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BASIC NOTES March 1997 What Outcome for the NPT PrepCom?The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the year 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will take place from 7-18 April at the United Nations in New York. This meeting will begin to implement the decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. As such, the PrepCom will establish a precedent and set the tone for future meetings and the 2000 Review Conference. If the PrepCom falls into a quagmire of procedural debates or fails to look forward as well as back, it could undermine the integrity of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. If, however, the PrepCom focuses on agreeing concrete goals, undertaking a brief but thorough review of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament since 1995 and setting out the next steps, it will significantly enhance international security. At the 1995 NPT Conference, states parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely and simultaneously undertook two further commitments: Strengthening the Review Process and Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The latter document established non-proliferation and disarmament goals including agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996, early completion of a ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons...". These three intertwined agreements will all play a role in the NPT review. The review of events since 1995 will recognize many milestones, in particular agreement on the CTBT, the International Court of Justice ruling on the general illegality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, signature by the nuclear-weapon states to the Pelindaba and Rarotonga Treaties on nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa and the South Pacific, progress toward universality of the NPT, ratification of START II in the US, and, most recently, US-Russian agreement on a framework for START III that could reduce their strategic arsenals to a level of 2,000-2,500 warheads by 2007. Unfortunately, the next steps on the multilateral disarmament agenda face a difficult road. Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on a fissile cut-off have yet to begin, tied up by prerequisites from some states for action on nuclear disarmament. The demand from many non-nuclear weapon states for an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament at the CD is rebuffed by the Western nuclear weapon states. The non-aligned Cartagena statement1 and the "Proposal for a Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons"2 from 28 members of the non-aligned movement at the CD have been virtually ignored. Demands for stronger assurances to non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are similarly disregarded. France and the United Kingdom refuse to join any multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament at present. Meanwhile, plans to expand NATO threaten to create a new dividing line in Europe, endangering arms control as a whole. The PrepCom provides the opportunity to address many of these shortcomings, but only if states parties are willing to use the meeting to push ahead the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.3 From Strengthening the Review Process, the purpose of the PrepCom is to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference." What form could those recommendations take, and what could they be? There are at least three options for the "product" of the PrepCom. One option would have each PrepCom agree its own "Final Document" by consensus. Unfortunately, attempts to get such complete consensus will almost inevitably end up mimicking the generally unsuccessful efforts at Review Conferences, with more time spent arguing over words than focusing on substance. A second option is a "rolling text" that would be handed on from one PrepCom to the next and adopted at the final PrepCom. This option, while increasing opportunity for eventual consensus, would lower the status of any agreement that can be attained at earlier PrepComs. This would not fulfil the vision for substantive PrepComs agreed in 1995. A third option is a Chair's statement that might encompass the other alternatives. This possibility, because it is the most flexible, would create the greatest chance for a successful PrepCom. A Chair's statement would avoid the difficulties associated with agreeing a final document by consensus, while allowing much stronger conclusions than are possible in a rolling text. To do this, a Chair's statement could include three parts: a summary of the discussions and debates at the PrepCom; a section of statements, goals and/or priorities agreed at the PrepCom by consensus (and thus having the greatest weight); and a section of "working documents". The last section could include proposals and texts drafted by parties but not necessarily agreed, i.e., a kind of rolling text that does not need to hold together as one document, at least not for early PrepComs.4 In this way, each PrepCom would have the opportunity to reach consensus positions where possible, yet via the Chair's summary and the working documents, reflect both what was achieved and what remains to be done. For example, the commitment to a CTBT in the Principles and Objectives has been attained. As Strengthening the Review Process explicitly calls for considering Principles and Objectives, it makes sense to agree points that update this document. Thus, a consensus statement recognizing the CTBT and calling for its rapid entry into force would be appropriate. More important, however, would be to establish a new concrete goal to replace the accomplished one. Several possibilities exist. One possibility would be to set as a goal a treaty on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and agreement on reciprocal no first use undertakings between the nuclear weapon states. Progress on this issue has long been a high priority for many non-nuclear weapon states. UN Security Council Resolution no. 984, passed shortly before the 1995 NPT Conference, and the unilateral statements by the nuclear weapon states have not satisfied many non-nuclear weapon states. In essence, a treaty on non-use would codify and enhance the existing unilateral statements. Thus, the first PrepCom could call by consensus for a multilateral treaty on non-use to be negotiated at the CD. The status and mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances at the CD could be addressed as well. As laid out in Strengthening the Review Process, the PrepCom could recommend the establishment of a subsidiary body to consider this and related issues. This subsidiary body would meet intersessionally, similar to working groups established under the Biological Weapons Convention. A second subsidiary body could also be established to consider proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and other regions. In support of Principles and Objectives' call for a "programme of action" on nuclear disarmament, the PrepCom could endorse the goals set out in the report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, such as taking nuclear forces off alert, removing warheads from delivery vehicles, ending deployment of non-strategic weapons, and initiating negotiations to further reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals. Another possibility could be to set a date for completion of the fissile cut-off negotiations, although given that talks have yet to start and that two of the key players on the issue - India and Pakistan - are not party to the NPT, this may be premature. Still, the parallel to the CTBT precedent in Principles and Objectives makes this a viable option. To assist in the preparation of all sections of the Chair's statement, the model used by Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the 1995 NPT Conference, could work well again. The work of the "President's Group" he assembled - including representatives from each of the major factions - was the key to agreement at the Conference. The Chair of the first PrepCom could create a similar body to allow for focused, informal discussions of proposed goals and statements. __________________ Endnotes
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