5 JULY 1999 • NUMBER 70 • ISSN 0966-9175

• STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE ENCOUNTERS OBSTACLES TO FUNDING, FULFILLMENT

• RUSSIA WATERS DOWN ROLE OF NATO

• EU SECURES DEFENSE IDENTITY, BUT WAFFLES ON WAY FORWARD

• NEWS BRIEF: EU & US BOLSTER CRISIS PREVENTION

• UK PARLIAMENT SEIZES ARMS TRADE MONITORING OPPORTUNITY

• OAS CONVENTION PAVES PATH TO REGIONAL ARMS REPORTING

• COLLECTIVE CONCERN SPURS SMALL ARMS STEPS

• NEWS BRIEF: US NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE MAY GO GLOBAL

• STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE (EXCERPTS)

• BASIC STAFF NOTES

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Encounters Obstacles to Funding Fulfillment

By Jack M. Seymour, Jr. and Tom McDonald

European countries signaled their commitment to begin Balkan reconstruction and regional integration with a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, adopted 10 June at the Conference on South Eastern Europe in Cologne.

Other endorsers of the Pact included foreign ministers from Balkan and South Eastern European countries, the US, Canada, and several multilateral institutions, including NATO, the UN, the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF. Speaking to BASIC Reports, Markus Ederer, Deputy Head of the South East Europe Desk in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hailed the Pact as "a good piece of work, under the circumstances and within the time constraints."

The Stability Pact presents a broad plan of cooperation with countries of South Eastern Europe to provide security, promote democracy and respect for human rights, and extend reconstruction assistance to the war-ravaged Balkans. It commits participants to the objective of "lasting peace, prosperity, and stability for South Eastern Europe" and sets forth a set of principles, objectives, and conditions to integrate the countries of the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions. It also establishes a framework for cooperation and briefly outlines particular roles among a multitude of national and international participants.

Pact Offers Lofty Goals, Little Action
However, a US State Department official revealed to BASIC Reports that the Pact provides little substance and offers few short-term solutions for the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. Calling the Pact "a rather weak document that provides very little operational guidance," the official explained that "it is much more of a political statement that requires a great deal of work. At best, it outlines some goals for the region, not Kosovo, in ten years' time or so, with no guidance on how to proceed at present."

As a call to action, however, the Pact wins approval in Europe and the US, especially for its stated ambition of tackling economic, political and security problems from an integrated regional perspective. Dragovest Goranov, Counselor at the Bulgarian Embassy in London, emphasized the Pact's perks for his country: "This Pact will help Bulgaria because it will give impetus to our efforts to join NATO and the EU." He also stressed the importance of investment and economic development in democratization efforts, saying that people in the region should seek to "replace the generals with General Motors and General Electric."

Kosovo Crisis Creates Kinks
Several issues cloud implementation of the Pact as European countries seek to address the aftermath of the recent regional conflict. The same State Department official stated, "The first task is to solve the refugee question," not only because of its humanitarian urgency but also because the fate of the refugees will play a crucial role in deciding how other issues are resolved. Indicating that countries in the Pact potentially could have broad capabilities, the official pointed out that coordination of assistance to refugees is a multifaceted challenge involving security, reconstruction, and humanitarian tasks which extend beyond the capacity of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Controversy Precedes Investing in Pact
Confusion also remains over financing and the priorities for the Pact's project funding, which may stymie its progress. G-8 leaders have emphasized that Yugoslavia cannot be included in a long-term plan for regional rehabilitation as long as Slobodan Milosevic remains in power, and their states would approve only humanitarian aid. However, states already are debating about how such aid is to be defined, and some officials acknowledge that eventually Yugoslavia must participate for the plan to succeed. Senior Balkan diplomats in London, speaking to BASIC Reports, questioned the wisdom of excluding Yugoslavia from investment projects on account of its key geographical position in the center of the region. Its usual role as a trade conduit is severely hampered by downed bridges and blocked rivers, they warned.

