Putting
Some Sparkle Into The Evian G-8 Summit: Cooperative Threat
Reduction
By
Dr Ian Davis
With
the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialised nations gathered for their
annual economic summit meeting, in Evian, France, the rising
number of global problems is presenting them with a daunting
agenda.
While
the future of Iraq and proposals to stimulate the sluggish world
economy are topping that agenda, a number of urgent security
issues are also being discussed. One involves a stock-take on the
little known agreement from last year’s summit in Geneva: the
G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.
In
short, the Global Partnership programme is designed to safeguard
the weapons complex of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and prevent
proliferation of deadly nuclear, as well as chemical and
biological materials. Russia is thought to have enough surplus
nuclear weapons material to make at least 60,000 nuclear warheads
(in addition to an estimated arsenal of approximately 5,000
deployed strategic nuclear warheads and an even more dangerous and
unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons, estimated at
approximately 3,400). In
the absence of reliable systems to safeguard and account for this
huge stockpile, much of this material is highly vulnerable to
theft or diversion to terrorist and ‘rogue’ states.
A similar Cold War legacy exists in relation to Russia’s
chemical and biological weapons programmes.
The
United States has shown commendable leadership in attempting to
address this issue. The US Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction
(CTR) agenda is now in its 12th year, and more recently
has begun to be supported by European states and the G-8. At the
June 2002 Kananaskis Summit in Canada, the G-8 countries pledged
to provide up to $20 billion over the next decade. Under
the ‘10+10over10’ plan, the United States will
contribute $10 billion over the next 10 years to threat reduction
and nonproliferation programmes (mainly in Russia) while the other
G-8 members will collectively contribute the same amount over the
same timeframe.
These
US-led threat reduction activities have produced significant,
quantifiable results in Russia and other parts of the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), including: roughly 6,000 nuclear warheads
removed from deployment; more than 400 missile silos destroyed;
nearly 1,400 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines and
strategic bombers eliminated; storage and transportation of
nuclear material made more secure; 150 metric tons of
weapons-grade uranium eliminated; a major biological weapons
production plant eliminated; and 40,000 chemical, biological,
nuclear and missile weapons scientists provided with support to
pursue peaceful research.[1]
Over $1 billion a year is now being made available for
international threat reduction programmes – but it is not
enough.
But how
about this for an alternative 10+10+10 equation: Over the past ten
years, less than one tenth of the amount spent in ten weeks on
neutralising Iraq’s alleged WMD threat has been directed at
eliminating the much greater threat arising from within the FSU.
Much
of the threat reduction agenda remains to be completed. Roughly
half of the nuclear weapons-grade material in Russia remains
inadequately secure, the destruction of chemical weapons is just
starting, and much remains unknown about past biological weapons
activities.[2]
Moreover, the two main reemployment strategies for weapons
scientists in the WMD complexes in Russia and the FSU—science
research contracting and technology-driven commercialisation and
business development—are proving inadequate, and failing to
provide many career changing opportunities.
So
what needs to be done? First,
the
cooperative threat reduction agenda needs reform and accelerated
implementation. To this end, each of the G-8 countries should
appoint a central coordinator for threat reduction and develop a
comprehensive long-term plan of implementation.
Second,
more money is needed to accelerate implementation of existing
plans, especially in areas of relative neglect, such as
alternative job creation, retraining of weapons scientists and
downsizing weapons complex infrastructure. Additional funds are
also needed to expand the scope of threat reduction to include new
materials and new countries. Possible fiscal solutions being
mooted include the exchange of Russian debt for nonproliferation
projects and the expansion of the partnership to other non-G-8
countries. Reconsideration of the costly and contentious plutonium
disposition plans should also be on the agenda, but is unlikely to
get a hearing because of vested interests.
Third,
improved oversight of threat reduction projects by elected
representatives in partner countries is needed. Where appropriate
a single congressional or parliamentary committee in each of the
G-8 countries should be given the responsibility of providing
oversight of all the threat reduction activities, progress and
problems.
Fourth,
sustained political support for cooperative threat reduction has
to be shown by the G-8 in order to overcome funding limitations
and restrictions, bureaucratic hurdles and delayed implementation.
Fifth,
the Russian Government needs to improve the overall environment
for threat reduction, including the provision of financial
transparency, facility access and legal protection. But
transparency cuts both ways: a comprehensive global inventory of
nuclear warheads and fissile material is also urgently needed, as
is an inventory of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
And
finally, threat reduction should begin at home. It is not just a
Russian problem. In addition to assisting Russia to disarm under
the Global Partnership programme, the other three nuclear-armed
G-8 states (the United States, the United Kingdom and France)
should reaffirm their intention to implement the 13 disarmament
steps agreed to in 2000 under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The United States has approximately 6,800 operational
nuclear weapons, and their destructive power is the equivalent of
some 80,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. These weapons, and the smaller
numbers deployed by France and the United Kingdom, continue to
threaten the very existence of humankind, yet fail to deter the
asymmetric terror activities of non-state groups like al Qaeda.
Indeed, the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons and
related materials only increases the likelihood of a terrorist
group eventually obtaining a ‘dirty bomb’ capability or even a
nuclear warhead.
The
US Senate’s decision last week to at least partially rescind a
10-year ban on funding research and development of new
‘low-yield’ nuclear weapons, was both unnecessary and
destabilising. Instead, the US Government needs to renounce its
goal of expanding the US nuclear arsenal. Similarly, US and
Russian warheads that are no longer operationally deployed under
the Treaty of Moscow should also be eliminated under the threat
reduction programme. And efforts to expand threat reduction
programmes and principles to new regions and countries, such as
North Korea, the Middle East and South Asia also need to be
urgently explored.
Cooperative
threat reduction represents the ‘third way’ in nuclear
non-proliferation: a middle ground between multilateral arms
control regimes and coercion or preemption.
As such it offers a practical approach to disarmament that
all members of the G-8 can support. Robust political and financial
backing for this agenda in Evian could put some much needed fizz
back into a glass currently half empty.
[1]
Reshaping US-Russian
Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council 2002, p1.