BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REVIEW UNCERTAIN

By Oliver Meier

Representatives of 145 State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) will meet in Geneva to resume the Fifth Review Conference on November 11, 2002. Diplomats will have up to two weeks to break the current deadlock and find ways to strengthen the 30 year old BWC. The President of the Review Conference, Tibor Toth, suspended the Review Conference on December 7, 2001 after the U.S. had demanded a formal end to negotiations on a verification Protocol.

Follow-up mechanisms

Since the Review Conference was suspended, the question of whether and how talks about strengthening the Convention should continue has emerged as the make-or-break issue. The majority of State Parties favours agreement on such a follow-up mechanism and would like to hold meetings between this and the next RevCon, which will probably be held in 2006. The purpose of intersessional meetings is not entirely clear yet, but they would discuss technical, scientific and political issues of importance to the ban on biological weapons. Unlike other multilateral non-proliferation and arms control regimes, the BWC does not provide for any regular meetings between Review Conferences.

During the first part of the Review Conference last year, the U.S. endorsed an EU proposal to hold annual meetings of States Parties and to install expert groups. However, U.S. support for intersessional meetings was linked to a “termination” of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of state parties (AHG), which had spent more than six years negotiating a verification mechanism. Most States Parties found the proposal to end the AHG unacceptable.

Nine months later, the U.S. position on the question of a follow-up has further hardened. On September 2, 2002 John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, presented a U.S. non-paper to allies and negotiation partners. During the meeting of the Western Group in Geneva, Bolton made clear that “the U.S. does not support follow-on meetings between November 2002 and 2006 Review Conference”. The non-paper stated that the U.S. wants “a very short RevCon … with the sole purpose of and outcome of agreeing to hold a RevCon in 2006.” Reportedly, the U.S. initially argued for a ten-minute meeting during which no substantive discussion would take place.

In Geneva, the U.S. is completely isolated. In consultations since September, even the closest allies have refused to go along with the U.S. proposals. So far, however, Washington has apparently not made any specific concessions. Nevertheless, several diplomats hope that the U.S. will not stick to its tough line and that agreement on a follow-up mechanism will be possible.

In a statement to the UN’s First Committee on September 30, the EU again emphasised the importance of strengthening the BWC. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the Union, listed specific issues that should be discussed among BWC Parties during the period between Review Conferences. Topics the EU would like to see on the agenda of intersessional meetings include national implementation of legislative and regulatory measures, compliance, confidence-building to clarify non-compliant behaviour as well as investigations. All of these and several other measures were also mentioned in a Green Paper that the British Government published in April 2002.

Most non-aligned countries find themselves somewhere between these two positions. Traditionally and during the AHG, non-aligned countries have emphasised the importance of expanding technological and scientific exchange in the context of the BWC. For some, this includes a loosening of export control regimes, in particular the Australia Group. While the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a whole appears not to be resisting a compromise on a follow-up mechanism, it is likely that as a group it will insist that regulatory as well as promotional aspects are discussed in the intersessional period. Thus, South Africa in a statement to the First Committee has proposed to hold expert group meetings under the BWC for about four weeks annually and to consider the results of such meetings at annual meetings of State Parties.

Issues of contention: Ad Hoc Group and compliance

Success at the Review Conference seems to depend equally on the capacity for compromise and on a willingness to avoid difficult issues. Addressing the failure of the AHG to complete its work is one such thorny issue. Officially, the U.S. still insists that the AHG mandate has to be terminated. This, however, would be unacceptable to many countries, which see a termination of the mandate as abandoning the multilateral path to strengthening the BWC. The ‘sleeping beauty’ approach to the AHG therefore enjoys broad support: the Final Declaration would not mention the AHG and the mandate would rest, until such time when the political circumstances for a resumption of talks improve.

Another potential trip wire for the meeting is how to address compliance with Article 1 of the BWC, which prohibits the development and production of biological weapons. At the opening of the Review Conference on November 19, 2001 John Bolton publicly accused four BWC parties (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea) as well as one signatory state (Syria) of non-compliance. During the Geneva consultations in September, Bolton threatened to again accuse state parties of non-compliance. Under the issue ‘non-compliance’, the U.S. Western Group paper states: “if the RevCon is very short, the U.S. would not ‘name names’. We would do so in a longer RevCon.” This strategy, which has been categorised as blackmail, has further outraged U.S. allies.