Funding resources for undertaking the Pact's tenets may be forthcoming. At the 18-20 June Summit in Cologne, G-8 states agreed to hold a donors' conference in Brussels in July, and a second conference in the Balkans in the autumn of 1999. In pledging support for the Pact, the G-8 leaders noted that they "consider this stabilization process to be one of the major political and economic challenges ahead of us."

Further Structure, Dialogue Encouraged
Officials at the State Department stressed that the success of the Stability Pact hinges on coordination of many disparate players, including diverse international, national, and private institutions, "to bind their different agendas, capabilities, and requirements into a common, focused purpose." To help provide leadership, the US is considering naming an independent, senior, politically acceptable person to coordinate its input, and a similar figure might be appointed in Europe.

Please see excerpts from the Stability Pact are reprinted in this issue.

Russia Waters Down Role of NATO

Not all aspects of the Stability Pact negotiations were smooth. In consulting with the EU on the text, Russia was successful in limiting NATO's role. A US State Department official speaking to BASIC Reports confirmed that the Russians, in negotiating the text with the German Presidency, had managed to gain acceptance of "watered-down language" on NATO's role in implementing the Stability Pact and on the goal of integrating South East European countries into European institutions. Countries including Bulgaria and Romania objected to Russia's changes on the integration issue, but the other European states conceded to the Russian language in the final text. The United States, according to the official, "swallowed its pride" and tacitly approved the document, thus giving "more or less a defeat [to] NATO and the US, with the Russians using their weak hand rather effectively." - JMS/TM

EU Secures Defense Identity, But Waffles on Way Forward

By Catriona Gourlay

BRUSSELS. European Union (EU) member states, concerned over possible weaknesses in their defense capabilities in light of the Kosovo crisis, endorsed a Declaration at the European Council meeting 3-4 June in Cologne which will strengthen their collective capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management. But while the German EU Presidency worked to reconcile differences between neutral states and NATO members within the EU on the Declaration's basic tenets, it has become clear that EU member states have no plan for how to proceed in implementing defense cooperation.

Declaration Applies Balkan Conflict Lessons
The European Council Declaration outlined institutional and operational requirements for enhanced EU action in the defense field and committed the EU to implement all decisions by the end of 2000. This cooperation is possible after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in May, which provides for the progressive framing of a common defense policy, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The Cologne document seeks to build "a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability of relevant strategic planning" within the EU in cooperation with the defense ministries of member states. Irish Foreign Minister David Andrews stressed that the Kosovo crisis "has given support to the view that the EU should be better able to act at an early stage to prevent and manage such crises, on the assumption that the United States will not always wish to become actively involved."

The Declaration calls for regular meetings of defense ministers as a General Affairs Council, establishes a Political and Security Committee in Brussels, and creates an EU Military Committee. Further, it provides for certain Western European Union (WEU) assets to be absorbed by the EU. Other military provisions in the Declaration include seeking further progress in harmonizing military requirements and arms planning and procurement, which is necessary for EU-led operations not using NATO assets and capabilities.

In addition, answering Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's criticism that there was no single person in the EU he could phone for action during a crisis, EU leaders chose Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, to serve as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the end of 1999. A UK official, in an interview with BASIC Reports, stated that the appointment of such a "heavy-hitter... demonstrates the seriousness of the EU's intent since he will be part of the process of developing the EU's capacities."

Uncertainty Begets Growing Pains
Difficulties with enacting the Declaration have surfaced as EU member states strive to enhance cooperation. Several delegates considered the stipulated time frame ambitious since many countries have yet to formulate official policies on the document's components. A French official involved in the process stated, "We have no idea; the issues are clear but we have no policy. Negotiations on implementation have not yet begun. "

The Declaration also raises the contentious issue that some recommendations may compromise the current inter-governmental system, in which member states occupy the Presidency of the EU on a six-month rotating basis. Some states recognize that the current system may not provide the continuity and leadership necessary for crisis management. One UK official questioned, "Could successive Presidencies run a crisis?"

