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BASIC NOTESOCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 28 June 2004 -------------------------------------- THE PROBLEMS PREVENTING NATO FROM TAKING ON A LARGER ROLE IN IRAQ KEY POINTS NATO has been under pressure to take over the Iraq mission.
Proponents of having the alliance take over the mission argue this
would:
Critical problems have and will prevent NATO from taking on a
large and high profile mission in Iraq:
Conclusions and likely developments:
A
Glance at a Few Key Operations
Estimated Number of Troops International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
6,500 *See figures in text below.
INTRODUCTION U.S. President George W. Bush and his administration
officials have been politicking hard with allies at recent world forums to
bring about a formal NATO role in Iraq. The
arguments for NATO taking over the mission in Iraq include legitimizing the
U.S.-led operation, helping the United States to bear the costs of the
mission, and serving as an exercise that would help repair transatlantic
relations. Admittedly, the U.S.
president has been under pressure for some time by political opponents and
those who think it would be in the best interest of the United States to bring
NATO into Iraq. For example, the
presumptive U.S. Democratic presidential nominee, Senator John Kerry
(Massachusetts), argues that: NATO agreement
to take on this mission should be reached no later phases, beginning with taking control of Iraq’s border security, and taking over responsibility for northern Iraq and/or the Polish sector, and the training of Iraqi security forces. This would …send an important message to the American people that we are not bearing the security burden in Iraq virtually alone.[1] Bringing NATO into Iraq would also serve as an attempt to convey to Iraqis and other international actors that the mission has international, and not only U.S., interests and credibility at stake. Some have even argued that NATO will lose its credibility and relevance to international security if it does not take on the Iraq mission.[2] However, the deep transatlantic divisions over the timing and legitimacy of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 left the United States with a “coalition of the willing,” rather than with the formal help of NATO. Sixteen of the alliance’s 26 members have troops in Iraq.[3] The United States and the United Kingdom, both NATO members, have been contributing most of the troops for Iraq. The United States has between 120,000 and 135,000 troops in the country while Britain has the second highest troop contribution, with between 7,900 and 15,000 troops.[4] Among other NATO allies, Italy and Poland are next in line with the highest levels of troop contributions, but their troop totals taken together are below 6,000.[5] Non-U.S. troops make up only about 20 percent of the entire coalition force.[6] Of the non-U.S. coalition members, the British account for over 30 percent of that participation.[7] So far, NATO has assisted Poland in Iraq with force
generation activities, communications logistics, and movement.[8]
Since the first visit of the new Secretary General to the United States
at the beginning of this year, talk of whether NATO would take a wider and
more formal role in Iraq has come and gone, then come back again.
Particularly French and German unwillingness to send their troops and
Spain’s recall of troops from Iraq this past spring have stymied the plans
of those who want to see a full-fledged NATO peacekeeping mission in Iraq. As NATO heads into the Istanbul Summit, it appears that the
alliance is limiting its role in Iraq for the time-being to accepting an
invitation from the Iraqi interim government to help train security forces.
Three key problems are influencing NATO’s policy regarding Iraq:
In examining these issues, one sees that
NATO engagement in Iraq could considerably strain an already stressed
alliance. While having NATO take
on Iraq may be in the short-term interest of the United States and other allies currently
there, and may be even in the interest of Iraqis, it is not
clear that it would be in the best interest of NATO as a whole.
