Controversial Trial Examines South African
CBW Activities

By Chandré‚ Gould

Dr. Wouter Basson, the former head of the South African chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, walked out of the Pretoria High Court on Apr. 11 a free man. 

The controversial not-guilty verdict handed down by Judge Willem Hartzenberg exonerated Basson from alleged involvement in human rights abuses, fraud and drug trafficking after a marathon 30-month trial. While over 150 witnesses testified against him, Basson appeared as the only witness in his own defense, and his legal counsel did not submit a single document to support his testimony. 

The state will appeal the verdict on the basis that Hartzenberg should have recused himself from the case after demonstrating unacceptable bias in favor of the accused. The state applied for Hartzenberg's recusal from the case in February 2000 on the basis that they believed he had prejudged the case.

Fraud, CBW Trafficking Alleged
The state alleged that Basson, as head of the South African CBW program (code-named Project Coast) from 1981-1993, had used his position to defraud taxpayers through complex money laundering schemes involving a huge network of companies on several continents. Basson claimed that the money laundering system was designed to hide official procurement activities for the CBW program so as to bypass sanctions-related trade restrictions. 

Basson claimed during the trial that he had been authorized by the South African military leaders to use "whatever means necessary" to procure substances and equipment for the CBW program. The program manager and former Surgeon General, Gen. Daniel Knobel, testified, "The bottom line was that the Coordinating Management Committee [the military committee which oversaw the activities of the program] didn't want to know what happened abroad. A fair summary of the situation was 'We give the money. You bring the product. It doesn't matter where you get it. You can buy it on the black market or through bribery; if you have to, steal it.'" 

According to Basson, his military commanders gave him the authority to work with a group of people he described as an "international CBW mafia." According to Basson, this group, comprising Libyans, East Germans, Russians and Chinese (amongst others), had instructed him to purchase safe houses all over the world, assisted in the procurement of CBW agents and equipment for South Africa, and shared relevant information about CBW. Basson also alleged during his testimony in the trial that members of this group had helped him procure about five tons of chemical agents through a company in Hong Kong during the 1990s.

Murder Conviction Avoided
Basson was also found not guilty of involvement in a high-level military conspiracy to murder South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) prisoners of war in Namibia in the early- and mid-1980s. According to the many military operators who testified against Basson, SWAPO members were murdered through the administration of muscle relaxants in overdose, after which their bodies would be thrown from an aircraft into the sea. 

During the lengthy testimony, many of the CBW pro-ject's scientists implicated Basson in the development and use of chemical and biological warfare agents intended for use in the assassination of 'enemies' of the apartheid state. 

Some soldiers and medical doctors even implicated themselves in murder in order to testify against their former commander, with the understanding that they would qualify for an indemnity provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act. After pronouncing judgment, however, Hartzenberg denied several state witnesses this indemnity. 

Should the state win its appeal later this month, the trial will start again from scratch. The earlier denial of indemnity to state witnesses, however, will make the state's job more difficult in the next trial because witnesses will be extremely reluctant to testify. 

African National Congress (ANC) spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama said that the ANC was "dismayed by the judgment," and that the verdict "dented the quality of the reconciliation process." Ngonyama also said the trial was "handled irresponsibly," pointing to a denial by the judge to allow witnesses from abroad to testify against Basson.

Scientists May Pose Proliferation Risks
Much remains unknown about how the legal process will play out, but clearly the outcome of the trial raises some important and difficult questions about issues of proliferation. 

While lessons for the prevention of proliferation could be learned from hearing the testimony of scientists who worked within the program in open court, they exposed their identities and the nature of their work in the process. Although the importance of public scrutiny cannot be underestimated, and the valuable lessons that can be learned cannot be overemphasized, the South African government will have to remain vigilant to ensure that these scientists are not targeted for recruitment by other countries seeking to develop CBW programs of their own. 

That is not to say that these scientists were at the cutting edge of chemical and biological weapons development. On the contrary, the trial showed that much of the work they did for the South African program was elementary; however, their knowledge and expertise may still be of value to proliferating states. For example, Basson himself claimed to have gained extensive knowledge of the workings of an international black market in CBW agents and equipment. 

