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ACRONYM
BOOKLETS
This page provides the
Executive Summaries of the eight "Red Books" produced by
the Acronym Consortium between May 1994 and October 1995. These
booklets provide extensive information on the NPT review process,
including Preparatory Committee meetings and the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference, negotiations on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), and developments at the Conference on
Disarmament. To obtain full copies, please email
us or order them from here.
ACRONYM booklet No.
1
A
Comprehensive Test Ban within reach
By Rebecca Johnson
and Dr. Sean Howard
Executive Summary
Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) started at
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in January. This
booklet analyses the first session of talks: 25 January to 31 March.
A CTBT is one of the key
disarmament goals enshrined in the NPT. Progress made during the
first session of talks suggests it is realistic to expect the
successful conclusion of negotiations before April 1995, when the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) extension
conference opens in New York. However, many states appear reconciled
to a longer timetable, in which negotiations would not be finalised
until after the NPT extension conference, with the expectation of a
CTBT being approved by the UN in October 1995, ready for signature
by member states in the following year. This timetable carries with
it a serious risk that negotiations could be derailed. When a new
French president takes office in May 1995, France is expected to
resume testing. The other nuclear weapon states may take this as
their cue to raise new obstacles, and the opportunity could be lost.
Many states have
declared that the outcome of the NPT extension conference will be
linked with the successful negotiation of a CTBT. The UK, followed
by France, has reversed this linkage, arguing that the successful
conclusion of a CTBT is dependent upon the indefinite extension of
the NPT. There are suggestions that the UK and France may be
proposing 'reverse linkage' in order to slow down negotiations until
less favourable circumstances prevail.
Britain and France are
requesting provision for the nuclear weapon states to conduct
'safety tests' on their stockpiles. China is interested in retaining
the option to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. The issue of
safety tests is still bubbling among sections of the US
administration and the US labs are reportedly lobbying hard for
hydro-nuclear testing to be exempt from the treaty. Any nuclear
explosions, for whatever ostensible purpose, could potentially be
used to provide data useful to nuclear weapons design and
development. Such options would undermine the concept and
credibility of a CTBT, and greatly complicate verification of the
treaty. A comprehensive test ban should ban all nuclear explosions,
including those at a very low threshold.
China, the only state to
have tested since the moratorium, wants to conduct more tests before
the treaty is concluded, and does not want to sign until 1996. In
what are widely viewed as delaying tactics, China wants a CTBT to
contain security assurances for non nuclear states and commitments
on no first use of nuclear weapons. The consensus seems to be that
these issues are best dealt with in separate negotiations.
The Clinton
administration has become a powerful and effective champion of the
cause of a CTBT. However, much of its good work may be undone by its
opposition to the admission of Iraq into the CD which also blocks
the entry of 22 other states, including North Korea, South Africa,
Israel and Ukraine. These states plus Iraq are among the most
important to try to bring into negotiations and encourage to join a
CTBT.
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ACRONYM booklet No. 2
A
Comprehensive Test Ban:
Setback for an Early Treaty
By Rebecca Johnson
and Dr. Sean Howard
Executive Summary
This report summarises the second session of negotiations (16 May --
1 July) for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
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In April-May 1995,
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension
Conference will decide how much longer the NPT
will remain in force. The linkage between the CTBT and the NPT
extension process may not be in the best interests of either
treaty at this time, but it is undeniably relevant. The CTB
negotiations are too important in the broader arms control and
non-proliferation context to be allowed to proceed as if they
had all the time in the world. Timeliness will be an important
factor in the treaty's effectiveness.
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Contrary to
expectations, the Chair of the CD s Nuclear Test Ban (NTB)
Committee was unable to table a draft treaty at the end of the
second session. This was due to a number of political and
technical reasons, examined below. Perhaps the most important of
these, especially in determining US and Wester European actions,
was the concern that France and China be kept fully within the
negotiating process. The priority for the US appears to be to
keep the five declared nuclear weapon states together, rather
than to be "out front pulling" for a treaty by next
Spring.
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Instead of a Chair's
text as a basis for negotiations, heavily bracketed language has
been compiled from the reports of the working groups on
verifications (Working Group 1) and on legal and institutional
issues (Working Group 2). These compilations give little
indication of areas of broad agreement or level of support for
particular proposals. To focus negotiations and put the
possibility of a timely treaty back on track, there is a need
for a more compact rolling text early in the third session.
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The third and
penultimate meeting of the Committee preparing the NPT Extension
Conference meets in Geneva in September. If the test ban
negotiations have not made substantial progress by then, this
issue could end up dominating the discussion, to the detriment
of other vital concerns which need to be addressed before the
Extension Conference.
