29 MARCH 1999 • NUMBER 69 • ISSN 0966-9175

• British Parliament Kept Out of the Loop on NATO Strategy

• CFE Talks Advance Amid Controversy

• Impasse over Nuclear Disarmament at the CD

• NATO Ambassadors Tackle Small Arms Problem

• New BASIC Staff Member

British Parliament Kept Out of the Loop on NATO Strategy 

By Tasos Kokkinides and Thomas Neve

LONDON Just weeks before the NATO Summit is scheduled to open in Washington, British parliamentarians are expressing concerns over the severely limited nature of consultations on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. Nineteen heads of state and government will meet on 23-25 April to finalize NATO’s post-Cold War role, yet these legislators charge that they have had few opportunities to offer input into the process.

In an interview with BASIC Reports, Menzies Campbell, a Liberal Democrat member of the UK Defence Committee, remarked that, "It is a matter of considerable regret that the House of Commons has never debated properly the issues surrounding the NATO Strategic Concept." He argued that, "Parliament should have had the opportunity to consider matters such as NATO’s right of independent action without Security Council authority and further expansion of the alliance and its consequences….Foreign and Security Policy is the responsibility of the government, but the legislature is surely entitled to express its views."

Ann Clwyd, a Labour member of the International Development Committee agreed, saying that she is "disturbed with the whole process." Observing that Parliament has "not had a debate on NATO since 1997, before the present government came in," Clwyd commented that, "The lack of debate…is totally unsatisfactory."

MPs, Lords Protest Process
Members of Parliament (MPs) from the Labour Party told BASIC Reports that the UK government ignored the House of Commons by refusing to hold a debate on the revision of the Alliance’s strategy. They argue that negotiations and strategy sessions have all been carried out behind closed doors by civil servants from the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Their position is that Parliament has not been given any opportunity to react to, comment on or vote on key aspects of UK policy which will form the basis of its stance on NATO’s Strategic Concept.

A similar feeling of disgruntlement with the process is evident in Parliament’s upper chamber. Aside from a brief debate earlier this month -- attended by only one member of the opposition -- the House of Lords has not had an opportunity to express its opinions on revision of the Alliance’s strategy.

In an interview with BASIC Reports, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, defence spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, remarked that there has been "no intelligent debate" over NATO policy. In his view, it is "quite astonishing that we allow British defence strategy to be structured by an international organisation without any form of input and debate by our Parliament." On 1 February, Lord Wallace called on the government to brief Parliament on revision of the Strategic Concept. He was rebuffed by Minister of State Lord Gilbert who responded that, "There are no plans at present to consult the House before the negotiations are completed."

A Foreign Office spokesman justified the government’s position, commenting to BASIC Reports that since written questions are submitted on a regular basis, "there are regular opportunities within the normal course of Parliamentary business" to debate the Strategic Concept.

UK report expected mid-April
While the House of Commons Defence Select Committee is preparing a report on the future of NATO, lawmakers will not have a chance to review the government’s position and publicly debate the issue until the Select Committee releases its results. Maintaining that the report will be released in mid-April, a Defence Committee official dismissed criticisms that Parliament will have little time to review the report before the Summit opens on 23 April. In his view, the report‘s release "will be in time to influence the debate." In an interview with BASIC Reports, Lord Judd disagreed, arguing that "it would have been helpful to have a government statement on how they see [NATO’s] future in time for it to be openly debated in Parliament ahead of [the] Washington [Summit] itself."

Former Minister of Defence Lord Healey remarked that the "lack of discussion on NATO’s strategy is a great pity." However, he downplayed the significance of the protests from his fellow parliamentarians, predicting that, in light of the level of ambivalence among most backbenchers, "there will be no public reaction of any significance" to the Select Committee report.

Echoes in Washington
The sentiments expressed by the Lords and MPs are echoed in Washington. Like their counterparts in Westminster, US Senators have had little opportunity for debate on Alliance issues since approving the NATO enlargement treaty last April. Both Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill argue that the Clinton Administration overemphasized the enlargement issue in the run-up to NATO’s 50^th anniversary celebration. They argue that the enlargement focus came at the expense of any meaningful debate over the evolution of NATO and the role that the newly expanded Alliance will play in the 21^st century.

CFE Talks Advance Amid Controversy 

By Jørgen Dragsdahl

WARSAW Diplomatic sources close to talks on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty have told BASIC Reports that a breakthrough in the Vienna-based negotiations is close at hand. In recent months, Russia has been engaged in heated policy debates with both NATO and Poland concerning certain elements of the treaty. There are strong indications that the prospective treaty will ease Russian concerns over NATO enlargement, although Poland has protested what it argues are excessive concessions to Russian demands.

