24 FEBRUARY 1999 • NUMBER 68 • ISSN 0966-9175

• NUCLEAR DOCTRINE REMAINS THORN IN NATO'S SIDE

• NUCLEAR KNOW-HOW:  AN INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD BUTLER

Nuclear Doctrine Remains Thorn in NATO's Side

By Stephen Young

As the April Washington Summit approaches, NATO's nuclear policy continues to divide the Alliance. Despite US objections, Germany, backed by Canada, has continued to push for a thorough discussion of NATO nuclear doctrine, including the Alliance's first use policy. However, Bonn's latest proposal to create a "task force" to review NATO nuclear policy may defer what is likely to be a bitter policy debate until after the Summit.

Bonn Persists on Call for Nuclear Debate
Despite strong opposition from Washington, Germany has maintained its request for a discussion of NATO's nuclear stance, including its policy allowing first use of nuclear weapons. In a high-level conference in Munich on 6-7 February, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder again insisted that NATO conduct a review of its first use policy.

The United States remains adamantly opposed to any such discussion. According to an article in the German press, Washington recently warned Bonn that it viewed a public debate on first use "with substantial concern," arguing that it would "prove non-productive and damaging." The intervention apparently followed Schröder's remarks to Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien noting that he backed German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's proposal to discuss first use.

Washington circulated its intervention to Brussels-based NATO diplomats, informing them that they should be aware of "strong [US] opposition to reopening NATO nuclear policy." Making its position painstakingly clear, the United States stated that, "The revised Strategic Concept should not change the nuclear doctrine. We hope you agree."

Nuclear Task Force Seen as Compromise
During the Munich conference, Fischer broached a compromise. He proposed that, at the Summit, NATO should agree to "conduct a thorough examination that will give momentum toward further conventional and nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, as well as further confidence-building measures." German officials told BASIC Reports that this proposal envisions the creation of a task force to address a broad range of nuclear issues. According to one German diplomat, no first use might not be mentioned explicitly in the group's mandate, but it would be understood to be among the policies under consideration.

The German proposal has encountered a mixed reception from NATO allies. According to one NATO official, the French and British would prefer to conclude any policy discussion at or before the Summit. A British source told BASIC Reports that the United Kingdom "did not see the need" to create a new structure. Instead, the British feel that NATO's High Level Group, an existing group of experts under the Alliance's Nuclear Planning Group, would be an appropriate forum for continuing discussions on nuclear policy after the Summit.

Other states are concerned that such a task force might simply cloud over differences among NATO allies, while suppressing meaningful debate. As one official from a NATO country told BASIC Reports, "You need to ensure that the discussion doesn't become an end unto itself." A government official from a non-NATO European country put it more bluntly, suggesting that, "This will be a deal agreed to by the US to get the Germans and the Canadians to shut up."

Debate is Far From Over
While Schröder made it clear that Bonn would not disrupt the Summit with demands for a no first use doctrine, he insisted that discussion of nuclear issues should not be taboo. In this light, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen overstated the case after the Munich conference when he declared that the United States and Germany had resolved any conflict over NATO nuclear policy. During the meeting, Cohen had argued that, "the best hope for protecting ourselves against those who would unleash weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, biological or chemical, is to reserve the right to respond to such attacks with any means at our disposal. Any question about that policy undermines our deterrent capability."

There are indications that the Alliance may agree on modest changes to the Strategic Concept in order to de-emphasize further the role of nuclear weapons in NATO policy. According to a European source, one draft describes nuclear weapons as a "last resort," a revival of a phrase agreed at the 1990 London summit. Alternatively, the language may be revised in order to clarify that the circumstances in which NATO would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are very remote.

At this stage, few observers expect major changes to the Strategic Concept. As Canada's Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Ambassador Mark Moher stated in an interview with BASIC Reports, "I think there will be some modest changes to the language. In my personal view, I do not expect any earthshaking changes prior to a summit held in Washington hosted by President Clinton."

NATO States Split at CD
While media attention has focused on the rift between Washington and Bonn, Germany's position on revision of the Alliance's nuclear policy reflects a growing split within NATO over the pace of nuclear disarmament. In early February, five NATO countries - Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway and the Netherlands - proposed establishing an ad hoc group on nuclear disarmament at the Geneva-based CD for the exchange of information and views.

