10 MARCH 2001 • NUMBER 77 • ISSN 0966-9175

• CTBT INSPECTIONS REMAIN CONTENTIOUS

• U.N. STILL LACKS MANDATE FOR SMALL ARMS CONFERENCE

CTBT Inspections Remain Contentious

By Oliver Meier
VERTIC 

Major issues remain to be resolved before the planned verification system for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be established, despite progress at the Nov. 20-21 Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) meeting of the future CTBT Organization.

Most importantly, diplomats from those countries that have signed and/or ratified the CTBT continue to argue over the details of how future treaty inspectors will conduct their work.  Another controversial issue is whether, and how, information gathered by the future verification system will be distributed to third-parties outside the CTBT treaty, according to diplomats participating in the talks in Vienna.

Although the CTBT has entered some rough political waters since it was opened for signature in 1996 – with nuclear tests in May 1998 by India and Pakistan, and the refusal of the U.S. Senate in October 1999 to ratify the treaty – consultations among about 80 signatory states for implementing the treaty continue apace.

Despite the persistent problems, the 13^th session of the PrepCom was ground-breaking, wrapping up work in an unprecedented two days.  The PrepCom, which was established in March 1997, is in charge of implemen-
ting the treaty’s verification system. 

At the November meeting, the PrepCom approved the 2001 budget of 
$83.5 million for the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the future CTBT Organization.  Support for the Secretariat remains high.  Its budget has been rising for consecutive years and the financial record remains exceptionally good.  More than 90 percent of members’ dues have been paid.  The secretariat now has more than 200 staff and is doing the 
practical work of setting up the verification system.

On-Site Access Unclear
The PrepCom is also responsible for the development of procedures for on-site inspections.  Such inspections can be requested if a state party suspects that a clandestine nuclear explosion has taken place.  If 31 of the 50 members of the CTBT Organization’s Executive Council support the request, up to 40 inspectors can investigate the suspicious event.

However, several states, Israel among them, have expressed fears about 
the intrusiveness of on-site inspections.  They insist that the Operational Manual for these inspections, which is currently being developed by diplomats from several CTBT member states, should provide detailed instructions on the rights – and particularly responsibilities – of inspectors.  Others, including the United States, argue that inspectors should be given guidelines rather than instructions, and that a certain flexibility is necessary to ensure effective inspections.

Ambassador Arend Meerburg of the Netherlands, who has been appointed to the new position of Task Leader for the Operations Manual in November, will begin substantive discussions on a so-called initial draft rolling text for the manual in June.

Confidentiality Questions Raised
At the core of verification is the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a global network of 321 monitoring stations.  IMS stations will use four monitoring technologies – seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide – to detect, locate and identify test explosions in any environment.  When the network is complete, IMS stations in 90 countries will transmit data, many of them in near-real time, to the International Data Center in Vienna.  The data center collects and screens IMS data.  Raw data as well as ‘products’ are transmitted back to states parties, who can then make judgments about possible treaty violations based on IMS data and other information available to them.

The IMS is expected to be ‘capable of meeting the verification requirements’ when the treaty enters into force.  A recent report from the Provisional Technical Secretariat states that, at the end of 2000, more than 90 percent of site surveys for the 321 monitoring stations that make up the IMS were completed.  About one third of IMS stations are installed or meet established specifications, and experts at the secretariat expect that more than 120 IMS stations will be certified by the end of this year.

The release of International Monitoring System data to third parties remains another controversial issue.  Under the treaty, every member state has access to raw and processed data from monitoring stations.  But the CTBT does not specify whether others, such as researchers or  non-governmental organizations, should also have access.  Potential recipients have repeatedly requested such access.  For example, infrasound data from the International Monitoring System could warn civil air traffic of volcanic eruptions which can endanger aircraft.

China is the most prominent proponent of a narrow interpretation of confidentiality rules. Others point out that the CTBT Organization  will have to interact with various communities and institutions if it wants to take part in the scientific discussion.

PrepComs Stable, Treaty Troubled
While support for the PrepCom process is expected to remain strong, the future of the CTBT remains in doubt.  One of the next big political milestones for the CTBT will be the second international conference on ‘facilitating entry-into-force,’ which will take place Sept. 25-27 at U.N. headquarters in New York.  Countries that have signed and/or ratified the treaty will have to discuss how the remaining 13 countries – out of the 44 whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to enter into force – can be convinced to ratify the treaty.

In particular, the stance of the United States remains in question, as new President George W. Bush stated his opposition to ratification during his campaign.  Even U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former supporter of the CTBT, stated in his confirmation hearing that the Bush administration “will not be asking the Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” during its 2001-02 legislative session.

