21 APRIL 1998 • NUMBER 63 • ISSN 0966-9175

• US SENATE TELLS NATO TO KEEP RUSSIA AT ARMS LENGTH

• TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN EXAMINATION AND UPDATING AS NECESSARY OFTHE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

• BIG POWERS UNITE ON GLOBAL LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL

• STAKES RISE IN NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY MANEUVERS

• BASIC NEWS

US Senate Tells NATO to Keep Russia at Arms Length

By Tasos Kokkinides and Alistair Millar

The US Senate is preparing to impose conditions on NATO’s relationship with Russia which may seriously affect cooperation between the two former adversaries. In late April, the Senate is scheduled to ratify the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO. At the same time, the Senate may demand that the Alliance keep Russia at arms length in the review of NATO’s Strategic Concept.

In light of the new realities of the post-Cold War security environment, the Alliance, together with the three NATO invitees — Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — is undertaking a comprehensive review of its Strategic Concept. The updated strategy will, among other things, define NATO’s intended relationship with Russia. However, the US Senate appears eager to dictate how the relationship is defined even as the review process begins. (See the Terms of Reference for the Strategic Concept following this article.)

Senate Committee Adopts Resolution
On 3 March 1998, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted a resolution on NATO expansion requiring NATO to exclude Russia from its decision-making process and limit mutual consultations to only those topics on which NATO has already agreed positions. The resolution stipulates that, "NATO will not discuss any item with the Russian Federation prior to agreeing to a NATO position within the North Atlantic Council on that agenda item."

It goes on to say that, "the Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which NATO’s basic strategy, doctrine, or readiness is negotiated with the Russian Federation...[A]ny discussion with the Russian Federation of NATO doctrine will be for explanatory, not decision-making purposes...[and] the Permanent Joint Council will not be used to make any decision on NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness."

Under the Founding Act signed in May 1997, NATO and Russia established a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which provides "a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern." By allowing only those decisions already agreed by NATO to be brought to the table, the Senate resolution, if approved by the full Senate, would effectively prevent any substantive discussions from taking place in the PJC.

NATO and Russia have already agreed on an agenda for the PJC, including consultations on topics such as the Balkans, peacekeeping and military doctrine. However, the Senate resolution could make a common approach to the crisis in Kosovo and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia much harder to achieve, as NATO-Russia consultations on these topics would have to be put on hold pending a NATO consensus.

Russia Sees "Spirit of Cooperation" Undermined
Speaking to BASIC Reports on the condition of anonymity, a Russian official close to the PJC acknowledged that Russia does not expect to have a formal voice in the Alliance’s deliberations. However, he pointed out that, "NATO’s strategy is not simply an internal NATO matter. The outcome of the review will affect the Russian position in Europe...NATO cannot ignore us in drafting its strategy."

The Russian official sharply criticized the Senate resolution, calling it a "unilateral interpretation of the Founding Act" which could jeopardize the "spirit of cooperation between NATO and Russia" forged by the historic agreement. He went on to say that, "There are certain elements in the Senate that are trying to poison the political atmosphere, but this will not undermine practical cooperation between NATO and Russia...The Founding Act says that we would work together and make joint decisions. The political interpretation of the Senate would render the document meaningless."

Russia, NATO Interpretations Differ
However, NATO officials apparently see no conflict between the Senate resolution and the principles outlined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. A European NATO official told BASIC Reports that, "There is no contradiction...between a ‘consultation,’ which is basically an exchange of views without commitment, and the ‘conditions’ set by the Senate...We would listen to the Russians, inform them and ‘come back home’ to decide whatever we want. The [North Atlantic Council] will decide after having heard the Russian point of view, without any obligation to take it into account."

In response to its exclusion from NATO strategy discussions, Moscow may, in turn, limit consultations with the Alliance regarding the ongoing review of Russia’s own defense doctrine. According to the Russian official, "Russia is not ready to give its defense doctrine to NATO for discussion." Explaining that the "major principle we want to adhere to is mutuality," he told BASIC Reports that, "We will give NATO our draft strategy if NATO gives us an outline of its new strategy."

