BASIC NOTES
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
24 February 2005
The Missile Defence Debate Gap in Britain:
As Wide As Ever in 2004
By Leyla Kattan and Nigel Chamberlain
Key Points
Introduction
A review of Hansard in 2004 reveals that the Missile Defence debate
in the UK Parliament has yet to be started in earnest. MPs have
on numerous occasions questioned the government in general, and
the Defence Secretary in particular, over alleged plans to involve
the UK more closely in the US missile defence programme. Their questions,
however, have been met with short replies and the repeated assertion
that no decisions have been taken relating to the basing of US interceptor
missiles in the UK.
The June 2003 US-UK Framework Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
on Ballistic Missile Defence was finally placed in the Library of
the House, after initial refusal to accede to MP requests to do
so, and after BASIC had acquired a copy and posted it on our website.
The MOU outlined the developing military and industrial relationship
between the UK and US on missile defence. Its availability encouraged
MPs to further question the Defence Secretary over UK involvement
in the US missile defence programme. Annex A, on the arrangements
for the upgrade work at Fylingdales, and Annex B, which gave further
insight into the behind-the-scenes arrangements for closer collaboration,
were then made available in December 2003 and October 2004 respectively.
With limited information being placed in the public domain and
a serial lack of candour on the part of the UK government, it was
hardly surprising that the print media became interested in any
speculative assessment that came their way. The blame for whatever
inaccuracies arose from this situation can be squarely laid at the
doors of Whitehall.
The non-debate in Parliament
It is interesting to examine the parliamentary answers given by
the Defence Secretary in response to questions about basing US missile
interceptors in the UK. Over the course of 2004, Geoff Hoon generally
responded to questions with curt, evasive and dismissive replies.
For example, a question by Alan Simpson MP on the 25 May which
asked the Minister if he had had any discussions with the US authorities
about basing missile defence interceptor sites in the UK was met
with the following reply:
The Government have not yet decided whether the United Kingdom
requires its own missile defence, and these discussions do not
therefore involve specific architectures or basing assumptions.
The day after Parliament reconvened following the recess on 11
October, the Secretary of State for Defence gave a written answer
announcing that he had signed an agreement "setting out mechanisms
for co-operation with the US in research, development, test and
evaluation activities related to missile defence". His statement
did not refer to this agreement as 'Annex B' to the 12 June 2003
MOU which led to some confusion about what he was actually referring
to. Moreover, he said he was placing it in the Library of the House
of Commons but it did not become available until a week later.
This confusion was reflected in the tone of a parliamentary question
by Nicholas Soames MP on 21 October in which he said:
It is perhaps a complete coincidence that on Tuesday this week
the Secretary of State placed in the Library of the House an annexe
on research, development, test and evaluation of ballistic missile
defence capabilities and systems to a US-UK memorandum of understanding
dated 12 June 2003 regarding ballistic missile defence.
On the 28 October, the Minister of Defence, in response to a question
by Menzies Campbell MP, once again insisted that:
There have been no discussions between Ministers or officials
of either government about the stationing of interceptor missiles
in the UK. The Government have not yet decided whether the UK
requires its own missile defence, and our discussions with the
US on missile defence matters do therefore not involve specific
architectures or basing assumptions.
On the same day Mr Hoon responded to a question by Alan Simpson
MP, who asked whether parliamentary approval is required before
a proposal for the siting of US interceptor missiles in the UK can
be authorised, by saying that:
Any decision on the siting of interceptor missiles in the United
Kingdom would be open to scrutiny and debate in the normal way.
Specific parliamentary approval would not be required.
Similar comments were made by the Defence Procurement Minister
Lord Bach on the 3 November in the House of Lords. In response to
a question by Baroness Miller about government discussions with
the US administration regarding the siting of a US controlled missile
defence system in the UK, Lord Bach's response was that:
The government have not yet decided whether we need our own missile
defence...That is a decision for the future when the US system
has further evolved and we have better information on potential
costs and architecture.
And on 6 December, Geoff Hoon responded to a question by Norman
Baker MP, thus:
The government have not yet decided whether the United Kingdom
requires its own missile defence...It would therefore be premature
to consider specific military sites for basing interceptors, or
any other part of a missile defence system for the UK.
From these answers it can be determined that the official stance
by the government on the involvement of the UK in BMD and the placing
of missile defence interceptors on British soil has three clear
elements:
- Discussions with the US on missile defence cover a wide range
of issues, but talks have not included the possibility of extending
BMD to the United Kingdom.
- No request has yet been made by the US, and no decision has
been made by the UK to allow for an extension of missile defence
to cover the UK.
- Because no decision has been made, there is no need to discuss
specifics, such as where the interceptors might be placed and
how much this would cost.