NATO’s priority, says its Secretary General, is
Afghanistan – NATO’s first major operation outside of Europe and North
America. The alliance seems to be
saddled with living up to its commitments there and in the Balkans and thus
could become overwhelmed if it were to take over a major operation in Iraq. The Secretary General plans to announce in Istanbul that NATO will increase the number of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.[9] Yet NATO has struggled to muster the equipment needed to keep up with the requirements of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is the 6,500-member stabilization operation that the alliance has commanded since August 2003 in Afghanistan.[10] NATO allies have contributed more than 90% of ISAF ground troops since the force’s creation, but NATO has had a difficult time establishing and taking over five (PRTs), which it was to do by the time of the Istanbul Summit.[11] The Dutch had difficulties following through with its pledged six Apache helicopters for Kabul until Luxembourg forked over money.[12] Turkey committed to delivering several helicopters in January[13] but did not deliver them until May[14] and the NATO operation remains short of heavy cargo aircraft.[15] As the September 2004 elections approach, Afghanistan in all
likelihood will experience increasing levels of violence.[16]
The Taliban have claimed responsibility for attacks on efforts to
register voters[17]
and numerous aid workers have been killed in recent months.[18]
Tribal warlords recently attacked
a provincial capital in central Afghanistan and ran its governor out of town.[19]
Consequently, pressure has been mounting on the alliance to
beef up its operations in Afghanistan. Back
in April, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns buttonholed Spain, Turkey and
Germany as being among 10 allies that he thought had “excess troop
capacity” that could be used to bolster operations in Afghanistan.[20]
U.S. officials have apparently asked Canada to delay pulling out most
of its 1,900-member force at the end of the summer so that there will be an
overlap with additional European troops coming in, which would provide a
larger troop presence around the time of the elections.[21]
Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, said after a meeting with
Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, that Belgium would double its contribution to
the NATO-led operation (up to 600 before September), but more troops are
needed before the elections.[22]
At the beginning of June, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage said after meetings in Brussels that “At an appropriate time we
will re-engage in discussions with our NATO friends about the role they may or
may not play [in Iraq]. It’s
not as if there are large numbers of ground forces in the various countries of
NATO ready to be sent to Iraq, there are a finite number of troops.”
According to the Reuters report, however, Armitage said that NATO could, at
least militarily, handle engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Armitage said,
“We can walk and chew gum at the same time, I’m sure NATO can as well.”[23] Afghanistan is not, however, the only mission that NATO needs
to worry about. The alliance
still has responsibilities in the Balkans and toward its newest members.
Violence erupted in Kosovo in mid-March and NATO had to pull troops
from elsewhere to supplement the 17,000-member Kosovo (KFOR) force.[24] NATO’s mission in Bosnia
(SFOR)
will conclude at the end of the year. Although
the European Union has plans to deploy a mission in Bosnia, NATO will maintain
a presence there. The alliance
has the goal of bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro into
the Partnership for Peace Program.[25] Finally, NATO still has responsibilities for the old-fashioned territorial defense of the treaty area, which is larger than ever. With the induction of seven new members this spring, NATO has the task of helping its newest members adapt their militaries to the requirements of the alliance. As a whole, the alliance has been undergoing fits and starts of transformation from the Cold War era, including the creation of the NATO Response Force and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Battalion.[26] The alliance has taken on a number of challenges that it may need to cope with before it takes on any more.
THE RISKS OF PARTICIPATING IN THE IRAQ MISSION
Although the big NATO allies of Germany and France have said
that they will not send their own troops to Iraq and do not understand the
wisdom of doing so, they also said that they would not block NATO from
participating in an Iraq mission.[27]
Those allies that do decide to contribute more forces under a NATO
operation will want to consider that it could become a long-term commitment
filled with serious risks.[28]
Certainly, the danger posed to allied troops is something for
NATO leaders to consider even as current members already have their armed
forces in Iraq. As of early
June, the U.S. military fatality count stood at 806.[29]
The entire coalition had suffered 916 deaths as of early June with
many more injured. (See the Coalition
for a Realistic Foreign Policy article written by David Isenberg about
the controversy over the count of dead and wounded in Iraq.[30]) NATO’s decision will also depend on whether the interim Iraqi government invites the alliance into the country and what an eventual elected Iraqi government decides as well. The opinion of the Iraqi people may factor into this calculus, especially if Iraq does become more democratic. According to an internal Provisional Authority poll conducted in May, 82 percent of Iraqis polled “disapprove of the U.S. and allied forces in Iraq.”[31] Would sticking a NATO label on the operation and adding a thousand more troops really make a difference in their feelings toward foreign forces? It may be too late for NATO to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis. Although room does not permit a discussion of whether having NATO take over operations in Iraq would bring about legitimacy for Western intervention and thereby help defuse insurgency movements in Iraq, it seems unlikely that it would help much at this point. If anything, raising NATO’s profile and presence in Iraq will only serve to make it a more appealing and maybe easier target for terrorists. Another risk for the alliance is that NATO
could find itself in a situation where it would be unable to determine whether
its operation in Iraq is a success or a failure, especially because it is
unclear what would count as a success for the current U.S.-led operation.