The way forward

Diplomatic preparations for the Review Conference follow a familiar pattern. European and other allies are desperately trying to define a proposal that might be acceptable to Washington. Despite the apparent lack of willingness to accommodate other views, best case scenarios are based on the hope that this time around Washington will be willing to compromise. It was the same hope and the lack of fallback options that contributed to the implosion of the AHG and suspension of the first part of the RevCon.

Expectations regarding the Review Conference have currently been lowered to the point where it is clear that the outcome of the Review Conference will fall short of what is needed to strengthen the BWC. Even agreement on a Final Declaration seems no longer to be sacrosanct in order to secure U.S. agreement to a follow-up mechanism.

Agreement on a strong and flexible follow-up mechanism is important. It could be used to decide on measures to increase transparency in areas where the potential for misuse of biotechnology is relatively high, such as biodefense. It can also be used to discuss proposals to strengthen the Convention. This includes the measures proposed by U.S. President George W. Bush on November 1, 2001 which may be useful but are not sufficient substitutes for a more comprehensive verification proposal.

Even if agreement on a follow-up mechanism can be secured, other important issues need to be addressed. Over the last year, since the collapse of the AHG, governments and non-governmental experts have developed new ideas to strengthen the bioweapons ban. New conventions to criminalise the use of biological weapons and to improve biosafety and security are among those proposals. Others have highlighted the need for new transparency measures and the need to implement stricter national controls and legislation.

The Review Conference is the right forum for discussions on these and other issues. In trying to devise a strategy to avoid failure at the Review Conference, diplomats must not forget that there are real issues that need to be urgently addressed. Effective responses to the threat of biological weapons can not be addressed in ten minutes.

Oliver Meier is International Representative and Correspondent of the Arms Control Association (www.armscontrol.org) in Berlin.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL COSTS 
OF A WAR WITH IRAQ

By Nigel Chamberlain
BASIC

On September 30, the Congressional Budget Office presented their ‘Estimated Costs of a Potential War with Iraq’ to the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee and other Congressmen in response to their request of September 20.

In his covering letter, Dan L. Crippen Director Congressional Budget Office, stated that the costs of a military conflict with Iraq and its aftermath are “highly uncertain” depending on a number of related factors. CBO examined two representative examples of the force structures being discussed and estimated the cost of deploying a force to the Persian Gulf between $6 and $13 billion. Prosecuting a war would cost between $6 and $9 billion a month. Returning U.S. forces to home bases would range from $5 to $7 billion. The costs of occupation could vary from $1 to $4 billion a month.

Present at that meeting was Honorable Robert C. Byrd, Chairman Committee on Appropriations who, on October 5, made a speech during the Senate Debate on Joint Resolution 46, which gave the President special powers to wage war on Iraq.

In his opening remarks, Senator Byrd said, “We are rushing into war without fully discussing why, without thoroughly considering the consequences, or without making any attempt to explore what steps we might take to avert conflict.”

Warming to his task, the Senator went on, “This resolution is breathtaking in its scope. It redefines the nature of defense, and reinterprets the Constitution to suit the will of the Executive Branch. It would give the President blanket authority to launch a unilateral preemptive attack on a sovereign nation that is perceived to be a threat to the United States. This is an unprecedented and unfounded interpretation of the President’s authority under the Constitution, not to mention the fact that it stands the charter of the United Nations on its head.”

Having referred to the Constitution historically, and in some detail, the Senator said, “Congress has a responsibility to exercise extreme care the power to declare war. There is no weightier matter to be considered.” He then referred to the Congressional Budget Office Report and ran through the major estimated costs of a war with Iraq adding that, “We need – the American people need – information and informed debate.”