MPs have shown signs of weariness with the lack of candour demonstrated
by the Defence Secretary. In a Commons debate on the 21 October,
Nicholas Soames MP asked outright:
Are they [the government] in favour of interceptors being stationed
on UK soil or not? If not, why not? If so, what is the state of
the negotiations?
Mr Soames also made the astute observation that the government
had been similarly unforthcoming about details of earlier discussions
prior to the decision to upgrade the tracking station at RAF Fylingdales.
In a Westminster Hall debate on UK-US relations on the 3 November,
it was the Liberal Democrat MP, Norman Baker, who expressed concern
with the government "smuggling through the possible deployment of
missiles, whether at Menwith Hill, Fylingdales or anywhere else
in the United Kingdom". Mr Baker alsostated his concern that the
lack of debate and information was an indication of the government
having something to hide.
Also on the 3 November, Lord Bach included a comment about the
US administration having offered to extend BMD to the UK. Indeed,
this is the basis of the MOUs - to open up opportunities for the
UK to buy into US technology and be permitted to field US systems.
What insights do Annex A and Annex B offer?
Annex A - 'The Upgrade of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station,
Royal Air Force Fylingdales, Yorkshire, United Kingdom', was placed
in the Library of the House of Commons in December 2003. However,
it is not clear who signed it or when it was signed as that page
had been removed beforehand. Some of the key extracts from the Annex
are as follows:
- "... establishes a program to upgrade the capabilities of the
Early Warning Radar (EWR) located at RAF Fylingdales for missile
defense purposes;
- "... a key contribution to the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BDMS);
- "... modification of the existing EWR by the installation of
new hardware and software to convert the facility to a UEWR";
- [The UK Participant will] "assist the U.S. Participant in meeting
its deadline for completion the upgrade of the RAF Fylingdales
radar system by September 2005"; and
- "The UK Participant will retain its responsibilities for the
cost of operations and maintenance for the ITW/AA mission"...and...the
costs associated with operations and maintenance of the UEWR".
This document appears to be consistent with the above stated position
of the UK government. However, it will be important to follow developments
at Fylingdales throughout 2005, particularly to seek information
from the government about allocated costs to the MoD, and thus the
UK taxpayer.
Annex B - 'Research, Development, Test and Evaluation of Ballistic
Missile Defense capabilities and Systems', was signed in London
by Professor Roy Anderson, Chief Scientific Adviser for the UK and
by Lt Gen Henry Obering USAF, Director Missile Defense Agency for
the United States on 12 October 2004. Some of the main clauses are
as follows:
- "... options for the defense of the U.K. and the implications
for the defense of Europe";
- "....joint development of defense options";
- "Analyses related to architecture studies of options for the
defense of the U.K.";
- "the extension of the U.S. system to make missile defense capabilities
available for the U.K.";
- "... for the purpose of harmonizing the Participants' ballistic
missile defense requirements ...."; and
- "The MDA and the U.K. Missile Defence Centre (MDC) will manage
all missile defense efforts.....".
This document indicates that the UK government may have gone further
down the road of integration with US plans for missile defence than
publicly admitted. It clearly suggests that there will be missile
"defense" for the UK and Europe, at some stage. While the activities
of the US Missile Defense Agency are relatively well known and openly
discussed, the activities of the UK Missile Defence Centre are shrouded
in secrecy and its Director, Group Captain Clive Field keeps a very
low profile - to say the least.
Print media interest
The UK print media has been very interested in exactly what the
MOU and its annexes actually amount to, particularly in light of
government secrecy on the issue. Articles and letters in October
and November on the discussions about missile defence interceptors
on British soil were partly informative and partly speculative -
a direct result of the lack of official candour.
In a front-page article in the Independent on Sunday on
17 October 'Star Wars deal places US missiles on UK soil', Severin
Carrell and Francis Elliott wrote:
Tony Blair has secretly agreed to allow President Bush to site
US missiles on British soil as part of the new US 'son of Star
Wars' programme. ...Downing Street has given an agreement in principle
to the Pentagon to station interceptor missiles at RAF Fylingdales,
North Yorkshire. The confidential deal goes far beyond the official
position that Britain is providing enhanced radar provision for
the US national missile defence programme.
Sir Menzies Campbell MP, Foreign Affairs Spokesman for the Liberal
Democrats, was quoted:
These reports, if true, are a source of grave concern given that
a decision appears to have been taken behind closed doors before
a full public debate on the costs and strategic implications.
...In view of the potential significance of these events it's
extraordinary that MP's don't yet have access to this agreement.
On the same day, Brian Brady wrote in Scotland on Sunday
about the missile interceptors being based in Alaska and added:
But the Americans remain keen to extend their shield further
afield, preferably in Europe. The UK is their favoured location.
