BASIC NOTES
2 December 2003
IAEA Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Programme
The jury's still out but time is short
By Andreas Persbo, L.LM.
The Play
The US Administration has, for some time, been pushing the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare Iran in
'non-compliance' with its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
commitments, a move that would automatically refer the issue to the
United Nations Security Council for their consideration and
possible action. The Iranians had warned that a strongly- worded
resolution would be contradictory to the Tehran declaration of 21
October 2003, and again implied that such a move might prompt an
Iranian withdrawal from the NPT. The three European states
(Britain, France and Germany) that had formulated the Tehran
declaration with Iran did not want to jeopardize this agreement and
stated that they would oppose such a move.
All indications were that it would be a serious showdown at the
next IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna. A resolution on
Iran was expected to be adopted on Friday 21 November 2003, and
rumours of a European draft resolution circulated in the media.
However, by Friday afternoon it was clear that the Board could not
reach an agreement, so it adjourned and went into an unprecedented
four-day recess. Negotiations continued over the weekend, resulting
in the United States lowering its demands. However, a senior
western diplomat reiterated that, "there was never any disagreement
[between the US and the Europeans] on the end state we're seeking",
i.e. an Iran with no nuclear weapons.[1] After the weekend, the media reported that a new
resolution had been drafted which bridged the divide.
The Resolution
On 26 November 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted
resolution 81 (2003) entitled 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran'.[2]
In its second preambular paragraph, the Board welcomed the
Tehran declaration issued by Britain, France, Germany and Iran on
21 October 2003. However, further down the preamble, the Board
expressed its deep concern, noting that, "Iran has failed in a
number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement..." The Board was also
gravely concerned by the fact that Iran had enriched uranium and
separated plutonium in undeclared facilities; that Iran had
indulged in a pattern of concealment of its activities; and that
the new information disclosed by Iran included much more that was
contradictory to the information previously supplied.
Importantly, the Board recognised, "the inalienable right of
States to the development and practical application of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric
power, with due consideration for the needs of developing
countries", while at the same time, "underlining the vital
importance of effective safeguards for facilitating cooperation in
the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy".
The Board adopted twelve operative paragraphs, which feature two
decisions and two requests. It is important to note that the Board
unanimously welcomed Iran's offer of active cooperation and
openness, while at the same time strongly deploring the country's
past failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its
safeguards agreement. It therefore called on Iran to take, "all
necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis..."
Of particular importance is operative paragraph 8, since it
outlines the procedure for eventual sanctions in the event that
Iran fails to meet the requirements of the resolution. It reads
"should any further serious Iranian failures come to light, the
Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider, in the light
of the circumstances and on advice from the Director General, all
options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and
Iran's Safeguards Agreement".
Finally, the Board decided "to remain seized of the matter".
The Board further requested the Director General to take all
steps necessary to confirm that the information provided by Iran on
its past and present nuclear activities is correct and complete as
well as to resolve such issues as remain outstanding. To that end
it requested that the Director General submit a comprehensive
report on the implementation of the resolution by mid-February
2004. Iran is called to sustain full cooperation with the Agency in
implementing its commitment to full disclosure and unrestricted
access, and thus to provide the transparency and openness that are
indispensable for the Agency to complete the considerable work
before it.
The Reactions
The IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei held that the
integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime was, in no
uncertain terms, affirmed by the resolution. He cautioned that the
IAEA still, "have much verification work to do before we can
provide the assurances expected by the international community" and
that that verification work solely depended on Iran's full
co-operation and transparency. He maintained that the success of
the verification mission also depended on the agency getting full
co-operation from all relevant countries, particularly those that
were the source of some of the nuclear material and equipment in
Iran.[3] Activities are expected to
begin in the next few weeks. Dr. ElBaradei also held that, "any
serious failures in the future by Iran to comply with its
obligations will be met with an appropriately serious response",
apparently referring to operative paragraph 8 of the resolution.[4]
The Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran,
Mr. Hasan Rowhani, does not share the conclusions of the IAEA
Director General. On 27 November 2003, he was quoted as saying, "we
believe that Article 8 has no value and it contains nothing new".
