BASIC NOTES

 25 August 2000

Pushing the Wedge:  NMD and U.S. Alliances

By James Nagelberg

In 1992, less than three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and only a year and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gen. Colin Powell, then-U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned against isolationism and a break in American commitment to European allies. "The American people are wise enough to know that we must be as strongly linked with Europe in the future as we have been in the past," he said.[1]

Today, the number of deployed troops in Europe has dropped by two-thirds from Cold War levels and, while the transatlantic relationship is defined by more than mere numbers, European allies feel that their voices are being unheard in Washington. At the same time, a renewed American focus on Asia has created a threat perception among U.S. policy-makers that is driving the controversial program to create a National Missile Defense (NMD) network – in spite of European protests.

The New Threat Perception
Since the report of the Rumsfeld Commission and North Korea’s testing of its Taepo Dong-1 missile in 1998, Asia has been at the heart of American foreign and defense policy-making.

"The defense studies and 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have moved the U.S. from planning on winning a war in Europe to one in Asia and one in the Middle East – both threats in the Asian theater. Today, everything points in that direction. The entire military planning structure is based on this," said Tomas Valasek, a senior Europe analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington.

The intense interest among U.S. military officials and Congress in development of a NMD system is part and parcel of that trend. "The limited system is a very Asian-oriented system," said Dr. Larry Niksch, a senior Asian analyst at the Congressional Research Service, the semi-independent research arm of the U.S. Congress based in Washington. "Clearly, in the back of some people’s minds, China is a factor in this debate."

From James Woolsey, former director of Central Intelligence, to congressional leaders such as Rep. Benjamin Gilman, R-N.Y., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, policy- and decision-makers throughout Washington have been slowly coming out of the closet to reveal their own beliefs about the need for a NMD system that could counter a Chinese nuclear launch. Though China has only a minimal nuclear deterrent – roughly two dozen liquid-fuel, single warhead ICBMs – paranoia among the so-called China hawks continues to drive deployment of the unproven, multibillion dollar NMD system.

"It’s easy to talk about North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, but people don’t like to talk about Russia or China. But people privately also are a little worried that there could be another threat from China. I’m candidly telling you that behind closed doors you hear some people expressing concerns about ultimate threats from China," said Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., in July.[2] 

Kyl has not been shy about including China in the NMD equation in the past. Nearly a year ago, Kyl stated that a "National Missile Defense must be able to defeat and deter the Chinese threat."[3] 

Deaf Ears to Europe
The change in threat perception has caused a shift in American policy that at times has excluded European interests. "In defense policy, you tend to avoid areas of stability, so America isn’t worried about Europe as much as Asia. In other words, no threats equals no attention," said Valasek.

In fact, the Asian drift in Washington has been a gradual one. According to Stanley R. Sloan, a private consultant and retired senior specialist with the Congressional Research Service, "In [President Bill] Clinton’s first year of office, the administration attempted to use a tilt in policy toward Asia to gain leverage in diplomatic dealings with Europe. That turned out to be a bad strategy that upset our allies."

After realizing the flaws in this strategy, policy-makers began to change how they deal with the European allies. "The administration is finally having consultations with the European allies now, but they’re falling short of accomplishing the administration’s goals," said Dr. Sean Kay, a Politics and Government professor at Ohio Wesleyan University.

A large part of the failure in American diplomatic efforts in Europe on NMD has been the seemingly deaf ear of the administration and Congress. The tunnel vision created by a threat analysis aimed at Asia has allowed European views to go disregarded.

"We’ve certainly overlooked the European position on NMD because we’re so focused on threats from Iran, Iraq and Korea," said Valasek.

Sloan added that, "Too many members of Congress are dismissive to European attitudes. In terms of strategy, what the Europeans think should play a larger role in decision-making for Congress and the administration."

The dismissive response from U.S. leaders over NMD and an array of other issues has contributed to European feelings of neglect. "Had we prioritized conversations with our allies a year ago, we might not be having this open debate on NMD right now. The administration was handing down decisions without making a true dialogue of it," said Kay.

Leaders from virtually all of America’s European and NATO allies have expressed their frustration in dealing with the United States on NMD.

"Unilateral efforts to build defenses against the dangers [of missile attacks] are unlikely to provide lasting security and might quite possibly increase insecurity," said Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.[4]

Following the release of a negative report on the U.S. NMD proposal by the Foreign Affairs Committee in the U.K. House of Commons, Committee Chairman Donald Anderson said, "We should make crystal clear to the U.S. that it cannot take our cooperation for granted."[5] 

Beyond Europe
The U.S. administration’s insistence on developing an NMD network has worried many American friends and allies beyond Europe’s borders as well.

"The Japanese have only supported missile defense politely. They really don’t support it because they are uneasy about getting caught between the U.S. and China. South Korea doesn’t want the system either, because it already has lived with North Korean missiles and artillery for a long time and they think the only way to remove the threat is to put an end to enmity. Even the [American] armed services are scared stiff about NMD because they think it will eat their budget," said Dr. Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council.

The Real Threat
While the 1999 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), summarized and submitted by the National Intelligence Council as an unclassified report to Congress, added to the support for NMD when it declared that North Korea could hit the continental United States with an ICBM in the next 15 years, the most recent NIE should set American policy for the future. The still-classified document has been reported to say "European concerns could strain the Atlantic alliance."[6]

Many analysts agree that the largest threat faced by the United States would be the diplomatic repercussions of a decision to deploy a NMD. "Everyone focuses on the military response to NMD deployment, but the real threat is the political response and what that does to diplomatic relations, especially with our allies. This is a stupid game as long as there’s no near-term threat or capability to deploy," said Sigal.

Addressing Clinton’s four requirements for NMD deployment, Sloan told BASIC that: "The cost of dividing ourselves from our allies and the Russians is pretty high. Competitors could become potential foes and allies could be alienated. A cost-benefit analysis says that we should look for another program that makes overall security better than worse. The short-term danger is that you would force Europeans closer to a position similar to Russia and China rather than the U.S. and that would be a mistake, possibly in ways you can’t quantify in the short-term."

Even if a decision is made not to deploy a NMD network, U.S. leaders must make a better effort to cooperate with its European allies in the post-Cold War world.

"If we’re coming heavy-handed in negotiations and not consulting with our allies, we’re contributing to a Europe that will develop its policies in spite of U.S. beliefs. Is that the kind of relationship with Europe we want? Or do we want one that is a cooperative and productive? If we’re not careful, we can create a confrontational relationship with Europe rather than a true alliance. The alliance is firm right now, but needs bolstering. We have to start working with our allies at a bottom-up kind of level," said Kay.

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Endnotes

1 Survival, Summer 1992

2 New York Times, July 5, 2000

3 Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, World Forum Conference Panel on National Missile Defense, June 24-27, 1999

4 Reuters, March 22, 2000

5 London Daily Telegraph, Aug. 3, 2000

6 Washington Post, Aug. 10, 2000

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