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Research Reports | BASIC Reports | BASIC Papers | BASIC Notes | Joint Publications |
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BASIC REPORTS
NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
15 MAY 2001 • NUMBER 78 • ISSN 0966-9175
Denmark
Debates Chinese Reaction By Jorgen Dragsdahl An “orderly and positive dialogue” between the US and China is, according to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, “absolutely decisive” for Denmark’s future position on missile defense. During a three-hour debate in the Danish parliament on May 3rd, Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft, a Social Democrat, repeatedly stressed the crucial significance of the Chinese reaction to a US missile defense if a new arms race is to be avoided. If one looks ten, twenty, or thirty years ahead, he said, the world is likely to have two superpowers again, and one of them will be China. Thus everybody must make “extraordinary efforts to secure a peaceful relationship between the two giants.” Greenland, a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, is likely to play a key role in an American national missile defense. A US radar facility at Thule is to be upgraded. The official Danish position, repeated during the debate, is that Denmark will not take a stand on US plans before a “precise” request is presented and the international framework for such plans is clarified. But both Mogens Lykketoft and spokesmen for the major parties raised numerous de facto demands. If a new arms race is to be avoided, “the main perspective” in a missile defense effort must, the foreign minister said, be non-proliferation agreements and deep “agreed” cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. Lykketoft called for “an active and focused dialogue” with the so-called “rogue” states, a term he avoided, and highlighted European Union efforts to encourage a renewed dialogue between the US and North Korea. The Danish focus on Chinese reactions is in part motivated by uncertainty over possible Russian reactions. In the US-Russian relationship, the ABM Treaty, which prohibits a national missile defense, is a key issue. Associating himself with recent remarks from the German foreign minister, Lykketoft called the Treaty “a fundamental contribution to stability” which should not be terminated unilaterally by either party. But an agreement by Moscow and Washington on modification of the Treaty is viewed by the Danish minister as a realistic possibility because a missile defense will not reduce Russian possibilities for deterrence. However, he added, with regard to China the case is different, and from the perspective of future peace and stability it is “far, far more important that the US and China do not collide.” As preparation for the parliamentary debate, the Foreign Policy Committee on April 25th held a day-long hearing on missile defense. It was dominated by gloomy assessments. While China was not invited to give an official presentation, Professor John Steinbruner from University of Maryland strongly deplored the absence of even concepts of agreement with China on limiting deployment of missile defense. He predicted a Chinese counter-reaction directed against space assets, in effect taking them hostage. Sir Timothy Garden of King’s College in London found that moves towards missile defense most likely will reduce security for European countries. The message from the invited international, independent experts were, despite their different perspectives, unequivocal: Denmark and other US allies must speak up now, and voice their concerns, if the Bush administration is to be influenced. Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution in Washington DC was in this respect the big surprise witness. Invited as a representative of the “pro”camp, he ended up issuing the strongest calls for European pressure on the Bush administration. “I think Europe is about to make one of the big mistakes it sometimes does,” Daalder warned, referring to a “deafening silence” from European governments in the last three months. European policy, he said, is based on two wrong assumptions. One, that missile defense will not come quickly. Two, that the Bush administration will act in a co-operative framework. But the European silence has been taken by the Bush administration as a go-ahead signal for a unilateral approach: if the US takes the lead, the allies will follow. European governments should “at the highest level,” Daalder said, send a coordinated message: “We in Europe have real fundamental interests when it comes to the question of what you do with the ABM Treaty. If you think you can do to the ABM Treaty what you did to Kyoto [global warming agreements], you are wrong.” During a discussion on possible consequences if Denmark says “no” to a US request for use of Thule, Daalder went even further: Denmark should raise at the highest level with the administration that it will not under any circumstances agree. “You have the leverage, use it,” he said to the Danish politicians. At least some listened. While a move during the parliamentary debate by far-left parties for a clear stand against missile defense was rejected, almost all other parties stressed the need for a co-operative framework involving Russia and China. Even a representative of the Conservative party, Per Stig Moeller, could envision a Danish “no,” although he deemed it unlikely given his trust in the Bush administration. Also, the need for approval by the home rule government in Greenland for use of Thule was stressed. Beyond these points, parties expressed views covering a broad spectrum. The Social Democrats highlighted the need for an effort against Third World poverty to get at the roots of global instability. Opposition center and right wing parties voiced interest in a missile defense system covering Europe too. In the end, the parliament refrained from giving the government concrete directives on the substance of further dialogue with the Bush administration in which the generally skeptical views presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be raised. Jorgen Dragsdahl is a Danish journalist specializing on defense and security affairs. Push Needed to Conclude BWC Protocol By
