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Matters of Emphasis: The Hunt for Chemical and Biological Weapons in Iraq

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Introduction

“We were not lying.... It was just a matter of emphasis”

Bush Administration official on ABC News, April 28, referring to the way the administration hyped the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the United States

The primary reason given for the US-led invasion of Iraq was the biological and chemical weapon disarmament of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Since the invasion, US and UK forces have failed to find any significant quantities of either biological or chemical agents, despite the deployment of a special force of US inspectors.

There is increasing reason to wonder whether Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), code for nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, was as extensive as US and UK officials claimed before going to war.

This *BASIC Special Briefing* sets out to review the evidence and is divided in two parts:

- an overview and reconsideration of the evidence of Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons as uncovered by the UN inspectors prior to their withdrawal and the subsequent military ‘liberation’ of Iraq; and
- a review of the evidence that has been accumulated since the fall of the Saddam regime.

This second section will be periodically updated as events in Iraq unfold. This new information will also be available via bi-weekly email updates on the conflict in Iraq (see www.iraqconflict.org for further information).

Part I: The Evidence Prior to War

That Iraqi armed forces have had chemical and biological weapons, and have in the past tried to produce nuclear weapons, is beyond doubt. The seven years of UN inspections after the 1991 Gulf War clearly established the existence of weapons programs in all three areas. The world knew as far back as the Iraq-Iran war that Iraq had successfully developed and used chemical weapons. It is also widely believed that Iraq used chemical weapons on its own Kurdish population in Halabja in March 1998. And despite declaring in 1991 that it did not possess any biological weapons or related items, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) uncovered a well-developed BW program in 1995.

Yet those same chemical and biological programs also suffered significant disruptions and setbacks as a result of the 1991 war, and the subsequent UN inspections regime. UNSCOM, for example, destroyed more than 480,000 liters of chemical agents and 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors in Iraq's arsenal, the vast bulk of the stocks Iraq was said to possess. That, coupled with Saddam Hussein's past refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions to disarm, and to obstruct inspections by UNSCOM and its successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), made gauging the scope and extent of Iraq's biological and chemical programs very difficult.

Yet, despite formidable obstacles, and contrary to many public statements by British and American officials and political leaders, UN inspectors had made progress in narrowing down the uncertainties. These uncertainties were compiled by UNMOVIC in a report "[Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes](#)" dated March 6. The report was released the day before Hans Blix, UNMOVIC director, gave his last quarterly report to the Security Council, just thirteen days before the start of the war. It grouped 100 'unresolved disarmament issues' into 29 clusters, and presented by discipline: missiles, munitions, chemical and biological weapons. The report provided much evidence to support both sides of the debate over the state of Iraq's NBC weapons programs, and was referred to in particular by Jack Straw in his comments at the Security Council. But the evidence of what Iraq does NOT have, or what it likely CANNOT make anymore, has not received as much attention as what it MIGHT be able to make, or what it COULD make. Unfortunately, the contents of the report received very little public attention, even though UNMOVIC promptly posted it on its website.

**Box 1: Relevant excerpts from UNMOVIC Report:
Unresolved Disarmament Issues, March 6, 2003**

- According to Iraqi authorities, instructions were given to all MIC [Military Industrial Complex] establishments that they were to be evacuated of "*all dangerous materials and essential assets*" by 15 January 1991. The Gulf War started two days later. It would appear that most WMD programs were halted during the war, although Iraq has acknowledged that the conversion of aircraft fuel drop tanks into spray tanks for BW agents such as anthrax, did continue throughout the war (p. 8).

- By its design and technical parameters, the R-400 bombs could be quite suitable as a delivery means for some chemical warfare agents, but less so for the proper aerosolization of biological agents. With an impact fuse the R-400 could have been effective for delivering a Sarin weapon; fitted with an air burst fuse it could have been suitable for delivering persistent agents, such as VX and Mustard. With respect to biological agents, the relatively large volume of liquid agents together with the small burster tube and thick bomb walls means that much of the agents would not be dispersed as respirable aerosol particles but as relatively large and much less effective droplets (p. 47).

- According to documents discovered by UNSCOM in Iraq, the purity of Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were on a level below 60%, and dropped below Iraq's established quality control acceptance level of 40% by purity some 3 to 12 months after production (p. 72).