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ACRONYM booklet no. 3
By Rebecca Johnson
and Dr. Sean Howard
Executive Summary
This report reviews the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) underway at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in
Geneva since January 1994. Diplomatic preparations for the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Extension
Conference next April have been running in parallel to the CTBT
talks. Because a CTBT is an important goal enshrined in the NPT,
this ACRONYM report discusses the relationship between the two
issues. It also assesses progress made by the NPT's Preparatory
Committee (PrepComm) and the likely outcome of unresolved issues.
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The third session
resulted in a 93-page heavily bracketed rolling text.
Intersessional negotiations have been agreed for 28 November -
16 December, with the possibility of additional talks in
January. The most important issues yet to be agreed are scope,
entry-into-force, verification and the Implementing
Organization.
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Until the scope of
the treaty is finalised little further substantive progress can
be made. While the P5 nuclear weapons continue to haggle over
safety tests (favoured by the UK and France), peaceful nuclear
explosions (favoured by China), not classifying laboratories as
an "environment" (Russia) and thresholds for
hydronuclear testing (the USA, Russia, the UK, and France), the
vast majority of states, as well as international public
opinion, want a comprehensive test ban on all nuclear testing,
with no exceptions or thresholds.
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Despite its forceful
advocacy of an early treaty, the US has surprised its allies by
tabling a proposal to allow relatively easy withdrawal from the
treaty after ten years. Perceived as threatening the treaty's
duration, this proposal commands no support and is viewed as
helpful and dangerous in the run-up to the NPT extension.
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Although progress on
a CTBT has been disappointing for hopes of a timely treaty,
satisfaction at having agreed a rolling text--albeit
heavily-bracketed--is likely to prevent the CTB issue from
damaging the 3rd meeting of the NPT's PrepComm, 12-16 September
in Geneva. The implications of the CTB negotiations for the NPT
Extension Conference next April will be determined by whether it
can reach agreement on the key articles identified above. If
significant progress is not made, and with possible changes of
government in France, the USA, and Russia in the near future,
there is a danger that momentum may be lost altogether.
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ACRONYM booklet no. 4
Strengthening
the Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Decisions Made, Decisions Deferred
By Rebecca Johnson
Executive Summary
The third of four meetings of the committee preparing the 1995 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Conference took
place in Geneva on September 12-16, 1994. The Plenary Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) is seeking to finalise arrangements and
procedures for the confrence whose main task will be to determine
the further duration of the NPT. It was attended by 89 States
Parties, and -- for the first time -- by seven non-Party governments
and 51 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as observers. This is a
report of the Third PrepCom
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The major issues
requiring decision were the 1995 Conference agenda; the rules of
procedure, including costs and method of adopting the extension
decision; background documentation for the Conference;
appointment of Chairs for the Conference committees; and
appointment of a chair for the fourth PrepCom, to be held in New
York in January.
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Although substantial
agreement was reached on all the issues, the Third PrepComm was
unable to reach consensus, and had to remit the draft agenda,
rules of procedure, background documentation and appointment of
Chairs to the fourth PrepCom.
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Conclusion of a
legally binding agreement on security assurances to non-nuclear
weapons states Parties and a comprehensive test ban treaty are
two objectives that would substantially increase the prospect of
a successful NPT Review and Extension Conference. Among the
objectives identified, these two would be possible to achieve
before April 1995 if political will were exerted by national
governments.
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ACRONYM booklet no. 5
Extending
the Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Endgame
By Rebecca Johnson
Executive Summary
The fourth and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting to
organize the 1995 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Extension and Review Conference took place in New York on January
23-27, 1995. It was attended by 142 States Parties, 7 non-party
observers, and 72 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Altogether
154 States Parties and 91 NGOs have attended one or more PreComs
since 1993. This is a report of the fourth PrepCom.
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The Fourth PrepCom,
characterised as "co-operative" by its Chair,
Ambassador Patokallio of Finland, agreed the outstanding
decisions on the agenda of the 1995 Conference and chairs of the
committees. Two matters were remitted: Rule 28, which deals with
voting procedure, particularly regarding the extension decision;
and whether there should be two final documents dealing
separately with the review of the treaty and the extension
decision, or one, covering both. An inter-sessional meeting will
be held in New York, April 14-15 to finalize the rules before
the NPT Conference.
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Although over 70
states have declared support for indefinite extension, there are
growing indications that more parties are becoming interested in
the "third option" of a "rolling" extension
of successive fixed periods. Emphasizing the importance of
political credibility over minimum legal requirements,
non-aligned states are calling for the extension decision to be
made by consensus.
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Differences over
voting procedures for the extnsion decision is a strategically
important debate over the validity of various extension options
and the mechanisms most condusive to particular outcomes. This
will prove particularly important if several alternatives for a
rolling extension are put forward, as the length of period and
the renewing mechanism will have crucial political implications.
