14 AUGUST 2000 • NUMBER 74 • ISSN 0966-9175

• GLOOM HANGS OVER CD

• NMD STIRS INTERNAL TENSIONS IN ALLIED NATIONS

• NEWS BRIEFS

• STATUS OF CURRENT ARMS CONTROL TREATIES  

• EDITOR'S NOTE

Gloom Hangs Over CD

By Jenni Rissanen
The Acronym Institute

GENEVA – With the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the world’s forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, in its fifth stagnant year and facing little prospect for revitalization of the talks in the near future, there is an apathetic silence hanging over the CD meeting room in the Palais des Nations here. Delegations from 66 countries gather in the council chamber on Thursday mornings for CD plenary meetings, but with the current deadlock in the CD, these simply add to the prevailing droopy ambience.

The CD’s last accomplishment was the 1996 conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Due to disagreement over its program of work, no negotiations have been launched by the CD since. And none are likely to be launched before the end of this year’s session in September.

Under its rules procedure, the CD is expected to adopt an agenda at the beginning of the year, then form a program of work to tackle the different issues on that agenda. But for several years now, the consensus-based CD has spent the majority of its time arguing over the program, thus failing to embark on any substantive work. In August 1998, the CD was able to agree on a work program and conducted its business based on that for a few weeks before closing for the year. In the beginning of 1999, it was again unable to agree on the work program. This year, the situation remains the same, and it is all but confirmed that 2000 will be another lost year.

Nations Dispute Work Program
The CD has met for 17 weeks since January, with Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus and Belgium each taking a turn as CD President and presenting proposals for a program of work. None of them, however, was able to invent ‘the magic formula.’ There is a dawning realization that such a formula does not exist, and what is really lacking is political will. Ambassador Hassan Wirajuda of Indonesia said in his farewell speech here June 29 that the CD worked in an atmosphere where "goodwill is an distant wish and flexibility an empty concept" in which "any proposals launched will not fly, or else be shot down instantly."

At the core of the dispute about the work program are three issues: a ban on the production on fissile material, nuclear disarmament, and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) – nowadays often referred to as the three ‘priorities.’ Delegations have disagreed on the mechanisms to deal with each of the three issues, as well as their tasks and powers. There is a lot of talk about which topic deserves an ad hoc committee or an ad hoc working group, viewed as carrying different status and weight, and whether the mandate of the ad hoc bodies should be one of treaty negotiation or just exchange of views.

Underlying these ostensibly procedural debates are competing security concerns and goals among CD delegations. For example, the U.S. plan to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system has become a divisive issue over recent months. China and Russia, which oppose the U.S. plans, are pressing for negotiations on PAROS in the CD as a way to raise concerns about the weaponization of space. In a June 22 speech here, China’s Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned that "even a layman can see that [the planned NMD program by the United States] will turn outer space into a new weapon base and a battlefield."

Another complicating factor is that any CD work program is seen as a whole and agreement on it as a ‘package deal,’ with all of its components requiring the approval of all 66 delegations. Making linkages between the different components is a common phenomenon in the CD and a major contributory factor in the impasse.

China, Russia Push Space Talks
Up until this year, delegations generally had viewed nuclear disarmament and PAROS as the key obstacles to an agreed work plan. During the first part of this year’s session, however, delegates became increasingly concerned that the long-sought negotiations on a fissile material production ban – a consensus mandate dating from 1995 – also were slipping further into the future, due to the linkage made by China between this issue and PAROS. China has underlined that PAROS is its first priority, with Beijing insisting on ‘equal treatment’ for the three topics – that is, if there are to be fissile material negotiations, then there should also be negotiations on PAROS, and for that matter on nuclear disarmament, although the latter is included by China as a gesture towards the non-aligned countries, known as the Group of 21.

Russia, too, backs PAROS negotiations but is less enthusiastic about CD work on nuclear disarmament, despite recent support for this given by the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States continues to resist nuclear disarmament and PAROS negotiations, with Ambassador Robert Grey saying Feb. 17 that the two "topics are not ripe" for treaty negotiations.

NPT Success Does Little to Drive CD
Some in the CD had hoped that the constructive outcome of the sixth NPT Review Conference, held in New York this spring, would help the CD overcome its deadlock. However, even with the approval in New York of an action plan on "practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI" as outlined in the May 22 conference document, the CD’s impasse has continued. Belgium’s attempts in June and July, as CD President, to get acceptance for a carefully balanced program of work after the NPT Review Conference showed that the positions of the key players continue to be an obstacle.

There has been little public reaction within the CD to the NPT Review Conference, but it is clear that although the nuclear weapon states were able to avoid the worst hurdles in New York – such as the profound disagreement over NMD – dealing with these realities is more difficult here where commitments made on paper are put to the test.

