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BASIC NOTES
1
December 2001
NMD:
Overview of the Political Debate in the United Kingdom
By
Mark Bromley and David Grahame
The
National Missile Defense debate in the United Kingdom is influenced
by a number of contradictory elements and arguments.
Political judgments jostle with national security concerns
and commitment to the ‘special relationship’ struggles against
differing transatlantic perceptions on multilateralism and
deterrence. The
confusion surrounding Labour’s stance on NMD is a result of the
variety of forces in play which make a clear decision very
difficult.
Blair,
Straw and the Special Relationship
Since
the arrival of the Bush administration in the White House, there
have been mounting signals
from the upper echelons of government that British support for NMD
is increasingly likely. This culminated on 24 October 2001 when,
during Prime Minister’s Questions, Tony Blair stated “I do not
agree with those who are opposed to it [NMD]. During the summit with
President Bush in February, we made it clear that we were prepared
to look at defensive as well as offensive systems.”
This
represents a marked change in thinking. During the Clinton
presidency the UK government was not averse to allowing ministers to
raise doubts about the wisdom of the scheme. In March 2000, Peter Hain, the then UK Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs stated “I don't like the idea of
a Star Wars programme, limited or unlimited… Any decision it [the
US] makes must be done in close co-operation and agreement with the
Russians.” Again in December 2000 Hain stated “We have made it clear
that any means to go down the road of the National Missile Defence
System (NMD) must be, as an absolute pre-condition, by an agreement
with the Russians. An agreement to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty would be required. We don't want to see that abrogated
unilaterally by the Americans. If this happened, it would be
extremely dangerous and could unleash a world arms race involving
Russia, China and so on.”
Since
the Bush administration came to power there have been various
reports of the enormous pressure being placed on the UK government
to abandon this ambiguity and come out in favor of NMD.
An article in February 2001, for example, indicated that US
administration officials were furious with the UK position.
It quoted one as saying “you’re either with us or
you’re not.” In the
face of these efforts, the UK government has taken a progressively
more receptive tone.
In
May 2001, Tony Blair’s Press secretary, Alistair Campbell, told
reporters that he viewed missile defense as a “good idea.”
Meanwhile, in August, an adviser to Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw sent out a briefing paper on NMD which clearly supported the
US proposals. The paper
argued:
“Missile
Defence is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort,
but part of it. Proliferators are not irrational. All our
non-proliferation instruments – the multilateral Treaties,
national and international export controls, interception/disruption
operations etc are ultimately aimed at affecting the cost/benefit
calculation that all proliferators must make, however crudely.
Effective Missile Defence can do the same, by reducing the likely
benefit of developing WMD-armed missiles (or by raising the cost,
through the need to build more, or more sophisticated, systems). It
therefore complements, not replaces, the other tools in the
non-proliferation toolbox.”
Tony
Blair seems to have been won over by these arguments and on 30
September, The Observer reported that
he had given the green light to NMD, telling his colleagues
it was “inevitable”.
The
political reasons for responding to US pressure and voicing support
are twofold. First, the Labour Party’s damaging debates on
unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1970s and 1980s left the
impression that Labour was weak on defense issues, and were widely
attributed to having contributed to its electoral defeats in the
1980s and early 1990s. Blair
is keen to avoid a recurrence of these debates and deny the
Conservatives a potent political weapon.
Central to this agenda is the need to convince the public
that Labour is committed to the ‘special relationship.’
Secondly,
the close ties between the US and the UK affords Britain political,
military and strategic advantages that Blair is keen to preserve.
The UK enjoys often unique technology-sharing agreements with
the US. Examples
include the Trident system, the Tomahawk Cruise missile and the
Joint Strike Fighter. Britain
also enjoys favorable access to US intelligence operations,
particularly through specialist imagery and signals intelligence
such as the Echelon system, partly based at Menwith Hill.
These benefits guarantee the UK government a level of
international prestige and influence that it might not otherwise
enjoy. All of this
would be at risk should the UK fail to allow the US the use of radar
bases for NMD.
It
is therefore something of a surprise that the UK government has yet
to openly support the proposals. While in private the Government is keen to placate its
American allies, in public it is still sticking to the line it has
held since Bush came to power.
This line was again reiterated during defense questions on 29
October. Geoff Hoon stated:
“We
share US concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery, and that we shall continue
to work together to tackle the potential threat with a comprehensive
strategy. However, it
remains the case that the US has not decided how it wishes to
proceed with missile defence and has made no request for the use of
facilities in the United Kingdom.”
This
ongoing reticence reflects the fact that there are still strong
forces at all levels of government arguing against NMD.
These pressures remain potent and leave the question over the
use of UK-based radars wide open.
The
Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense
There
are strong concerns in Whitehall policy circles that NMD is a
dangerous political exercise, which will be ultimately damaging to
Britain’s national security. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
is deeply worried about the strategic instability the project could
bring and the threat it poses to multilateral arms control.
