BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
15 JULY 2005
After the London suicide bombings:
Facing difficult choices on home-grown terrorism
Andrew Cottey and Ian Davis
Last week's attack on London's public transport that killed at
least 54 people and injured about 700 raises perennial questions:
what is the appropriate balance between security and liberty in
responding to terrorism? Should one accede to terrorists' demands
or negotiate with terrorists? Can we address the underlying circumstances
and grievances that give rise to terrorism? While these are universal
questions in the post-9/11 world, they have particular resonance
in Britain and some specifically British dimensions - especially
in the light of the knowledge that at least three of the bombers
were British-born and bred. After the United States and Israel,
the United Kingdom is, for a variety of reasons, the most likely
target for terrorist attacks in the Western world.
The London terrorist attacks might be thought of as Britain's 9/11
- as the 2002 Bali bombing was for Australia and the 2004 Madrid
bombings were for Spain. However, the 7/7 atrocities in London represent
a somewhat different narrative to those of New York or Madrid. The
bombings in London were primarily carried out by home grown terrorists:
three of the four bombers are known to be British-born young men
with no convictions or known prior terrorist involvement. The fourth
bomber is thought to be of Jamaican origin.
From what we know, the three British suicide bombers lived in ethnically
mixed suburbs in West Yorkshire the likes of which surround many
UK towns. One was a 22-year-old cricket lover whose father ran a
fish and chip shop; another was a 30-year-old married man with a
baby daughter and a mentor in primary schools for children with
learning difficulties; and another was a 19-year-old living at home
with his parents. It was his parents that alerted the police when
he did not come home from a day-trip to London. These, further,
were the first suicide bomb attacks in British and Western European
history. Although the British government and public were already
deeply aware of the likelihood of terrorist attacks and the government
had already implemented major counter-terrorist measures, the confirmation
that the terrorist attack was the work of domestic suicide bombers
suggests that it will have a profound impact on the psychology and
politics of Britain. As one commentator has said, it puts the British
model of pragmatic multiculturalism - until now the source of quiet
admiration across Europe - under unprecedented scrutiny.[1]
It will also generate a new debate about what kind of security measures
can be taken against such home-grown terrorists.
The most immediate questions that arise from the London bombings
are:
- How and by whom were these young men radicalised?
- What has been the impact of British foreign policy in this radicalisation?
- Are further suicide bombings in Britain likely?
- What more can and should be done by the intelligence and security
services to detect and prevent such attacks?
How and by whom were they radicalised?
The question as to how cricket-playing British-born Muslims from
suburbia were turned into suicide bombers lies at the heart of
the struggle to understand the nature of this atrocity - and in
preventing future attacks. Our understanding, and even that of
the immediate families of the bombers, however, is just beginning.
In particular, whether the people who helped plan and orchestrate
the attack were home-grown, or al-Qaida visitors from overseas,
remains to be resolved. Identifying the support network that facilitated
the London bombings is thus vital to understanding the nature
and extent of this new threat.
Early indications suggest that the three British bombers were
radicalised in part in Britain, but that at least some of them
also attended religious schools and perhaps training camps in
Pakistan (where that country's porous western border region facilitates
contacts with Afghanistan based al-Qaida and Taliban members).
There are problems of deprivation, unemployment and white racism
in the Muslim community in Britain, but how far these contributed
to alienation and radicalisation of the bombers is unclear. Attention
is now focusing on the role of elements within the British Muslim
community in contributing to the radicalisation of the bombers.
The mainstream Islamic community in the UK has for some years
sought to counteract the radicalism of some Islamic preachers.
Indeed, most UK mosques are cautious on sensitive issues like
Iraq and many are thought to have lost touch with their younger
populations, who look to the internet or radical peer groups for
inspiration. As Massoud Shadjareh of the Islamic Human Rights
Commission puts it, "We don't have any arenas in our mosques for
them to discuss these issues. We are pushing it underground".
There are a number of extremist websites that could have provided
the bombers with the expertise to make the explosives or put them
in touch with like-minded people. Extreme Islamic groups often
post instructions and videos on websites telling sympathisers
how to make bombs. They also provide tips on which materials are
hardest to detect and how to carry out a suicide bombing.
Further steps to counter the influence of radicals within the
British Islamic community who advocate the use of violence are
likely. New controls on foreign imams who cannot speak English
or have little comprehension of British society are due to be
introduced later this year. They will need a basic command of
English and to be competent at reading and speaking it within
two years. In addition, the Muslim Council of Britain are bringing
together international scholars to challenge the belief that people
who carry out such criminal acts achieve martyrdom and to contextualize
the references to violence in the Qur'an. The British government
has commissioned studies on why some young Muslim men are attracted
to commit such atrocities. The results of these studies will need
to be made public, widely debated and acted upon.