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair’s arguments for regime change
in Iraq have varied, including ridding Iraq of “weapons of mass
destruction” and related programs, removing a brutal dictator guilty of
gross human rights violations, or turning Iraq into a bright and shining
democracy to serve as an example for the rest of the Middle East.
On this last point, even the United States and Britain may not be on
the same page in practice. Former Coalition Provisional Authority official, Michael
Rubin, who resigned from the Defense Department in early April, told the London
Daily Telegraph, “The U.S. and Britain were working at cross purposes.
It didn’t appear that the Brits were always forthright with their
agenda. They didn’t want to
talk about the end goal of democracy. It was clear that the U.S. was serious about democracy, the
Brits less so.”[32] Under the latest U.N. resolution, the current coalition’s mandate would expire once a constitutionally elected government is in place, which is not expected to happen until December 2005 at the earliest.[33] At that time, the Iraqi government could ask foreign troops to stay longer. The Anglo-American alliance has suffered confusion over how much control they would have over their own troops in Iraq after June 30, 2004 when the interim Iraq government is to take over from the provisional authority with U.N. assistance (as of the posting of this article, the date has been changed to June 28).[34] Prime Minister Blair stated that Iraq would have some control over foreign troops in its country. The U.S. Secretary of State disagreed with that assessment. Later, the U.K. Prime Minister clarified what he meant, saying that the United States and Britain “…absolutely agree there should be full sovereignty transferred to the Iraqi people and that the multinational force should remain under American command.”[35] These differences between the closest of NATO
allies, and the extremely dangerous environment in Iraq, still give pause to
other allies who are only pondering participation in an Iraq mission.
If NATO were to take over a peacekeeping mission and then later, were
to exit without leaving any legitimate and effective replacement security
force, the consequences could be disastrous. Iraq might be left, for example,
with an unsavory, even if constitutional, government in Iraq, and NATO’s
participation would be seen as having done more harm than good. ASSESSING ALLIES’ FEELINGS TOWARD THE U.S.-LED WAR AND ONGOING TRANSATLANTIC TENSIONS Allies have been and will remain reluctant to contribute more to the Iraq operation not only because of tight resources and high risks, but also because they remain wary of U.S. and U.K. justifications for entering the war in the first place and have been uncomfortable with the conduct of the war. European leaders may also be concerned about the long-term policy implications for the alliance if NATO formally enters Iraq. The opposition to the war of certain European leaders is well
known, especially those of France and Germany. Poll after poll has also shown that European publics, even in
countries that have sent troops, have mostly been against the war.[36]
A poll commissioned by The German Marshall Fund of the United States
and the Compagnia Di San Paolo revealed that a majority of Europeans polled
did not think that the war was worth the loss of lives or other costs.[37]
Of course, there will be times when leaders need to conduct foreign
policies that are not popular with their constituencies.
However, in instances where a massive commitment from many people
over a long period of time is required, it is critical to have this support,
even in foreign policy matters. Iraq
is one of these instances. The case of Spain demonstrated this problem.