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The primary reason
for opposition to indefinite extension is the widespread
perception of a lack of convincing progress on, and genuine
commitment to, nuclear disarmament. At the very minimum, some
real progress on security assurances, a fissile materials
cut-off, and agreement on at least the scope and verification of
a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT) is urgently required.
However, consideration must be given now to a range of more
far-reaching measures.
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ACRONYM booklet no. 6
By Rebecca Johnson
Executive Summary
The 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)
will be held in New York from April 17 to May 12. The 175 States
Parties will review the implementation of the Treaty since it
entered into force 25 years ago, and decide on whether to extend it
indefinitely or for a fixed period or successive periods. ACRONYM
Report No 6 analyses the extension options and procedural debates
over voting, and provides a full report and analysis of negotiations
on a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and fissile cut-off in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) during 1994 and the first months of
1995.
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The work of the CD
this year has been overshadowed by the politics of the NPT. This
has prevented multilateral discussions on several issues and
appeared to paralyse political initiative within the Nuclear
Test Ban (NTB) Committee for most of the negotiations, which
concentrated instead on streamlining the draft treaty text and
the verification system.
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Two major political
breakthroughs were announced on the first and last days of the
CD. On day one, the US retracted its special right of withdrawal
-- the widely condemned easy exit proposal, and committed to a
permanent treaty. On the final day, the UK, supported by France,
withdrew the unpopular provision for safety testing in
exceptional circumstances, thereby opening the way for agreement
on a scope article.
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The most contentious
political questions to be resolved are scope, entry into force
and the composition of the Executive Council of the Implementing
Organisation. With exceptions out of the way, the primary scope
problems are China s desire to retain nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes and low yield nuclear explosive testing, known
as hydronuclear experiments (HNE), which the other four nuclear
weapon states want to be able to conduct. Though the test ban
issue is unlikely to cause problems at the NPT Conference, there
are growing anxieties among non-nuclear-weapon states that
negotiations are too slow and that the nuclear-weapon states
could decide on a form of threshold which would negate the CTBT
s purpose as an instrument to promote nuclear disarmament as
well as non-proliferation.
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After disagreements
over the inclusion of existing stockpiles, the CD agreed a
fissile cut-off mandate which made no direct mention of stocks,
but left the scope of a cut-off Convention open for discussion
in the Cut-Off Committee, expected to begin in June. Many
non-aligned states are concerned that a cut-off which only halts
future production will appear to legitimise existing military
stockpiles.
The advocates of
indefinite extension of the NPT are now confident that they have
sufficient votes. However, a successful outcome resulting in a
strengthened non-proliferation regime will depend on more than the
numbers. Much depends on the conduct of the review debates, and on
what procedures are agreed for voting and recording the extension
and review decisions. Though conditions directly attached to the
Treaty will be resisted, there may be stronger calls for a timebound
framework or steps to bring about nuclear disarmament in compliance
with Article VI. While recent progress has diminished the influence
of a CTBT and fissile cut-off on the Review debates, a sharpened
focus is expected on security assurances, military and commercial
stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), export
controls and regional concerns. To secure its ends, the NPT
Conference must not just extend the Treaty, but give it a new lease
of life. All its Parties must renew their commitment to its
objectives and a more effective programme for achieving them.
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ACRONYM booklet no. 7
By Rebecca Johnson
Executive Summary
The 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
was held in New York, 17 April to 12 May. It was attended by 175 of
175 states parties and by 195 non-governmental organisations. This
is a report of the NPT Conference and analysis of its decisions.
On 11 May the states
parties decided without a vote to extend the NPT indefinitely. The
decision was taken as part of a politically binding package which
included Principles and Objectives for non-proliferation and
disarmament, and agreement on additional meetings of the Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) to enhance the Treaty review process.
The Principles called
for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) no
later than 1996 and a programme of action on nuclear disarmament,
including a ban on production of fissile materials for weapons
purposes ('Fissban'), and systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons, with the 'ultimate goal[s] of eliminating
those weapons...'.
Since then, China has
conducted two nuclear tests. On 15 May and 17 August, saying that it
will stop once a CTUT has entered into force. On 13 June, France
announced that it would resume testing with a series of up to eight
explosions between September and May (the first of which occurred on
5 September). France claimed these were necessary to enable it to
sign a CTBT in 1996. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) still lacks
agreement on the main CTBT articles of scope, verification, entry
into force and the implementing organisation. The CD has so far
failed to convene a committee to negotiate a convention that would
ban fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, despite agreeing
its mandate on 23 March.