David Clark, Robin Cook’s special adviser from 1994 till
the last election, wrote in July 2001 that Cook never supported NMD
and that the Foreign Office remained heavily opposed.
Clark argued that British policy makers believe “there is
no strategic rationale for NMD” and views the project as
“sledgehammer designed to crack a walnut”.
The
Ministry of Defense is similarly fearful of NMD,
worrying that it will drain funds and attention from other
important defense procurement projects.
These concerns were clearly expressed by the Chief of the
Defense Staff, Sir Michael Boyce, in an interview on 28 July:
“There's
no point in completely impoverishing ourselves in order to provide
ourselves with a defence against one particular system and not being
able to do anything else ... As far as I'm concerned there is no way
I'm in the position to suggest we can pay for any missile defence
technology from within the existing defence budget and carry on
doing what we are doing at the moment…We must make sure we don't
leave out the Russians or indeed the Chinese... We must be sensible
about how we work with them, we - the west in general - and the
Americans in particular.”
This
deep unease within the Whitehall establishment concerning NMD
reflects the challenges that the
proposed system poses to long-standing UK security thinking. For the
last fifty years this thinking has been based on three tenets;
nuclear deterrence, multilateral arms control and national security.
US NMD plans represent a full frontal attack on all three of
these beliefs. Deterrence
is undermined by the possibility that the US could launch a nuclear
attack without fear of reprisal, multilateral arms control is
endangered by challenges to the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and
national security is threatened as UK involvement makes Britain a
target for enemies of the US.
NMD
poses a huge threat to conventional thinking both within the FCO and
the MoD, but rather than confront the issue head on and risk the
anger of the Americans, officials are instead hoping that due to
issues of cost and technology, the problem will simply disappear. As
David Clark noted “The strategy of the Foreign Office was … to
play for time in the hope that events would conspire to get the
Government out of its hole; technological failure, spiralling costs,
a deal with Russia or even the collapse of North Korea.”
Political
Opposition
This
deep unease at the highest levels of the UK government is matched by
increasingly vocal opposition from the rank and file of the Labour
Party; its backbench MPs, the Trade Unions and its constituency
members.
Parliament
as a whole appears averse to the idea of NMD.
Hence, an Early Day Motion tabled by Malcolm Savidge strongly
questioning the wisdom of the US plans has collected 280 signatures
- a vast number considering that government ministers and whips are
not allowed to sign and that very few EDMs collect more that 100
names. The motion:
“expresses
concern at President Bush's intention to move beyond the constraints
of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in developing missile defence;
and endorses the unanimous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee, which recommended that the Government voice the grave
doubts about NMD in the UK, questioned whether US plans to deploy
NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems
faced by the international community and recommended that the
Government encourage the USA to explore all ways of reducing the
threat it perceives.”
This
EDM has been supported by the Liberal Democrats who have declared in
their manifesto that NMD was “a threat to international stability
and arms control agreements.”
Political
opposition has also arisen from outside of parliament with both
trade unions and local Labour groups bringing pressure to bear.
On 14 June 2001 eighteen trade union general secretaries
wrote to the Guardian arguing that NMD would do “immense
damage to international treaties covering weapons of mass
destruction” and that it would be “wholly inappropriate for our
government to support this initiative and [we] strongly urge it not
to do so.” Likewise, at the last Labour Party Conference there
were 17 motions, mostly from Constituency Labour Parties, voicing
concern over Blair’s support for NMD.
These were thrown out on the grounds that they were not
“contemporary” prompting anger in Labour ranks and charges that
Blair was trying to “gag” his party.
September
11 and the military campaign
Given
the current international crisis it is difficult to determine how
these different pressures will play out.
Prior to September 11th there were clear
indications that pressure was building, leading towards an
uncomfortable confrontation between the government and its
backbenchers and supporters. Given
the present need to sustain a unified coalition, it would seem that
such a confrontation is unlikely in the near future.
However, as the current military action draws on this may not
last. Increased
civilian casualties and a possible expansion of military action to
Iraq will erode public support for the war and again raise doubts
about the direction of US security policy.
In this environment, NMD will inevitably return to the fore,
again placing the Government in a difficult position.
In
addition, there are some indications that the Government believes
that the current crisis offers it the opportunity to be more
strident in raising its concerns with Washington over the direction
of US policy. Asked in
the House about the US Government's refusal to ratify the
comprehensive test ban treaty, its stated wish to abandon the
anti-ballistic missile treaty and continuing efforts to develop NMD,
Defense Minister Adam Ingram replied: “Clearly, we can take
considerable comfort from the active role played by the US in
engaging with its allies and countries with which it would not
previously have engaged. We are now in a new international
environment and progress can be made on the back of that.” It
remains to be seen whether this new spirit of international
cooperation will persist.
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