As soon as Spaniards had a chance to express their views with
concrete political action, they did so and Spain’s new leader pulled
out their 1,300 troops from Iraq.[38]
In mid-May, the New York Times and the London Times
were reporting that U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s tenure could end
sooner than originally thought because the Iraq war and issues
surrounding it were going so badly.[39]
If the phase after the end of major combat requires a long-term
and large troop commitment to help provide security and aid
reconstruction, then this type of conflict management will usually give
contributing countries the chance for their people to hold proxy
referendums on such missions. European rhetoric about the U.S. handling of the Iraq
situation has been blunt and suggests that the United States, and the
United Kingdom to a lesser extent, have lost the trust of other NATO
allies. The most
notorious of statements occurred when Spain’s new Prime Minister,
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, said that the Iraq war was “based on
lies.”[40]
Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski in March said that
Poland was “misled with the information on weapons of mass
destruction.”[41]
The Polish Defense Minister said at the end of April that his
country would “significantly” reduce his country’s presence
after Iraqi elections in 2005.[42]
Nevertheless, Poland, which has 2,400 troops in Iraq and leads
the multinational division there, has also said it will stay in Iraq
“until we’ve done our job.”[43]
Poland would probably prefer a formal role for NATO with the
hope that it would receive more support from allies. According to
polls conducted in Poland this year, however, a little over half of
Poles are against having their troops in Iraq.[44]
On the ground, even the “special relationship” allies have had problems working out their differences. The chief of the general staff for the United Kingdom in Iraq, General Sir Michael Jackson, told a parliamentary committee that there have been “disagreements between the Americans and the British over peacekeeping.”[45] According to NATO and European defense officials, non-Americans in the coalition have felt that the Americans have been “too quick to resort to overwhelming force against insurgents.”[46] In some instances, coalition partners have complained that the U.S. military has failed to consult in a timely fashion about planned maneuvers, “including some that have put coalition troops under fire.”[47] In this environment, it is difficult to see how countries that opposed the war will now want to contribute to a massive NATO operation. As one European defense official told the Los Angeles Times in May, “It’s hard to talk other people into joining a mission when those who are there already aren’t 100 percent happy.”[48]
To be sure, some European leaders may be
withholding their support for a formal NATO operation out of
political spite against the U.S.-U.K. alliance.
They are unwilling to commit resources to a military
operation that they poorly received from its inception.
Although some European leaders took advantage of domestic
political opportunities by inflating their anti-war rhetoric and
maybe even sought to position themselves as alternative poles to the
American “hyperpower,” they also sincerely disagreed with at
least the timing of the U.S.-led invasion on foreign policy merits.
It should not be a surprise at this moment that many of them
are unhappy with the idea of sending their own troops into Iraq,
even as part of a NATO mission.
The revelations about failed intelligence and the Abu Ghraib
prison abuses have not helped to change these views.
In the long-term, allies should be
concerned about how a NATO role in Iraq may set a precedent for
future alliance action. The
Bush administration seemed to hold the assumption that once the
United States-led coalition invaded Iraq and finished the main
combat phase of the war, European allies, possibly under a NATO
umbrella, would hail to Iraq to pick up the pieces.
Even without strong European support for the war initially,
allies would surely seize the opportunity to help build the peace
once the heavy fighting was over.
This did not happen and the war did not go as well as
expected. Furthermore, the way in which the
United States went to war, on the basis of preemption but without a
clear imminent threat, has angered some allies to the point of not
participating in Iraq. If
allies had immediately thrown their support behind a peace operation
in Iraq without question and debate, they would have been tipping
their hats unintentionally to this policy of preventive war based on
insufficient and unreliable intelligence and dubious
decision-making. Once
the precedent is set, it could be very difficult in future cases for
the allies to refuse action when they are suspicious about the
intelligence and policy reasons for sending allied troops into harms
way. This behavior has
consequences for the future use of NATO assets, especially the NATO
Response Force, which is designed precisely for quick response and
could become a tool for preemptive action.
In many respects, it would have been better if the NATO
allies could have focused their efforts on the peace operations it
had already started before the Iraq war.
Allied troops now in Iraq could have been used in
Afghanistan, and Afghanistan could have become a showcase for NATO
peace operations capability and maybe even solidified the
alliance’s credibility in the post-Cold War world. Given the current level of violence and the daunting task of
preparing for its elections, Iraq will need a substantial amount of
help with its security. But
if Iraq is becoming the mother of all tar babies, then why would a
transforming alliance wish to take on the aforementioned risks now?
