14 AUGUST 1998 • NUMBER 65 • ISSN 0966-9175

• MORE TALK, LITTLE ACTION ON LIGHT WEAPONS IN OSLO

• AN INTERNATIONAL AGENDA ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS:  ELEMENTS OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING

• UN LOBBIES FOR COORDINATION ON SMALL ARMS

• COORDINATING ACTION ON SMALL ARMS (CASA): THE UNITED NATIONS POLICY

• INTERVIEW WITH DR. OWEN GREENE ON UN EFFORTS TO CONTROL SMALL ARMS

• NATIONS CALL FOR NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD

• BASIC NEWS

More Talk, Little Action on Light Weapons in Oslo

By Kate Joseph

After two days of deliberations, an historic inter-governmental meeting on small arms ended in low-level consensus on 14 July. At the invitation of the Norwegian government, delegates from twenty-one nations met in Oslo to discuss the spread of light weapons and proposals to control legal and illicit transfers. Delegates emerged from the meeting with a draft statement outlining "Elements of a Common Understanding" but little by way of a concrete action plan. The draft, currently under review by the participant governments, is expected to be formally released by the Norwegian government on 10 August. (See text of the draft statement reprinted below.)

Participants acknowledged the scale of the problem and agreed on the need for a coordinated response encompassing the illicit trade, legal sales and existing stocks of weapons. However, opinion remained sharply divided on the best way to tackle small arms proliferation. The draft statement, described by Dr. Joseph Smaldone, head of the US delegation, as a "nicely balanced document," endorses a range of existing initiatives, but little more. Yet despite the limited scope of the agreement, officials remained upbeat about the meeting's results. They also downplayed the absence of major suppliers such as Russia, China and Israel.

During the course of the talks, participants reportedly watered down significant sections of the original Norwegian text used as a starting point for discussions. In particular, several delegations insisted on downgrading the status of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The original reference to NGOs as "important partners" with governments was deleted and replaced with a more limited acknowledgment of the "important role of NGOs." The change reflects pressures from certain governments to avoid a repeat of the landmines campaign, in which a powerful NGO coalition ultimately succeeded in isolating those governments who remained opposed to a total ban.

The draft statement currently under consideration seeks to prevent illicit weapons transfers through tightened border controls, coordinated law enforcement efforts, and weapons marking. It also addresses the legal trade by endorsing the development of codes of conduct to govern arms transfers and strengthening international humanitarian law in order to better regulate the sale and use of small arms. Finally, the agreement calls on countries to support weapons collection and destruction programs in order to reduce existing weapons stocks.

Insufficient Support for Convention Idea
A Canadian proposal to develop a convention prohibiting international transfers of small arms to non-state actors met with a lackluster response. In an interview with BASIC Reports, Smaldone described the convention as "premature." The head of the UK delegation, Paul Hare, agreed, noting that there was merit in the Canadian proposal, but cautioning against "attributing too much importance to the legal trade."

While these reactions to the Canadian proposal may indicate conflicting views over whether or not to consider far-reaching controls on the legal trade, a Canadian official played down the significance of the proposed convention. In an interview with BASIC Reports, he emphasized that Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was "merely floating the concept, and never expected a strong reaction." However, it appears likely that Canada will continue to explore the feasibility of such a convention. Axworthy reportedly intends to ask NGOs for their input on the issue when he delivers the keynote address at an NGO meeting near Toronto in mid-August.

More Discussions Planned
The Oslo meeting also appears to demonstrate increasing momentum on the light weapons issue. In April, delegations from more than 30 countries met in Oslo to discuss light weapons in Africa. Led by Mali, the group agreed a moratorium on the production, export and import of light weapons in West Africa. July's agreement will be followed up by a meeting in New York in September and meetings in Belgium and Canada in October. Countries have also discussed holding an international conference in 2000 or 2001 in Switzerland.

Text of "An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding."

 UN Lobbies for Coordination on Small Arms 

By Jim Wurst

The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) has started a drive to consolidate all UN actions on small arms into a single office that would allow the UN to "speak with one voice" on one of the major emerging arms control issues. The ambitious strategy not only aims to move small arms higher up on the UN agenda, but also outlines how the small arms issue will be incorporated into the mandates and day-to-day operations of diverse UN offices.