He fell short of saying that he believed that the resolution
symbolised an American defeat, but nevertheless held that: "The US
tried to include a clause in the resolution which would have
allowed Iran's nuclear dossier to be referred to the Security
Council automatically, but we announced that it was a violation of
the Teheran Declaration and it didn't happen".[5]
Mr. Rowhani stated that Iran, "notices that there is no
reference to the Security Council [in the resolution] and this
shows that Iran has observed all outstanding issues". He continued
to argue that Iran had voluntarily decided to temporarily suspend
its uranium enrichment programme in order to foster confidence. And
since the IAEA had not asked Iran to make any legal commitment in
this regard, the Iranian government had the discretion to decide if
and when to restart its uranium enrichment programme. Mr. Rowhani
expressed the view that the "uranium enrichment issue is an
important achievement, and it is a source of national pride for us,
and we should continue it".[6]
The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, welcomed the
resolution.[7] He held that the
resolution is an, "important step forward in the international
community's efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons". Meanwhile, US State Department spokesperson Richard
Boucher summed up the US perception of the resolution at a
press-conference and took the opportunity to caution the Russian
Federation on its involvement in the Iranian nuclear programme. He
said:
In sum, this resolution puts a requirement on Iran to cooperate
in all the ways that it's promised and all the ways demanded by the
Board of Governors. That would mean that governments who have
programs or who have had programs with Iran would only want to
cooperate within those guidelines.[8]
Iran is completing work on the Bushehr light water reactors
(LWRs) with Russian help. It has been estimated by the Federation
of American Scientist that the project employs some 900 workers and
that the Iran-Russian deal to deliver two VVER-1000 reactors is
possibly worth up to one billion dollars.[9] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation later issued a press release in which it stated:
It is important that the questions of ensuring the transparency
of the Iranian nuclear program will continue to be dealt with in
the framework of the IAEA with reliance upon its monitoring
instruments. Accordingly, the adopted resolution determines the
procedure for subsequent actions to be taken by the Agency to
definitively clarify the questions still outstanding ... Russia
expects that this work in the conditions of the new character of
cooperation between the IAEA and Iran will continue to be carried
out objectively, without unnecessary politicization.[10]
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, who engineered the
agreed statement prior to the meeting of the Board of Governors,
also seemed pleased with the resolution. The UK Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw stated:
I welcome this Resolution on Iran, adopted by consensus among
the Board of Governors of the IAEA. It is an important step forward
in the international community's efforts to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons ...The Resolution is the result of
the intensive diplomatic consultations, which followed [the French,
German and British visit to Iran]. We and our partners look forward
to continued co-operation with Iran.[11]
From Paris, President Chirac indicated his satisfaction with the
outcome of the IAEA Board meeting and said that the agreement,
"goes in the direction of efforts made by the international
community to convince the Iranians to take effective and durable
measures necessary to restore confidence".[12]
The EU's foreign policy representative, Javier Solana, said he
was "very happy" with what he saw as a European Union effort to
curb the development of nuclear weapons in Iran through
diplomacy.[13]
The Conclusions
It may be that the US Administration is waiting for IAEA
inspections to reveal undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, and
that it is hoping that such revelations may pave the way for
Security Council involvement.[14]
However, it seems apparent that the European initiative has, for
now, succeeded in securing Iran's position as a NPT signatory and
the adopted resolution is not counterproductive in this regard. It
is now imperative that the inspection process be permitted to
proceed without being tainted by political opinions that could
effectively hamper Iran's current right under the NPT to develop
its own peaceful nuclear energy policies.
A source of concern is operative paragraph 8 of the resolution. An immediate
meeting of the Board of Governors is required if, "any further serious
Iranian failures come to light". It is unclear who is authorized
to make this appreciation. The IAEA naturally believes that it falls
within its remit. But it remains unclear what kind of event it would
consider 'serious'. Dr. ElBaradei stated that a "small piece of
equipment would probably not be a serious failure. A lab working
on nuclear activities would".[15]
The statement is indicative, but hardly binding upon IAEA members.