Since January 1997, representatives from 30 countries have been negotiating major revisions to the CFE Treaty, attempting to modernize it in order to address the security challenges of the 21^st century. Designed to ensure an equitable balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces, the 1990 accord was lauded as the principal arms control agreement in Europe. However, in recent years, it has been overshadowed by new initiatives such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

NATO countries and Russia appear ready to agree to lower ceilings for the categories of military equipment covered by the CFE Treaty. Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) includes tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, helicopters and artillery. However, some observers warn that lower ceilings will produce little in the way of any actual disarmament since national holdings of heavy weapons are already far below present ceilings.

Russia Sees Golden Opportunity
Russia has been promoting the CFE Treaty as the cornerstone of a new European security order. Moscow has embraced revision of the treaty as an opportunity to place certain limitations on NATO, rooted in international law. While other elements such as NATO’s March 1997 pledge not to station "permanent substantial combat forces" in new member countries are only politically binding, it is expected that these initiatives will play a crucial role in enhancing stability in Europe.

Fearing that the expansion of NATO could tip the balance in favor of the Alliance, Russia has conditioned its reluctant acceptance of NATO enlargement on progress in the CFE negotiations. On 2 January, a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) statement condemned the Alliance’s expansion as a "threat to the existing CFE Treaty which is based on the principle of parity between the two groups of participating states." Russia warned that it would take "appropriate steps" to defend its interests.

A flurry of bilateral meetings with NATO and Poland followed and appear to have appeased Russian concerns. In fact, the day before the Alliance’s official enlargement on 12 March, the Russian MFA conveyed a letter to CFE participants that one western government official described to BASIC Reports as "optimistic, even warm."

Turkey Agrees to Higher Flank Ceilings for Russia
Obtaining higher ceilings for force deployments in its southern and northeastern border regions has also remained a key Russian policy objective. In this regard, an agreement on higher flank ceilings between Turkey and Russia – first reported on 11 February – may also have spurred Russia to take a more conciliatory approach to the CFE negotiations.

While Russia and Turkey appear to have reached a tentative agreement, Vienna has not yet confirmed the agreement. In an interview with BASIC Reports, one NATO official anticipated that this agreement would be "sustainable." Although Russia will technically be in violation of the CFE Treaty if its forces stationed in the flank areas are not reduced by May, he argued that the tentative agreement with Turkey would satisfy other CFE states, thereby diminishing the importance of the breach. Russia’s concessions to Turkey in the agreement remain unclear.

Poland Protests Russian Demands
Moscow’s attempt to block the stationing of NATO reinforcements in Central Europe – even temporary deployments for brief periods – brought about a clash between Russia and Poland.

The adapted treaty establishes territorial ceilings in five categories of heavy weapons. Although these ceilings can be exceeded by outside forces, parties must conform to a set of rules governing these deployments. Such extenuating circumstances include responding to crises, conducting peacekeeping operations and holding multinational military exercises. In the case of crises, the proposed treaty language distinguishes between Basic Temporary Deployment (BTD) and Extraordinary Temporary Deployment (ETD), with ceilings of 153 and 459 tanks, respectively.

Russia originally rejected the proposal granting the three new NATO member states rights to ETD. Without ETD rights, the proposed deployment of a Polish-based multinational corps made up of Danish, German and Polish troops would have been prohibited.

Perceiving Russia’s position as a serious threat to its full membership in NATO, Poland grew increasingly concerned as its new allies asked Warsaw to consider submitting to Moscow’s demands.

A recent poll reported that one third of the Polish population believes that in the case of armed threats, NATO would simply leave Poland to defend itself. Similar concerns spurred Polish authorities to launch a vigorous protest against any such concessions. Warning that Poland could become a second class member of NATO – upholding all of the duties of membership but not enjoying all of its rights -- Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek blasted the CFE Treaty, calling it "a thing of the past."

Geremek told the Polish media that, "No concessions should be made to compensate the frustrations of countries that remain outside of NATO." However, a CFE negotiator from a NATO country dismissed this view as "pure madness," observing that an increasingly frustrated Russia could become a serious problem for the Alliance.

Polish "Victory" Remains Unclear
Polish negotiators ultimately declared victory in their confrontation with Russia, citing Moscow’s acknowledgement of Poland’s right to receive two divisions. The agreement, hammered out in bilateral talks, has not yet been confirmed in Vienna.

One western diplomat voiced doubts of a Polish victory, telling BASIC Reports that, "We are more likely to see Russian acceptance of five to six units of BTD deployments for all three new members combined." Such a formulation would guarantee Poland less than two armored divisions.