What has been the impact of British foreign policy on this radicalization?
The attacks in London certainly raise difficult questions about
how far important aspects of British foreign policy have made
the country a prime terrorist target and what can be done to address
the underlying causes of terrorism. The group that has claimed
responsibility for the attacks, the Secret Organisation of the
al-Qaida Jihad in Europe, said the attacks were a response to
the UK's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is impossible to gauge the exact balance of motivations that
drove the four young suicide bombers, but it is likely that the
conflict in Iraq and the wider 'war on terror' was one of them.
The attacks on civilians in London are indefensible, but the Prime
Minister was warned by British intelligence in the run-up to the
war in Iraq that such attacks were a likely consequence. As Seumas
Milne argues:
"It's perfectly true that Muslim anger over Palestine,
western-backed dictatorships and the aftermath of the 1991 war
against Iraq - US troops in Arabia and a murderous sanctions regime
against Iraq - was already intense before 2001 and fuelled al-Qaida's
campaign in the 1990s. But that was aimed at the US, not Britain,
which only became a target when Blair backed Bush's war on terror.
Afghanistan made a terror attack on Britain a likelihood; Iraq
made it a certainty".[2]
After the March 2004 Madrid bombings, the newly elected socialist
government chose to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. The British
government is unlikely to respond in similar fashion - although
ironically it has recently floated plans to significantly reduce
the British military presence in Iraq. Nevertheless, the London
attacks do raise the broader question of how far Britain's involvement
in the Iraq War and broader support for the US 'war on terror'
has helped to make the country a key terrorist target.
Tony Blair has sought to push global poverty and a resolution
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the centre of the international
agenda - because he believes the moral case for addressing these
problems is compelling, but also because they are vital to reducing
the support base on which terrorists draw. The Gleneagles G8 summit
may be an important turning point in beginning to address global
poverty. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, remains highly
volatile. In both cases US President George W. Bush has been at
best a reluctant partner. Although Blair probably did help to
persuade Bush to adopt the roadmap for Middle East peace and accept
the principle of a Palestinian state, Bush's strong support for
Israel and lack of engagement with the conflict remain central
obstacles to a long-term settlement.
More broadly, these issues raise the question of how far Blair
has been wise to invest so much in the relationship with the US
and whether that relationship has been a help or a hindrance in
achieving other vital foreign policy goals. Although a dramatic
rupture in Anglo-American relations is unlikely, the next British
Prime Minister may undertake a more subtle distancing of the UK
from the US and pursue a more independent foreign policy.
Are further suicide bombings in Britain likely?
The police and security services seem to think so. The search
for members of the London suicide bombers' support network is
the current priority amid concerns that they may still be in Britain
and capable of carrying out further attacks. Former Metropolitan
Police Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, has written that up to
3,000 British-born or British-based people had passed through
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and of these, about 200
were committed "home grown terrorists". Senior British anti-terrorist
officials had previously suggested that there were probably fewer
than 30 or so extremists in Britain prepared to commit a terrorist
attack. But since the four suicide bombers from West Yorkshire
were previously not known to the security services, no one can
know for certain how many potential suicide bombers there are
in Britain.
Suicide bombings have occurred in more than 20 countries, including
Israel, Iraq, the United States, Turkey, Russia, India and Sri
Lanka. In short, suicide bombers have become a staple of contemporary
religious inspired extremism. However, it is important to recognise
differences in motivation and targeting. Tamil Black Tigers of
Sri Lanka have killed themselves in attacks on politicians and
army installations, with little regard to civilian casualties.
In other parts of the world, soldiers have been willing to commit
suicide in bombing another army, most notably the Japanese kamikaze
in World War II and the Iranian basaji during the Iran-Iraq
War.
In the Middle East, suicide bombing was first used by the Hezbollah
in Lebanon in November 1982 and continued until Israel withdrew
from Lebanon in 1999. The targets were predominantly the security
personnel and armed forces of Israel, the United States and their
Western allies. Only in Israel/Palestine and Iraq since 2003,
however, have suicide bombings regularly involved civilian volunteers
targeting civilians.[3] Israel has
experience such attacks for some decades, although they became
more widespread from the late 1980s onwards. In Iraq the occupying
US and allied military forces started out as the primary target,
but the newly emerging institutions of the Iraqi government, together
with other civilians (including Shiite mosques, international
offices of the UN and the Red Cross and Iraqi men, women and children,
often waiting to apply for jobs with the new army and police force
or those in close proximity to US armed forces) have become targets.