In response, German and UK delegates supported the idea that the High Representative take a stronger role by chairing the Military and Political and Security committees and perhaps even some meetings of the General Affairs Council. Smaller states refuted this option, fearing that their influence would be eroded. Swedish and Irish delegates concurred with one Finnish official's view that "EU foreign and security policy is strictly inter-governmental. The role of the Presidency remains vital and there is no need to change it."

Ambiguity on WEU-EU Integration Evident
Consensus is also lacking on incorporating defence functions of the WEU into the EU. While the Amsterdam Treaty calls for "gradual integration of the WEU into the Union," an Irish official noted that the WEU is a useful intermediary among EU members, non-EU European NATO members and the WEU Associate Partner states of Central and Eastern Europe. The official told BASIC Reports, "It might be easier to retain the WEU as a means of involving these states... than creating new means of doing so within EU structures." In contrast, a UK official suggested "not only to wind up the WEU as an institution, but also to repudiate those parts of the WEU founding treaty which had been superseded by events."

Still, the Declaration recognizes that increased cooperation in EU-led operations will require more decision-making consultation with non-EU European NATO members. It stipulates that non-allied EU states must continue to participate on equal footing in EU operations, and WEU Associate Partners should also be involved in operations. Yet the complexity of incorporating all of these diverse actors means that "creating mechanisms to provide the appropriate level of involvement of each participating member state will be one of the most difficult political and institutional questions to resolve," said one Finnish official.

Complex Declaration Creates Vague Future
The forthcoming Finnish Presidency has no plans to tackle these issues directly. Rather, according to one diplomat, "We will first begin negotiations on matters internal to the EU, so as to identify which institutional and military resources the EU will require to be effective." The official could not predict results in this area, saying, "We have not yet put our spade in the ground so we have yet to see whether it will be hard or soft."

Catriona Gourlay is Director of the International Security Information Service (ISIS) in Brussels. Martin Butcher contributed to this article.

News Brief: 
EU & US Bolster Crisis Prevention

In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, measures to deal with regional crisis prevention were included in the Declaration from June's EU-US Summit in Bonn. While the document reinforced EU and US commitment to further strengthen joint capacities, it gave no specific details regarding the actual programs to achieve that goal. The declaration acknowledges the key role that both the UN and the OSCE must play and recognized the "primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security." NATO was also mentioned as a "centrepiece" of transatlantic security, but no role in crises prevention was specified for the Alliance. - J. Smith

UK Parliament Seizes
Arms Trade Monitoring Opportunity

By Sally Chin

In a precedent-setting move by the world's second largest weapons supplier, the UK Government undertook significant measures to increase openness in arms export disclosures in its 1997 Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls.

However, pro-active Parliamentarians questioned the quality of the reporting and the integrity of Government arms export decisions in a joint review of the exports approved and refused by the UK. While the 1998 Report's release is imminent, and thus is unlikely to take into consideration the Parliamentary inquiry results, Members of Parliament (MPs) hope that pressure to hold the Government accountable will lead to more in-depth and influential inquiries in the future.

The Ministry of Defense, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department of Trade and Industry released on 25 March 1999 the first-ever Annual Report, which outlines UK policy guidelines and commitments concerning arms exports, lists the various types of export licenses for Military List items and Dual-Use Goods that were approved and denied for May-December 1997, and gives statistics on the actual arms exports for January-December 1997.

'Flaws' Render Report Vague, Inconsistent
While the Report is considered the most detailed of all European government arms export disclosures, concerns were raised by MPs that the codes and terms used in the Report were vague. Labour MP Harry Cohen, member of the Defense Committee, called the Report "full of flaws," and suggested that it "could be significantly improved through less ambiguity."

Although the Government expressed "commitment to transparent and responsible arms exports" in 1997's Policy Pledges for a Responsible Arms Trade, the Annual Report is inconsistent in its detailing of export licenses. While the total number of approved and denied export licenses is provided on a country-by-country basis, the listings exclude the quantity and value in each export category. Further, goods are not always specified; in many cases, only a code is given. Finally, reasons for approvals and refusals are not provided.