The Congressional Budget Office made the following assessment for a ‘Heavy Ground Option’ in relation to British participation:

"Which allied forces might participate in a conflict with Iraq is uncertain; only the British have thus far indicated their intention to contribute troops. Thus, CBO assumed that two-thirds of a British heavy armoured division and two thirds of a British air wing would be part of the Heavy Ground force, as well as a British naval contingent of 21 ships, as in Desert Storm. CBO's estimates of the costs incorporate the assumption that the United States will provide limited logistical support to those forces similar to the support it provided during Desert Storm."

On October 8, following a private briefing with a senior member of the British Armed Forces (since confirmed by BASIC Reports), it was reported that Britain’s contribution to an American-led invasion of Iraq would be substantial and would include heavy armour. This willingness to participate substantially had been communicated to the U.S. and it was added that, “If things had not moved by the end of the month I would be very surprised.” At the time of writing BASIC Reports was assured that no such move has been announced.

The Congressional Budget Office report was raised in the U.K. House of Parliament in a debate on ‘Defence in the World’ on October 17. Alice Mahon MP spoke to the report and asked Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon specific questions about the stated British contribution to a military force.

THE ROAD TO PRAGUE, AND BEYOND

By Nigel Chamberlain

The Secretary General has been very busy recently extolling the virtues of NATO and promising definitive progress at the Prague Summit scheduled for November 21-22.  

At a conference in Brussels on October 3, titled ‘Prague 2002: Challenge and Change for NATO’, Lord Robertson’s speech was on the theme ‘NATO: A Vision for 2012’. He made five predictions and detailed how NATO must plan to deal with their consequences.

• More instability in Caucasus, Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East in the years ahead.
• Instability will spill over into Europe and North America from the areas it originates.
• Terrorism, driven by fanatical extremism, will increase.
• Despite the state remaining the central organising principle of modern civilisation, more states will fail.
• Proliferation of WMD and conventional weapons will be a defining security challenge of the century.

He concluded that the net result will be an uncomfortable security environment  requiring a practical ‘blueprint’ going beyond theoretical battles about what is “in” and “out-of-area”.

First, in order to respond effectively, NATO has to reshape its military capability to be able to move faster and further and stay in the field longer. Second, enhanced consultation and collaborative action is required to combat terror and share risks and burdens. Third, NATO-Russian relations must improve in order to tackle terrorism, proliferation, ballistic missiles and crisis management. Fourth, security co-operation to prevent terrorist attacks must be extended to the Mediterranean and Central Asia. The final requirement will be for institutional co-operation: with the UN providing political legitimacy and civil administration, the OSCE organising elections after a conflict, NGOs helping mend the torn fabric of a society and the EU yielding its enormous political and economic leverage.

Lord Robertson emphasised how important the Prague Summit would be. New members will be invited to join, NATO’s Partnerships to countries to the East and South will be deepened, anti-terrorism will get a clearer profile, new WMD challenges will be addressed and improved defence capabilities will be discussed.

On October 8, the Secretary-General made a speech before the EU Parliament in Brussels outlining the priorities on NATO’s agenda ahead of the Prague Summit. He called for the institutionalisation of NATO-EU co-operation, reiterating a theme from the ‘blueprint’ in his October 3 speech. He also suggested that the Prague Summit goals, including the development of a NATO Response Force, were complementary to, and not in competition with, the EU’s proposed Rapid Reaction Force.

Lord Robertson confirmed that invitations will be issued in Prague to up to nine countries aspiring to join NATO but that they will not formally join until Accession protocols and necessary agreements are in place, a process that may take until the 2004 Summit to complete. BASIC Reports can confirm continued opposition to enlargement from within the Russian Federation.

Improved defence capabilities will be the second main issue at the Summit. There is potential here for duplication and overlap with the EU which must be avoided. The Secretary-General said: “My message is very clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment must be coherent. That is why we need to work in full transparency on the capabilities issues.”

He returned to another Summit initiative, the NATO Response Force, which he categorically denied would be a rival to the European Rapid Reaction Force. No new forces are envisaged, just an effective re-organisation of existing forces.