The NPT Parties gave the CD two explicit tasks: to negotiate a fissile material treaty and set up a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. Whether the CD will be able to move forward on these issues – and on PAROS – will depend on developments outside the CD, principally how the United States will proceed with NMD and the results of U.S. bilateral talks with China and Russia. With these outside events still unfolding, expectations here are that the CD will once again wrap up its year in September with ‘nil’ on its report card. ¨

LONDON – U.S. allies face not only growing parliamentary unrest, but also intensifying intergovernmental discord, as Washington nears a decision on first steps toward deployment of a new National Missile Defense System (NMD).

Political tensions are most keen in U.S. partner countries that will be directly affected by NMD deployment. Australia, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom will be asked to provide radar or early warning facilities to enable NMD deployment. Canada shares the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) with the United States, and some in Canada fear the government could be asked to house interceptors on Canadian soil in a second-phase of NMD deployment aimed at stopping missiles on a trajectory from the Middle East.

While the debate in Australia has only just begun, the other four U.S. allies are being forced to examine NMD’s possible impact on national arms control policies, as well as military budgets, according to allied officials and independent experts.

British Debate Deepens
In particular, the possible inclusion of Fylingdales, a U.K. early warning facility in North Yorkshire, in any NMD system is provoking public and parliamentary interest. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook came under fire in a June 28 hearing of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee for not taking a public position on NMD. Cook maintained that London has not been asked to do anything, and therefore has no position. Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon, however, had told Channel 4 News here on March 21, "we are sympathetic to such requests."

In addition, a large number of parliamentary questions and non-binding Early Day Motions have been put forward by members of Parliament (MPs) criticizing NMD. Ann Clwyd, Labour Party MP, told BASIC Reports: "NMD has the potential to undo a great deal of carefully constructed arms control agreements, and there must be more public and parliamentary debate within the [United Kingdom] if we are to have a constructive impact on the United States."

Canadian Foreign, Defense Ministries Split
In Canada, there have been similar debates, with the defense and foreign ministries pitted against each other. Canada’s 1994 Defense White Paper committed Ottawa to consultation and research cooperation with the United States on ballistic missile defense, but not to participation in any NMD system, according to the Foreign Ministry’s Web site. On June 16, however, the two countries renewed a treaty assuring NORAD operations for an additional five years, making NORAD’s shared early-warning radar system in the Arctic potentially available for a future NMD network.

Many Canadian politicians say they would prefer to wait and see if the technology works before making a commitment. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, however, repeatedly has stated that he opposes NMD because of the possible effects on arms control and disarmament, regardless of the technology’s feasibility.

Northern Allies Keep Wary Eye on Russia
Norway and Denmark, on NATO’s northern flank, are struggling to stay on good terms with both Washington and Moscow over the NMD issue, according to national officials and experts. ‘‘The Danish and Norwegian governments have been trying to avoid debate on the topic, preferring to restate that they support the ABM treaty and would not want to see an NMD deployment that abrogated that treaty,’’ Jorgen Dragsdahl, a Danish defense journalist, told BASIC Reports.

While Copenhagen is constitutionally responsible for Greenland’s defense and foreign policy, the Danish government is loathe to make any decision contradictory to public sentiment in Greenland, especially as negotiations on Greenland’s independence are slated to begin in the fall. In a Nov. 18, 1999 statement, the home-rule government that Greenland "can’t support plans for an upgrade of the Thule radar" if it meant violating the ABM treaty.

Norway, the only NATO country to share a border with Russia, is particularly conscious of Russia’s huge and decaying nuclear arsenal, and thus wary of any action that might sour Russian arms control cooperation, Norwegian officials said. Espen Barth Eide, Foreign Ministry state secretary, said Oslo does not doubt the motivations of its most important ally [the United States], but that the government does question the wisdom of introducing the NMD program now – concerned it might jeopardize existing arms control agreements and cool the climate for further progress.

Nonetheless, Lt. Gen. Sigurd Frisvold, chief of the Defense Staff, was reported in the Aftenposten July 17 as saying that Norway should consider taking part in NMD if a reliable system is developed. His proposal immediately was rejected by a majority of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, reported The Norway Post on July 19.

Norway also has been working to dispel Russian fears that the U.S.-funded radar at Vardo, just 40 kilometers from the Russian border, will be involved in the NMD system. Instead, government officials claim, the radar will be used for tracking space debris.

In fact, Moscow has been vocal in its objections to the radar. Russian Gen. Leonid Ivasjov told NRK, the Norwegian public broadcast network, on July 17 that Moscow will act unless Norway closes the radar during Russian military exercises.¨

The excerpts below are from an April 18 memo to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.K. House of Commons from the Defence and Foreign ministries in response to a request by the committee as to whether "any possible upgrading of the early warning radar at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire, in relation to the possible deployment by the United States of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, would constitute a breach of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)." The full version of the document can be found via BASIC’s Web site: www.basicint.org.

WMD 10f

FCO/FAC/016-00

US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

13. Fylingdales is an RAF base. It provides the UK with early warning of ballistic missile attack against the UK and Western Europe, and the US with early warning for North America. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) has existed there since 1963; in 1992 the original ‘Golf Balls’ construction was replaced by a Phased Array Radar system. We will need it to continue to perform its early warning functions, whether or not it is also used in future in support of National Missile Defence.

