BASIC NOTES

2 April 2002

A Multilateral Approach to Ballistic Missiles?

By David Grahame,
BASIC

The destabilizing proliferation of ballistic missile technology forms one of the central justifications for the development of US missile defense. Ominous predictions of growing ballistic capability amongst ‘states of concern’ have given the US plans powerful impetus. The clearest example of this has been the vast political impact of the so-called Rumsfeld Commission Report. Released in July 1998, the report starkly concluded that North Korea, Iran and Iraq could “acquire the means to strike the United States within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq).”[1] The subsequent launch of North Korea’s three stage Taepo-Dong rocket in August 1998 seemed to confirm the worst fears of the Commission, and congressional support for the missile defense project soared.  

While the accuracy of the Rumsfeld Report has been heavily disputed, there is no doubt that proliferation of missile technology is a serious concern which the international community has failed to fully address. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in April 1999 that there is a real need for “multilaterally negotiated norms against the development of such weapons. Currently there is no treaty regulating missiles. International agreements on such norms would substantially improve prospects for future progress on existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties.”[2] Could such a multilateral regime also provide a more effective and popular alternative to missile defense?

Progress in Paris
In February 2002 over 80 states met in Paris to discuss a draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). Intended to establish both international norms against proliferation and modest confidence building measures, the Code has garnered a great deal of diplomatic support. The European Union (EU), the United States and Russia are generally in favor of the draft Code and, while differences persist, it seems likely that an agreed document will be ready by the end of the year. The ICOC has also managed to engage nearly all the countries with ballistic technology with only North Korea, Iraq and Syria staying outside of the process so far.  

These are promising first steps. Gerard Errera, the French Foreign Ministry's deputy director of political affairs, noted in the Conference’s opening speech, “The fact that so many accepted our invitation is a reason for optimism… This is a sign that the international community has assessed the challenges that are tied to the development - qualitative and quantitative – of ballistic capabilities.”[3]

However, the Code does not represent an effective and verifiable regime against ballistic missiles. Instead, it is a politically binding document, encouraging states to undertake limited measures such as annually reporting on their ballistic missile programs and alerting all other signatories before conducting ballistic missile tests. There is no attempt to commit signatories to legal obligations, with the focus remaining on broad principles rather than detailed action plans. The UK foreign secretary, Jack Straw rightly argues that the Code, while important, represents only “a tentative first step to developing an internationally agreed regime.”[4]

Missile Apartheid?
To create a truly wide-ranging and powerful multilateral system, the international community must now build on these first efforts. Such progress is necessary due to the worsening health of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Created in April 1987, the MTCR now consists of 33 countries [5] which co-ordinate their national export controls to prevent the spread of ballistic goods and technologies.  However, two main difficulties have emerged with this approach.

Firstly, some countries outside the group see the MTCR as a cartel created by developed nations to monopolize valuable missile and space launch technology. This view was clearly expressed in 1997 in a paper presented by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations:

The MTCR is not a negotiated multilateral treaty. It is a cartel formed by some industrialized countries for the purpose of placing controls on the transfer of technology which could contribute to the manufacture of ballistic missiles with nuclear weapon delivery systems. There is no commitment on the part of the originators of the MTCR to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate ballistic missiles globally. It is, therefore, essentially an arrangement for promoting their own security interests only.[6]

Secondly, the MTCR is severely  undermined on a practical level as expertise in missile technology is no longer limited to its members. Instead, countries outside the regime, above all North Korea, are increasingly able to both develop and export ballistic goods and expertise. [7] With no internationally agreed norms of conduct, action against the perpetrators remains sporadic and inconsistent.  

Bearing these problems in mind, there is a clear need to engage with countries outside the MTCR and create a system which both establishes an international predisposition against missile proliferation and moves strongly against non-compliance. However, several key difficulties need to be overcome before such a goal can be achieved.    

An Unverifiable Agreement?
Particularly troublesome in limiting missile proliferation is the almost identical nature of offensive ballistic technology with that of peaceful space launch vehicles [SLV]. Mark Smith of Southampton University’s Mountbatten Centre argues, “It is almost impossible to develop an SLV programme that does not have latent convertibility to a ballistic missile programme, so purportedly peaceful SLV programmes can be swiftly weaponised.”[8] Due to this similarity, there is the clear dilemma that ‘states of concern’ will mask their ballistic programs behind claims to peaceful SLV intentions.