The Defense Manufacturers Association asserted in its written testimony that generalized listings preserve commercial interests, and added that further detail could "seriously impinge upon commercial/security sensitivities with customers and competitors." Several Parliamentarians strongly disagreed with the contention that the withheld information preserves national industry interests, and Cohen emphasized the need to "debunk the claim of 'commercial confidentiality.'"

Inquiry Shows New Parliamentary Scrutiny
In an effort to address the Report's inconsistencies and step up Government accountability for arms exports, Parliament convened its first-ever assembly of four Select Committees to review the exports approved and refused by the UK, examine the level of transparency in reporting, and solicit evidence from expert witnesses. Conducting this joint inquiry was especially important to rectify past "weakness of Parliamentary involvement" in holding the Government responsible for its arms transfer policies, according to Labour MP Bruce George, chairman of the Defense Committee. George elaborated that the UK system "is executive oriented; Parliament is trespassing on an area that has been Governmental. We must fight for ground."

To establish information independently of the Annual Report, the inquiry gathered written memoranda from witnesses from within and outside of the government, then heard oral evidence on the findings. Recalling the Government pledge not to supply arms "to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression, nor where they might intensify or prolong existing armed conflicts or where they may be used to abuse human rights," MPs and witnesses alike were concerned with "questionable" arms exports to countries such as Indonesia and Kenya. The written submissions and a transcript of the oral evidence will comprise a Special Report, which will be made available to the public and submitted to the House and ministers.

Labour MP Ted Rowlands, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and chairman of the joint Committee, initially hoped that the Special Report "might influence the structure and the nature of the 1998 Report." However, the likely release of the 1998 report on exports before Parliament's summer recess means that it most likely will not reflect the inquiry's results.

Future Inquiries Will Ensure Openness
Yet parliamentarians anticipate that the new means of examining UK arms exports will promote further dialogue with Parliament. In the next session, the joint committee hopes to conduct a thorough investigation of both the 1997 and 1998 Reports, as well as question Foreign Minister Robin Cook about the Government's actions. MPs then will have the chance to make recommendations on how the Government can improve transparency in subsequent Annual Reports.

Despite perceived advances in accountability, Cohen told BASIC Reports that Government primary legislation to tighten arms export controls appears unlikely in the upcoming Parliamentary session. "It won't be in the Queen's speech, and the Scott Report [the inquiry into the arms-to-Iraq scandal] seems in the distant past."

OAS Convention Paves Path 
to Regional Arms Reporting 

By Kate Joseph

Regional arms trade transparency for the Americas became a reality this month when nineteen members of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed an accord on conventional arms transfers. The "Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions," agreed during the 7 June General Assembly in Guatemala City, requires signatories to disclose information on major arms exports and imports annually. Although early initiatives might have broadened the Convention, measures to limit arms transfers and report small arms trafficking proved too difficult to negotiate.

Submissions will follow weapons categories identical to those covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms - battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile launchers. As a result, Convention negotiators anticipate that regional information on arms transfers will be more up to date and accurate. Carlos Alberto Portales, Chilean Ambassador to the OAS and chair of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, noted that "agreement was easy because [the Convention] took the same categories as the UN Register."

OAS Efforts to Enhance Openness Praised
Highlighting goals of increasing confidence and security building, the document sets a precedent as the first comprehensive regional register of arms transfers. In addition to the annual reporting requirement, states will have to report within 90 days of weapons acquisition, through both imports and national production. Countries that have not acquired any new weapons must still file a yearly "nil" report. Convention negotiators hope that the 90 day deadline to disclose weapons acquisitions will improve on the UN Register, which is issued annually.

Although the Convention duplicates some of its work, the UN was quick to stress that the OAS initiative is complementary to its Register, and was developed with the help and advice of experts from the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA). A DDA official told BASIC Reports that the UN was "very pleased that the hemisphere has moved in the direction of establishing a regional register."