Jenni Rissanen GENEVA – Time is running short to conclude a verification instrument to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to the BWC, which began negotiate the verification Protocol in 1995, convened on April 23 for its penultimate (23rd) session, ending on May 11. The Group is aiming to conclude the Protocol before the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC, scheduled for November 19-December 7 this year. After this session, the AHG has only seven more weeks of scheduled negotiations, making this a major challenge. To accelerate efforts, the Chair of the AHG, Ambassador Tibor Tóth (Hungary), released his compromise proposal for the verification instrument – “a composite text” – about three weeks prior to the session, on March 30. The introduction of the text, however, has not come without trouble, as some important players in the negotiations are reluctant to base the negotiations on Tóth’s text. Another big question is the position of the United States, which has been conducting a major policy review that will determine their position on the Protocol. There is growing concern that the outcome will be negative towards the Protocol, casting a big shadow on the negotiations. Mixed
Reaction to Chair’s Text Sweden took the floor on behalf of the EU, which has been a strong supporter of introducing the composite text, and thirteen associated countries. Although the text did not “meet all EU expectations,” the EU believed that through the text, the AHG would “be able to find solutions to the remaining open questions”. Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Switzerland agreed with the EU that the text “should be the platform for the political decisions that are needed now.” Russia had taken first glance at the text and said it contained “many positive points,” but that there were also “a number of unacceptable positions,” on which Russia was ready to work. The views in the NAM were split: Brazil, Chile and South Africa welcomed the introduction of the text whereas China, Iran, Libya and Pakistan were critical, with Cuba somewhere in the middle. Brazil, Chile and South Africa endorsed the Chair’s move. Brazil was “very pleased” with the “balanced text,” and argued that it could serve as a basis of further work. It was satisfied with the Chair’s solutions on the few outstanding cooperation issues and believed the text contained “politically viable” solutions for the problem of technology transfer disputes. Chile saw in the composite text “not only the intention but also the materialization of compromise,” and agreed with the Chair that a wide sense of dissatisfaction would mean that a workable balance had been struck. Regardless of whether the text was going to be a or the basis of negotiations, it filled “a political need.” South Africa noted the short remaining time and agreed with many others that the text should constitute the basis for future work. Representing a different view in the NAM, China, Cuba, and Pakistan reiterated that they still considered the Rolling Text as the only basis of the negotiations, characterising the Chair’s text as good “reference,” “supplementary” or “resource” material. China appeared most critical of the text, complaining it was “one-sided” and “still far from final agreement.” It felt “nobody [could] be sure about the fate” due to divergent views in the AHG. Pakistan called for “a good, fair Protocol” which included “unambiguous” provisions on cooperation and which would establish “only one uniform and multilateral regime to govern exports” as well as a mechanism to deal with transfer denials. Cuba was not “completely satisfied,” but it felt the Chair had made a good attempt to satisfy different interests. Iran, which has played an active role in the negotiations, underscored its commitment to multilateral arms control and disarmament instruments. Iran believed the composite text did indicate that threat AHG was moving negotiations onto a more crucial stage, but “not necessarily the endgame.” It had not found the text balanced and was disappointed, in particular, with the treatment of the entry-into-force question, as was Libya, and the technology transfer provisions. Iran also warned against a “shift of blame” game, in a clear reference to the United States, which has kept a low profile in the AHG during the last weeks. However, its silence has not gone unnoticed and there is nervousness about the new administration’s policy review’s position on the Protocol. Although the US delegation has kept an official line of saying that the review is still underway, rumours and press reports (Chemical & Engineering News, 20 April, 2001) indicate that the conclusions, which are yet to be approved at a higher level, are negative towards the Protocol. Already, some have been complaining that the lack of participation by the United States, due to their policy review, is crumbling confidence in and complicating the whole process. However, one high level diplomat argued that as long as the US review had not received its final rubber stamp, it was important not to take its outcome for granted, but to remain active and try to keep the Americans involved as well. This was important “for the credibility of the current efforts in the informal consultations.” What
