4 JUNE 1998 • NUMBER 64 • ISSN 0966-9175

• EU PAYS HIGH PRICE FOR FRENCH SUPPORT ON CODE OF CONDUCT

• NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION STUCK IN NEUTRAL

• ECOSOC, G-8 JOIN FORCES TO COMBAT FIREARMS TRAFFICKING

• ECOSOC RESOLUTION:  MEASURES TO REGULATE FIREARMS

• BASIC NEWS

EU Pays High Price for France Support on Code of Conduct 

By Geraldine O’Callaghan

Opinions are sharply divided about the substance of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports agreed by EU Foreign Ministers at the General Affairs Council in Brussels on 25 May. While the UK is celebrating the code as the coup de grace of its EU Presidency, others argue that France’s intractability during negotiations ultimately compromised the code’s effectiveness.

UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook applauded the agreement as a "substantial step forward towards responsible and effective regulation of the European arms trade," adding that, "From now on our arms industries will compete on price and on quality but not on the standards we all apply on human rights."

However, not all EU states share Britain’s enthusiasm for the final text. Irish Foreign Minister David Andrews said that he was "bitterly disappointed" with the criteria governing the sale of weapons to countries with poor human rights records. "Half a loaf is better than none," he said, "but we see this as the beginning – it has to be built on and improved."

Code Seeks Common Standards, Transparency
The code, which addresses arms exports to non-EU countries, is intended to establish "high common standards" for arms exports and "strengthen exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency." However, many question whether the final text, watered down in negotiations, can meet those objectives.

The code outlines eight detailed guidelines to govern the process by which EU states grant or refuse applications for arms export licenses. These criteria address a number of issues, including human rights, regional stability, sustainable development and terrorism. The code also establishes consultation mechanisms and requires all EU countries to submit annual reports on arms exports.

Final Text Watered Down
Although several EU states have been advocating an EU code for several years, it only formally emerged on the agenda when the UK assumed the EU Presidency in January 1998. Following bilateral discussions, Britain and France jointly tabled proposals for negotiation with the other thirteen member states.

In an interview with BASIC Reports, a UK Foreign Office official praised the agreed code, noting that, "This is the first attempt to align member states’ policies on arms exports since the eight common criteria were agreed by the European Council in 1991 and 1992. The Anglo-French initiative has enabled this to happen."

Many other officials felt that the Anglo-French proposals did not go far enough. However, their appeals for more restrictive language and mechanisms eventually gave way to French demands. As a Dutch Foreign Ministry official explained, "As consensus was required from all 15 member states, France was in a very strong position. It was felt that it was important to get a code agreed even if it meant watering it down."

Controversy Over Human Rights Criteria
Arms exports to repressive regimes were a key point of debate. Belgium, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands advocated general restraint in arms transfers to countries guilty of serious human rights violations. In the final round of negotiations, states were offered the option of including a clause implying that EU states should abstain from licensing exports of equipment that could potentially be used for repression. However, bowing to strong French pressure, the text was toned down. The agreed code only requires states to "exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licenses" to countries where serious violations of human rights have been documented by the United Nations, the Council of Europe or the EU.

Shrouded in Secrecy
A state’s granting of an export license refused by another state — known as undercutting — was also a contentious issue. Despite strong support for multilateral consultations, French opposition resulted in a code which requires only bilateral consultations. If a country wishes to grant an export license which another EU state has refused, it only has to consult that particular country, not all member states. If after bilateral consultations, the state decides to proceed with the license, it is only required to notify the member state which issued the denial. Since these bilateral consultations will be confidential, this provision clearly undermines efforts to increase transparency.

EU officials have suggested that some countries may pursue improved notification procedures on a unilateral basis. However, arguing that this would violate the spirit of the code, France intends to block these efforts through diplomatic channels.

The code fails to provide any mechanisms for parliamentary accountability or public scrutiny. Though all of the other EU states supported public disclosure of annual reports on defense exports, France prevailed at the negotiating table once again. The agreed code only requires states to provide these reports to the Council of Ministers, not to national parliaments, the European Parliament, or the public. Moreover, although efforts to institute an annual review of the code’s implementation were successful, it will also remain confidential.

Next Steps
The EU code’s overall effect on arms exports remains uncertain. However, it is clear that the political will of EU states will be a determining factor in the code’s success or failure. Since the code is not a legally binding document, some see the real test not in the criteria but in the consultation mechanisms. As a British official pointed out, "This is the first time that countries have been required to exchange information on specific arms exports. It has to be seen as a welcome development."

