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BASIC REPORTS
NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
10 NOVEMBER 2000 • NUMBER 75 • ISSN 0966-9175
NATO 'Paragraph 32' Arms Control
Review By Tom McDonald As NATO moves towards finalizing its 'options' for future arms control work to be presented to ministers in December, the parameters of future Alliance actions in the arms control field are becoming clearer. While many issues remain unresolved, according to allied diplomats and NATO officials, the final report to ministers is expected to cover a wide range of topics relating to nuclear weapons, conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. For example, there is an ongoing debate about the possibilities for engaging Russia in the arena of sub-strategic weapons - from potential new proposals on increasing transparency about weapon holdings all the way to negotiations on reducing deployment. Other substantive topics under discussion, according to allied diplomats and Alliance officials, include: work on the swift implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; confidence- and security-building measures in conflict areas of the wider Euro-Atlantic region, such as the Caucasus; the possibility of de-mating some types of nuclear weapons from delivery vehicles; improving the balance of intelligence on proliferation issues; making sure the negative security assurances offered to non-nuclear weapon states by individual allies are integrated into Alliance policy; and studying recent Russian proposals for a joint theater missile defense scheme. The talks, however, are at a crucial stage, and many officials involved refused to comment on the record for fear of upsetting a sensitive process. "Nothing has been formally agreed," one NATO official told BASIC Reports in mid-October. The 'options' under consideration are the result of NATO's 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999, at which heads of state and government issued a communiqué‚ entitled "An Alliance for the 21st Century." Paragraph 32 of this communiqué‚ reads as follows: "[.] In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence- and security- building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options. The responsible NATO bodies would accomplish this. We support deepening consultations with Russia in these and other areas in the Permanent Joint Council as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council." NATO defense ministers made no mention of the review at their Oct. 10-11 informal meeting in Birmingham, England, but a representative of one NATO delegation told BASIC Reports that "there is a degree of optimism that the process will have a useful outcome." The Senior Political Committee shortly will be reviewing the recommendations of the other committees involved. "An initial framework document has been produced, but we are not in the detail stages yet," said one allied diplomat. According to one U.K. official, "things are proceeding on track for bringing the process to a conclusion through the various committees in time for the December ministerials." NATO officials are extremely reluctant to spell out the precise details of topics now under discussion. However, they have in the past suggested a number of areas where NATO might contribute to arms control debates and activity. For example, the report is expected to draw attention to recent accomplishments, including the creation, in May of this year, of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre at its headquarters; an assessment of its role in arms control and disarmament since the end of the Cold War, including its work on small arms and land mines; and the engagement of Southern Flank neighbors on non-proliferation issues within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. It also is as yet unclear exactly how the recommended 'options' will be presented to ministers at their respective meetings in Brussels - with the issue still under debate. While foreign ministers originally were tasked with the so-called Paragraph 32 process, some allied delegations are seeking better ways to include defense ministers - especially with regard to the aspects of the report relating to nuclear weapons, according to one NATO diplomat who spoke to BASIC Reports on condition of anonymity. Defense ministers are due to meet Dec. 5-6, and foreign ministers will follow suit Dec. 14-15. More direct involvement by defense ministers would ensure that the political and military sides of the Alliance are properly integrated. Furthermore, any work done by those committees traditionally subordinate to defense ministers will be continue to be routed through them for their approval. Neither has a decision been made as to whether the final report will be released as a public document or remain confidential. One source close to the negotiations told BASIC Reports that it was possible that a shorter version might be produced for the public, but stressed that this was only one of a number of options still on the negotiating table. Whatever is presented to ministers in December, it seems clear that NATO will take a long-term and broad view of its future contribution to the arms control agenda. As one European diplomat at NATO headquarters in Brussels told BASIC Reports, "This process is about arms control and proliferation writ large."