Universality, and
particularly the nuclear weapons programme of Israel, became a major
focus of the Conference. At the insistence of 14 Arab states, a
resolution on Middle East security issues was also passed without a
vote. The Conference urged all states to adhere to the Treaty and
sought to put pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan by agreeing in
the Principles that NPT parties would not supply nuclear materials
and technology to any state that refuses to put its nuclear
facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.
The Conference failed to
reach consensus on a Final Declaration summarising its review of the
Treaty. It came to important agreements on security assurances,
safeguards, cooperation, safety, transshipment and dumping of
nuclear materials, and so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.
However, there was bitter deadlock on nuclear disarmament. The
non-nuclear-weapon states wanted much more than the nuclear-weapon
states were prepared to offer.
Western states were
united on indefinite extension but divided over nuclear disarmament.
Non-aligned countries were divided on the extension question but
rather more united on substantive issues, particularly nuclear
disarmament. They called for a time-bound framework of measures
leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Failure by
the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill the obligations undertaken in
the Treaty would discredit the decisions of the Conference and
seriously undermine the non-proliferation regime.
Effective implementation
of the 'enhanced review' and 'Principles and Objectives' decisions
will be vital for the future authority of the NPT. Planning will
need to begin now to ensure that the Review 'PrepCom meeting in 1997
is successful in addressing these issues.
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ACRONYM booklet no. 8
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty:
Now or Never
By Rebecca Johnson
Executive Summary
Negotiations for a
comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) opened at the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in January 1994 and continued through the year,
resulting in a heavily bracketed rolling text in September 1994.
This formed the basis for negotiations in 1995, which ran from 31
January to 22 September. This report reviews the 1995 session of the
CD and the CTBT negotiations in Geneva.
The CD failed to agree
its work programme or establish any other committees during 1995.
While this left a clear run for CTBT negotiations, it demonstrated
deep seated problems of structure and dysfunction in the Conference.
At the end of the year the CD agreed to a two-stage process for
expanding its membership from the present 37 to at least 60, with no
date set for the new members' full admission to the CD. Though it is
generally agreed that participation by a wider group of more
representative states would give greater validity to the disarmament
negotiations, serious thought must be given to the structures,
groups and mechanisms for decision-making in an enlarged CD, to
avoid the kind of gridlock that bedeviled its work in 1995.
Progress on a CTBT has
continued slowly. Much of 1995 was spent on tidying up and
clarifying the mass of text options and providing a more streamlined
revised rolling text, which nevertheless covers 97 pages, with 1200
pairs of brackets, signifying lack of agreement.
China and France each
conducted two nuclear explosions between May and October 1995.
Instead of throwing negotiations off course, the tests have
re-invigorated public demands for a complete ban. So far this has
been reflected in more positive negotiating postures by France, the
US and UN and Russia, but little movement from China. China's
positions, from advocating so-called peaceful nuclear explosions to
wanting gold-plated international verification, are now perceived by
many negotiators as the major threat to conclusion of a treaty.
The principal
developments during 1995 were on scope, verification and duration of
the treaty. First exceptions for safety tests were dropped, then low
yield thresholds and hydronuclear testing were abandoned, as the US,
UK, Russia and France came to support a zero yield comprehensive
ban, favoured by the majority of other states. There is near
agreement on an international monitoring system and allocation of
costs, with finalisation of a primary seismic network of 50
stations. The US dropped its easy exit' proposal to allow withdrawal
after ten years, but the US, UK and France linked their support for
a fully comprehensive ban with an interpretation of supreme national
interest which would allow them to leave the treaty if they deemed
testing of their nuclear weapons to be absolutely essential in the
future.
The NPT Principles and
Objectives, agreed by 174 states carried the commitment to conclude
a CTBT 'no later than 1996'. For this to be feasible in view of the
CD calendar, negotiations would have to be concluded by June 1996.
Attempts to delay until the end of the year could risk losing the
treaty altogether. The most effective way to accelerate negotiations
at this stage would be for one or a few states to submit a clean
draft text around February, thereby enabling attention to be focused
on the crucial outstanding issues, including entry into force,
scope, on-site inspections and the executive council.
If the CTBT is to become
a reality in 1996, already acknowledged differences of interest will
have to be challenged and resolved. Such pressure on obdurate
positions is a necessary part of any negotiating endgame, and needs
to be catalysed as constructively as possible by an effective draft
text. If the CD continues to move at the pace of the slowest or
seeks to avoid the confrontations of the endgame early in 1996, it
could let the CTBT slip from our grasp altogether.
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The Acronym Booklets, known as the "red books" for their distinctive
covers, provide a wealth of information on the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference, including the Preparatory Committee meetings
that led up to the Conference. They also cover negotiations on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Conference on
Disarmament.
Executive summaries from
the Acronym Booklets appear above. For complete copies, please order
them from our order
page or email
us. The cost is $10/£7 per copy plus shipping..
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