Asked whether Basson posed a possible proliferation threat, the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is responsible for the implementation of both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, said, "South Africa and all its citizens are obliged to comply with the international norms and requirements regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Yet the statement did not directly address whether the former head of South Africa's chemical and biological warfare program can be prevented from sharing his knowledge.

Basson is still a practicing cardiologist in South Africa and is no longer employed by the government. 

* Chandré‚ Gould is an associate researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in South Africa and has been responsible for the CCR's chemical and biological warfare research project since 1999. 

NPT PrepCom Achieves Little 
Despite Growing Nuclear Dangers

By Christine Kucia
BASIC

Without much fanfare or notice, the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT PrepCom) concluded in New York on Apr. 19 after passing a procedural document. 

Rather than trying to obtain consensus on a document describing the proceedings, Amb. Henrick Salander of Sweden, the PrepCom's chair, chose instead to issue a "Chairman's Summary" of the meeting's discussions. The summary aimed to reflect the balance among the varied topics of discussion throughout the meeting's duration.

Salander's paper met with both criticism and acclaim among delegates. One French representative speaking to BASIC Reports suggested that certain comments, such as the critiques levied by non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon states have not seriously embarked on steps toward disarmament, received excessively lengthy attention in the document. Meanwhile, other issues that were discussed at length in the meeting, such as peaceful uses of nuclear energy, warranted only a short passage in the summary. Other countries commended Salander for successfully reflecting the many competing concerns and producing a document that was both balanced and substantive.

U.S. Policy Unsettles Delegates
With memories of Sept. 11 fresh in their minds, delegates offered support for measures to control proliferation of nuclear weapons and component materials with a renewed sense of urgency. However, controversial U.S. policy statements indicating the continued prominence of nuclear weapons in military strategy cast a long shadow on the PrepCom. The Bush administration's plans to develop a low-yield nuclear weapon able to penetrate hardened and deeply-buried targets also met with strong reactions from many of the 138 delegations in attendance. 

Amb. Mahmoud Mubarak, Egyptian Assistant Minister of Foreign, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), related the group's disappointment over the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as well. On behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, he noted, "The additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability ... will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It could also . create an apparent rationale for action based solely on unilateral concerns." Mubarak also expressed the NAC's concern over the potential development of missile defenses, which could spawn an arms race in space. 

Word Play Dominates First Week
Sources of disagreement emerged early in the meeting. During the 2000 NPT Review Conference, states parties established measures to improve the strengthened review process for the treaty established in 1995. According to the final document from the 2000 meeting, countries were expected to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty as well as its universality."

During the PrepCom some states parties, including France and the United States, disputed the reporting mechanism, citing the lack of an actual requirement for reporting. Led by the NAC, several countries responded by refusing to agree on the meeting's timetable. Since the timetable requires a consensus agreement in order for the meeting to proceed, the exchange of views among members states stymied the meeting's progress for a short time.

After negotiations that lasted throughout the first week, delegations settled on language that eliminated the word "reporting" in favor of allowing discussion on "agreements, conclusions, and commitments" on nuclear disarmament issues, and to address "commitments, conclusions, and follow-up submissions" relevant to Middle East issues.

Amb. Christopher Westdal of Canada, who was involved in resolving the impasse, told BASIC Reports, "The language agreed does not undermine the reporting obligations." He also noted that "this year's agreement won't bind the future meetings, but we've solved the problem in ways that will apply to future meetings as well. An important precedent was set."

Conference Ends Without Results
Yet after resolving the problem of approving the timetable, the remainder of the conference lacked substantive debate on nuclear arms control issues. According to Amb. Makmur Widodo, Indonesian U.N. representative speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), many countries held high expectations for the PrepCom's strengthened review process. He explained, "To this end, the PrepCom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament."