Next? Whether delegations will begin actual bargaining on Tóth’s text is still unclear, with China and possibly others opposing such a move and the United States not engaging. In his opening remarks, Tóth acknowledged that the Rolling Text was the basis of the negotiations and that this could only be changed if all delegations agreed. One Western diplomat felt that the best that could be expected from the April-May session was that the composite text “survived” the scrutiny. Thus, the period between now and the final session, scheduled for July 23-August 17, as well as the final four weeks will be “make or break” time during which the final push must be made if the AHG is to succeed in bringing the negotiations to a close and delivering a Protocol before the Review Conference.
At
UN 2001 Prep Com, Consensus Elusive By Christina Torsein The Third Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects recently concluded at the end of March in New York. Discussion focused on questions of NGO access and the Program of Action document. The Program of Action document, commonly referred to as L4, has four sections: the preamble; a section on preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; a section on implementation, international development and assistance; and a section focusing on follow-up and implementation. Throughout the first week, discussion focused on whether or not NGOs should receive access to the Conference. In the end, it was decided that UN Economic and Social Council-accredited organizations and others who go through the accreditation process will be able to attend the Conference in July. During discussion of the Program of Action document, various states suggested additions to the preamble, notably the effects the proliferation of small arms have on women and children, and the importance of recognising international humanitarian law. Canada, Sweden (on behalf of the European Union, which holds the Presidency until July 1st) and numerous African states, among others, all called for further wording to recognise the humanitarian consequences of the proliferation of small arms. Addressing the floor, a delegate from Canada stated, “the human dimension of the problem of small arms must be reflected in the preamble. In its current form, it is not adequately reflected as some important elements on human security from the last draft version have been dropped and other elements have still not been incorporated.” The importance of a universal marking and tracing system also was discussed. Norway, Canada and the United States, among others, all called for a universally recognised and user-friendly system. An internationally binding instrument on brokering was also called for. Throughout the Prep Com, reference was made to the various regional initiatives in existence which address the proliferation of small arms (notably the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Bamako Declaration). There also is frustration that the Program of Action document will only be a politically binding document and not a legally binding mechanism. Over the course of the two weeks, many of the discussions were closed to NGOs, which they found disappointing. However, the NGOs that were there as part of IANSA, the International Action Network on Small Arms, gave lunchtime and evening briefings to delegates and other NGOs to present their concerns and priorities. In addition, NGOs were given the opportunity to address the plenary at the end of the first week of the Prep Com. Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, the former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the plenary during the NGO session on behalf of the Eminent Persons Group. In his statement Dr. Axworthy recognised the role NGOs play in this process. In addition he called for three treaty-making mandates, namely an international treaty on marking and tracing, an international treaty on brokering and an international Code of Conduct. The value of NGO participation during the Prep Coms and the Conference was remarked upon by numerous governments throughout the proceedings. The UN 2001 process is recognised as the main focal point to address the international proliferation of small arms at the moment, yet governments reached little consensus on the Program of Action document. At the outset of the Prep Com, hopes were high that delegates could progress forward on their revisions of L4, but this was not the case. During the second week evening sessions were held in order to try and move discussion along. Others argued that while the discussions were drawn out, one positive aspect was that delegates showed a substantive grasp of each paragraph of the working document. The Chair of the Conference for the last two Prep Coms has been Ambassador dos Santos of Mozambique. It was decided that the Chair for the Conference will be Ambassador Reyes of Colombia. It was also agreed that the first week of the Conference will be ministerial, that is to say, foreign ministers will be encouraged to attend. It is unlikely that an inter-sessional will be held before the Conference in July. In this light, it remains to be seen what the final outcomes of the Conference will be. The UN 2001 Conference will be held from July 9-20, 2001 in New York.