An Irish official was somewhat less effusive, telling BASIC Reports that, "There is not much hope in the language, which is designed for loopholes." He emphasized that, "The importance of the code is denial notification among member states. It is up to those countries with more restrictive export criteria, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, to deny sales to repressive regimes. This could force the bigger exporters into a tougher position."

Various countries may undertake unilateral efforts to gain concessions prior to the first annual review, though progress is expected to be slow. "We need to wait and see how the code works first," commented a British Foreign Office official. "It may not produce any dramatic new results soon, but if the information circulation is successful, we may be able to push for further improvements and the current agreement could be a catalyst for increased transparency."

NATO-Russia Cooperation Stuck in Neutral

By Jorgen Dragsdahl

Brussels – One year after the signing of the historic Founding Act establishing a partnership between NATO and Russia, the two parties are scarcely any closer to a working cooperative relationship. Joint meetings on a broad variety of topics are now routine at NATO headquarters, yet the exchange of information is often superficial, and progress is hampered by political and practical obstacles. Perhaps symbolic of this inertia, even the new offices set aside for the Russian delegation to NATO remain unoccupied.

While progress has been made in some specific areas, neither Russia nor NATO appears to have a clear strategy for their future relationship. With decisions on critical matters such as military-to-military cooperation moving at a snail’s pace, one key NATO source warned that Russia may lose interest. NATO’s reluctance to discuss strategy, doctrine and infrastructure connected to enlargement has been problematic and will remain difficult as long as the three new members are not at the table. As a first step, NATO could provide a briefing on the ongoing review and revision of its Strategic Concept. However, the NATO source predicted that the real breakthrough will come only when the Alliance changes its position on a given issue as the result of consultations with Russia.

Individual Partnership Program in Limbo
Moscow has yet to approve the Individual Partnership Program (IPP), first drafted last fall, which outlines Russian cooperation with the Alliance. Obtained by BASIC Reports, the latest text of the IPP, dated 10 March, is extremely promising. However, Russian Foreign Ministry officials maintain firm objections to several items, much to the chagrin of their counterparts in the Russian military.

The IPP is divided into seventeen subjects, including: air defense, democratic control of forces, defense research and technology, peacekeeping and military exercises. The most activities in any one category are outlined for civil emergency planning. While the program only foresees sending observers to military exercises, that limitation appears to have been abandoned when Russian combat troops participated in an exercise in Denmark last month.

NATO sources do not expect significant progress in the Alliance’s relationship with Russia until the IPP can be utilized. As one key official described, "If military-to-military cooperation is not developed, then 90 percent of NATO’s potential for Russia will not be used."

Work Plan Still Secret
The Founding Act also established a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) responsible for consultations, coordination and even joint decisions and actions between Russia and the Alliance. An ambassadorial-level meeting of the PJC is convened each month. Some observers argue that Russia has largely used these occasions as a means of testing NATO politically. One source described the PJC as a boxing ring where ambassadors circle each other trying to score points.

To date, Russia has not given permission to release the work plan for NATO-Russia cooperation, dated 15 December. Obtained by BASIC Reports, the document outlines 18 topics for consultations, cooperation and exchange of information, including: the future security architecture of Europe, proliferation (policy and defense efforts), defense conversion, retraining of soldiers, combating international terrorism and armaments cooperation.

Nuclear Reductions in Question
The work plan also addresses reciprocal exchange on nuclear weapons doctrine, strategy and safety. However, progress has been riddled by disagreement and confusion. A first working group meeting was called off because experts from Moscow were unable to participate. On 28 February, the working group did meet, but still without these experts present.

On 29 April, the PJC met at ambassadorial level to discuss these nuclear issues. According to detailed information made available to BASIC Reports, the exchange focused on the de-targeting of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as reductions and safety. Afterwards, several western participants voiced their dissatisfaction with the Russian contribution, pointing out that Russia had failed to address concerns over the size of its tactical nuclear arsenal.

However, quoting confidential minutes from the meeting, another source disagreed, noting that during the course of the meeting, the Russians outlined their progress on implementing an informal agreement on reducing tactical nuclear weapons reached by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. They reported that 80 percent of Russia’s warheads had been destroyed and that destruction would be complete by 2000. They also provided a breakdown of weaponry already destroyed: 80 percent of artillery shells, tactical missiles and landmines, half of anti-air missiles, one-third of tactical sea-based missiles and all anti-ballistic missile warheads.