Is South Asia Headed for a Post-Cold War By Huma Siddiqui NEW DELHI - Never was a missile test flight watched so intensely by the whole world as the one recently conducted under the U.S. National Missile Defense Program (NMD). But what happened - or rather, did not happen - on July 7 can provide the world a platform to appeal to the United States to see reason and abandon NMD, according to Indian political and military analysts. Indian government officials and analysts widely are opposed to the U.S. NMD program, criticizing the effort as leading to the militarization of space, and potentially triggering an arms race in Asia. "We are against the militarization of outer space and any steps that could lead to a cascading effect in terms of an arms race," said Raminder Jassal, official spokesman for the Ministry of External Affairs, in his daily briefing to reporters on the day of the U.S. missile test. While India's response to NMD is not likely to be a direct or immediate build-up of its own nuclear arsenal, officials here already speak of potential long-term consequences for New Delhi's nuclear posture. According to Pramod Bhatnagar, spokesman for the Indian Ministry of Defense, "The U.S. NMD program is not going to affect us until the time Pakistan starts building up arms; until such time, we are not going to react by attempting to build up our armory." Should the United States decide to deploy a limited NMD, it would come as a serious blow to the post-Cold War nuclear arms control regime, according to Indian leaders. Immediately after the U.S. missile test, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh told Worldview India, a national current affairs program broadcast on the state-owned Zee channel, that the U.S. missile defense program "runs counter to [the United States'] own philosophy of moving from step one to two to three, and a gradual reduction of the vast armory of weapons of mass destruction. . The missile defense program of the United States will without doubt have a consequence which will be damaging to the overall approach to disarmament." Neither India nor Pakistan perceives any nuclear threat from the United States, according to analysts here. Yet, any U.S. decision that affects global nuclear arms control, and provokes strong negative reactions from the Russian Federation and China, will echo strongly in South Asia. With NMD conceivably interrupting any further reductions in the U.S.-Russian strategic arsenals and forcing a Chinese buildup, it would signal for India the beginning of a post-Cold War nuclear arms race, according to Indian military analysts. At present, there is a divide between the nuclear moderates and the hardliners in India. The moderates support the concept of a minimal and de-alerted nuclear force in the low hundreds and oppose further nuclear tests. Also, the moderates support India's signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and eventual accession to a multilaterally negotiated Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The hardliners, on the other hand, favor a posture with a triad nuclear force comprising 400 to 1,000 nuclear warheads. They advocate the resumption of nuclear testing to develop lighter thermonuclear and enhanced radiation warheads for a potential MIRV-ed ballistic missile force; the hardliners are also skeptical of the value of a fissile material cut-off. Thus far, the moderates, led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Singh, have prevailed in this debate. If current trends persist through this decade, India probably will field a modest nuclear force in the low hundreds, according to military analysts and government officials. There is also the possibility that India might participate in the global non-proliferation regime with the exception of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The government of Pakistan also has publicly adopted a policy of strategic restraint - and likely would maintain such a policy as long as India does also, experts here said. However, quantitative and qualitative improvements in China's nuclear capability would undermine the moderates in India and Pakistan. A higher Chinese alert status would invariably increase threat perceptions in New Delhi and Islamabad successively; it would intensify pressure on governments in both capitals to accelerate the integration of nuclear weapons into their respective armed forces and improve operational readiness - actions that will have adverse consequences for nuclear crisis stability in South Asia. The trouble with U.S. nonproliferation policy with regard to South Asia is that it is contradictory, according to Indian officials and military analysts. While the United States advocates a regional nuclear rollback, its policy on missile defense threatens to wreck any meaningful efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. India's nuclear proponents establish a linkage between global nuclear disarmament and regional proliferation. They long have argued that the nuclear weapon states have no intention of undertaking comprehensive nuclear disarmament; that they are interested in perpetuating the divide between the 'nuclear haves' and 'have nots' in order to maintain their nuclear hegemony. Should the global nuclear arms control agenda stall because of a U.S. move to deploy NMD, this argument will strengthen, according to experts, and lead to a renewed drive behind the Indian government's plans to build and deploy nuclear weapons. The security interests of India's rival Pakistan obviously are inextricably tied to India's military posture. Thus, the overall outcome of a U.S. NMD network will be an increasing salience of nuclear weapons in South Asia, which will not only come as a blow to regional arms control initiatives, but also serve as an incentive for other potential proliferators to follow suit, military experts here said. 2000 UN Register of Conventional Arms Editor's Notes: The following tables provide data on weapons transfers, both exports and imports, for calendar year 1999 as reported by the 84 participating states to the eighth annual United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (A/55/99). Where applicable, information from recipients' import submissions on the number and type of weapons received has also been included for comparative purposes. The details from recipient state import submissions are provided only on those transactions reported by the supplier in its export return; transactions reported by a recipient but not listed in the supplier's export submission are not included below. States were asked to specify their definition of a weapons transfer in order to clarify discrepancies between supplier and recipient reports, but countries continue to differ in interpretations of when a transfer takes place: at the time of transfer of control, transfer of title, or otherwise. The Register includes additional information provided by governments on procurement from national production and military holdings. UN Register Category – Abbreviation I Battle Tanks
– Tanks NP:
Non-participant. Recipient state did not participate. * While the numbers
and descriptions match those in lists of participant supplier
states, and suppliers name Uruguay as a recipient state, BASIC
omitted Uruguay’s numbers and descriptions because it had named
no supplier states in its imports list. 2000 UN
Register Tables (PDF format only)
This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Theresa Hitchens in Washington.
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