On 13 July, Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala announced that DDA had prepared a policy paper on Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA). Dhanapala told the press conference that the plan creates a "focal point" in the DDA "to coordinate on a UN-wide basis all action on small arms. This is in recognition of the fact that there are humanitarian and human rights aspects to the use of small arms in conflicts" as well as concerns related to development and security. (See excerpts reprinted below.)

The strategy was presented to the Senior Management Group, a regular meeting of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General and the under-secretaries-general of the key political departments, and adopted on 24 June. The first CASA meeting was scheduled to take place on 4 August.

Links to Development, Firearms Work
Adapting a lesson learned from the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, CASA frames the issue not exclusively in disarmament terms, but in the broader context of humanitarian aid and development. The paper argues that as "the instruments of choice in intra-state conflicts," small arms belong on the UN agenda as security, humanitarian and developmental concerns.

The delineation of responsibilities clearly aims to be as inclusive of as many UN entities as possible. According to the policy paper, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) "will be a major partner in drawing lessons from the collection of weapons as part of disarmament and demobilization exercises in the UN" and "will establish a disarmament component within each peacekeeping operation to study, assess and report on the results of each exercise." If implemented, this proposal would address one of the major criticisms plaguing recent peacekeeping missions: that disarmament has been pursued only as an after-thought.

One of CASA's most ambitious aims is to institutionally recognize the intrinsic link between disarmament and development. The paper notes that, "For over five years, there has been a worldwide decline in military expenditures and yet no additional resources have been re-directed towards developmental programs. What needs to be recognized now is that apart from being the beneficiary, development may actually promote disarmament..." CASA also calls on the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to utilize its expertise to implement "specific requests linking disarmament to development."

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) will be responsible for promoting "the humanitarian agenda on small arms, which might include the compilation of data on the use and effects of small arms from United Nations humanitarian and NGO workers in the field." In addition, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict "will provide support for advocacy measures to prohibit children from being forced or allowed to take up arms." Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) "will continue its advocacy role for the disarming of refugees and the effective separation of combatants from refugees."

CASA also aims to draw in the Vienna-based Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. This Commission, part of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), passed a resolution in April calling for a legally binding international instrument to control illicit firearms and ammunition (see BASIC Reports No. 64). Cooperation between CASA and ECOSOC would establish an important link between the use of small arms in political and criminal arenas.

Political Will Remains in Question
Since first launching its work on small arms in 1995, the UN's efforts have highlighted the politically charged nature of both the problem and the proposed control measures. States have voiced opposing views on a range of topics, from the definition of light weapons to the right to self-defense. The test for CASA will be how to move from paper to meaningful action. The report itself acknowledges that broad controls on small arms represent a much more complex challenge than anti-personnel landmines because "it is possible to locate [mines] in isolation from any other category of small arms which cover so many types and uses that to ban them in toto is almost like banning kitchen knives."

The strategy paper also makes a subtle reference to the lack of consensus among member states on the small arms issue, noting that, "There is some risk that the mandate of the [UN] may be pulled into directions not supported by political consensus which is so necessary for taking effective global action."

Jim Wurst is a UN-based journalist and consultant on light weapons disarmament at the Council on Economic Priorities in New York.

Text of "Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA): The United Nations Policy."

Interview with Dr. Owen Greene on UN Efforts to Control Small Arms

BASIC Reports correspondent Geraldine O'Callaghan recently had the opportunity to interview Dr. Owen Greene about progress on controlling light weapons within the United Nations system. In his role as Consultant to the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, Dr. Greene provides the Group with expert advice on all aspects of small arms proliferation as required and is responsible for preparing drafts of the Group's final report which will be submitted to the UN Secretary-General in August 1999 before being considered by the General Assembly.

The Group includes representatives from 23 countries: Algeria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Mozambique, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In his role as a Consultant, Dr. Greene attends the Group's three week-long plenary meetings in which the representatives discuss key issues related to the Group's mandate. The first meeting took place in New York in May. The second will be held in February 1999 in Geneva and the third is scheduled for July 1999 in New York.

Dr. Greene will also help the Chair to organize three regional workshops, which will be attended by Group representatives and selected outside experts. The first workshop, taking place in Tokyo in the second week in September, will address peacekeeping, integrating security assistance into development agendas and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice's ongoing work on firearms. The second workshop will be held in Geneva in advance of the Group's second formal meeting. This workshop will likely investigate the feasibility of marking weapons as well as a global plan of action to explore the practicalities of destruction initiatives. Details of the third and final workshop are yet to be confirmed, but it will likely be held in Tokyo in May 1999 and take the form of a negotiating session in advance of the drafting of the Group's final report.