NATO Position Needs Clarification
While the Senate resolution represents only one extreme position, Russian involvement in NATO’s internal affairs has clearly been a contentious issue since the signing of the Founding Act. However, as a Washington-based US official interviewed by BASIC Reports pointed out, "A clear and common line of interpretation regarding the Founding Act is needed soon." Before the drafting process for the new Strategic Concept begins, NATO, and the United States in particular, "have to come up with a clear position on their attitude towards NATO relations with Russia." The drafting of the new Strategic Concept may begin in late summer and the document will be formally presented and accepted at the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999.

Terms of Reference for an Examination and Updating as Necessary of the Strategic Concept

• As set out in paragraph 19 of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation of 8^th July, 1997, the Alliance Heads of State and Government called for an examination and updating as necessary of the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe’s new security situation and challenges.

• The Council has given this task to the Policy Coordination Group (PCG). Advice from the NATO Military Authorities and other relevant NATO bodies will be taken into account as appropriate. The work of the PCG, which will be carried out under the arrangements set out in its TOR, will be guided by the following considerations.

1. it must ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with Europe’s new security situation and challenges;
   
   
2. it will confirm the Allies’ commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defence and the indispensable transatlantic link;
   
   
3. it will preserve those aspects of the Strategic Concept that are consistent with the existing and foreseeable strategic environment and other Council decisions and declarations since 1991;
   
   
4. it will take into account the changes in the European security environment since 1991;
   
   
5. it will take into account the internal and external adaptation of the Alliance and its assumption of new roles and missions (such as crisis management, peace support operations and measures against proliferation), including all relevant Ministerial decisions since 1991, while recognising that the process of transformation is an ongoing one and that the Alliance must be prepared to meet the risks and challenges of the future.

Big Powers Unite on Global Light Weapons Control

By Geraldine O’Callaghan

Next month, the Group of Eight Industrialized States (G-8) will, for the first time, consider measures to combat the illicit light weapons trade. BASIC Reports has learned that, at the 15-17 May Summit in Birmingham, UK, they will consider a legally binding "international instrument" to combat firearms trafficking.

This high-profile forum includes the world’s five biggest arms exporting nations which together account for nearly 90 percent of global arms exports. As one official close to the negotiations told BASIC Reports, "The G-8 intends to take a clear lead in combating illicit trafficking which will set a precedent for other countries to follow." A clear political commitment from these influential states would indicate a significant ground swell of support in favor of a multilateral light weapons control regime. It would also represent a crucial acknowledgment of the connection between light weapons and the outbreak of crime and violent conflict.

Engaging Russia
Although illicit weapons are being addressed in other fora, a G-8 agreement would introduce another major player, Russia, into the effort. Though it is one of the world’s primary producers and exporters of light weaponry, to date, Moscow has not been actively involved the light weapons debate. Russia is also not part of any regional institution examining illicit weapons trafficking. Although one Russian official described their role in negotiations as that of "willing victims," he also told BASIC Reports that Russia "will be one of the most active participants at the summit." A British official also described Russia as "very supportive of the proposals and committed to a high level of cooperation toward developing the work of the G-8."

Roots of G-8 discussions
Illicit weapons trafficking first appeared on this group’s agenda during the 1994 Economic Summit in Halifax, when leaders highlighted the economic and social costs of crime. By the time of the Denver Summit in June 1997, illegal firearms trafficking had become a priority and decisions to consider a "new international instrument" and a "stronger international regime" were included in the summit’s Final Communiqué.

Meanwhile, more concrete measures were already taking shape within the Organization of American States (OAS). Just four months after the Denver Summit, 27 OAS states signed an "Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, and other Related Materials." (See BASIC Reports No. 61.) US officials told BASIC Reports that they planned to advocate the OAS convention as a "template" to be adopted by other regional organizations and by the G-8. Canada also lobbied actively for an international instrument patterned on the OAS agreement.

