BASIC Notes

North Korean Nuclear Weapons Programme and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime:
Reactions and Prospects for Regime Adaptation

The October 16revelations that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is pursuing a uranium enrichment programme – with nuclear weapons capability the ultimate goal – is yet another shock to the increasingly beleaguered nuclear non-proliferation regime.1 Since the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995, the regime has suffered several setbacks, among them: the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, the rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the United States Senate in 1999 and the general rise of US unilateralism. Whereas shocks to the regime have, in the past, served as a useful catalyst for change (the Indian “peaceful” test of 1974 and the 1991 revelations about Iraq being cases in point), the shocks of the latter half of the 1990’s have noticeably failed to do so.

The frankness, if not the substance, of the North Korean revelations appear to have caught many in the international community – particularly the United States – entirely off-guard. This is not, of course, the first time a non-nuclear signatory to the NPT has reneged on its obligations. Nonetheless, these events pose a different sort of challenge to the regime: what can be done when a non-nuclear-weapons state (NNWS) in the NPT not only develops a nuclear programme in secret, but openly admits to its military nuclear intentions and thus reneges on its treaty commitments? Furthermore, what can be done if that state refuses international calls to disarm, does not (as of yet) withdraw from that treaty but instead attempts to turn its admission into a bargaining chip?

Article X of the NPT allows a Member State to give three months notice to withdraw from the treaty – an option that has been threatened (by the DPRK in the early 1990’s) but never exercised in the thirty-two years of the Treaty’s existence. India and Pakistan, while admitting freely to their nuclear programmes, remain outside the NPT. Israel, too, is a non-signatory that has not formally admitted to its nuclear arsenal. Iraq, while a non-nuclear party to the NPT, embarked upon a clandestine programme while denying its military aspirations in this area. The challenge posed by the DPRK today therefore constitutes a different style of cheating. The revelations of their programme and intentions, and the ways these revelations are addressed, consequently hold serious implications for the future credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

Such a challenge was one that, it was hoped, had been resolved in 1994 with the conclusion of the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States. Under this agreement, the DPRK undertook to freeze its nuclear programme, specifically the activities of operating a 5MW plutonium-producing reactor and the construction of two further gas graphite reactors (50 and 200 MW respectively) also capable of producing plutonium. In exchange, the Agreed Framework provided for the construction of two Light Water Reactors (LWR), which have the advantage of not being as proliferation-prone. This construction was to be undertaken by a US-led international consortium known as the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In addition, the DPRK was to be provided with 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil to compensate for the loss of its plutonium-producing reactors. The KEDO reactors remain uncompleted.

There is, at present, no indication that North Korea will withdraw from the NPT and, effectively, from the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The DPRK leadership has made much of its need for nuclear weapons as an unavoidable consequence of American hostility, most clearly expressed in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. It could therefore cite American policy toward it as comprising the “extraordinary events…[that] have jeopardized the supreme interests”2 which must precede the withdrawal of any state from the NPT.3 Invoking Article X would violate a long-standing taboo and set a dangerous precedent, one that would significantly weaken the regime’s authority.

The contradiction between North Korea’s open pursuit of a nuclear-weapon capability and its membership in the NPT as a non-nuclear signatory, is stark and brings with it its own set of problems. The response of the international community to this situation is thus critical to the future of global non-proliferation efforts.

The timing of the DPRK’s admissions, coinciding with the crisis between the UN and Iraq, might have discouraged concerted reactions. However, the obvious unease within the US Congress and the application of further economic sanctions by the United States in the wake of these revelations (most recently the cessation of fuel-oil shipments) demonstrate a willingness to react. Whether anything can be done, within the context of the very NPT regime whose credibility has been threatened by these events, is an entirely different matter.4 As it stands, the answer would appear to be no. While Article X of the NPT allows for a Party to the Treaty to withdraw from it, there is no facility within the NPT for other States to deal with, or even to ‘evict’ a Member State that is in violation of its obligations. The agreement that all non-nuclear signatories sign with the IAEA (INFCIRC/153) simply allows for the Board of Governors to report any violations to the United Nations Security Council.

The only enforcement recourse available within the context of the regime lies with the United Nations Security Council. The situation in Iraq, however, has taken pride of place on the agenda of that body. Even so, the East Asian geo-political context is very different from that of Iraq, rendering a military solution, by the Bush administration’s own admission, untenable. The Security Council would thus have to consider other means of applying pressure upon North Korea.

Where shocks to the nuclear non-proliferation regime have occurred and been incorporated into it, the adaptation of the regime’s norms and structure has traditionally been the product of political negotiations. This flexibility has not been sufficient in recent years, however, and the regime has been shown to have lacked the framework to deal with the latest challenges to it. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 galvanised Clinton administration efforts to convince India and Pakistan to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Following their unwillingness to sign that treaty, however, the possibility of bringing South Asia into the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime (outside the NPT) is at an impasse, especially exacerbated after the failure to ratify the CTBT in the American Senate. The NPT, with its division of Parties into nuclear-weapons states (those who have tested a nuclear device before July 1 1967) and non-nuclear-weapons states (everybody else), could not integrate them without fatally undermining the basis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself. The regime was unable to respond not because of a lack of will but because of a lack of viable, realistic solutions within the existing structure.

The DPRK has refused to end its nuclear programme unless the United States begins negotiations towards a non-aggression treaty and guarantees its sovereignty.

Yet the United States has already declared that the DPRK’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme is a prerequisite to any discussions. This is particularly true in the light of the perceived failure of the diplomatic carrots offered by the Agreed Framework to tempt the DPRK away from a nuclear weapons programme. Given the incompatibility of these two positions, the lack of progress is hardly surprising. Yet there remains an opportunity for NPT signatories to find solutions and arrive at an improved outcome. The Indian “peaceful” nuclear explosion of 1974 inspired six months or so of stunned inactivity before Congressional hearings on the subject whipped up sufficient American interest to pursue the multilateral export controls that ultimately resulted in the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. In the current DPRK case, one possible – albeit long-term – solution to the diplomatic impasse may lie in promoting and supporting the resuscitation of the so-called Sunshine Policy of working towards improved relations between North and South Korea.

While one shock to the regime is potentially a useful catalyst for change and renewed confidence, it does not necessarily follow that more are better. In the wake of the Indian and Pakistani tests, the concerns regarding Iraq, and the general loss of confidence in non-proliferation regimes, particularly in the United States, it may be that this latest development in North Korean could spell the end of the regime. In order to retain credibility, the nuclear non-proliferation regime must respond to these revelations and yet, it is difficult to see how it will be able to do so on either a structural or a normative level without undermining its own foundations.

1 We shall leave aside, for the time being, the recent confusion over whether or not the DPRK has admitted to possessing nuclear weapons.

2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article X, para.1.

3 The Agreed Framework, it should be recalled, obliges both the US and the DPRK to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.” (See “Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, Section II.)

4 This is not to argue that the regime has failed per se. No IAEA inspectors were ever allowed into the DPRK and thus cannot be accused of having failed to detect or prevent the North Korean weapons programme. The point is simply that the revelations have raised questions – justifiably or not – as to whether an international regime is an effective vehicle through which to deter or otherwise prevent nuclear proliferation.