If NATO commits to a peacekeeping role, then it will become
stuck between U.S. efforts to have control over the security and
policy developments in Iraq and the anticipated chaos of Iraqis
trying to figure out their own political future. On the other hand, with the Iraq situation so dangerous, and
the stakes so high for international security, some ask how NATO
allies can conscientiously refuse to participate in Iraq.[49]
No other multilateral security institution is yet prepared to
take on the high-end of the threats present in Iraq. Other ideas circulating besides training security forces[50]
include guarding Iraq’s borders and removing unexploded ordnance.
If NATO were to take on peacekeeping, it would probably
provide a few hundred headquarters personnel, and not thousands of
more troops.[51]
Some of the troops from alliance countries already in Iraq
could be shifted to NATO. As with the invitation to train security forces, additional
requests for NATO involvement need to come squarely from the Iraqis.
If it seems that the United States is the sole motivator
behind a NATO peace operation (and it may be too late to change the
appearance of this), NATO will take on the resentment in the region
that the U.S.-led coalition has been experiencing.
If the operation falls apart, it could de-legitimize the
alliance even more than if it had avoided the Iraq mission in the
first place. NATO
operations elsewhere could suffer as the alliance struggles with a
failed mission in Iraq. One NATO official has said, “Afghanistan is where NATO’s credibility is on the line. In Iraq, it’s the U.S.’ credibility that’s on the line.”[52] Because of current NATO mission requirements, the danger of the Iraq situation, and continuing transatlantic tensions over U.S.-led policies toward Iraq, NATO will not play a major role in Iraq in the short-term. From the U.S. perspective, it may appear that because NATO is not becoming more involved in Iraq, that it is shirking its responsibility and in turn is undermining the alliance’s credibility. On the other hand, NATO could undermine its credibility by becoming heavily engaged in Iraq while it continues to have a difficult time fulfilling its other commitments. The alliance could stretch itself far beyond its capacities. Therefore, NATO does not appear to have great options as it faces the Iraq issue. --------------- NOTES [1]
See “A Strategy for Success in Iraq,” URL <http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/iraq/>
version current on June 18, 2004. [2]
See Daalder, Ivo, and Kagan, Robert, “The Allies Must Step Up,” Washington
Post, June 20, 2004. [3]
Kessler, Glenn and Milbank, Dana, “Leaders Dispute NATO Role in
Iraq,” Washington Post, June 10, 2004. [4]
Daniszewski, John, “Outbreak of Iraqi Violence Pressures
Allies,” Los Angeles Times, April 12, 2004. [5]
For a total list of coalition troop contributions to the operation
in Iraq, see GlobalSecurity.org’s Web page: URL <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm>
and <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat.htm>. [6]
GlobalSecurity.org’s Web page: URL <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm>
and <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat.htm,
version current on June 20, 2004>, accessed June 27, 2004. [7] Estimated
using GlobalSecurity.org’s Web page: URL <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_ [8]
Foglesong, General Robert H., “NATO Air Power,” Armed Forces
Journal, June 2004, p. 46. [9]
De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap, “Projecting Stability: Territorial Defense
No Longer Sole NATO Aim,” DefenseNews, May 24, 2004, p. 29. [10]
NATO also is supporting a PRT in the northern city of Kunduz.
ISAF’s mission includes assisting the interim Afghan
government, and helping to develop Afghan security forces and
protect U.N. personnel in Kabul.
The United States and its allies have 20,000 troops
conducting the military operation to go after Al Qaeda and Taliban
remnants (Salahuddin, Sayed, “Belgium Pledges More troops for NATO
in Afghanistan,” Reuters, May 20, 2004).