NATO’s military planners will be asked to further develop their thoughts on how to defend against terrorist attacks. Substantive work will be reported to the Summit on protective measures to combat the use of WMD by terrorists, including detection, counter measures and support for civilian authorities. There is thought to be capacity here for further NATO-EU co-operation. There is also scope for enhancing NATO’s Partnerships in this regard. According to sources at NATO HQ in Brussels, BASIC Reports can confirm that there is little likelihood of substantive discussion on nuclear strategy.

There were warm words for the constantly improving NATO-Russian relationship. This was contrasted by the lack of momentum in NATO-EU relations. Practical co-operation in Yugoslavia, the Balkans and Macedonia has been productive but they need to be institutionalised by formal agreements. Lord Robertson firmly asserted that, “We have to find the right balance between ‘assured access’ to NATO assets for the EU members, and ‘assured participation’ in the EU political-military decision process for non-EU Allies.”

The Secretary General was in Washington on October 22 speaking on ‘A Transformed NATO: Delivering Security in a Dangerous World’. He expounded on the threat from, and need to defeat terrorism as exemplified in the campaign against Al’ Qaida with a sub-text of differential co-operation (bilateral, multilateral, ad-hoc coalitions) to achieve the desired results.

Despite some difference of opinion on military response to crisis, he argued that “Europeans recognise the continuing necessity of a close transatlantic security and defence relationship enshrined in NATO.” The Partnership program received praise again, as did the “mould breaking co-operation with Russia on key topics…”.

On the Summit itself, Lord Robertson reaffirmed his commitment to transforming NATO to meet the new security environment via the Prague Capabilities Commitment. “As we near Prague, I am continuing to browbeat all NATO governments on capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.” To that end he told his audience that the U.S. must be prepared to transfer the technology needed to modernise European armed forces if it wants Europeans to share the responsibilities and risks of today’s threats.

“Prague will set the seal on a profound transformation that will confirm the Alliance’s value to the United States, and to all its member countries, in the very different strategic landscape of the 21^st century.”

THE FUTURE OF THE OSCE 
- PANEL DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON

By Robert Barry

On October 22, 2002 BASIC and the Royal Norwegian Embassy sponsored a discussion on the future of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Cannon House Office Building in Washington, D.C.  Participants included:  

• Jan Kubis, OSCE Secretary General
• Kim Traavik, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister (State Secretary)
• Steve Minikes, U.S. Representative to the OSCE
• Knut Vollebaek, Norwegian Ambassador to the U.S. and former OSCE Chairman in office
• David Johnson, U.S. Coordinator of Assistance to Afghanistan and former U.S. Representative to the OSCE; and
• Adam Kobieracki, Polish Coordinator for OSCE and former chair of the OSCE Permanent Council.

The audience included former heads of OSCE field missions, representatives of the U.S. State Department and OSCE member state embassies in Washington, academics, journalists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Participants were asked to focus on the following questions:

• How to maintain a division of labor between the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) as NATO expands and the EU becomes more operational?  How will the OSCE maintain its distinct role as a flexible, economical and effective multilateral organization?
• Can the OSCE play a larger role in Central Asia and the Caucasus as its operations wind down in the Balkans?
• What lessons have we learned from the OSCE’s conflict prevention and nation-building efforts?  Are these experiences relevant to the current situation in Afghanistan, a post-conflict Iraq or other regions?
• What reforms are needed to provide a better sense of political direction to the OSCE without building a cumbersome central bureaucracy?

The Division of Labor Among Transatlantic Organizations: Competition or Cooperation?

The participants acknowledged that the OSCE had almost no public profile in the United States and that some U.S. officials in this and previous administrations wrongly considered that NATO and the OSCE were rivals. Some of this feeling traces back decades to the time when the Soviet Union was using the concept of a conference on European security to undermine NATO. Ambassador Kobieracki pointed out that the OSCE is the only organization that has a mandate to involve itself in the internal affairs of member states and thus to deal with some of the root causes of terrorism.

Several participants stressed that the relationship among the United Nations (U.N.), NATO, the EU and the OSCE did not need to be a zero sum game. Highly successful examples of cooperation in Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo were referred to.  

