ISSUE AREAS:

BASIC NOTES

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

17 APRIL 2005

Investing in Prevention
Comment on the UK Prime Minister's Strategy Unit report of February 2005

By Paul Ingram

Key Points

• The UK Prime Minister's Strategy Unit has just published a report 'Investing in Conflict Prevention'.
• It introduces an 'instability framework' to analyse the complex factors and relationships that feed conflict
• It does not fight shy of some uncomfortable conclusions in how policy pursued by richer countries can exacerbate the situation.
• In particular, it looks at how the activities of elites in unstable countries, particularly those of a predatory nature, worsen tensions, and how important the disruption of conflict financing is in efforts to break the cycles of violence.
• Inevitably, coming from a UK government perspective, it does fall short on alternative perspectives, analysis, and the role of other actors.
• Above all, the question remains, will the United Kingdom take notice of the findings of this report, and will it work with other governments to introduce its recommendations?

Introduction

Everyone knows it is better to prevent a conflict before it breaks out. But what does this mean, and how can we most effectively marshal limited resources to best effect? These are questions that ought to involve everyone concerned with international development and security. In February 2005 the British Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (an internal think-tank based in the Cabinet Office) published an advocacy document entitled Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response. This is a response to that document and is based upon a formal presentation made by Paul Ingram on 21 March at the Cabinet Office.

BASIC has been involved in several meetings with officials in the Strategy Unit as they have prepared this report over 2004. BASIC welcomes this report, seeing it as a valuable contribution to the debate. The analysis is sound and the report well written. The back-up documents on the website, including the process manuals, support the work effectively. We would commend the recommendations to other governments and organisations, and urge widespread use of the documentation in further development of international policy.

The importance of prevention

Readers of this report are left in no doubt of the importance of conflict to development, and the cost-effectiveness of engaging in conflict prevention. The report points out that this 'invest-to-save' option becomes even clearer if we take into account the bigger-picture issues such as longer-term energy insecurity, tackling organised crime, the impacts of asylum and migration, and the economic impacts of conflict.

It may sometimes appear to be a 'long punt', require uncertain analysis of complex interrelationships and not always achieve the immediate goal of preventing the outbreak of violence, but there are several mitigating factors:

1. It is relatively cheap when compared to military intervention later in the crisis
2. Failed attempts at conflict prevention may still reduce the brutality of the conflict, and assist in the post-conflict reconstruction
3. Investment in conflict prevention has positive spin-offs in other respects.

It has become fashionable to debate the importance of security as against development when it comes to richer countries' allocation of resources internationally. Of course one depends upon the other, and the quality of each is critical upon the other. Security achieved through the abuse of human rights and oppression of opposition or the general population is a strong driver of conflict. Development that causes mass migration, unemployment and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of elites also drives conflict. This later point needs to be treated a great deal more seriously. While conventional forms of economic development have delivered astonishing results, they have also at times concentrated wealth and rewarded violent or aggressive operations.

The Instability Framework

The study introduces an 'Instability Framework' model, based upon a systems control model with inputs, outputs and feedbacks. This gives a good structure for considering interventions to improve a situation. It details the risk factors for instability from both inside and outside a country, the shocks that can send a country spiralling into conflict, and external stabilising factors, all of which impact upon a country's capacity and resilience to conflict. It also demonstrates the feedback loop whereby weakened country capacities can worsen risk factors, leading to the entrenched conflict situations we have witnessed in many countries. The factors that impact upon conflict, and solutions brought to bear, can be represented within the control model enabling a more systemic perspective on the chances of success in intervention.

While this is a strong contribution to our tools for conflict prevention, there does need to be greater recognition that elements of the model are contestable. For example, it claims, with little explicit evidence, that open external markets, foreign direct investment and remittances are sources of stability. The reality is of course, mixed, a point made elsewhere in the report in reference to the need for sensitivity to the process of opening up markets. Experience in many countries of rapid structural adjustment, the removal of regulation and barriers to trade has led to the concentration of wealth and economic deprivation, sowing the seeds of conflict. Remittances are often used to fund and supply rebel groups, lengthening conflict when otherwise rebels would have to use other means that direct military challenge.