Other sources at the meeting stressed that Russia did not offer a base number for these reductions. Unofficial Russian sources indicate that the elimination program covers only 13,700 of Russia’s 21,700 tactical nuclear weapons. Without additional clarification and verification of the Russian report, many officials will likely continue to minimize the importance of these figures.

Making Headway on Peacekeeping
There have been encouraging signs of progress in the area of peacekeeping, such as Russia’s participation in the follow-up force in Bosnia. In addition, the IPP specifies that units from Russia's 27th Motorized Rifle Division should be made available for training as peacekeeping forces. The program also designates a 260 square kilometer training area near Totskoye in the southern Ural region for Partnership for Peace activities.

Russia has been lobbying heavily for establishing the PJC as a steering body for peacekeeping cooperation. However, NATO is promoting the much broader Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) — in which the other Alliance partners are also represented — as a "political-military framework for peacekeeping operations led by NATO." In response to this formulation, Russia has pushed for deletion of the phrase "led by NATO."

Despite this disagreement, the five working group-level meetings which have taken place have offered what one source called a "fairly productive" exchange, although disappointingly, Russian military representatives have not participated. NATO has focused on practical experiences from Bosnia and increasing the effectiveness of NATO-Russia cooperation. Russia has pursued a somewhat different angle, emphasizing the rules of engagement and the nature of mandates. On the latter issue, Russia’s position is that the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should always be given authority, and that the EAPC should not overshadow the OSCE. A seminar in Norway on 22-23 June will deal with legal issues, specifically modalities of cooperation with the United Nations and the OSCE.

Jorgen Dragsdahl is a Danish journalist with 25 years of experience in security affairs.

ECOSOC, G-8 Join Forces to Combat Firearms Trafficking

By Susannah L. Dyer

At the seventh session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice held in Vienna on 21-30 April, the United Nations moved one step closer to a convention on illicit weapons trafficking. Fifty-six countries sponsored a resolution calling for a legally binding international instrument to combat illicit firearms and ammunition trafficking. (See text of the resolution reprinted below.)

The Commission, part of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), has been examining the firearms issue for nearly three years within the context of a wider initiative on transnational organized crime. Progress on the firearms issue has accelerated over the past year as the result of active political support from member states of the Organization of American States (OAS), which agreed a similar convention last fall. A Canadian official commented that, "The OAS Convention has really moved this work forward, and has served as a useful model for a similar initiative at the international level."

Led by the United States, Canada and Brazil, the resolution drew a broad range of supporters and passed smoothly despite protests from the gun lobby, most notably the US-based National Rifle Association (NRA). While the United States had bowed somewhat to NRA pressure on previous occasions, it threw its full support behind the resolution in Vienna. The proposed resolution now goes to the UN General Assembly, where approval is expected.

G-8 Echoes ECOSOC
At the summit in Birmingham, UK on 15-17 May, the Group of Eight Industrialized States (G-8) lent their support to the ECOSOC effort as well as the other ongoing national and regional initiatives to control illicit firearms. The summit’s final communiqué emphasized the work of the Lyon Group, a working group established to develop policy proposals on firearms trafficking following the G-7 Summit in Halifax in 1994. In the Birmingham final communiqué, the G-8 stated that, "We endorse the Lyon Group’s principles and action plan to combat illegal manufacturing and trafficking of firearms. We welcome its agreement to work towards the elaboration of a binding international legal instrument in the context of the UN transnational organised crime convention."

In response to the G-8’s endorsement at the summit, Jonathan Winer, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Crime, Narcotics and Law Enforcement, said that the system of import/export controls, weapons tracing, and weapons marking enshrined in the OAS convention "is now effectively in the process of being globalized."

While the Birmingham discussions addressed illicit firearms within the narrow context of transnational crime, the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting in advance of the summit covered a broader range of weapons issues. In their statement of 9 May, the ministers voiced concern about the "potentially destabilising effect of accumulations of conventional weapons in regions of tension," and made a commitment to "pursue in the appropriate fora the problem of small arms proliferation." However, the Birmingham final communiqué made no reference to the link between light weapons and conflict.

Geraldine O’Callaghan contributed to this report from London.

Text of the ECOSOC Resolution

BASIC News

BASIC notes with utmost regret that Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, Deputy Director, is leaving the staff to take on the role of Executive Director of the new Program on General Disarmament at the University of Maryland. In over six years at the organization, Natalie greatly enhanced BASIC’s work and benefited the international community, particularly with groundbreaking work on light weapons and the international arms trade. BASIC wishes her all the best at her new position.