However, some states have voiced concern about the strength behind the document's implementation and accountability of signatories. Minister Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Mexican Mission to the OAS, was skeptical about the amount of political will behind the Convention. Although participation is mandatory for all signatories, he stated that there will be no implementation mechanism established, and no review process until seven years after it enters into force.

Small Arms Reporting Remains Elusive
In an effort to create a compelling agreement, negotiators had considered several expansive initiatives on more controversial arms issues in the document's early stages. Despite statements by the UN and several OAS states supporting small arms and light weapons transfer reports, the Convention failed to expand reporting categories beyond those used by the UN Register. According to a US official, negotiators feared that attempts to include small arms would "deflect attention from the draft text," thus delaying final agreement of the document.

An official from the mission of Canada to the OAS described the Convention as "a building block," and noted that most member states do not currently have the capacity to track small arms transfers. The official pointed out that "there is nothing to say reporting on small arms and light weapons transfers can't be re-addressed" in the future. An advisor at the US mission to the OAS echoed this view, saying "there may be room for expansion at a later date."

Early Drafts Offered Broader Scope
In addition, the United States suggested that signatories provide advance notification of proposed weapons purchases, which raised concerns among some member states about commercial interests. Sources close to the negotiations told BASIC Reports that some South American states feared pressure to adopt alternate bids from arms manufacturers, especially those in the US. Brazil's compromise proposal of a three-month post-import notification period won favor among the member states.

Broadening the mandate of the Convention also fell short of OAS approval. Mexico advocated for the inclusion of language limiting arms sales, but was unable to secure enough support for the proposal. Gomez Robledo told BASIC Reports that the agreement should nevertheless be seen "as a first step towards negotiations on limitations and arms control."

Convention's Future Uncertain
Although a majority of OAS member states signed the Convention, and more are expected to join, the agreement now must be ratified by six countries in order to enter into force. Diplomats insist that prospects are good even though member state approvals of the OAS illicit weapons trafficking agreement, signed in November 1997, have been slower than expected.

In an effort to secure early ratification in the United States, officials at the State Department and US mission to the OAS are mounting a major drive to raise the profile of the transparency Convention. The US mission to the OAS already has lobbied 100 "policy-makers and opinion formers" since the Convention's passage to foster support for the agreement.

Collective Concern Spurs 
Small Arms Steps

Editor's Note: As states begin to realize the global impact of small arms and light weapons, recent international initiatives are receiving greater attention in a variety of multilateral institutions. The following is a brief roundup of events from the past three months as states struggle to formulate comprehensive policies addressing numerous aspects of the small arms trade worldwide.

UN Firearms Protocol: UN efforts to finalize the Firearms Protocol, a legally binding international agreement to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, continued at the April 1999 meeting of the Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC's) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Differences remain on several issues, including the remit of the convention, the definition of "firearms" and the inclusion of explosives. The Firearms Protocol will be attached to a Convention on Transnational Organized Crime to be approved by the UN in 2000.

Wassenaar Arrangement: A working group for the Wassenaar Arrangement considered several new proposals to increase transparency in reporting conventional arms transfers at its 25-28 May meeting in Vienna. While the Arrangement's 33 member states currently report transfers using categories based on the UN Register of Conventional Arms, new recommendations from the US and UK would add up to 10 new categories or sub-categories. In addition, France signaled a newfound willingness to expand transparency in the Arrangement by suggesting measures to provide greater clarification of the existing categories. Meanwhile, Germany showed its commitment to expanding reporting in its proposal for a semi-annual information exchange on small arms transfers, which are not currently covered by the Arrangement. The working group is scheduled to meet again in November 1999.