Dr. Greene is also Research Co-Director and Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies in the United Kingdom.

Q: What is the mandate for the Experts' Group?

A: In many ways, this is a follow-on from the work of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms set up by the UN General Assembly in 1995 to assess the problem. The Group will consider how to consolidate the original recommendations and strengthen international actions. The tasks of the new Group are to prepare a report on the progress made on implementing the Panel's recommendations, as well as on a report outlining recommendations for further action and evaluating the possible objectives and desirability of convening an international conference on combating illicit weapons trafficking in all its aspects.

Implementation of most of the recommendations of the last Panel has not yet been institutionalized. A number of states and regional organizations have taken forward some of the recommendations and real progress is being made. However, there is still debate over how far the UN should go in institutionalizing measures and how much these proposals should be implemented on an ad hoc basis.

Q: Has the Group established any specific priorities or areas for urgent action?

A: No. There is a very strong recognition that this is a very complicated problem and that what may be a priority in one area or region may not be the same in another. We need to combine and coordinate prevention and reduction measures.

Thus far, no one area has been outlined for special attention. There is, however, wide recognition of the urgent need to tackle the problem of illicit trafficking, but there remains an ongoing debate about the appropriate scope of any international action in this area. A growing number of states, including many of those represented on the panel, recognize that effective action on illicit weapons trafficking requires associated action on reduction measures and controls of legal arms transfers. But some countries are nervous about widening the scope to acknowledge these other aspects of the illicit problem.

There is also wide recognition - although no consensus - of the importance of strengthening controls on legal transfers of small arms and reduction measures. There is strong support for this in principle, but debate continues on how to implement these measures.

Q: How will these recommendations be implemented so as to have a practical impact on violence and insecurity?

A: There are a range of recommended actions which require action by a variety of bodies within the UN system, as well as regional bodies and the states themselves. But it is important that a coordinated approach is taken. Many of these actions depend on the actions taken by regional organizations and states. The priority for the Group will be to assess how global actions can help support actions undertaken at the local and regional level.

Q: How do you respond to critics who say there is no political will to get these recommendations off the drawing board?

A: They are overly pessimistic. There is still a problem with political will but support is growing rapidly. Last year, an ever-increasing number of states advocated coordinated global action on small arms. Political will is the main thing that is needed to ensure the proposals are implemented in a coherent and integrated manner. It is representative of the importance that the UN gives to the subject of small arms that 23 countries are now involved in the Group, including all P5 [Permanent Members of the UN Security Council] Member States. This is good news because we would like to get as wide a consensus as possible for the final report.

Q: Can you foresee any obstacles to the Group's work?

A: It is recognized that in some regions, awareness of the problems is much higher than in others. In addition, the conception of the problem and how to tackle it varies, for instance, between Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the countries of the OAS [Organization of American States]. There is also a traditional concern among some Middle Eastern and Asian countries that work on any issue relevant to domestic conflict, including controlling small arms might set a precedent for intervention in domestic affairs.

Q: How does the Group's work fit in with other ongoing initiatives on light weapons?

A: The Group warmly welcomes all current regional initiatives, most notably the OAS Convention, the EU Programme and the proposed West African Moratorium, and places a premium on developing international arrangements and initiatives to reinforce work at the regional levels.

The Group will also look at ways of internationalizing the regional arrangements. The OAS Convention is clearly a prime candidate for globalization, a strategy being considered and developed by UN Crime Commission. The Group recognizes recognize that this is a key area and hence it will be a priority at the Tokyo workshop.

The Group will also be aiming to work alongside the UN Crime Commission as much as possible. However, a key question is whether the Commission's firearms protocol will be similar in scope to the OAS Convention. If the Commission maintains a broad definition of firearms, then its work will make a significant contribution to efforts directed at tackling the proliferation of weapons designed according to military specifications. It is these weapons which fall under the remit of the small arms panel.