This operation is separate from the ISAF peacekeeping
mission. Military officials have told Congress that U.S. troop
numbers should decline this summer down to 13,000 and would work
toward the “long-term goal of transferring the military mission to
NATO” (Crawley, Vince, “U.S. Plans to Reduce Troops in
Afghanistan,” DefenseNews, May 3, 2004, p. 28). [11]
Hill, Luke, “NATO Struggles to Form New Afghan PRTs,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, May 5, 2004. [12]
Kessler, Glenn and Milbank, Dana, “Leaders Dispute NATO Role in
Iraq,” Washington Post, June 10, 2004 and
Gouy,
Anne-Claude,
“Apache Helicopters Arrive in ISAF,” SHAPE News, April 1,
2004, URL http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2004/04/i040401.htm,
version current on June 27, 2004. [13]
Dempsey, Judy, “NATO Warned of Danger to Afghan Role,” Financial
Times, May 18, 2004. [14]
“Turkey Sends Three Helicopters and Personnel to Afghanistan,” Turks
U.S., May 30, 2004, URL http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20040530115917552&mode=print>,
version current on June 27, 2004. [15]
Dempsey, Judy, “NATO Warned of Danger to Afghan Role,” Financial
Times, May 18, 2004. [16]
According to a political activist who campaigns for women's
rights in Afghanistan, "If NATO left tomorrow, the city would collapse into civil war within 24 hours,"
(Ghafour, Hamida, “Where Guns Rule,
Disarmament Falls Short,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2004). [17]
Salahuddin, Sayed, “Belgium Pledges More troops for NATO in
Afghanistan,” Reuters, May 20, 2004. [18]
More than 400 aid workers, international troops and Afghan civilians
have been killed in 2004 (Schmickle, Sharon, “Part of Our Mission
Here is to Win the Hearts and Minds,” Star Tribune, June
20, 2004). [19]
“Uprising Deposes Governor: Central Afghanistan Erupts into
Violence,” Associated Press via Columbia [20]
Salahuddin, Sayed, “Belgium Pledges More Troops for NATO in
Afghanistan,” Reuters, May 20, 2004. [21]
Thomas, Gary, “U.S. Asks Canada to Extend Stay in Afghanistan,”
VOANews.com, June 1, 2004. The Canadians reportedly refused to delay
the withdrawal. See
“Canada Refuses to Delay Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan,” RFE/RL
via Sabawoon Online, June 21, 2004, URL http://www.sabawoon.com/newsnew/miniheadlines.asp?dismode=article&artid=17776.
Eurocorps, which will be headed by French and German troops,
will take over the command of the ISAF from Canada in August (Bennhold,
Katrin, “Zapatero May Add troops in Afghanistan,” International
Herald Tribune, March 24, 2004). [22]
Salahuddin, Sayed, “Belgium Pledges More troops for NATO in
Afghanistan,” Reuters, May 20, 2004. [23]
Chalmers, John, “U.S. Expects ‘Smooth Sailing’ for Iraq
Resolution,” Reuters, June 2, 2004. [24]
“NATO Resolved to Help Bring Kosovo Violence Under Control,” NATO
Press Release, March 19, 2004, URL < http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-046e.htm>,
version current on June 27, 2004. [25]
Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the New
Defence Agenda,” in Brussels, May 17, 2004. [26]
“On the Agenda: Military Transformation,” part of NATO’s
Istanbul Summit Web page, URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/mil-transf.htm>,
version current on June 16, 2004. [27]
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany has said that, “The
problem will be that NATO would find itself in the same situation as
the coalition forces are in now with regard to the confidence that
the Iraqis have in these forces as guarantors of security and
stability. … I would be very grateful if people would understand
my doubts as to whether NATO really can play such a positive role as
they seem to think, and will make no secret of these doubts in
Istanbul,” (Bernstein, Richard and Landler, Mark, “Schroeder to
Oppose NATO Role in Iraq,” New York Times via International
Herald Tribune, May 21, 2004). [28]
See Ricks, Thomas E., “Wolfowitz Says Iraq Stay Could Last
Years,” Washington Post, June 23, 2004. [29] Isenberg, David, “Fuzzy Math
on Iraq,” Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, June 7, 2004,
URL<http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/content/view/35/>,
version current on June 8, 2004. [30]
Isenberg, David, “Fuzzy Math on Iraq,” Coalition for a Realistic
Foreign Policy, June 7, 2004, URL<http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/content/view/35/>version current on June 8,
2004. [31]
Matthews, Mark, “Restraints Urged on American Military,” Baltimore
Sun, May 14, 2004. [32]
Tempest, Matthew and agencies, “U.S. Strategy Criticized
Ahead of Blair Visit,” The Guardian, April 14, 2004. [33]
Chalmers, John, “U.S. Expects ‘Smooth Sailing’ for Iraq
Resolution,” Reuters, June 2, 2004. [34]
According to one report, British and U.S. officials were making
plans to send 3,000 NATO troops to Iraq for the purpose of providing
extra security to the interim government around June 30, 2004.