G-8 proposal takes shape
A questionnaire drafted by the US State Department last fall provided G-8 states with a proposed outline for a legally binding international instrument. The suggested areas for cooperation closely paralleled the central tenets of the OAS convention, including: firearms identification, confiscation or forfeiture and disposal of firearms, import/export/transit licenses and authorizations, record-keeping, and exchange of information through an Interpol crime database.

Early on, EU members of the G-8 were reluctant to agree to such a formulation, not yet having reached EU-wide consensus on harmonizing import/export certificates or marking weapons at the point of manufacture and import. However, officials close to the negotiations believe that, although the EU Member States are bound by their own legislation on the movement of firearms through EU territories, this will not impede the strong degree of consensus emerging within the G-8.

The G-8 made significant progress in early 1998 as the result of two G-8 Firearms Subcommittee meetings in London. At the March meeting, they agreed that the principles of the OAS convention and its accompanying Model Regulations (negotiated through the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission) would be adopted as the framework for a legally binding international instrument. Members of the subcommittee told BASIC Reports that it would emphasize controlling diversion of weaponry, ensuring safe storage of legally held weapons and advocating that all seized illicit weapons be destroyed rather than stored or resold.

ECOSOC pursuing similar initiative
Prior to the summit, the G-8 will be closely observing the progress of a parallel initiative being proposed by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. BASIC Reports has obtained a draft resolution sponsored by Brazil and Canada to be submitted to the Commission’s Seventh Session in Vienna on 21-30 April. The resolution calls on ECOSOC to formulate "a binding international legal instrument to combat illicit manufacturing in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition within the context of a UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention." The primary objective of G-8 negotiations will be to endorse this ECOSOC proposal and offer the political support necessary for its swift implementation.

The objectives of the proposed instrument will again follow the OAS principles. An ECOSOC official told BASIC Reports that, "Although support can never be guaranteed, it is hoped that the resolution will gain strong support from the G-8 Member States and the OAS States." A British official concurred, noting that the G-8 would like to take a collective lead in supporting the resolution. However, he argued that the ECOSOC and G-8 negotiations are "occurring the wrong way ‘round" and noted that, "It would have been preferable for the G-8 States to reach agreement at the ministerial level so they could support the resolution collectively before the ECOSOC meeting. There will always be a risk that support will dissipate."

Non-aligned support uncertain
The non-aligned states may also hamper support for the proposal at ECOSOC. India has also drafted a resolution for consideration, which, though supportive of the OAS model, advocates an extension of the mandate to include explosives. Supporters of the Canada/Brazil resolution argue that, although explosives are of great concern, the area requires further study before it can be included effectively in an international instrument. Officials close to the negotiations have suggested that if G-8 and OAS states fail to support the Indian resolution, the Group of 77 may in turn refuse to support a legally binding international instrument.

However, one British official expressed optimism that progress would continue unimpeded, noting that, "It is vital that momentum towards agreeing a legally binding international instrument is not lost. Although legally binding mechanisms are notoriously difficult to bring into effect, all efforts will be made by G-8 countries to develop consensus on the proposal."

Gun lobby may protest
The gun lobby, expected to turn out in full force in Vienna, may also try to undermine support for an international instrument. Since gaining official UN NGO status in fall 1996, the US-based National Rifle Association (NRA) has attempted to develop a global pro-gun lobby to protest any measures to control light weapons. However, as the United States has played a leading role in the development of the international instrument, Washington would likely risk political embarrassment if it backtracked on its support for the effort.

Stakes Rise in Non-Proliferation Treaty Maneuvers

By Stephen W. Young

Nuclear arms in the Middle East, global production of nuclear materials, and a treaty guaranteeing that the five nuclear powers will never use their weapons on non-nuclear states are likely items for a conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opening on 27 April in Geneva. The conference is the second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of NPT. However, the complications of a new review process together with conflicting goals among delegations are causing concern that the meeting will be unable to achieve substantive results.

The two-week long PrepCom is part of the strengthened review process agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Attaining the primary Western goal at that Conference – making the Treaty permanent – was only possible by also agreeing this new review process together with a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament."