The declaration of victory may also be camouflaging Poland’s own concessions in the deal. Poland has long refused to accept lower ceilings for its heavy weapons. For example, the original CFE Treaty allows Poland 1,730 tanks; Warsaw claims to have 1,727. However, only slightly more than 100 of these are considered reasonably modern; about half would generally be viewed as scrap metal. Poland’s new NATO allies may have succeeded in tempting Poland to accept lower ceilings by offering to supply Warsaw with second-hand tanks. A lower ceiling would in turn facilitate Russian acceptance of more substantial ETD rights for Poland.

Hurdles Remain
By early April, all CFE participants are expected to have declared new ceilings for heavy weapons. There are also indications that Russia and NATO will have settled their agreements on CFE issues before the NATO Summit opens later that month.

While a framework for Russia-NATO agreement is a sign of significant progress in the CFE negotiations, all 30 CFE participant states must still agree to the text before it can be finalized. Some observers anticipate that the final revised treaty may be ready in time for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summit in November.

Jørgen Dragsdahl is a Danish journalist based in Poland.

Impasse Over Nuclear Disarmament at the CD 

By Stephen W. Young

Conflict over nuclear disarmament continues to plague the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, essentially preventing the group from commencing its work. At the heart of the matter is the persistent disagreement between the nuclear-weapon states and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) over the need for disarmament talks as well as the mandate for any such discussions. While a new Belgian-led proposal on nuclear disarmament may draw support from Western nuclear-weapon states, recent US moves towards deploying a national missile defense system have heightened the level of discord at the CD.

According to a number of diplomats in Geneva, a large majority of CD states support some form of discussions or negotiations on nuclear disarmament. However, both the mandate and the mechanism for talks remain undecided because of disagreements among a few states. On one side, the five nuclear-weapon states have resisted any proposals for multilateral discussions at the CD. Conversely, a handful of NAM countries are demanding that negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons begin immediately.

As one western government source told BASIC Reports, "On the nuclear disarmament issue, the Russians are inflexible and the United States is reluctant to engage; the UK and France are largely quiet while China is focusing on the weapons in space issue. Others are being equally inflexible, insisting on approaches that will not be accepted." The source remarked that the CD discussions are in a stalemate, with "officials on both sides of the debate demanding that, 'you must work on my issues as I wish or I won't work on yours.'"

In Search of a Settlement
This debate is far from new. During its 1998 session, the CD charged a presidential troika consisting of the previous, current, and incoming Presidents of the CD with seeking consensus on nuclear disarmament. However, several non-aligned countries were unhappy with the troika’s progress last year and feel that a new approach is needed. Ambassador Mounir Zahran, head of Egypt’s delegation to the CD put it bluntly, telling BASIC Reports that, "The troika didn’t do anything. We are moving in circles. The new president will start to consult, and then he will disappear."

Partly in response to this frustration, a number of countries developed or renewed proposals for talks on nuclear disarmament. The association of NAM countries at the CD, known as the Group of 21, offered the most demanding proposal, calling for "negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention."

Other states brought forward more moderate approaches. A Canadian proposal called for "substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament…with the clear objective of identifying specific issues appropriate for multilateral negotiations at the CD at some time." South Africa renewed its proposal for an ad hoc committee to "deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons" and to identify any such steps that could be negotiated at the CD.

Belgian-led Proposal Under Consideration
A proposal from a Belgian-led group of five NATO countries appears to be drawing the most serious consideration. Specifically designed as a compromise that might be acceptable to the nuclear-weapon states, it calls for an "ad hoc working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views" on nuclear disarmament.

In an interview with BASIC Reports, Ambassador André Mernier, Belgium’s representative to the CD, shed some light on the details of the proposal. He said it would first involve a study -- possibly led by the troika -- of the structure and concepts of a mechanism to discuss nuclear disarmament. Once the mechanism and its mandate are agreed, CD parties would establish it.

While none of these proposals have attained the consensus required by CD tradition before talks can begin, some diplomats say that the Western nuclear-weapon states are considering the Belgian approach as a possible avenue to further disarmament discussions. According to Ambassador Mernier, "The impression we have now is that, for the Western nuclear-weapon states, this could be a way forward. We have resistance from the Russians, and from certain NAM countries who want more."

However, Western support does not appear to be universal. One Western diplomat commented to BASIC Reports that the Belgian idea has a "very weak mandate." Thus it remains to be seen whether consensus will be achieved on any of these proposals during the CD’s 1999 session.