In relation to the recent meeting of like-minded governments in Oslo, any initiative which helps concerned governments assess the small arms problem and crystallize follow-up action should help the UN process. The work of individual governments can help to reinforce local and regional actions. It is also a great opportunity to direct resources into reduction and destruction measures. However, it is vital to recognize that the small arms issue is not like the landmines issue and I doubt that a separate initiative not linked to the UN system is the right answer. I would like to see such initiatives, undertaken either by a government or group of governments, feed into the work of the UN. It is very important that the UN not be marginalized in small arms control.

Q: The Panel report noted that current international laws surrounding weapons transfers is inadequate. Will the Group consider measures to be incorporated into international law?

A: It is too early to say. There is significant debate on the scope of action on illicit arms. There will probably be debate when it comes to defining what constitutes an illicit transfer. For many countries, illicit is "what governments don't sanction."

Q: The report of the last panel highlighted areas for further study, such as illicit trafficking, ammunition and marking of weaponry. What progress has been made?

A: The UN General Assembly has not yet taken a decision on holding an international conference on illicit weapons trafficking in all its aspects, but the Swiss Government has offered to host such a conference in the year 2000. It is possible that a resolution will be put to the next UNGA highlighting the need for a conference. If the need is acknowledged, the Group should be tasked with setting the agenda and clarifying objectives for the conference.

As yet, a separate UN study on the feasibility of marking arms has not been established. However, recommendations on marking and registration are important. Thus, the Group's Chair, Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, is considering arranging substantial discussion on this issue at a forthcoming workshop.

A group of experts from eight countries was nominated to complete a study on ammunition. They met in early May and will prepare a report early next year, in time to be considered by the Experts' Group on Small Arms.

Q: Has there been any discussion of destruction of seized, collected and/or surplus weapons?

A: Yes, and destruction will probably continue to be a major area of discussion over the next year. The Group is likely to consider further developing an international program on the destruction of weapons. Destruction of surplus weapons is generally recognized as a priority, although progress has been limited. How to promote international action on this issue will be a major area for debate.

The group will be working to reinforce the Panel's recommendation on prioritizing weapons collection and destruction in UN peacekeeping operations. There are clearly strong arguments for prioritizing this in peacekeeping mandates but there are often political obstacles to implementation. For instance, parties to a conflict may not be ready to agree to hand in their weapons and therefore will not accept destruction of weapons within the peacekeeping mandate. Sometimes you have to choose between inclusion of this in the peace agreement and no agreement at all. But there is heightened awareness, especially among peacekeepers themselves, of the need to integrate weapons collection into mandates and it will be a major topic for discussion.

Q: Is there a role for NGOs in the Group's work?

A: The Group is very well aware that states and UN agencies do not have all the information and analysis required to tackle the issue and thus the expertise and cooperation of a wide range of NGOs is needed in order to take action. The Group takes a very positive view of the role of NGOs and is looking for ways to gather NGO input and taking account of NGO publications.

Q: What effect has National Rifle Association's (NRA) opposition to small arms control had on the UN's work?

A: The NRA is clearly taking an active interest in the Group's activities and indeed in all international fora that might lead to restrictions on firearms. As yet, it is unclear whether the NRA is a serious impediment to the Group's work, as they are primarily concerned with domestic possession. We also know that they have, in part, lived with the constraints that will be imposed under the OAS Convention. I think it is possible for the UN Group to identify far-reaching and substantial recommendations which do not conflict with the NRA's core concerns. Like other NGOs, they will have the opportunity to present information for the consideration of the Group.

Nations Call for Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

Editor's note: On 9 June 1998, eight countries released a declaration demanding "the speedy, final and total elimination" of nuclear weapons. In its declaration, the "New Agenda Coalition," made up of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, called on the five nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapon-capable states to take a number of specific steps toward nuclear disarmament. The text of their statement is reprinted below.

Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World:
The Need for a New Agenda

1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.

2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again".

3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called for a commission to make proposals for " the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."

While we rejoice at the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.

4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.

5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistent reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.

9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorised launches.

11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.

12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.

13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.

14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a joint no-first use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security assurances.

15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon states together with the non-nuclear-weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.

9 June 1998

For additional information on the New Agenda Coalition click here.

BASIC News

BASIC would like to extend congratulations and best wishes to staff members who are moving forward in their international security careers. European Analyst Alistair Millar now works with the Fourth Freedom Forum in Washington, while Nuclear Analyst Nicola Butler will begin working with the Acronym Institute in London in September.