Predatory Elites and Conflict Financing

The Strategy Unit's analysis focused upon the roles of elites and the financing of conflict. Elites, interested in accumulating wealth, use violence to protect their market share and control of resources, even when operating within the formal economy. The report points out that the financing of conflict can come from external powers, the sale of natural resources, diasporas providing remittances, and organised crime. Increasingly transnational corporate networks play an important role, wittingly or unwittingly, in supporting particular sides and entrenching conflict. External powers may prop up regimes, help to finance military expenditures or supply military equipment, or create a dependency that stifles balanced development. They also help, through bilateral or multilateral aid packages, to ensure countries open up their markets.

The forces of globalisation can increase the capacity for the concentration of wealth, increasing the returns from the use of violence. When the economy is concentrated upon one or two primary commodities, the extraction and production is frequently under the control of a small elite. Oil is a prime example. As oil production starts to tail off in the near future, and the price rises, the potential for greater rent-seeking will increase even further, and the likelihood of further conflict inescapable. Although the implementation of smart sanctions against elites who perpetrate violence, as suggested in the report, should be supported, such sanctions can only be a part of the solution. Richer governments need to further reflect how their policies may deepen the problem. The support for predatory elites needs to end, and strategies for undermining their grip on economies developed further. The promotion of structural adjustment and free international markets may need to be tempered when it is clear that such markets drive conflict.

In the end richer government face a challenging choice; how much do they respect the sovereignty of existing elites and cooperate with them, despite the manner in which their activities drive conflict, and to what lengths can they go to undermine them and sweep them away. This is a debate today largely driven by the United States, whose aggressive promotion of democracy incites cynicism on the part of many analysts. Whether one agrees with the American methods or not, the question remains.

Winning hearts and minds

This report is an important read for anyone interested in the improvement of policy towards development and security, offering a progressive model for change. It is, though, also important to recognise its constraints and drawbacks, the biggest perhaps being that it has not achieved a break-out from a view of the world that sees the UK government as a benign force for good, struggling with its resource constraints in tackling the world's problems. Many in poorer countries do not share this perspective, and if policy is to be successful, it needs to take into account these different opinions.

Investing in Prevention underplays some additional roles western countries play in driving global conflict. More could be said of the subsidies provided by exporting countries to their defence industries (see BASIC's work on subsidies), of insufficient attention to prosecuting corruption perpetrated by companies, of the prolific and unsustainable use of resources and of the post-Cold War diplomatic politics that support elites. Robust discrimination in the application of international law, arms control and the use of force has the United Kingdom supporting repressive regimes in the name of the war on terror, while supporting intervention to displace others. This can create resentment and a desire to fight back against those seen as enforcing an international order in their own interests. Efforts to prevent conflict can then be interpreted by some as a way to persuade 'the natives' to buy in to the perceived underlying 'imperialism'. The 'carrots and sticks' mentioned in the report to force opponents to "motivate powerful individuals to act in support of stability" (p.58) may simply be interpreted code for forcing people to accept the status quo.

Conclusion

The UK government's role in conflict prevention goes way beyond the priorities of the conflict prevention pools, which themselves, at £134m, account for less than one third of one percent of the budgets of their sponsoring departments (Foreign Office, Dept for International Development and Ministry of Defence). Investing in Prevention is a welcome and timely contribution to the government's consideration of its role in the world, and how it can be improved. It is not enough to rely upon rhetoric, good will, and marginalized budget lines. The report goes some way down the road to suggesting improvement to the way the UK analyses its role. But in the end, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating: in the response of the international departments involved in delivery. Their analysis needs to be a great deal more holistic, and to take account unintended consequences, historical dynamics, and conflicting forces operating against a progressive policy of prevention, as well as accounting for the perceptions from those outside Britain. The report focuses on ways in which the United Kingdom could act to respond more effectively to conflict. Government departments would do well to consider how their policies and actions actually drive conflict, and take into account the following principles when looking to develop the United Kingdom's international agenda:

1. Ensuring consistency between policy and practice, and a universal application of policy so that UK foreign policy is perceived as 'fair';
2. The recognition, as the report advises, of the importance of multilateral, cooperative action to address conflict drivers;
3. A willingness to revisit established ideologies and practices, to question their positive and negative contribution to conflict prevention;
4. That recent statements by UK ministers that seek to raise the importance of human security (such as poverty alleviation, tackling corruption and correcting injustice) requires some transformation in security policy.

ENDS