- There is no evidence that any bulk Sarin-type agents remain in Iraq – gaps in accounting of these agents related to Sarin-type agents weaponized in rocket warheads and aerial bombs. Based on the documentation found by UNSCOM during inspections in Iraq, Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were largely of low quality and as such, degraded shortly after production. Therefore, with respect to the unaccounted-for weaponized Sarin-type agents, it is highly unlikely that they would still be viable today (p. 73).

- To UNMOVIC's knowledge, the only precursors for Sarin-type agent production that Iraq may have been capable of producing indigenously (although no such production has been declared) were cyclohexanol and thionyl chloride, as the starting materials for production of these precursors are available in Iraq. While the specific chemical process equipment required to construct such plants could be obtained by removing them from various facilities in Iraq, to UNMOVIC's knowledge there is no such plant. Therefore, unless precursors remain from Iraq's CW programme before the Gulf War, or have been clandestinely acquired since then, Iraq would not possess all of the chemicals required to produce Sarin-type agents. Iraq would also need to use "corrosion resistant" process equipment for some processes involved in this production sequence. The bottleneck for Sarin-type agents would then be the limited amount of such process equipment available to Iraq.

Assuming improvements in its quality control and process to produce the agent, it is possible that Iraq had the capability to produce Sarin-type agents of a storable quality before the war. If not, Iraq might instead have produced readily-storable precursors such as MPC, which can be used for Sarin production. However, no evidence of precursors was observed by UNMOVIC inspection teams (p. 74).

- There is much evidence, including documents provided by Iraq and information collected by UNSCOM, to suggest that most quantities of Mustard remaining in 1991, as declared by Iraq, were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. The remaining gaps are related to the accounting for mustard-filled aerial bombs and artillery projectiles. There are 550 mustard-filled shells and up to 450 mustard-filled aerial bombs unaccounted for since 1998. The mustard-filled shells account for a couple of tonnes of agents while the aerial bombs account for approximately 70 tonnes. According to an investigation made by the Iraqi "Depot Inspection Commission", the results of which were reported to UNMOVIC in March 2003, the discrepancy in the accounting for the mustard filled shells could be explained by the fact that Iraq had based its accounting on approximations (p. 76).

- It seems unlikely that significant undeclared quantities of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based on the quantity of media unaccounted for. Thus

the estimate based solely on fermenter availability, that an additional 7,000 litres of botulinum toxin could have been produced is not supported by the facts (as the limiting factor for additional botulinum toxin production is not fermenter availability but media) (p. 125).

The *New York Times* reported ten days before the invasion that UN weapons inspectors in Iraq had discovered a new variety of rocket seemingly configured to strew bomblets filled with chemical or biological agents over large areas.¹ The weapon was discovered after the UN inspectors returned to Iraq in November. At first, Iraq told the inspectors that it was designed as a conventional cluster bomb, which would scatter explosive sub-munitions over its target, and not as a chemical weapon. A few days later, the Iraqis conceded that some of the weapons might have been configured as chemical weapons.

But it remains unclear, according to the UNMOVIC report, whether the Iraqi cluster warhead is a newly-developed one, devised during the absence of inspectors over the past four years, or whether its existence had been kept secret before 1998, when the inspectors left.²

In addition, the situation regarding anthrax stocks also remained unresolved. Despite receiving an updated report from Baghdad just before the war in Iraq began, UN inspectors continued to doubt that Iraq had destroyed all of its anthrax stores. In the report, Iraq tried to account for the destruction of 3,400 liters of anthrax agent at al-Hakam. A translation of the report from Arabic was completed recently and UNMOVIC experts have since reviewed the report.³

Citing data collected from soil samples, Iraq claimed it used a sufficient quantity of potassium manganate to neutralize all the anthrax at its al-Hakam facility. UNMOVIC spokesman Ewen Buchanan said commission experts were skeptical that the Iraqi report completely documented anthrax destruction activities.⁴ Even if the document were true, he said, Iraq had still not fully accounted for the remainder of the 8,445 liters of anthrax agent it had declared that it produced at two facilities and destroyed. Iraq previously had declared that some of the material had been loaded into aerial bombs and missile warheads.⁵

Three days before the war started, the *Washington Post* reported that despite US administration claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, US intelligence agencies had been unable to give Congress or the Pentagon specific information about the amounts of banned weapons or where they were hidden.⁶

Whether or not US or UK forces find chemical or biological weapons in Iraq over the next weeks or months, the data previously collected by UNMOVIC will be useful in a longer-term clarification of the situation.