UN Group of Experts: Many unresolved differences about the content of a final report remain after a 31 May - 4 June meeting of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in Tokyo. In particular, the mandate of a proposed UN conference on illicit small arms trafficking in all its aspects, to be held in 2001, has yet to be decided. Reports indicate that the delegation from Egypt wants to reference weapons of mass destruction in the Group's report, although this may be outside its mandate. The Group was charged by the UN Secretary General to study the implementation of the UN's "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms," released in 1997.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC): A commitment by NATO countries to examine small arms issues paved the way for EAPC to draft a work program on small arms. The EAPC, which brings together the 19 NATO member states and the 25 Partnership for Peace countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, approved a program on 18 June. The text focuses on the security of small arms stockpiles, the provision of resources for the destruction of surplus weaponry, and information sharing on export controls and the enforcement of embargoes. The group will also assess methods of integrating small arms concerns into NATO peacekeeping missions; at present, it is unclear how far these strategies will be used in NATO's current KFOR mission in Kosovo. A US official involved in the negotiations praised the program as a good awareness-raising measure, but noted that its success "depends on the resources that member states will commit for implementation."

Group of Eight (G-8): Despite indications from an earlier Foreign Ministers' meeting that small arms continue to be a priority for the G-8, references to controlling small arms were conspicuously absent from the final communiqu‚ of the 18-20 June Summit in Cologne. The Group's final statement simply commended the work of ECOSOC and called for an "early conclusion of the negotiations of UN conventions and protocols on organized crime." Expectations of a more substantial statement were heightened after the Foreign Ministers' communiqu‚ of 10 June described small arms as among "the most serious threats to mankind." The G-8 foreign ministers also supported efforts to combat illicit trafficking, to control conventional arms transfers, and to combat organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.

EU-US Summit: Cooperation and dialogue were the watchwords after a preparatory meeting between small arms experts from the EU and US on 14-15 June preceding the EU-US Summit. The meeting reviewed progress on current initiatives, ranging from the EU Code of Conduct and Joint Action on Small Arms, to the ECOSOC Firearms Protocol. It also highlighted new proposals, such as a moratorium on small arms sales to Africa. US officials speaking to BASIC Reports described the meeting as a productive first step in "opening a conversation on small arms," while EU officials stated that the discussions would "form the basis of an agreed EU-US position on small arms." The partners' final communiqu‚ from the Summit in Bonn showed commitment to address similar issues: "We are also concerned at the destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms in various parts of the world. We will intensify our joint efforts to fight these threats." Discussions between EU and US officials will resume in New York in September 1999.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Southeast Asian nations gave increased attention to the problem of global small arms proliferation at ASEAN's Second Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in Rangoon, Burma on 23 June 1999. In the final communiqu‚, delegates recognized arms smuggling as one of the many forms of transnational crime, and "noted with particular concern the increase in. trafficking in firearms," among other criminal activities. The Ministerial approved a program of action, which is likely to include strategies to combat the illicit arms and ammunition trade, as part of an overall strategy to tackle global organized crime. ASEAN member states are Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

News Brief:
US National Missile Defense May Go Global

Actions on US development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system continue, and recent events suggest that Russia and China may be included in the arrangement. BMD efforts received a boost after the US secured Russia's agreement to talks on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at the 20 June US-Russia Summit in Cologne. Previously, Russia's vehement opposition to the Treaty's renegotiation stymied US hopes to create the system.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings this spring have also focused US government attention to the BMD issue, and testimony suggested that the US should work with Russia and China on its deployment. Stephen Hadley, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Bush, said that BMD to counter weapons of mass destruction "can succeed only if the U.S. can enlist Russia and China, two of the greatest potential sources of both [weapons of mass destruction] and the means to deliver them."

In light of the recent Cox Report revealing possible illicit means by China to obtain US nuclear technology, Committee staff were reticent when asked about negotiations with the Chinese. An official on the House Armed Services Committee stated, "I wouldn't say there's no talk [about engaging them]." He went on to clarify that the bills presently under consideration "focus on an American [BMD] system with no sharing of technology at the moment." A staff member for Senator Chuck Hagel, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, added, "We seek to cooperate [with China] in a way that doesn't include the transfer of sensitive technology."
T. Neve/M. Butcher

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (Excerpts)

Editor's note: The following are excerpted sections of the principles, objectives, and mechanisms of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. For further information on the development and implementation of this Pact, please see the lead article of this edition of BASIC Reports.

I. PARTICIPANTS, DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION.

...

