The Trials and Tribulations of SBIRS-Low

By David Grahame
BASIC

As the United States pulls out of the ABM Treaty, the technological challenges of National Missile Defense (NMD) are becoming an ever more important focus of debate. Political demands for swift deployment of a workable system have increased the pressure on the testing regime. Both sides of the NMD argument are clambering for the scientific high ground amid disputed results and questionable test conditions. In this atmosphere, recent revelations concerning the Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low) provide an interesting insight both into the financial and technological hurdles missile defense faces and the wider political ramifications of scientific difficulties

The role of SBIRS-Low
As the Bush administration considers various architecture and options, the exact form that NMD will take is still uncertain. Nonetheless, it appears that SBIRS-Low is intended to play a key role. Consisting of 24-30 satellite radars in Low Earth Orbit, the SBIRS-Low system is intended to track hostile ICBMs as they travel through space. Satellite sensors will follow the incoming missiles and try to discriminate the live warhead from any possible decoys. SBIRS-Low then will feed targeting information to NMD Command and Control. The Low system is part of the larger SBIRS satellite network designed to replace the ageing Defense Support Program Satellites over the coming decade. Intended to provide greatly advanced early warning capabilities, the Low satellites will be complemented by the SBIRS-High system, which will comprise of six satellites in high orbit designed for initial launch detection and trajectory calculations.

There is consensus on both sides of the NMD argument that an effective missile defense system will need SBIRS-Low capability. Jack Spencer, a missile defense analyst for the pro-NMD Heritage Foundation, said that SBIRS-Low “is critical to effective missile defense, especially for more sophisticated threats.”(1) Likewise, John Pike, a military space analyst with GlobalSecurity.org, argued that the system “is the backbone of missile defense. I don’t see how the administration can move ahead without it.” (2)

Due to its perceived importance, the program has received substantial political and military support. In a June 2001 Senate hearing, Admiral Richard W. Mies, then Commander in Chief of US Strategic Command (STRATOM), described the SBIRS system as a program “critical to delivering time-sensitive information to decision-makers and warfighters.” (3) The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) supported such an assessment by requesting $385 million for the SBIRS-Low program in the fiscal year 2002 (FY 2002) defense budget.

There may be trouble ahead…
However, details emerged throughout 2001 of serious problems with the program. In particular, a House of Representatives committee report accompanying the FY 2002 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill launched a wide-ranging critique of the whole scheme. Recognizing that SBIRS-Low “represents an enormous technical challenge and is, according to one DoD official, the highest risk satellite program in DoD” (4), the report states, “The Committee is concerned by markedly negative trends in cost, schedule, and performance estimates for the final SBIRS Low configuration.” (5) Over the past year, the program’s life cycle cost has soared from $10 billion to $23 billion. This figure is more than half the amount the Pentagon previously predicted it would cost to build and maintain the whole NMD system for 20 years. However, even this figure may not be a accurate reflection of the final expense of SBIRS-Low as further difficulties are predicted and “the true program cost could be significantly higher.” (6)

Tightening congressional belts
These cost increases represent a serious threat to the program. The September 11 attacks created strong budgetary demands even as the US economic surpluses were disappearing. Indeed, US government economists anticipate deficits of just over $100 billion for this year and about $80 billion for 2003. In such an atmosphere, the huge expense of missile defense is under ever greater scrutiny. Carl Levin, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, noted in fall 2001: “When the missile defense debate resumes, there must be a renewed appreciation that every dollar we spend on the least likely threat of ballistic missiles is a dollar not spent on the most likely threat: terrorism.” (7)

Even if they support missile defense, fiscal conservatives are concerned about the costs and efficiency of NMD elements. This was clearly reflected in the torrid passage of the SBIRS-Low 2002 budget request. Following the committee criticisms mentioned above, the House version of the Defense Appropriations Bill actually recommended taking SBIRS-Low off the acquisition track. It advised instead that new funding tracks should be established to further develop the technology involved prior to acquisition. Only after heavy debate did the House and Senate joint conference offer the program $250 million, to be used at the discretion of defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The ground based option and political consequences
Even with this reprieve, the troubled scheme is already delayed by two years. Edward Aldridge, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, scheduled the first SBIRS-Low satellite launch for late 2007. This poses a problem for the Bush administration’s stated desire to get some kind of missile defense system, even if it is not perfect, operating in the very near future. In a July 2001 Senate hearing Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the BMDO, said that the Pentagon might, if a crisis seemed imminent, move to deploy a working missile defense system by 2005 or earlier. (8)

One possible solution is to rely more heavily on ground based radars to track incoming missiles. According to the House committee report, this option is favored by an as yet unreleased BMDO study into the cost and effectiveness of SBIRS-Low compared to ground and sea based alternatives:

The Committee understands that the study indicates that ground based radars not only provide a viable alternative to a space based system, but also provide this capability at significantly lower cost and risk. In addition, the prospect of building more ground based radars provide a graceful expansion of capability, if needed, based on changes in the threat or an evolving US strategy. (9)

The House report concludes, “A more prudent missile defense sensor strategy is to place near- and mid-term emphasis on ground based radars. Because of high cost and low technical maturity, a space based system appears to be more appropriate as a far-term option.” (10)

Such an approach would, however, have political and diplomatic ramifications. In particular, many US allies would be uneasy about allowing NMD radars to be based on their territory as they could provoke domestic discontent and protest, and could well become terrorist targets. A clear harbinger of these potential problems has been the heated debates in Britain and Greenland over whether to give the United States permission to deploy X-band radars at Fylingdales and Thule. (11) Ground based radars could also raise regional tensions. For example, both the Chinese and the Russians have been highly concerned by US plans to deploy an X-band radar in South Korea. (12)

Conclusion
The SBIRS-Low saga could well be a portent of the problems missile defense may face over the next decade. Serious congressional scrutiny of NMD technologies is likely to become a recurring theme, increasing in intensity if the fiscal situation takes a further downturn. In such an atmosphere, technological delays and difficulties will undoubtedly have powerful political consequences. Meanwhile, the tribulations of SBIRS-Low may further encourage an expansion of US ground based radar, with consequent diplomatic difficulties.

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Endnotes

(1) “Satellite system for US Missile Defense delayed by two years”, by Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg, 6 January 2002

(2) “Missile Defense early warning system in disarray, panel says”, by Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg, 7 November 2001

(3) Statement of Richard W. Mies, Commander in Chief United States Strategic Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Subcommittee, 11 July 2001

(4) Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2002 and Supplemental Appropriations 2002, House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, 19 November 2001. Document available here.

(5) Ibid

(6) Ibid

(7) Debate, “In the Wake of 11 September where does Missile Defense fit in security spending priorities”, Keith Payne v. Joseph Cirincione in Nato Review, Winter 2001-2002

(8) “Pentagon sets ambitious tests of missile plan”, by James Dao, New York Times, 13 July 2001

(9) Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2002 and Supplemental Appropriations 2002, House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, 19 November 2001

(10) Ibid

(11) For further information on these debates see BASIC's NMD home page

(12) “US to build radar base in South Korea for missile defense: report”, Associated Foreign Press, November 16, 2001. The piece reported how “The MD plan [for x-band radar in South Korea] has been a diplomatic tinder box between the United States and its key military rivals such as China and Russia.”

Many thanks to Dave Webb of the School of Engineering at Leeds Metropolitan University and Dr David Wright of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for their help in writing this article. Any errors are those of the author.

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