Part II: The Evidence Post-War

The US inspections regime

The day the war started, the *New York Times* reported that the Bush administration had deployed several new tactical units called mobile

exploitation teams, or METs, to locate and survey at least 130 and as many as 1,400 possible weapons sites.⁷ The day after the war started, the *Washington Post* reported that the UN agencies would not likely be invited to participate until US forces were ready to turn over dual-use biological or chemical sites for long-term monitoring.⁸ Meanwhile, UN sources said that the IAEA believed it had ongoing legal authority over former Iraqi nuclear facilities, regardless of a change in government.

Reportedly, military planners saw four stages in the search-and-disarm effort:

- to take control of and assess any known site that might present an immediate threat to US forces;
- to disable the threat and any ongoing production;
- to deploy "exploitation teams" with linguists, tools to extract information from hidden or encrypted computer files, and field laboratories that include detectors for radiation and sophisticated tests for biological and chemical toxins; and
- full destruction, which was expected to come much later.⁹

The search draws on nuclear experts from the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, civilian scientists from the Energy Department' s nuclear emergency response team, linguists from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and computer and records specialists from the Justice Department. The military is supplying specialists in missiles and biological and chemical weapons, drawn from Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency, the US Army' s technical escort unit and the Marine Corps' chemical biological incident response force.¹⁰

The Pentagon' s Defense Threat Redction Agency, which is conducting the weapons search, has printed some 9,000 booklets to help troops identify suspected weapons facilities and dangerous materials.

In mid-April, as the combat phase was drawing to a close, the Pentagon announced preparations to send 1,000 scientists, technicians, intelligence analysts and other experts to Baghdad. Called the Iraq Survey Group, the largely civilian team was to be led by a General and be equipped with mobile laboratories that can do tests in Iraq. It also is developing procedures for testing in laboratories in the US and the UK. The US Army' s 75th Exploitation Group, which has searched several sites in Iraq, will come under the command of the larger Survey Group and provide its transportation and logistics.¹¹ The Survey Group is directed from Baghdad by Charles Duelfer, a former State Department official who was former deputy director of UNSCOM under Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler, and director from 1998 to 2000.¹²

However, the US inspectors are reported to be struggling to carry out their mission, with insufficient resources and a shift of Washington' s attention from weapons of mass destruction, the ostensible reason for the US decision to go to war, to war crimes committed by the Iraqis after the war began. Although the Pentagon originally planned to deploy 20 METs of up to 30 people each, only two are currently operating inside Iraq.¹³

Box 2: What US inspectors are looking for

Chemical Weapons:	80 tones of mustard gas	<i>unaccounted for by Iraq</i>
	weaponized VX nerve agent	<i>UN says Iraq may have retained this</i>
	stocks of tabun, sarin, cyclosarin	<i>UN disputes Iraq's declaration on this</i>
Biological weapons:	10,000 litres of anthrax	<i>"strong presumption" that this still exists according to the UN</i>
	3-11,000 litres of botulinum toxin	<i>UN says Iraq failed to disprove figures of previous inspectors</i>
	Up to 5,600 litres of clostridium perfringens	<i>UN says Iraq failed to disprove figures of previous inspectors</i>
Missiles:	86 Samoud 2 missiles which fly more than the permitted range of 150 km	<i>Out of 120 listed by UN, 34 have been destroyed</i>
	Scud and al-Hussein missiles system, plus 50 Scud-B warheads	<i>UN says this "suggests" they may have been retained for "proscribed missile force"</i>
Munitions:	R-400 bombs, which can deliver chemical and biological weapons	

Signs and indications, but no 'smoking gun'

Despite frequent media reports that coalition military forces are finding 'signs' and 'indications' of chemical and biological weapons, usually turning out to be unspecified documents and possible dual-use equipment, to date no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found. Substantive evidence of a 'smoking gun' remains as elusive as ever.