U.N. Still Lacks Mandate for
Small Arms Conference

By Michael Crowley

The success of the upcoming U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects remains in doubt, despite some initial progress, with diplomats still divided over the meeting’s mandate and procedural format.

Representatives of U.N. member states at the second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the July-planned conference adjourned Jan. 19 in New York after having deferred decisions on recommendations to the formal conference on a program of action, rules of procedure, and the objectives of the conference, as well as the question of attendance by non-governmental organizations (NGO)s.

One key issue dividing U.N. members is whether the conference, planned for July 9-20, 2001, in New York, should address aspects of state-
sanctioned or ‘legal trade’ in small arms and light weapons.  While some governments, such as those of EU member states, believe that stringent regulatory control on legal exports are necessary to effectively combat illegal trade, others, such as China and Russia, believe that control of the legal trade is outside the conference’s mandate.

Wu Haitao of the People’s Republic of China stated that small arms are necessary to ensure law and order, noting that legal manufacture remains a sovereign right which must be respected.  He also stressed that the illicit trade is not a necessary outcome of legal production, and urged that this view be reflected in the program of action.

Wu warned that unrealistic objectives would create problems for the conference.  For example, he noted that the issue of transparency in manufacture – an issue that in China’s view involves national security – could be divisive.

Aleksander A. Orlov, a representative of the Russian Federation, contended that it was more important today to concentrate on concrete measures aimed at freeing regions of conflict from illicit arms flows, rather than radical measures to reduce and monitor legal transfers and deliveries of such weapons.

By contrast, Sune Danielsson of Sweden, speaking on behalf of the 15-nation European Union, argued strongly for addressing export control.  Noting the recent EU Plan of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, he main-
tained the need to include criteria for export control in the draft program of action.

Similarly, Raul Salazar-Cosio of Peru stressed that eliminating the illicit trade requires means to ensure that legal weapons are not diverted for illicit activities.

The importance of controlling the legal small arms trade also has been voiced by a number of NGOs and outside experts following the PrepCom process.

“The upcoming U.N. conference provides a much needed opportunity for the international community to build the humanitarian controls that are so desperately needed in the arms trade,” Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, told BASIC Reports.  
“Let us hope that member states will have the courage and vision to translate this potential into action in July 2001 and beyond.”

Action Program Elusive
Following the PrepCom’s opening discussions, a week-long plenary session was held to review, in detail, the draft program of action prepared by conference chairman, Carlos Dos Santos, of Mozambique.  The draft program is divided into four sections: preamble; preventing, controlling and curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; international cooperation and assistance; and implementation and follow-up.  Each section contains commitments and measures to be undertaken at national, regional and global levels.

The lengthy plenary highlighted further differences amongst the delegations.  For example, the U.S. representative, Elizabeth Verville, noted concerns that the draft language in section II (prevention and control) appeared to create a legal obligation for U.N. member states.  The object should be to create political commitments, not to draft a treaty, she warned.

In order to help guide the PrepCom’s deliberations on section II, Moctar Ouane of Mali introduced the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the 2000 Ministerial Conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).  Many delegations agreed that this regional document could provide the committee with a blueprint to soften the mandatory tone of some of the language included in the current draft of section II.

One issue that did find a strong core of support is the need for establishing adequate procedures for marking and tracing small arms.  Many delegates expressed the view that a comprehensive mechanism for tracing small arms could form the nexus of future U.N. efforts to implement international arms embargoes.  Some governments are even suggesting that the PrepCom consider creating a legally binding instrument.  The Russian delegate, however, urged caution, noting that establishing mechanisms to monitor the legal transfer of weapons would go beyond the conference's mandate.

Controlling Brokers Debate
The issue of controlling arms brokers was also broached during the discussions about preventative measures.  Some delegates stressed the need to strengthen the language on international accountability contained in the draft program.  While acknowledging the urgent need to address arms brokering, others suggested that the committee also take into account the work of an independent experts group due to report in February, and also the current U.N. Firearms Protocol negotiations in Geneva.

The importance of the participation of NGOs in the committee’s work, as well as at the 2001 Conference, also was raised by many attendees throughout the deliberations.  After a formal debate on the issue, sparked by the proposal of the Chinese delegation to limit the participation of NGOs to those specifically involved in the disarmament aspect of the small arms question, the committee agreed on some future NGO participation. However, the diplomats continue to disagree on whether to limit such participation to groups deemed “relevant and competent” with respect to the scope and purpose of the conference.  Delegates deferred a decision, although did hold an informal session to hear NGO presentations.

The next PrepCom meeting will be March 19-30, 2001, in New York.