1 OCTOBER 1999 • NUMBER 71 • ISSN 0966-9175 

• UN SMALL ARMS REPORT PAVES PATH FOR 2001 CONFERENCE

• INDIA LAUNCHES TEST OF PROLIFERATION POLICY

• BASIC NOTE

UN Small Arms Report Paves Path 
for 2001 Conference

Consensus Arises out of Difficult Deliberations 

By Kate Joseph and Sally Chin

After struggling to find common ground on weapons proliferation issues in its negotiations, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms issued a report in September for approval by the General Assembly. Despite shaping the scope of a first-ever international conference that will address the illicit small arms trade, severe differences in opinion among the 23 panel members rendered a report that otherwise, in the words of one Western group member, "did not break any new ground."

Conference to consider legal, illegal trade
The Group was initially formed to review the recommendations of the UN Panel, which two years ago explored a potential UN role in addressing small arms proliferation issues. However, halfway through the Group’s consultation process, the General Assembly also instructed it to develop a formula for a conference on the "illicit arms trade in all its aspects" in 2001. The Group decided to narrow the focus of the conference so that it specifically referred to small arms and light weapons. However, definitions of both "illicit trade" and "in all its aspects" were left wide open. As such, the conference can include discussion of the legal side of the small arms trade as well as the production, use and storage of small arms.

Disagreement Hindered Report’s Progress
While most Group members were satisfied with the final report, several experts noted that it did not sufficiently further the recommendations issued by the preceding UN Panel. In fact, only a few months ago, the entire process nearly stalled. Speaking to BASIC Reports, Donowaki said he had been concerned over the lack of time to conduct the negotiations. Disagreements among Group members threatened to delay publication of the report, and even to rescind some of the previous report’s recommendations.

For example, the 1997 report by the UN Panel discussed "a proportional and integrated approach to security and development," but the Group stumbled during its own negotiations. Dr. Owen Greene, the Group’s non-governmental consultant, remarked, "Many concerned governments and NGOs thought that this approach had become widely accepted, so I, and others, were surprised to discover at how problematic this was for a number of countries. The discussions in the Group therefore had to go back to first principles." Recommendations on civilian weapons possession and post-conflict weapons collection and destruction thus remained vague.

Some Successes for Small Arms Problem
Eventually, the Group was able to consensually issue recommendations covering several aspects of the small arms problem. Mexico’s Group member, Maria Angelica Arce, stressed the significance of agreement on issues like marking weapons "considering that the experts from some countries don’t want any controls on small arms at all." Greene told BASIC Reports that the recommendations in the Group’s report went substantially beyond the Panel’s proposals, but he acknowledged that "in some areas, such as transparency, it didn’t go as far as many would have hoped. However, it’s basically a strong report and the bottom line is that issues were taken as far as they could have been."

Gaillard told BASIC Reports that the weapons marking recommendation was an important step to improve information exchange on the small arms trade between governments "because marking is a transparency issue. It’s a way to actualize concerns about transparency." The report calls on manufacturers to mark all weapons and for states to make explanations of these markings available. However, it stops short of recommending marking at the point of import or export.

Group Work Parallels Protocol Process
Throughout the Group’s discussions, members sought to avoid duplication with current negotiations toward a Firearms Protocol for the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which will be a legally binding international agreement to combat illicit firearms trafficking. Although the processes are linked, the Group tried to avoid a clash of interests by focusing on military-style weapons used in conflict, leaving firearms and crime to the Protocol process. As a result, domestic gun control issues received little attention in the Group’s report, and discussions of crime were pointedly limited. One Western Group member admitted that most members considered the issue "too complicated" and best avoided.

The Group will present the report to the General Assembly for consideration this fall.

By Tom McDonald

In another bold step to advance India’s newly-revealed nuclear status, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) proposed a draft Nuclear Doctrine on 17 August 1999 that offered parameters for the state’s nuclear weapons capacity. South Asian neighbors and Western leaders alike decried the document as an unhelpful step backwards for global non-proliferation efforts, and warned that India’s continued efforts to become a full nuclear power could impede the success of international conventions in the process of ratification.

The proposed Doctrine, drafted by the non-governmental NSAB and endorsed by the Vajpayee government, explains India’s stance on deterrence and non-proliferation regimes and its future plans for the structure and strategy of nuclear forces. The draft emphasizes India’s continuing adherence to a "no-first-use" policy, but also notes that India will meet future nuclear attacks with "adequate retaliatory capability" aimed at inflicting "unacceptable" damage to the aggressor. It suggests that India develop a triad of nuclear forces, including air- and sea-based systems, to add to its current missile capabilities in order to ensure credible deterrence. According to the document, the newly-developed forces could even be supplemented by "space based and other assets." India’s Prime Minister would ultimately control the triad of systems, although decision-making would be supplemented with other politicians or even military officers in a decentralized command and control structure.

Political Motives Questioned
Immediately following the Doctrine’s release, India’s actions garnered criticism from the region and Western states. Commentators in the Indian press expressed fears over the safety of nuclear materials and the proposed C3I systems in the absence of concomitant funding proposals and because of ongoing high tension in the region. They also voiced skepticism of an initiative released at the beginning of an election campaign.

Pakistan also strongly criticized India’s draft initiative. In a meeting of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Pakistan representative Munir Akram said that Pakistan would be obliged to respond to India’s move, which he characterized as a dangerous escalation of its nuclear and conventional arms build-up. In an interview with BASIC Reports, Colonel Zahid Hamid, Military & Air Attaché at the High Commission for Pakistan in London, agreed that the draft was damaging to the already fragile relations between the two countries. However, he noted that the Doctrine was not specific to Pakistan or any other neighboring country, and suggested that the proposal was in fact an ambitious program to advance India’s broader political objectives. Hamid described it as "a statement of India’s desire to sit with the big boys in global politics."

West Wary of Proliferation Policy Test
Reactions to the Doctrine from Western states were overwhelmingly negative. US State Department spokesman James Rubin called it "a document which describes the Indian desire to develop a nuclear arsenal" that was "not encouraging." Diplomats from several EU countries raised concerns over both the political impact and the costs of such a broad program. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in the German Foreign Ministry told BASIC Reports that India could afford to operationalize the Doctrine over a 30 year period, but that the Indian government would have to sacrifice other, already under-funded parts of the budget, such as education and health.

Western pressure on India to scale back its expansive initiatives has mounted. In conversation with BASIC Reports, several Western diplomats indicated that their ambassadors in Delhi were urging caution and restraint, although Indian officials abroad were unable to discuss the doctrine due to its draft status. However, private consultations with the caretaker government continue as Western states pressure India on several key points such as signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ceasing fissile material production, restraining weaponization and deployment of India's nuclear arsenal, and adhering to responsible arms exports controls.

A Future for the Draft?
India responded to international criticism by highlighting the draft nature of the document. Savitri Kunadi, India’s representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament, emphasized that it was a preliminary text that was issued for public discussion in conjunction with the Indian government’s commitment to greater transparency in its decision-making processes.

The doctrine’s future remains uncertain, and in light of this autumn’s national elections in India, diplomats have adopted a wait-and-see approach to the document. A diplomat in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London told BASIC Reports that future policy would be in the hands of the winner of the elections, and that any incoming government likely would move forward with the draft in order to capitalize on the overwhelming national support for India’s nuclear ambitions. Only budgetary constraints and international pressure would provide a counterbalance to India’s swift development into a full-fledged nuclear power.