Missile Defense Causes a Stir
The Clinton Administration's promotion of a national missile defense system is further complicating discussions in Geneva. Calls from Republican members of Congress to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty have also sparked strong criticisms, especially from China. In a February speech to the CD, Chinese Ambassador to the CD Li Changhe warned that amending or abolishing the ABM Treaty "will have [a] serious negative impact on [the] nuclear disarmament process."

In response to the US developments, China is demanding that the CD negotiate limits on weapons in outer space. While this topic is among the issues traditionally covered by the CD, it seldom receives much attention. However, the Chinese demand is almost certain to meet resistance from other nuclear-weapon states. If China insists, this issue may in turn obstruct agreement on nuclear disarmament and other critical CD issues.

The second session of the CD is scheduled to open in Geneva on 10 May.

NATO Ambassadors Tackle Small Arms Problem

By Loretta Bondi

Representatives from 45 countries debated the threat posed by small arms proliferation during an ambassadorial meeting of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in Brussels on 12 March. The two-hour discussion, the first of its kind in a NATO forum, wrapped up with agreement to establish a working group on small arms loosely modeled after the council’s landmines working group.

Canada is being credited for taking the lead on what observers say is a long-neglected topic, with strong support coming from the United States, Norway and other allies. However, it appears unlikely that small arms proliferation will figure on the agenda of either NATO or the EAPC during their respective summit meetings in Washington in April.

Surplus weapons are key concern
Concerns have been raised that the Alliance’s eastward expansion will trigger a cascade of weapons rendered obsolete by downsizing and modernization of forces in former Warsaw Pact countries. Analysts maintain that this trend is already evident in the war-torn zones of Africa and the Balkans where cheap light weapons from Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are in abundance.

A NATO official present at the Brussels meeting told BASIC Reports that security of surplus weapons stockpiles will be a priority for the EAPC small arms working group. "Canada, the US and Norway, among others, are fully supportive of the idea and have proposed concrete actions aimed at identifying problematic stockpiles and at improving their security through training programs," the official said.

However, other officials pointed out the potential difficulties of negotiating and implementing such initiatives. Belarus reportedly stressed that the weapons hemorrhage is closely interlinked with crime. The Ukrainian delegation – which also represented Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova -- reminded EAPC members that large portions of CIS territories are virtually beyond the control of central governments.

Scope of efforts remains unclear
Some analysts fear that the EAPC will merely provide a forum for discussion, leaving concrete measures and implementation to the will of individual states. Highlighting the cloudy lines of responsibility, a NATO official cited a recent letter from NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stating that responsibility for weapons stockpiles rests not with NATO, but with individual countries. "This is the position that some governments are most comfortable with," he observed.

The NATO official also identified the harmonization of export controls among NATO allies and EAPC partners as a problematic area. Some states adhere to the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the recent EU Council Joint Action on Small Arms, but observers point out that effective implementation of these measures lags well behind good intentions.

Some NATO officials are also doubtful that consensus will be reached on confidence-building and transparency measures such as full disclosure of stockpiles and production inventories. France and some CIS republics allegedly remain strongly opposed to increased transparency.

Links With Peacekeeping
A recurrent theme in the discussions involved peacekeeping operations that NATO is expected to undertake as the Alliance redefines its mission for the 21st century. Some EAPC countries pledged to study ways to demobilize and disarm combatants and dispose of light weapons during peacekeeping operations.

According to officials, the working group on small arms may prioritize this task in its work after it receives its mandate from the EAPC Political Committee and begins meeting in early April. "Rest assured that this will be no paper tiger," one official remarked. "Things have a way to progress fast even within a slow-moving institution like the EAPC."

Doubts Over Coordination With NGOs
Officials remained cautious when asked how they planned to coordinate their work with the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). A coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on the small arms issue, IANSA plans to launch its international campaign to reduce the "misuse and proliferation of small arms" during the Hague Appeal for Peace in May.

One official told BASIC Reports that, "We have not discussed this topic at the EAPC ambassadorial meeting, although Norway and Belgium have raised the issue during other EAPC discussions. If the US or another influential member takes the initiative to schedule EAPC consultations with non-governmental organizations, I am sure everybody else will support it."

Loretta Bondì is Advocacy Coordinator of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch

New BASIC Staff Member

BASIC is pleased to welcome Jack Seymour as our new Senior Fellow for European Security. Mr. Seymour was previously Director of their Program on Atlantic Cooperation at the Atlantic Council. He also served in the US Department of State for over 20 years, concluding his foreign service career as Deputy Director of the Office of Central European Affairs.

This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Susannah Dyer in Calgary. 

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