As the coalition forces advanced increasing effort was devoted to locating CB weapons, but to no effect. For example, an entire artillery brigade, typically comprising 3,000-5,000 soldiers, was retrained to secure and examine sites suspected of holding banned weapons. And the Pentagon offered rewards of up to \$200,000 for help in finding Iraqi leaders or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.¹⁴

On April 17, Hans Blix, in an interview with the German weekly *Der Spiegel*, urged the US-led coalition to allow his team back into the country to look for weapons of mass destruction, saying that would increase the credibility of any discoveries.¹⁵

US forces are reported to have narrowed their hunt for banned weapons to about three-dozen sites dispersed throughout Iraq. Inspection of these sites is expected to take at least a month.¹⁶ As of April 30, around 90 of the top 150

'hot' sites that US intelligence indicated were most likely to hold illegal weapons have been visited. The current string of false alarms includes:

- *Al Tuwaitha (south east of Baghdad): suspected nuclear weapons*

US soldiers broke IAEA seals in attempting to 'verify' the presence of safeguarded nuclear material. Not appreciating the significance of the facility, the soldiers left the contents unattended for days, during which time the materials could have been diverted or stolen.¹⁷ The IAEA issued a statement calling for greater care and requesting to be allowed back in to ensure that the material is not diverted or disturbed.

- *Baghdad: suspected biological and chemical weapons*

On April 15, US special forces raided the Baghdad home of a microbiologist Rahib Taha, nicknamed 'Dr. Germ', who allegedly ran Iraq's secret biological laboratory that weaponized anthrax. Documents were seized and three men arrested.¹⁸ While Taha's whereabouts are unknown (it had been reported by the *Washington Times* that she had fled to Syria), her husband Amir Muhammed Rasheed, Saddam's former oil minister and one of the most senior Iraqis dealing with UN inspectors, has been detained.

At the *Taji Airfield* on the outskirts of Baghdad, US troops have been searching for traces of chemical and biological weapons, so far without success.

- *Baija (northern Iraq): suspected chemical weapons*

Field tests are being conducted on 14 55-gallon drums discovered by US special forces on April 25. Initial reports suggested that tests had confirmed positive for a chemical nerve agent cyclo-sarin, although these reports were later said to be incorrect. More accurate verification is awaited, as samples of the fluid have been sent to three labs for further testing: one in the United States, one in Europe and one in the Persian Gulf.¹⁹

- *Hindiya (near Karbala, central Iraq): suspected chemical weapons*

Initial tests on substances found suggested the presence of nerve agents sarin and tabun and the blister agent lewisite. Subsequent US tests indicated that substances found are not chemical weapons agents but pesticides.

- *Nassiriya (southern Iraq): suspected chemical weapons and conventional munitions*

US marines found chemical suits, masks and atropine injectors in buildings used by Iraq's 11th Infantry Division. Earlier marines found weapons and ammunition inside a hospital.

- *Najaf (southern Iraq): suspected chemical weapons*

Early reports that US forces captured a possible chemical-weapons plant in the town of Najaf turned out to be false.²⁰

- *Qa Qaa (central Iraq): suspected chemical, biological and conventional munitions*

Ongoing investigations at this five-square-mile ammunition manufacturing and storage plant near Karbala have so far been inconclusive.²¹ Reports suggest

that some radioactive material was discovered in a maintenance building, together with suspicious dual use biological equipment that was buried in metal containers. Seven canisters of cesium were removed from the huge maintenance warehouse, and although analysts have not yet determined their specific purpose, early indications suggest that the containers of cesium were probably intended to calibrate machinery in one of the many buildings and production facilities under construction at the site. International inspectors visited the plant as late as February, but failed to find biological or chemical weapons or agents there.²²

CNN reported on April 15, that the 11 mobile laboratories found buried in the ground near the ammunition plant were not for chemical and biological weapons, as originally reported, but are likely to have been intended to make conventional weapons.²³

