternative viewpoint while seemingly avoiding engagement in
the debate as presented. Instead, what follows is invariably superficial,
uninformative, confrontational and unsatisfactory.
The Government has frequently promised but studiously avoided a
debate on replacing the Trident nuclear weapons system. Meanwhile,
the time for that decision to be made has been compressed and accelerated
from potentially six years to no more than six months, including
the summer parliamentary recess. No government case has been made
for what clearly amounts to the indefinite retention of nuclear
weapons since the initial announcement in December 2003 that a decision
would be needed in the next Parliament. That projected date of not
later than May 2010 has been brought forward to the end of this
year, without explanation or justification.
Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence appear content to let
the exchanges of the 1980s be replayed in order to marginalise opposition
while galvanising support for perceived realism. A combination of
august former civil servants, seemingly objective academics and
a largely acquiescent media is preparing the ground for a truncated
parliamentary exchange on a predetermined outcome. The current and
expectant Prime Ministers will respectively declare it only 'sensible'
and 'prudent' for the UK to retain its 'independent nuclear deterrent'.
Then Tony Blair can proclaim, "Debate had, job done, no problem"
and hand over the leadership to the safe hands of Gordon Brown.
For almost 50 years the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) has
permitted extensive transatlantic nuclear weapons collaboration,
everything short of transporting a complete nuclear warhead. Although
a 10-year extension of the MDA was officially endorsed in 'an exchange
of notes' between governments in December 2004, what passed for
government notification of intent to proceed was quietly slipped
out just before the end of the parliamentary session in July that
year. For almost a year, every attempt to utilise established parliamentary
procedure to encourage executive accountability was met with a bureaucratic
stonewall.
Current activities conducted under the cloak of the MDA at the
nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States and the United
Kingdom give every indication of 'business as usual'. Detailed preparation
for replacing Trident has been under active consideration behind
the closed doors of Whitehall and the perimeter fence at Aldermaston.
Their conclusions will eventually be presented to Parliament as
nothing more than a reasonable continuation of what went before.
This is a tried and tested means of sustaining and managing the
business of staying in the nuclear club.
Industry and trade unions have also been hard at work with what
was described by former Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon as "one of
the most effective defence lobbies I have come across". Rand Europe,
'Independent advisors to the UK Ministry of Defence' has also done
its bit to promote and secure the Barrow-in-Furness shipyard as
'a world class centre of submarine excellence'.
So, before we are presented with a statement that the existing
Trident programme will be continued and in due course renewed or
replaced, those who argue for retention should be obliged to make
the case in detail. Mere repetition of "nuclear deterrence has prevented
war for over 50 years and it will be an effective insurance policy
for the unstable and unpredictable world we live in" will not suffice.
We need to examine the claim that nuclear weapons prevented a conflagration
with the Soviet Union. If there is no convincing evidence, then
supporters should be required to say, "We believe
that nuclear weapons did prevent a Soviet attack on Europe and we
believe they will deter an attack from nuclear weapon
or rogue states or terrorist groups in the future." Thus what has
been presented as a statement of fact becomes a statement of opinion.
We need to know how close to a nuclear exchange, and on how many
occasions, nuclear war-fighting strategy brought us to the brink
of war, whether by design (having to be seen to be willing to carry
through with the threat of use) or by accident (miscalculation,
error, mishandling). And this must be considered in light of both
NATO's and the UK's willingness to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively
against non-nuclear opponents. Does the 'only to be used in the
last resort' claim stand up to scrutiny?
For the threat of retaliation to be credible, Ministers must openly
say that they would be prepared to agree to the actual use of nuclear
weapons and that they are aware of the grave consequences. They
would also need to recognise that the order to fire is an admission
that nuclear deterrence has failed. They must be prepared to commit
substantial and open-ended financial support to maintain the weapons
factories, unmarked warhead convoys on the roads, the missile supply
and technology transfer from the United States and waste storage
facilities in the UK. Then they must say that they are prepared
to go to the United Nations and declare that the nuclear disarmament
commitments that their predecessors signed up to would have to be
set aside until worldwide political stability could be guaranteed.
Finally, an explanation must be forthcoming as to why it is necessary
and acceptable for the UK and a handful of other states to say their
possession of nuclear weapons is legitimate while the possession
of the same in the hands of others is unnecessary and illegitimate.
Exactly what is so special about our little nation that we somehow
feel more secure and important by demanding we be treated as a special
case? What exactly would be different if the UK had a non-nuclear
defence policy?
Defence Secretary Des Browne appears to be the only Minister to
have come close to accepting that the Government must make the case
for Trident replacement when he said, "We need to marshal the facts,
we need to marshal the issues, we need to marshal the arguments
and the options. It is the responsibility of Government ministers
to make decisions, then those decisions, of course, can be subject
to parliamentary debate. But we need to make recommendations to
put forward to Parliament." Since making these comments, he has
given a clear indication of his support for the retention of nuclear
weapons and reiterated that the decision will be made in advance
of any parliamentary debate. So what exactly constitutes an 'open
debate' and why bother giving MPs an opportunity to voice their
opinions when the outcome is predetermined?
It is time to take a little look under the national security blanket
cloaking the MoD building in Whitehall and put the question, "Is
nuclear deterrence a tried and tested defence strategy or an elaborate
belief system masquerading as scientific theory?"
Nigel Chamberlain is a consultant to the British American Security
Information Council (BASIC) with offices in London and Washington
DC. His work includes:
Beyond Trident
- Will the current Labour Government commit its successors to the
indefinite retention of nuclear weapons?
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 2005 NPT Review Conference
US-UK nuclear weapons collaboration
under the Mutual Defence Agreement: Shining a torch on the darker
recesses of the 'special relationship'
|