Many participants pointed to the OSCE’s unique space: including the group of 30 countries, which are not and probably will not become members of NATO or the European Union. This space includes Central Asia. The OSCE is already playing a very important role in Georgia in pressing for the implementation of the Istanbul decisions on the withdrawal of Russian forces and turnover of Russian bases. In the event of a solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a potential peacekeeping role is foreseen for the OSCE, which could necessitate the deployment of the organization’s largest ever field mission.

Moldova deserves special attention. The OSCE could play a central role in implementing a federal solution that would settle the issue of the breakaway enclave of Transnistria. The OSCE is also a candidate for a role in peacekeeping as well as police and legal reform. While there appears to be little chance at present that Transnistria will accept the concept of federation, assurances about the facilitating role of the OSCE might contribute to efforts in reaching a compromise.

In Moldova, the OSCE is also pressing for implementation of the Istanbul summit decision on the withdrawal or destruction of huge amounts of Russian ammunition and arms left behind from the Soviet era. While the Istanbul deadline of December 31, 2002 will not be met, considerable progress was made in 2001 and the push for compliance should not be abandoned.

New Challenges: Central Asia and the Caucasus

While many participating states see Central Asia and the Caucasus as a logical focus for the OSCE in the future, and the incoming Dutch chairmanship has promised to concentrate on Central Asia, serious obstacles remain. Perhaps the most serious is the tendency of host governments to view the presence of an OSCE mission on their territory as a malady that needs to be overcome.

The challenge is to package OSCE assistance more attractively without stepping back from emphasis on respect for human rights. Several participants suggested a new balance in the OSCE’s activities linked to new security threats that have emerged with the escalation of international terrorism. While some in Central Asia see oppression as the answer to these challenges, the OSCE approach must concentrate on getting at the root causes of terror, one of which is an overly repressive approach to alienated elements of society.

The OSCE is cautiously attempting to demonstrate its relevance in Central Asia.  It has begun a program of police training in Kyrgyzstan by sending teams to Bishkek and Osh to set up model police stations where new techniques of policing can be demonstrated. If successful, this could be expanded with larger scale police training efforts both in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere in the region.  Other areas that could be explored include training of border police and efforts to mediate border disputes. Easing legal transit among the countries of Central Asia and promoting trade and transport within the region would provide economic as well as security benefits.

Special purpose OSCE field missions or teams may prove more acceptable to host countries than the kind of large general-purpose missions that have been established in the Balkans. In addition to police training and the rule of law, such thematic missions could focus on institution building, assistance to parliamentary bodies, strengthening municipal governments, electoral reform, trade and transport.

The International Crisis Group has suggested that a key to stimulating the interest of Central Asian governments is to emphasize the economic dimension of the OSCE, in particular by partnering with international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). OSCE field missions have done some interesting things in the economic area, such as assisting in audits of state and local budgets, but it will never evolve into an organization that can provide the kind of economic aid for which Central Asians are looking.

The United States and the Russian Federation are putting the finishing touches on a paper outlining new threats to security, which they will submit to the Porto Ministerial meeting this December. This paper might provide new openings for the OSCE in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, particularly in dealing with organized crime and its links to terror.

Applying the Lessons Learned from the OSCE to Other Areas

While the initial position of the Bush administration was to decry nation-building, subsequent events have caused a re-examination of the issue. In Afghanistan, the United States and its partners are trying to create institutions where none existed before. The United States and the United Kingdom have been discussing what might follow regime change in Iraq, and how the international community might create conditions for democracy. As diplomats look at the possibility of convening an international conference on the Arab Israeli peace process, the parties have asked what lessons can be learned from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)-OSCE process.[i] As terrorism spreads to Southeast Asia, new approaches to security problems have been suggested.

The current U.S. Coordinator of Assistance to Afghanistan, Ambassador David Johnson, has regretted that some of the mechanisms available to the OSCE do not exist in South Asia. As a first step in providing them, he suggested that Afghanistan be included among OSCE partners for cooperation to facilitate collaboration with OSCE member states bordering Afghanistan (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan). The main problem in Afghanistan is the absence of viable institutions, which leads to concentration on individual personalities. OSCE experience in institution building could be usefully employed in Afghanistan, but delivery mechanisms are needed.