Yet with countries uncertain of the best path to take to shore up the NPT by 2005, the Chair's description of the meeting's themes was overwhelmingly affirmed by delegates as the most useful way to proceed. Despite the disagreement and concern for international nuclear policy that overshadowed much of the conference, Canada's Westdal believes that the integrity of this non-proliferation treaty is "battered, but unbowed." 

By Christina Torsein

While the United Nations has stepped up its efforts to address weapons trafficking through a Program of Action agreed at a July 2001 conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), by far the most progress on combating small arms proliferation has been made within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE member states adopted a detailed and far-reaching Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons in November 2000, and in the ensuing 18 months have quietly embarked upon the implementation process.

Kate Joseph, the Confidence and Security Building Measures Officer at the OSCE, told BASIC Reports that the initiative is "a very comprehensive document covering a wide range of issues, including both the supply and the 
demand side. The document is a good basis from which to build on." Similarly, Christine Cadieux, First Secretary of the Canadian Delegation said, "The document is a beginning, not an end. We see [it] as a living document. The Canadian government cares an awful lot about the document, but we are also realistic and realize it is something to build upon." 

Information Exchange Key to Process
In adopting the OSCE document, participating states agreed to exchange information on five key aspects of their policies and procedures related to SALW: national marking systems; national procedures for the control over manufacturers; national legislation and current practice on export policy; controls over international arms-brokering; and techniques and procedures for the destruction of small arms.

The resulting information exchanges during 2001 are certainly the most comprehensive to date, with 45 of 55 participating states submitting reports, often providing highly detailed information about national practices. The information collected increases government-to-government transparency on the practices and procedures of a large and diverse group of states.

Up to seven information exchange meetings and regional information workshops will be held as part of the process. In February, the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) held a workshop on the implementation of the OSCE document and to discuss the outcome of the first round of information exchange completed in June 2001. One key finding was that submissions by participating states varied greatly in the level of detail made available, and that states have widely divergent criteria for determining what constitutes complete and useful information. Given these differences in reporting techniques, the FSC is considering the development of some form of template to encourage greater consistency among reporting states for the next information exchange, which is scheduled for Jun. 30, 2002. 

The information exchange also revealed substantial differences in practice. Of the 28 reporting states with policies on marking SALW, for example, only four have national marking systems currently in place that conform to the OSCE minimum criteria: that the year and country of manufacture, the manufacturer, and the weapon's serial number should be marked on weapons in a manner readable to non-experts.

At the February workshop, the FSC and participating states also examined ways to contribute to the full, correct and continuing implementation of the measures outlined in the initiative. In addition, the creation of a "best practice" handbook was discussed, along with how implementation of the SALW measures can contribute to the fight against terrorism.

Document's Limits Hinder Efficacy
Several challenges face OSCE member states as they begin implementation of the initiative. Since the OSCE is a consensus body, the document's language includes many provisions that are voluntary. Another weakness is that information exchange on imports and exports is discussed only within the context of OSCE member states, rather than including transfers to and from states outside the OSCE. Cadieux told BASIC Reports, "We would have wanted the document to apply outside of the OSCE. We need to be realistic to strengthen it." 

Cadieux also stressed that "more work needs to be done. There are some loopholes."

One such loophole is that the findings from the information exchanges are not made available to the public or other non-OSCE governments. Without greater public transparency, independent assessment of the document's effectiveness is difficult, especially the extent to which its provisions are being fully implemented by participating states. 

Noting the many strengths of the document, Joseph told BASIC Reports, "The OSCE has a strong background in transparency. They can work with other regions to show how they did it. This is also true for information exchange. The OSCE can also team up with other organizations, for example, on weapons collection. In the future we hope that we can develop projects like this." 

The war against terrorism may well strengthen the political momentum for such developments. Asked if the events of Sept. 11 will impact upon the implementation of the OSCE SALW document, Joseph responded, "Many countries that had reservations before [Sept. 11] are behind the document. There is much more consensus now." 

* Christina Torsein, a former BASIC analyst, is now working as a consultant for the Child Rights Information Network. Ian Davis contributed to this article. "

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