- *Mobile biological weapons laboratories*

In a presentation before the United Nations in February, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell said Iraq had as many as 18 trucks used as mobile facilities for making anthrax and botulinum toxin. With nothing to distinguish them from ordinary trucks, such mobile trucks are likely to be difficult to find. It was reported on April 29 that US forces in northern Iraq have seized a truck that US intelligence officials believe could be a mobile biological weapons laboratory. However, no suspicious substances were found on the vehicle, although tests are ongoing.²⁴

Conclusions

There are four potential explanations for the current failure to find significant evidence of banned weapons in Iraq:

- The weapons were destroyed or moved out of Iraq prior to invasion;
- The weapons were destroyed in coalition bombing or subsequent looting;
- The weapons were destroyed even earlier, perhaps in the early or mid 1990s; or
- The weapons exist but have not yet been found.

Each of these explanations, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, is considered in turn.

Were the missing weapons destroyed or moved out of Iraq prior to the invasion?

On April 21 the *New York Times* reported that a scientist who claims to have worked in Iraq' s chemical weapons program for more than a decade told an American military team that Iraq destroyed chemical weapons and biological warfare equipment only days before the war began. Reportedly the scientist led Americans to a supply of material that proved to be the building blocks of illegal weapons, which he claimed to have buried as evidence of Iraq' s illicit weapons programs.²⁵

Thus far the scientist is unidentified and was not allowed to be interviewed. Nor, as was noted in the *New York Times* article, was the reporter permitted to write about the discovery of the scientist for three days, and the copy was then submitted for a check by military officials; thus leaving doubts about the credibility of the story.

Overall, however, this is an unlikely explanation for the general failure to find illicit weapons that had been identified so confidently prior to the war. The logistical problems of transporting or destroying large stocks of chemical and biological weapons just days before the US-led invasion are likely to have precluded this as a realistic option. This is not to say there is not a real danger that in the post-war chaos and looting that some WMD materials may have been diverted out of Iraq (as was predicted by one analyst prior to the war²⁶).

Were the weapons destroyed in the bombing campaign or stolen by looters?

Scores of suspect sites, industrial complexes and offices have been stripped of valuable documents and equipment. Investigations at the Qa Qaa facility, for example, have been hampered by the failure to secure it from looters. Word that the plant was open to pillage spread quickly through surrounding impoverished villages, and by the time specialist units arrived, much had already been looted. For instance, the experts found manuals that came with two drying ovens imported from Germany, equipment that can be used to culture viruses and bacteria for weapons. But the ovens themselves were gone by the time the specialists arrived.²⁷

Again, although it is very possible that much evidence for CBW would be degraded by looting or military action, it could not possibly be the case that all conclusive evidence would be destroyed. However, we expect this explanation to be used more frequently in the weeks ahead if no significant weapons caches are found.

Were the missing weapons destroyed many years ago?

Claims that Iraq destroyed some illicit chemical and biological weapons in the 1990s – an explanation that failed to convince the UN inspectors and British and American intelligence officials prior to the invasion – are also being given greater credence in current US administration briefings.²⁸ There was very little reporting of this speculation prior to the war, however.

One exception was an exclusive report largely ignored by the rest of the US media at the time. In early March, *Newsweek* reported that Hussein Kamel, the highest-ranking Iraqi official ever to defect from Saddam Hussein's inner circle, told CIA and British intelligence officers and UN inspectors in the summer of 1995 that after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them. The UN inspectors allegedly hushed up Kamel's revelations for two reasons: Saddam did not know how much Kamel had revealed; and the inspectors hoped to bluff Saddam into disclosing still more. Iraq has never shown the documentation to support Kamel's story, but the defector's tale raises questions about whether the stockpiles attributed to Iraq still existed prior to the war.²⁹

Other *post facto* (but still unconfirmed) reports, based on recent interviews with a leading Iraqi scientist, Nassir Hindawi, suggest that Iraq's biological weapons program may have been shut down as a result of the economic sanctions in the 1990s.³⁰

Isn't it a question of needing more time to find the weapons?

Quite possibly, since continued instability in Iraq is making it difficult for US teams to conduct systematic surveys and careful testing. Iraq is a large country and a systematic concealment campaign could take weeks or months to expose, even without a functioning resistant regime controlling access.