In an interview with BASIC Reports, Ambassador André Mernier, Belgium's Permanent Representative to the CD, explained the reasoning behind the call for such a forum. He noted that, "In the future, you cannot escape a debate on nuclear disarmament. The debate flows directly from the NPT, a Treaty we have all signed." Of the five, all except Norway have US nuclear weapons deployed on their soil under NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, a point highlighted by Mernier.

In the same vein, Canada reintroduced a proposal it first made last year seeking to "establish a mechanism for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues" in order to identify issues appropriate for multilateral negotiations.

Despite strong support for these initiatives among NATO members, it appears unlikely that the nuclear-weapons states will accept either proposal quickly.

Otfried Nassauer of BITS and Martin Butcher of CESD contributed to this article.

Nuclear  Know-How: 
An Interview With Richard Butler

By Daniel Plesch

Richard Butler is Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the UN body charged with the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He recently announced that he will not seek a further term beyond June 1999.

BASIC Reports correspondent Dan Plesch met with Butler to discuss the challenges facing the commission and the impact of UNSCOM's experiences on other nuclear disarmament efforts. The work of UNSCOM has become increasingly controversial in the wake of US and UK air strikes on Iraq. In particular, criticisms have been levied at UNSCOM's for its role in supplying intelligence information that allegedly was used in these strikes.

Q: What are the lessons of your work in UNSCOM for your earlier work chairing the Canberra Commission and negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

A: There has been a continuing effort in the direction of non-proliferation since 1945. And there have been many setbacks. Today a few notable countries are outside the international regimes: Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel. In historical terms there is a continuity; from the use of chemical weapons on the Somme in 1915 and the Almagordo nuclear test in 1945 - from the very beginning - there have been attempts to create legal regimes ensuring that these weapons would not be possessed by anyone. If you make the leap of imagination and consider the alternative of a world without these aspirations, then we have a world that would have been completely out of control.

Q: In light of the Iraq experience, can the work of the Canberra Commission be dismissed, as some people have argued?

A: There is growing body of opinion supporting the goals of the Canberra Commission and the judgement that nuclear weapons are intolerably risky, that at some point they will be used with unacceptable effects. In the 1990s there has been a shift in thinking; people who earlier on would not have said this are now asking, "Is elimination so impossible?"

Q: How can the international community build on the UNSCOM experience?

A: The reason we must not lose the Iraq case is that something far more important is at stake. This intrinsic case is less important than the broader case. Can non-proliferation be made to work? The biggest problem is people cheating from within the non-proliferation regimes by cheating the inspectors. If we lose the Iraq case we will lose a lot more. But I do not have an answer to the Iraq crisis right now; what is at stake is the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

Q: Why are countries not providing UNSCOM with the needed political support?

A: Well, for obvious reasons, right now I cannot be specific. The gut reason is that states have insufficiently included the contribution of international regimes into their definitions of national security and foreign policy. National interests are falsely divided from arms control interests. State power is defined in terms of technology, of conventional might, borders, money - this is an inadequate definition in the modern age. I would add arms control regimes.

Q: Would it be better to have a new UN structure to carry out UNSCOM-type missions?

A: One of the best things about UNSCOM has been its unprecedented independence from the UN bureaucracy and budgetary controls. Its operational success has rested in large measure upon this.

Q: What was Security Council's role in authorising the use of nationally provided technical means?

A: There was not much Security Council involvement in acquiring technology for information collection. The Security Council appointed the Executive Chairman and from the beginning was happy to have the Executive Chairman carry out the job of information collection.

Q: How do you respond to allegations that that the dependence on national personnel and technical means has undermined UNSCOM's independence?

A: These allegations have arisen only recently and the cooperation [between the UN and member states] has existed for some time. The Security Council resolutions in fact require member states to offer all possible assistance to UNSCOM, although much of our technology was bought off the shelf from Radio Shack. It is Iraq's behaviour that has compelled UNSCOM to draw on more resources.

You have to have competent people. I agree with the remark that is silly to hire inspectors from the Salvation Army, even though they are very good at what they do. Forty to fifty countries have helped and it is inevitable that many of the competent people will come form defence and from intelligence.

Q: Do you agree with US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Jamie Rubin who recently expressed the view that nations acquire intelligence from all available means and it is naive to expect anything else?

A: That may be Rubin's view. I do agree we should avoid naivet‚. The business of arms control is difficult. it's difficult taking away an adult's toys. When you're in the business of arms control and dual use, though, a great deal of intelligence gathering can often be simply a matter of good export controls and regulations. Intelligence can be basic.

This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Susannah Dyer in Calgary.

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