Will
the EU Fill Gap Left By US Reversal By
Oliver Meier The Bush administration intends to severely cut back its non-proliferation efforts in Russia. President Bush’s proposed FY 2002 budget would reduce Department of Energy (DOE) non-proliferation funds for nuclear disarmament and verification efforts in the former Soviet Union (FSU) by about $100 million, or 32% compared to the 2001 budget. Overall DOE funding for cooperative nuclear security programs would fall from $311.6 million in 2001 to $211.1 million in 2002. The cuts, if implemented, would decrease security and transparency of nuclear material stored on the territory of the FSU, slow down disposition of former nuclear weapons material and increase the probability of former Soviet weapons scientists selling their knowledge to proliferators. At the same time, an overall review of the $800 million Extended Threat Reduction Initiative, including programs managed by the Department of State and Department of Defense, is still under way. Among the large DOE programs most affected is the nuclear materials protection, control and accounting program (MPC&A), which would be cut by 18% from $169.7 million to $138.8 million. MPC&A efforts include the safe and secure storage of weapons-capable materials. The Nuclear Cities Initiative, aiming to help conversion of former Soviet nuclear weapon centers, would be cut from $26.6 million in 2001 to $6.6 million in 2002 – a 75% decrease. Six out of nine long-term non-proliferation projects which were funded in 2001 are to be discontinued. These include efforts on the development of a plutonium registry, improved safeguards for civil plutonium at the nuclear storage sites at Mayak, better security for naval nuclear fuel and warheads, as well as funds to assist Russia in closing down its nuclear weapons production facilities. The Bush administration also has changed course on North Korea. Even though the outgoing Clinton administration came very close to reaching an agreement with Pyongyang on missiles, all high level contacts between the US and the DPRK have been stopped while a policy review is under way in Washington. The US government maintains that an agreement on the North Korean missile program would be unverifiable. Meanwhile, the European Union is showing tentative signs of preparing to walk down a different arms control path and may be preparing for a stronger role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction materials and technology. The adoption of a European Joint Action in 1999 on a cooperation program for non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia was “a clear political signal by EU member states that Europe should be more visible in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament,” Marc Deffrennes, head of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Section (Weapons of Mass Destruction) at the European Commission in Brussels, told BASIC Reports. On 8-9 March 2001, the first Conference on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation in the Russian Federation and in the Newly Independent States took place. It was organized by the European Commission and co-hosted by the Swedish EU presidency in Brussels. The meeting took stock of EU non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, but did not result in any new initiatives. One hundred and seventy participants from the EU, FSU and the US discussed the European contribution to nuclear security programs in the FSU, the destruction of chemical weapons and how to secure the jobs of former Soviet weapons scientists. Similar meetings are planned to take place annually. Another new idea, potentially complementing similar efforts in Russia, is the development of a European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI). ENCI would have the goal of developing new strategies and identifying funding mechanisms to assist in the conversion and restructuring of the Russian nuclear weapons complex. This would be a European-led effort, but would include representatives of the US and Russian governments as well as non-governmental organizations. An International Working Group for the ENCI was launched on April 9 in Como, Italy, but the composition, mandate and funding for the ENCI are still to be determined. During the Swedish presidency, the EU also has become more involved in engaging North Korea, one of the main proliferators of weapons of mass destruction delivery vehicles. Obviously disturbed by the abrupt US policy change, EU governments announced at the EU summit in Stockholm on 24-25 March 2001 that Brussels would send its own team of mediators to Korea. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh argued that “Europe must step in to help reduce tension between the two Koreas, not least because the outside world is so worried about North Korean missiles.” During the visit of the EU troika, which also included Javier Solana, Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, North Korea promised to continue its moratorium on missile testing until at least 2003. It remains to be seen whether these initiatives mark the beginning of a more active European involvement in non-proliferation, disarmament and verification. “For the time being, the main role of the EU is to coordinate non-proliferation programs run by member states,” says Defrennes. Many hurdles remain until the development of a genuine European non-proliferation policy, matching US initiatives. To start with, European spending on non-proliferation remains dwarfed by US funding. Between 1992 and 2001, the European Commission and individual EU member states have spent a total of $550 million on non-proliferation and disarmament programs in the FSU. In the same period, the US has spent more than $3.6 billion on various threat reduction efforts – more than seven times the combined EU contribution. A stronger European role also is hindered by the fact that there is almost no bureaucratic infrastructure in Brussels to initiate, implement and coordinate arms control and disarmament agreements. Setting up a policy unit to deal with such matters – integrating the Commission’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Section, the existing Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programs and the various desk officers – will be a necessary first step to develop a coherent policy. As long as the EU member states do not commit more resources to a joint arms control policy, the EU’s involvement non-proliferation will remain a largely intergovernmental affair. India Thanks Bush for CTBT Reprieve By Huma Siddiqui India’s government has yet to make up its mind on the merits of eventually signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – with the election of George W. Bush as US President seen by New Delhi as giving officials more time to craft a coherent policy. Bush’s opposition to ratification of the CTBT, which has been signed by Washington but was rejected by the Senate last year, is further being welcomed by Indian diplomats as helping to clear the testing issue as an obstacle to improved US-Indian relations. While moving forward with its nuclear weapons program, India voluntarily has announced a testing moratorium – similar to that declared by former US President Bill Clinton and reiterated recently by Bush. There are several political and practical questions that New Delhi must answer before signing the Treaty, however. According to Bhashyam Kasturi, an independent military expert in New Delhi, “India's position on the CTBT has never been consistent. The question that has always remained unanswered is: ‘What do we want?’” In fact, the government of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee is relieved that it does not, for the time being, have to scramble to put together a national consensus on the CTBT, according to diplomats here. Indian politicians see the Treaty as largely symbolic, but New Delhi’s refusal to sign is a position that is soaked in nationalism and there could be a large domestic political price tag attached to reversing direction. It is widely assumed by politicians here that that signature of the CTBT will put a spike in India's fiercely independent security status. “The status of the Treaty will be no better after India's signature – as it cannot come into force without ratification by the United States,” noted Air Marshal (ret.) A.K. Mukhopadyaya, a military analyst here. “In the new found keenness [among political circles in India] to discuss the CTBT, it has clearly been forgotten that earlier, it was postulated that India would only consider signature after the Treaty is ratified and observed by all major powers,” he continued. Another question widely debated among Indian experts is how to weigh the potential technical benefits of signing the Treaty – which could include the transfer of badly needed nuclear safeguards technologies – with the potential costs of forgoing future tests designed to improve India’s arsenal Kasturi, for example, cautions that India needs to know exactly what ‘safeguards’ would be on offer before making a decision. Experts point out that while new testing may not be required for bomb development, it would be needed to refine India’s nuclear science and technology approaches. “India will have to carry out a minimum of 40 nuclear tests,” asserts Mukhophadyaya. “In the first phase, 20 or so will be mainly weapon-related. The rest will be mainly scientific, engineering and technology demonstrators.” He argues that the current “political window” provided by Pakistan’s test-firing of the Ghauri missile and its threat to test-fire an even longer range missile should be exploited by Indian leaders as a rationale for continuing India’s own testing program in the near-term. Pro-testing experts also point out that India’s self-proclaimed testing moratorium had little international benefit, with the United States maintaining sanctions imposed due to India’s weapon development program. So far, the government has been in a defensive mode regarding the future of its testing program – rather than putting forth an active policy agenda. As long ago as January 2000, Jaswant Singh, external affairs minister, told BBC TV that the Indian government needed time to build a consensus before signing the CTBT. That consensus, however, remains elusive..
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