On the other hand, the conduct of the war suggests that Iraq may not have possessed useable WMD and posed no threat outside its borders. Most analysts had predicted that Saddam Hussein would use such weapons if his regime faced collapse. Either the regime had displayed unprecedented restraint during the combat phase (possibly because of the threat of being charged with war crimes) or the non-use confirmed that he lacked the weapons or an effective delivery capability.

Moreover, the lack of success thus far in finding chemical or biological weapons—even the most strident proponents of the war no longer expect to find any nuclear weapons—is increasingly a problem for the United States. As Scott Ritter, former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) arms inspector, wrote:

What if it turns out that Iraq was, in fact, disarmed? What if it transpires that the UN weapons inspectors had succeeded in their mandate, and that the Iraqi government had complied with its obligation? The consequences and ramifications of such a finding are many, and few are trivial.³¹

Even if coalition forces find evidence of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, they will face a credibility problem. An article in the *Washington Post* quotes Jay Davis, who led the Defense Threat Reduction Agency until 2001:

A very important political component is if you find these things, how do you establish the proof of that to the satisfaction of 35 foreign ministries and those of you in the media? A large number of conspiracy theorists all over the world will say the US government has planted all that stuff.³²

The *New York Times* drew a similar conclusion:

The military units searching for unconventional arms in Iraq are not truly expert in finding hidden weapons. They need to be buttressed not only by American civilian experts but, even more important, by respected international inspectors as well. Such neutral experts need to ensure a strict chain of custody and oversee the accuracy of laboratory analyses. Otherwise there is a danger that any findings will be discounted by a skeptical world that is all too ready to believe that the evidence was planted or manipulated.³³

And similar concerns have been expressed by British Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, who has called for any discovery of weapons to be verified by an independent body:

I think it is important that we have an objective source of verification. Whether that should be UNMOVIC, which wasn't particularly successful in its time in Iraq, or whether it should be some other international body or some other country that

has a tried and tested reputation for objectivity in this area, I think we are still looking at it.³⁴

It is reported that Britain may ask impartial countries such as Sweden or Switzerland to verify any banned items uncovered by US or UK forces, but it would be more appropriate to facilitate the return of UNMOVIC to Iraq. Despite the unfounded doubts of Geoff Hoon, UNMOVIC was relatively successful in Iraq, and a return of the UN inspectors would not only confer some much needed legitimacy to the post-conflict search for weapons, but also help to re-engage the wider international community in the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq.

At the Al Tuwaitha nuclear site it is imperative that the IAEA be re-admitted as soon as possible in order to prevent diversion of nuclear materials.

UNMOVIC should also be given the task of on-going monitoring in Iraq once the 'coalition' military forces have left in order to ensure that any new Iraqi government complies with its disarmament obligations.

Does this mean that the WMD threat from Saddam was overstated by Britain and the United States?

Although it is still too soon to be drawing any final conclusions, reports have started to emerge in the media that the statements made by officials immediately before the war that suggested a far more advanced and extensive program are having to be reassessed. The previous confidence in Iraq's possession of advanced WMD could have been based on US intelligence misjudgments or the result of distortion by members of the Bush Administration.

Some senior officials are now emphasizing the need to find a paper trail and testimony that points to the Hussein regime's capability and intent to develop chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, as opposed to a readily usable stockpile of weapons.³⁵ Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke has sought repeatedly to "manage expectations," in her words, saying that the search process could take up to a year to complete. That is rather ironic, considering that UNMOVIC said before the war began that it could wrap up inspections in a few months.

One can only hope that future non-proliferation and counter-proliferation strategies are based upon evidence carefully collected rather than on prejudice or political expediency.

¹ John H. Cushman Jr. with Steven R. Weisman, "A new type of rocket found in Iraq: Inspectors say chemicals could cover wide area," *New York Times*, March 10, 2003.

² *Ibid.*

³ David Ruppe, "Iraq: Latest Iraqi Report Fails to Clear Anthrax Questions," *Global Security Newswire*, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/4/2/9s.html.

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⁵ *Ibid.*

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¹¹ John J. Fialka, "US Readies A Different Army To Search For Weapons In Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, April 17, 2003.

¹² Stewart Stogel, "Rice Taps Inspector With Iraq Experience," *Washington Times*, April 18, 2003, p. 12.

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