14. Present US plans for the first phase of a National Missile Defence system envisage the use of Fylingdales and four other existing ballistic missile early warning radars (three of them in the United States, the fourth at Thule in Greenland) for tracking hostile ballistic missiles in mid-flight. These radars would each be upgraded to enhance their usefulness to a National Missile Defence system. In the case of RAF Fylingdales, this upgrading would involve changes to the present software which governs the operation of the radar, and some related information technology hardware changes.

15. Since the US Administration has not yet decided to proceed with the deployment of an NMD system, and US/Russian discussions on this are continuing, we cannot predict with any certainty the circumstances in which the Government might be asked to agree to the use of RAF Fylingdales for NMD purposes, and to its related upgrading.

16. The two most likely scenarios would appear to be:

a) The US and Russia had agreed on modifications to the ABMT to permit the deployment of the first phase of an NMD system; or

b) The US and Russia had not reached agreement on modifications to the ABMT to permit the first phase of NMD, and the US had formally given notice of its withdrawal from the treaty.

17. In scenario (a), the upgrading and integration of RAF Fylingdales into NMD would presumably have been agreed by the Parties to be permitted under the terms of a modified ABMT. In scenario (b), such constraints as the ABMT currently places on the role of RAF Fylingdales would no longer be operative. Either way, the question of any possible breach of the treaty through the upgrading of the Fylingdales radar or its integration into any NMD system would not appear to arise.

18. The Government has made clear, both to the United States Administration, and to the Russian Government, that it wishes to see the ABMT preserved. We are also keen to see early progress towards the further reduction of their respective nuclear arsenals. We therefore strongly hope for a successful outcome to the discussions between them on these issues...

Read the Full Report

LONDON – The U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, in a wide-ranging report released Aug. 2, raises fundamental questions about the wisdom of the proposed U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) network.

The committee, comprising parliamentarians from Britain’s three major political parties, recommends that the Labour Party government encourage the United States "to seek other ways of reducing the threats [Washington] perceives" from ballistic missile proliferation. "We are not convinced that the U.S. plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community," the committee stated, and urged Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government to make clear "the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within the [United Kingdom]."

The report, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," stresses the potential negative effect of NMD on international stability. "[T]he question is whether the additional security that NMD might offer outweighs the negative impact of its deployment on strategic arms control."

The committee did commend the Blair government for its stance in support of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). At the same time, the committee urged "the government to impress upon the U.S. administration that it cannot necessarily assume unqualified U.K. cooperation with U.S. plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral U.S. abrogation" of the treaty.

Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain welcomed the report in an Aug. 2 statement. "[W]e agree that the ABM treaty should be preserved. We understand U.S. concerns about the threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation. We continue to make clear to the [United States] in discussion our own concerns. We believe the approach we have taken is the one most likely to help the process of reaching international agreement."¨

LONDON – Europe’s six largest arms producers are moving to harmonize and streamline their export control processes, as part of a new agreement designed to bolster the defense industry.

The defense ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom signed the agreement July 27, during the Farnborough Air Show. Crafted as a binding international treaty, the agreement now will require ratification by the six national parliaments. In addition, the six partner countries intend to open the accord, once ratified, to additional signatories across the 15-nation European Union.

The so-called Framework Agreement includes multiple measures aimed at helping Europe’s defense industry become more competitive on the global export market, in order to challenge the dominance of U.S. mega-firms, such as Boeing Co., Lockheed Martin Corp. and Raytheon Co.

According to the French Ministry of Defense’s Web site, the agreement covers six major issues: Procurement Security, Export Procedures, Security of Information, Research and Technology, Processing of Technical Information, and Harmonization of Operational Requirements.

"There are clear benefits for each country’s defense industry in a treaty which can help remove obstacles to industrial cooperation and promote improved equipment cooperation in Europe," said U.K. Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon in a statement announcing the accord.

Increased cooperation will be accomplished by reducing some barriers that currently exist among the signatories. This includes measures intended to streamline export controls, especially regarding products developed by joint ventures located in one or more of the six nations.¨

Regular readers will have noticed that there has not been an issue for some time. This is largely due to changes in staff. Now that we are back up to strength, you can be assured that BASIC Reports will be appearing more often.

In fact, we intend to institute a new publishing schedule, with BASIC Reports now slated to appear on a bi-monthly basis beginning next year. In addition, we intend soon to launch a new product – BASIC Reports On-line – that will provide news coverage of arms control issues and events in between our publishing schedule. On-line articles, in addition to electronic archives of the printed edition, will be found on the BASIC Web page at www.basicint.org, in a special section dedicated to BASIC Reports.

Both versions of BASIC Reports, however, will continue to provide you with objective, up-to-date, first-hand reporting. Our standards for sourcing information will continue to be high. Our stories will continue to provide insights not commonly found in coverage of arms control issues by the mainstream press. We intend to broaden our coverage base, in fact, by aggressive use of freelance writers from around the world.

This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Theresa Hitchens in Washington. 

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