The troops would not enter Iraq under the NATO label.
Instead, the troops would be labeled as a “British-led
international force” to placate Germany and France (“NATO Force
‘Preparing for Iraq,’” Agence France-Presse, June 19, 2004). [35]
Cawthorne, Andrew, “Blair Backs U.S. Fiat in Iraq,” Washington
Post, May 27, 2004, p. 24. [36]
For pre-war opinion, see Boston, William, “European Leaders,
Public at Odds Over War with Iraq,” The Christian Science
Monitor, January 17, 2003, URL http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0117/p07s01-woeu.html
and for post-war opinion, see Hutcheson, Ron, “Europe Poll Finds
Hostility Toward the U.S.,” Pioneer Press, March 17, 2004,
URL http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/news/nation/8203565.htm,
version current on June 23, 2004. [37]
See “Transatlantic Trends 2003,” Topline Data, July 2003, URL http://www.transatlantictrends.org/apps/gmf/ttweb.nsf/0/DA5A3225751A264585256D78000 [38]
Spain, however, has said that it will increase its troop numbers in
Afghanistan (Bennhold, Katrin, “Zapatero May Add troops in
Afghanistan,” International Herald Tribune, March 24,
2004). [39]
See Cohen, Roger, “The Next Casualty of the Iraq War Could be
Blair,” New York Times, May 16, 2004; and Webster, Philip,
“Britain and U.S. Plan for Quick Exit from Iraq,” London
Times, May 17, 2004. [40]
Shishkin, Philip; Vitzthum, Carlta; Robbins, Carla Ann, and
Champion, Marc, “EU Tightens Security After Madrid,” Wall
Street Journal, March 17, 2004. [41]
Champion, Marc and Jaffe, Greg, “Poland’s Leader Questions U.S.
Steps in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2004. [42]
Evans, Michael, and Thomson, Robert, “U.S. Wants More British
Troops Sent to Iraq,” London Times, April 30, 2004. [43]
“Poland, Bulgaria Won’t Leave Iraq,” Miami Herald, May
14, 2004. [44]
Connolly, Kate, “Poland ‘Will Keep Troops in Iraq Even if
Attacked,’” London Daily Telegraph, March 19, 2004. [45]
Simpson, John, “America Wants Britain to Sort Out Its Mess,” London
Sunday Telegraph, April 25, 2004. [46] Richter, Paul, “NATO Balking
at Iraq Mission,” Los Angeles Times, May 9, 2004, p. 1. [47]
Richter, Paul, “NATO Balking at Iraq Mission,” Los Angeles
Times, May 9, 2004, p. 1. [48]
Richter, Paul, “NATO Balking at Iraq Mission,” Los Angeles
Times, May 9, 2004, p. 1. [49] Daalder and
Kagan, for
example, argue that the German and French opposition to
participation in Iraq is “an abdication of international
responsibility.” See
Daalder, Ivo and Kagan, Robert, “The Allies Must Step Up,” Washington
Post, June 20, 2004. [50]
Germany has already been training Iraqi police at a camp in the
United Arab Emirates (Bernstein, Richard and Landler, Mark,
“Schroeder to Oppose NATO Role in Iraq,” New York Times
via International Herald Tribune, May 21, 2004). [51]
Richter, Paul, “NATO Balking at Iraq Mission,” Los Angeles
Times, May 9, 2004.
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