States Disagree on Mandate
Under the new review process, the purpose of the PrepCom meetings is "to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference." However, NPT member states have varying interpretations of this mandate.

In 1997, at the first PrepCom under this new process, South Africa proposed that the PrepComs address legally binding negative security assurances, with a goal of reaching agreement by the 2000 Review Conference. These assurances would commit nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. In his opening speech to the PrepCom, South African Ambassador Khiphusizi Jele proposed that, "The negotiation of legally binding security assurances within the NPT umbrella, as opposed to some other forum, would provide a significant benefit to the Treaty parties and would be seen as an incentive to those who remain outside the NPT."

Other delegations strongly oppose the idea. In an interview with BASIC Reports, Ambassador Andre Mernier, Belgium’s representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), argued that the NPT review process "cannot be used for a negotiation. That has to take place in the CD." US officials have also opposed any proposals that would allow the PrepComs to have a negotiating role. As one US official put it, "Preparatory Committees are just that – preparatory. They are not negotiating forums."

This opposition has not diminished South Africa’s aspirations. One non-aligned official suggested that this PrepCom will offer an opportunity for discussion, but without serious prospects for agreement on or even proposals for official text. These discussions could serve as the basis for a draft text or language to be presented to the 1999 PrepCom, with a view to approving the binding agreement at the 2000 Review Conference.

Giving PrepComs the Vote?
Both Western and non-aligned officials have quietly raised the possibility that PrepComs and Review Conferences could begin to take decisions by voting on contentious issues. Voting is allowed under Treaty rules, but traditionally the NPT has always operated by consensus. That pattern has, however, left several Review Conferences unable to agree final documents, and many states frustrated with the lack of progress on Article VI of the NPT which addresses the elimination of nuclear weapons.

A decision by one or more states to pursue voting could have momentous implications for the NPT. One official expressed the view that a vote requiring the nuclear-weapon states to take an action would probably be ineffective. However, the impact of trying to commit nuclear-weapon states to a "no first use" policy or to providing negative security assurances, is less clear.

With over 110 members, a united Non-Aligned Movement could pass a broad agenda of initiatives in the NPT through voting. However, any decision to pursue such a course would have to be carefully weighed for its implications on the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. While it unlikely that this course of action would be taken at the upcoming PrepCom, the possibility cannot be entirely discounted.

Insufficient Preparations May Hinder Outcome
The PrepCom may also face other difficulties. Some delegations have expressed concern that preparations for this meeting have been less than adequate. As one official noted, in such a brief period, it is very difficult to get results "unless these things are pre-cooked." Some officials have advocated wider consultations about the structure and agenda of the meetings than have taken place, a proposal that now may be too late to address.

Decisions about the schedule of the meeting are still being taken. A meeting to finalize the agenda was called off two weeks ago, and meetings during the week of 13 April were unable to reach agreement. There is general consensus that additional time will be allocated for discussion of the three issues agreed at the 1997 PrepCom. At that meeting, a Chair’s statement called for debate and consideration of proposals on negative security assurances, the 1995 Middle East resolution, and the CD negotiations on a fissile material production cut-off. According to one official from a Western delegation, a half-day of debate would be devoted to each of the three issues.

However, another Western official expressed concern that lengthy debates on these topics could limit discussion on other aspects of nuclear disarmament. The three topics fall under the rubric of nuclear disarmament, the first of three "clusters" of issues discussed at the first PrepCom. Allowing these three issues to monopolize the agenda for one cluster would leave little time for other discussion. Instead, the official suggested that discussion time for these three topics be allotted from the debate in each of the three clusters.

BASIC News

BASIC would like to pass on some wonderful news from our staff regarding some exciting "new arrivals" in 1998.

Congratulations to Natalie Goldring on the birth of her second child, Rebecca Michelle Merriman-Goldring, born on 30 January 1998.

A warm welcome into the world for Nicola Butler's first child, James David Jones, born on 9 April 1998. While Nicola is on family leave, Consultant Susannah L. Dyer has returned as Editor of BASIC Reports.

This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Susannah Dyer in Calgary.

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