While Britain has produced a handful of would-be suicide bombers
over the last five years, until the attack on London only one
had successfully completed a mission. In 2003, Asif Hanif from
London, acting on behalf of Hamas, blew himself up in a Tel Aviv
bar killing three people and injuring more than 40 others.
The authorities in Britain and Western Europe will be hoping
that the suicide attacks in London are an exception rather than
the start of a wave of such attacks. And there are some grounds
for cautious optimism. Unlike many suicide bombings overseas,
there were no 'martyrdom' celebrations from within the local community
or their families. Instead, the British Muslim community and the
families of the bombers have responded with disbelief, shame and
a sense of dishonour, accompanied by a readiness to help the police
in pursuit of the people who helped plan and orchestrate the attack.
While it is unlikely that we have seen the last of Islamic terrorism
in Britain, the attacks may have a galvanising effect on both
Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike to seek ways to prevent
another home grown suicide bomber in Britain.
What more can and should be done by the intelligence and security
services to detect and prevent such attacks?
Many of the traditional anti-terrorist measures that can be taken
have already been put in place. The British intelligence and security
services have been re-oriented towards Islamic terrorism and given
greater resources - a process that began before 9/11 but accelerated
after the September 2001 attacks. Regional offices of MI-5 are
already being set up and agents are actively being recruited from
within the Muslim and other minority communities.
The 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act gave the government
powers to detain without charge or trial foreign nationals suspected
of terrorism - although, as a result of legal opposition, these
powers are now being replaced by control orders that may be imposed
on both foreign nationals and British citizens. The government
has also proposed the introduction of identity cards - provoking
strong opposition not only from civil liberties groups but also
from the opposition Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The London
attacks may strengthen Prime Minister Tony Blair's hand in trying
to push through identity card legislation.
Following the discovery that the attacks were made by home grown-terrorists,
the Prime Minister has also announced a four-point plan. The British
government will:
- Start consultations with other parties to find a consensus
that could lead to fast-track legislation in the autumn to tighten
the law against "acts preparatory to terrorism" and those who
"glorify" terrorism;
- Examine how existing or new laws could be used to exclude
or deport people who incite hatred;
- Start a debate to confront perverted versions of Islam within
British Muslim communities, with the help of other parties;
and
- Mobilise Muslim and non-Muslim opinion around the world to
ensure that the moderate voice of Islam prevails.
Action within Brussels and other European capitals has also been
swift. For example, the home secretary, Charles Clarke, has won
the backing of EU governments to accelerate work on his controversial
proposals for the compulsory storage of billions of records of
personal email, mobile phone calls and texts. EU interior ministers
also agreed to accelerate a package of work on the introduction
of electronic fingerprints on existing identity cards, exchanging
information on lost or stolen explosives and passports, and swapping
advance airline passenger lists. France has suspended the Schengen
agreement and tightened passport checks at its borders. Italy
has also increased border checks.
While the devil is always in the detail, these measures appear
to be proportionate and have merit - especially those designed
to tackle the factors that contribute to the radicalisation and
recruitment of terrorist groups across Europe. However, it will
important to ensure that such measures are targeted correctly.
Otherwise another generation of marginalized Muslim men may become
alienated by an intrusive, aggressive state machinery that will
simply push them into secretive extremism. One of the lessons
of the British experience with Irish Republican terrorism was
that harsh measures directed against terrorism generated deep
resentment within the nationalist community in Northern Ireland,
radicalising some and making at least parts of that community
more not less likely to support or tolerate terrorists.
Ultimately and sadly, the deeper lesson of the London attacks is
that perfect security is not possible in a free society: short of
introducing a totalitarian state and severely constraining contact
with the outside world it is probably impossible to prevent terrorist
attacks altogether. To some extent therefore Britain and other European
countries may, like Israel, have to live with the reality of semi-permanent
vulnerability to terrorism. Britain, and other European and Western
states, however, also need to reflect on how their policies, domestically
and elsewhere in the world, may have contributed to the alienation
and resentment that makes young men such as the London bombers willing
kill themselves in order to kill others.
###
Andrew Cottey is Senior Lecturer and Jean Monnet Chair
in European Political Integration in the Department of Government,
University College Cork and a BASIC Board Member.
Ian Davis is Executive Director of the London and Washington
DC-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC).
Endnotes
[1]Madeleine Bunting,
'The heavy mob will get us nowhere - Muslim communities must be
treated as allies, not enemies', The Guardian, July 14, 2005.
[2]Seumas Milne 'It is an insult
to the dead to deny the link with Iraq ', The Guardian, July
14, 2005.
[3]Avishai Margalit, 'The Suicide
Bombers', The New York Review of Books, 50/1, 16 January
2003.
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