2. The countries of South Eastern Europe recognize their responsibility to work within the international community to develop a shared strategy or stability and growth of the region and to cooperate with each other and major donors to implement that strategy. Seizing the opportunity to address structural shortfalls and unresolved issues will accelerate democratic and economic development in the region.

3. We will strive to achieve the objective of lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South Eastern Europe. We will reach this objective through a comprehensive and coherent approach to the region involving the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN, NATO, the OECD, the WEU, the IFIs and the regional initiatives...

...

II. Principles and Norms

...

6. In our endeavours, we will build upon bilateral and multilateral agreements on good neighbourly relations concluded by States in the region participating in the Pact, and will seek the conclusion of such agreements where they do not exist. They will form an essential element of the Stability Pact.

7. We reaffirm that we are accountable to our citizens and responsible to one another for respect for OSCE norms and principles and for the implementation of our commitments. We also reaffirm that commitments with respect to the human dimension undertaken through our membership in the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all States participating in the Stability Pact, and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.

...

III. OBJECTIVES

...

10. To that end we pledge to cooperate towards:

• preventing and putting an end to tensions and crises as a prerequisite for lasting stability.

• bringing about mature democratic political processes, based on free and fair elections, grounded in the rule of law and full respect for human rights and, fundamental freedoms.

• creating peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region.

• preserving the multinational and multiethnic diversity of countries in the region, and protecting minorities;

• creating vibrant market economies based on sound macro policies, markets open to greatly expanded foreign trade and private sector investment.

• fostering economic cooperation in the region and between the region and the rest of Europe and the world.

• combatting organised crime, corruption and terrorism and all criminal and illegal activities;

• preventing forced population displacement caused by war, persecution and civil strife as well as migration generated by poverty;

• ensuring the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes...

• creating the conditions, for countries of South Eastern Europe, for full integration into political, economic and security structures of their choice.

IV. MECHANISMS OF THE STABILITY PACT

...

12. To reach the objectives we have set for ourselves, we have agreed to set up a South Eastern Europe Regional Table. The South Eastern Europe Regional Table will review progress under the Stability Pact, carry it forward and provide guidance for advancing its objectives.

13. The Stability Pact will have a Special Coordinator who will be appointed by the European Union, after consultation with the OSCE Chairman in Office and other participants, and endorsed by the OSCE Chairman in Office. The Special Coordinator will chair the South Eastern Europe Regional Table and will be responsible for promoting achievement of the Pact's objectives...

14. The South Eastern Europe Regional Table will ensure coordination of activities of and among the following Working Tables, which will build upon existing expertise, institutions and initiatives and could be divided into sub-tables:

• Working Table on democratisation and human rights;

• Working Table on economic reconstruction, development and cooperation;

• Working Table on security issues.

...

BASIC Staff Notes

BASIC recently said goodbye to staff who contributed greatly to the organization's mission of fostering public interest and awareness in international security and disarmament issues.

Stephen Young is now deputy director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers in Washington.

Thomas Neve will be earning a master's degree in international affairs at Columbia University beginning in the autumn.

Elizabeth Weber now assists with refugee resettlement in Washington area at the International Rescue Committee.

BASIC wishes them all of the best in their new endeavors.

Additionally, best wishes from the staff go out to Dan Plesch, BASIC's director, who began a six month sabbatical at the end of April.

BASIC also welcomes two new staff members whose experience and knowledge will be considerable assets to the organization's work.

Jack Seymour joined BASIC in April as Senior Fellow for European Security, and brings over 30 years of international affairs experience. He previously directed the Program on Atlantic Cooperation at the Atlantic Council. His distinguished career in the US government included Foreign Service postings in Europe and work in central and eastern European affairs in the State Department.

Martin Butcher joined BASIC in May as Visiting Senior Fellow. Formerly, he directed the Brussels-based Centre for European Security and Disarmament. Martin specializes in NATO and EU policy, EU nuclear non-proliferation, and French nuclear doctrine.

This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Christine Kucia in Washington and Tasos Kokkinides in London.

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