Max Kampelman, who did so much to shape the CSCE, has suggested that a Middle East peace conference be modeled on the CSCE, setting standards for democracy, economic development, the rule of law and human dignity, which ought to apply in a final settlement.[ii] A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East could build on work already underway in parliamentary and government circles in the region.

Israel, which with other countries of the region is a “partner for cooperation” with the OSCE, sent a delegation to observe the work of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2000 to see whether democratization programs being implemented there might be applied to Gaza and the West Bank. Despite the retrograde steps that have taken place since, Kampelman still detects potential interest among both Israeli and Palestinian officials.

In Southeast Asia, the upsurge in concern about international terrorism has caught the attention of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, which at its recent meeting in Mexico undertook commitments similar to those taken by OSCE participating states in Bucharest in 2001.

While the OSCE would play no role in establishing an internationally led civil government should it be required in Iraq, the model of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia might be modified to assist in that process.

A participant in the meeting suggested that Cyprus could be a subject of OSCE efforts, and indeed one of the projects carried out by OSCE in Bosnia was first developed as an effort to promote multi-ethnic government in Nicosia.

Reforming the OSCE

One set of challenges to the OSCE comes from the emerging new security architecture of Europe, with both NATO and the EU enlarging and becoming more active. This has an impact on the OSCE’s morale, but does not undercut its potential. A more serious problem is the uneven quality of political leadership and management. One participant called for the chairmanship to be made more predictable; perhaps by setting out guidelines that would govern how a country prepares for and conducts its year in office.

Kim Traavik of Norway was among those who believed that the answer lies in a stronger Secretariat and a Secretary General who would be more active in providing political guidance to the organization and its field missions. He also advocated adapting the nature of field missions to new situations, with more special purpose activities and adequate resources to carry them out. Former Chair in Office Vollebaek noted that there was no structure in the Secretariat, which could be used to implement Permanent Council decisions, for example on fielding the Kosovo Verification Mission and its successor.

The United States has been traditionally opposed to a larger, more powerful Secretariat but has recommended the creation of the post of Permanent Secretary to the Chair in Office, a senior official who would assist the OSCE Troika in providing continuity and political guidance to OSCE institutions.

Some participants urged that OSCE institutions be restructured to reflect today’s challenges. A new mandate might be given to the Conflict Prevention Center that would empower it to play a stronger role in preventing the outbreak of violence.  Efforts to deal with the root causes of terrorism and related issues such as trafficking in human beings and money laundering could be part of such an effort. 

The problem of Belarus and its defiance of the OSCE principles and efforts to squeeze out the Advisory Monitoring group by denying visas were discussed.  Clearly Belarus’ activities have weakened the organization, but efforts to maintain the mission must continue.

The issue of the OSCE’s status under international law was raised, but few saw any possibility of getting the 55 OSCE participating states to agree to a treaty that would legitimize interference in their internal affairs and would be resisted, not least by the United States. Issues related to privileges and immunities can be dealt with by more limited agreements, as already exist for many OSCE missions and activities. Issues concerning contracting and procurement can also be handled by means of more limited agreements.

Secretary General Kubis suggested that the management of the organization could be improved by decentralization and devolution of authority to program managers. He saw the need to strengthen missions in Central Asia and the Caucasus with personnel and resources if new tasks were to be carried out, and he welcomed the beginning of policing programs in Kyrgyzstan. The emergence of a “food for thought” paper prepared by the United States and the Russian Federation could improve cooperation with Russia, provide new balance in OSCE operations and define new methods for dealing with today’s challenges.

Robert Barry moderated the discussion. He is the former head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and currently a BASIC Board member. The discussion was organized around a BASIC Research Report authored by Robert Barry entitled “The OSCE: A Forgotten Transatlantic Security Organization?”  

 [i]. Created in 1973 and formalized by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the CSCE was the precursor to the OSCE.  The CSCE became the OSCE in 1994.
 [ii]. See op-ed by Max M. Kampelman, Washington Times August 15, 2002, p A 19

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