While this is a complication, it should not doom all efforts at multilateral control. A partial solution would be to greatly increase the transparency of all SLV programs. Smith argues that this could be carried out through “policy declarations, exchanges of information or on-site inspections. All three would probably be required to obtain sufficient information to ensure that guidance systems, payload, flight trajectory and launch facilities were appropriate for SLVs rather than ballistic missiles.”[9]

A more comprehensive option would be to discourage national SLV development programs in general, perhaps stressing regulated space launch consortia as an alternative. These could be run by an international organization or certified MTCR member and would provide developing nations with access to space whilst also ensuring that SLV technology and hardware was not diverted to offensive ballistic purposes. However, it seems likely that significant incentives would be necessary to make this acceptable to the developing world, introducing another key element of dispute.  

The Incentives Dilemma  
There have been many complaints that the draft Code offers no real enticements to states such as North Korea and Iran to abandon missile development. As John Wolfstahl of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace puts it “If it doesn’t provide incentives and all you have are sticks, it’s not very effective.”[10]  Such a view is supported by many of the nations involved in the ICOC negotiations. Hence, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, argued on 13 February 2002, “In the opinion of the Russian side, the text of the Draft Code could be improved by including in it more detailed wordings on such issues as technological cooperation and the provision of guarantees for countries voluntarily abandoning their own missile programs.”[11]

Other countries, above all the United States, strongly oppose the introduction of such incentives, believing that they would actually encourage continued ballistic development by ‘states of concern’ to force further concessions and benefits. Russian attempts to include concrete incentives in their earlier proposal for a Global Control System (GCS) against ballistic missile proliferation met with a frosty reception in Washington. While noting that incentives could play a role in certain circumstances, the United States argued, “One-size-fits-all approaches to incentives would, however, be counterproductive in countering missile technology proliferation, and it is not clear that this can be done on a multilateral basis (in contrast to a bilateral basis).”[12] It seems likely that the US stance on this matter has hardened even further since the arrival of the present administration. Indeed, President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ comments and suspicion of the Agreed Framework deal with North Korea seems indicative of a general aversion towards a concession-based approach to ‘states of concern’.

Conclusion
The creation of a truly effective multilateral control system for ballistic missiles will be a difficult and complex task. Work on the issue is in its infancy, and basic dilemmas concerning the verification and universality of the regime still have to be confronted. Above all, there is the vexed question of providing incentives to join the regime. Are such enticements key elements of engaged and forward-thinking diplomacy or rather naïve measures of appeasement? Finding a common answer to this question will be central to the success or failure of any international regime.

Despite such difficulties, a multilateral approach to ballistic missile control demands sustained international consideration. There has often been a tendency to criticize the failings of missile defense without offering any positive policy alternatives to deal with the considerable threat from ballistic missiles and WMD. Increased thought and spending is necessary on a whole range of multilateral options, from Cooperative Threat Reduction in the former USSR to increased transparency in worldwide nuclear postures and targeting. Given the huge financial, technical and diplomatic complexities of missile defense, sensible alternatives must also be explored.  

___________________

Endnotes

[1] “Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile threat to the United States”, 15 July 1998. 

[2] “Secretary-General stresses need for multilaterally negotiated norms against development of missiles”, United Nations, Press Release SG/SM/6960, 15 April 1999

[3] Gerard Errera, Deputy director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, French Foreign Ministry Website

[4] “The Future of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation”, speech by Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 6 February 2002. 

[5] The founding members of the MTCR were: France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Japan. These have since been joined by: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other states - including China and Israel - have pledged to abide by the MTCR guidelines even though they do not join the regime itself. 

[6] “Missile Technology Control Regime - its Destabilizing Impact on South Asia” paper presented by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations at the United Nations Conference on “New Agenda for Disarmament and Regional Security” on 23 July 1997.

[7] The latest US National Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threat considers the missile programs of  Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. These are at various stages of development but only one – that of Russia – is fully within the MTCR regime. 

[8] “Verifiable Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, by Mark Smith, VERTIC Trust and Verify, January-February 2001. 

[9] Ibid.

[10] “International Response: Code of Conduct Ineffective, Experts Say”, by Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire, 15 February 2002.

[11] Alexander Yakovenko, the official spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, answers a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent about the results of the Paris Meeting on the Draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 13 February 2002.

[12] “ABM Treaty ‘Talking Points’ – Response to Russian Proposal on Development of a Global Monitoring System and Expansion of Co-operation in other Areas to Track Missiles and Missile Proliferation Technology”  Presented to Russian officials by U.S. negotiators during meetings in Geneva on January 19-21, 2000. Available from The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 

 
Back to NMD Home Page