However, that interpretation fits well with the perceived objective
of the resolution, which is the conduct of effective and meaningful
inspections of Iran's nuclear programme.
It is possible that a state could claim 'a serious Iranian
failure' and call for a meeting on the basis of its own
intelligence sources, effectively undermining the verification
process. In that regard, Dr. ElBaradei has stated that the agency
wants to do its work without interference. In an interview with the
New York Post he said: "I would like to ask the member states to
sit back and relax".[16]
It is important that the Agency is allowed to work undisturbed.
The situation is delicate, and the international community runs the
risk that Iran, if pressured too much, could withdraw from the NPT.
Such a drastic outcome would undermine the non-proliferation regime
and further destabilize the entire region. It may, in the long run,
also result in serious consequences for Iran itself.
The Director General has been instructed to submit a
comprehensive report on the implementation of the IAEA resolution
within two and a half months. It is doubtful, however, that the
IAEA will be able to produce a fully comprehensive report within
this timescale even if inspections start immediately. As Dr.
ElBaradei said after the adoption of the resolution, "inspections
take time ... Even if you have 1,200 people and $1 billion, it can
take over a year".[17]
ElBaradei said he would send no more than 10 inspectors to Iran
for the next phase of the verification process. Therefore, it is
important that the Board of Governors does not abandon the
consensus position adopted by the resolution. If the Director
General requests more time to conduct inspections, that request
should not be construed as a result of Iranian non-cooperation.
The Recommendations
1. All concerned parties should immediately provide Iran
further incentives to remain on its course of transparency and
cooperation, the most imminent incentive being the resumption of
work at the Bushehr power plants by the Russian Federation and
others. This would undoubtedly be aided by an unequivocal agreement
for the return of spent fuel to Russia.
2. All concerned parties should exercise restraint in their
relations with the IAEA and Iran for the duration of the
implementation inspections.
3. It is of overriding importance that Member States
recognize the fact that these inspections may take time, and that
they must show patience with the inspection process.
Endnotes
[1] George Jahn:
"All
Claim Victory in Iran Nuke Agreement", The Guardian,
25 November 2003.
[2] IAEA
Resolution GOV/2003/81 "
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran", 26
November 2003
[3] Opening
Remarks at the Press Conference on the Outcome of the Board of
Governors' Consideration of the Implementation of Safeguards in the
Islamic Republic of Iran by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed
ElBaradei on 27 November 2003.
[4] Mark
Landler: "U.N. Atom Agency Gives Iran Both a Slap and a Pass",
New York Times, 27 November 2003.
[5] "
Iran to retaliate against pro-US IAEA members", IranMania News,
27 November 2003.
[6] "
Iran to retaliate against pro-US IAEA members", IranMania News,
27 November 2003.
[7] See,
inter alia, Louis Charbonneau: "
Iran to escape U.N. nuclear rap", Reuters, 26 November
2003.
[8] U.S.
Department of State: Daily Press
Briefing, Washington D.C., 26 November 2003.
[9] Federation
of American Scientists Bushehr Briefing, 11 October 2000.
[10] Ministry of
foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press
Department: Press Release"
On the Adoption by IAEA Board of Governors of a Resolution on the
Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the NPT in
Iran", 27 November 2003.
[11] Foreign and
Commonwealth Office Press Release: "
Foreign Secretary Welcomes IAEA Resolution", 26 November
2003.
[12] See,
inter alia, "
UN watchdog to condemn Iran nuclear programme but stop short of
Security Council", Channel News Asia, 26 November 2003.
[13] See,
inter alia, Michael Adler: "IAEA not to
threaten sanctions against Iran", Middle East Online 26
November 2003.
[14] See "US
lying in wait for more Iranian nuclear violations", Spacewar
Wire, 27 November 2003.
[15] Mark
Landler: "Atomic Agency Warns Iran for Secrecy on Nuclear
Activities", New York Times, 26 November 2003.
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
Ibid.
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