...Ministers expect a similar request for the US to use the 'spy
station' at nearby Menwith Hill to support the scheme.
The story was picked up by the BBC, Reuters, the Press Association,
the Guardian the Scotsman, and Global Security Newswire in the United
States.
One week later on 24 October, the Independent on Sunday
ran another story 'Moscow protests at Star Wars plan for UK'. A
spokesman for the Russian Ministry, Sergey Lavrov, warned the move
would "represent a disturbing new step" in international relations
and posed a "possible threat to the security of Russia".
This theme was picked up by Richard Norton-Taylor in The Guardian
on the 29 October, 'Britain: the outpost for Son of Star Wars?'.
On this occasion the MoD admitted "there may have been discussions"
while the Pentagon directed questions to the State Department who,
in turn, declined to comment. However, Director of the US Missile
Defense Agency Lt Gen Obering said:
I think it's important that we invite our friends, our allies
to participate in this with us, and that they can benefit from
the coverage the same way we have. We...have plans, and have conducted
quite a bit of consultation with our allies, on putting [in] a
third interceptor site ... we'll put a site in Europe to expand
that coverage to our allies.
On the 7 November, an article by Mark Townsend in The Observer,
'US ready to put weapons in space', discussed the adoption by the
US Air Force of a doctrine to establish 'space superiority'.
The new doctrine means that pre-emptive strikes against enemy
satellites would become 'crucial steps in any military operation'.
...Internal USAF documents reveal that seizing control of the
'final frontier' is deemed essential for modern warfare. Counterforce
Operations reveals that destroying enemy satellites would improve
the chance of victory. ...Space superiority provides the freedom
to attack as well as the freedom from attack.
In the article, concern was expressed about Britain's agreement
'in principle' to station US interceptor missiles at Fylingdales
as the journalist noted that: "Participation in the missile defence
programme means that Britain is already 'locked into' a programme
that could ultimately include space warfare".
This article drew harsh criticism from Geoff Hoon in a published
letter in The Observer the following week under the heading:
'Missile Mistakes'. The Minister of Defence criticised the article
for claiming that any agreements had been made by the government
to place interceptors in Britain:
There has been no request from the US to site ground-based interceptors
anywhere on UK soil, and therefore no decision, secret or otherwise,
has been taken.
Dr Ian Davis, Director of BASIC picked up on this point and in
a letter to The Observer on the 21 November, expressed his
frustration with Hoon and his blatant refusal to "deny that British
officials have had discussions with their US counterparts". Dr Davis
then recommended that proposed UK-US missile defence agreements
be made available for parliamentary scrutiny, and that the numerous
UK and NATO ballistic missile threat assessments be declassified
and placed in the public domain.
Meanwhile, the Independent on Sunday published details of
an exclusive interview with Lt-Gen Obering that same day. The article
confirmed that the US administration wants to base at least ten
missiles in Europe for the 'Son of Star Wars' missile defence system
within the next five years. Lt-Gen Obering confirmed that the UK
was in the running to host the interceptors. He added that the missiles
would be purchased in October 2005 and they would choose which European
country would host the site soon afterwards.
Once again, BASIC's Director picked up on these comments and Geoff
Hoon's earlier unequivocal denial of any talks taking place, in
his published letter in the Independent on Sunday on 28 November.
He asked:
Perhaps our relationship with the current US administration is
so special that its military no longer feels it necessary to inform
our Secretary of State for Defence when searching for real estate
in Britain? Or perhaps the wool is being pulled over our eyes?
Either way I think we should be told.
Conclusion and recommendations
This brief analysis offers an insight into the inner-workings of
the MoD on this important issue. Apparently the idea of an 'informed
decision' is not something the MoD wish to be party to. Despite
government ministers insisting over a period of nine months that
the decision to include the UK in US BMD plans must be made before
consideration of interceptor sites and other practical matters?if
indeed it is to be made at all?the reality has been of continual
obfuscation and fence-sitting. Surely, it is appropriate to have
the debate about the advisability of deploying missile defence systems
- in principle - first?
Of course, the possibility also exists that the government is being
more than unwilling to engage in any substantive debate on the issue
and is, in fact, not being entirely truthful with either the UK
Parliament or the British public.
- The government should be much more forthcoming about its thinking
on missile defence systems and permit some level of parliamentary
debate in 2005.
- Parliamentarians should continue to seek substantive answers
from the government on discussions with the US administration
and within NATO about developments and projected costs associated
with missile defence systems.
- MoD and NATO Feasibility Studies should be made available for
parliamentary scrutiny and comment, and review by independent
experts.
- The activities of the UK Missile Defence Centre should be made
more accountable.
- The Defence Secretary must be held to his word that "any decision
on the siting of interceptor missiles in the United Kingdom would
be open to scrutiny and debate in the normal way".
ENDS
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