1 JULY 1997
•
NUMBER 58 •
ISSN 0966-9175
Size of NATO Enlargement in Limbo as Madrid
Summit Approaches
By Tasos Kokkinides
and Stephen W. Young
With the Madrid
NATO Summit on 8-9 July just days away, the Alliance has yet to
reach consensus on the invitees for membership. Lack of agreement on
the Summit's central topic, coupled with Russian President Boris
Yeltsin's refusal to attend, may hinder the success of what one NATO
official hailed as the event "crowning the whole process of
enlargement initiated at the Brussels Summit of 1994."
Transatlantic
Friction Over Enlargement
The current level of disagreement over the Summit's central issue
threatens to unravel what was to be a largely ceremonial meeting of
NATO leaders to announce enlargement of the Alliance. The United
States and most of its European allies are currently at loggerheads
over the extent of NATO's enlargement to the east. Although NATO
officials have downplayed the significance of the disagreement, the
Alliance runs the risk of beginning the Summit without agreement on
new members. Officials have already voiced fears that opening the
Summit with this level of uncertainty will make the announcement of
new members look like an "Oscar ceremony."
In an interview with
BASIC Reports, one US official warned that delaying the decision on
new members "will not be conducive to the kind of Summit we
want to have...If the result of NATO's decision is in doubt, this
will increase the disappointment of the countries that will be left
out...Central European countries need to prepare themselves well in
advance."
US announcement irks
allies
When US President Bill Clinton endorsed a NATO enlargement
limited to three countries on 12 June, the announcement caught the
European allies by surprise. While a European NATO official
maintained that the United States was surprised by the level of
support within the Alliance for more than three new members, the US
statement quickly met with a cold reception. Clearly irritated by
the announcement, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that, "One
individual statement is in no way an advance decision."
Led by France, a group
of countries that includes Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada has formed a powerful lobby for the
inclusion of Romania and Slovenia in the first round of enlargement.
The day after Clinton's announcement, French President Jacques
Chirac said that, "We will indeed support the candidacy of
Romania despite the reticence expressed by the American
government." France's outspoken support for Romania's candidacy
will likely prolong the debate, delaying NATO's decision on new
members until the eleventh hour.
Consensus-Building
Proves Difficult
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana held a first round of
meetings with the ambassadors of the NATO 16, but met with no
success in his efforts to forge an agreement on the expansion issue.
The United States and Britain support a limited expansion that would
include only the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. However,
according to NATO sources, at least nine NATO countries support
expansion of the Alliance to Romania and Slovenia as well, bringing
the list of new members up to five.
Future Expansion
Remains Unclear
The final communiqu‚ at the Madrid Summit will state that NATO
will remain "open" for new future members. However, it
will not specify countries, nor will it set a timeline for future
accessions. According to the European NATO official, "people
are not currently thinking about the second wave. They have enough
on their plates." However, Alliance planners are facing an
artificial deadline of 1999 for the integration of the first new
members into NATO set by Clinton to coincide with NATO's 50th
anniversary. The official also commented to BASIC Reports that,
"nobody really knows how long it will take to integrate the new
members."
Some partner countries,
with little chance of making it to the first round, are not overtly
upset about Washington's support for membership for just three
countries. An official from one of the Baltic states, which will be
excluded from at least the first round of enlargement, told BASIC
Reports that, "It is in our interest to have as small a number
of countries invited to start negotiations as possible...It will
speed up the second round of enlargement...However, it is extremely
unlikely that NATO would pursue a further round of expansion if
countries such as Slovenia and Romania are included in the first
round." They fear that immediate membership for Romania and
Slovenia might jeopardize their chances for membership by bringing
the membership debate to an abrupt conclusion.
Other countries that are
stronger candidates for first round NATO membership _ but would be
excluded by the enlargement proposal advocated by Washington _ are
continuing their lobbying efforts in Brussels in hopes that their
future on the Alliance can be solidified in Madrid. A Romanian
official told BASIC Reports that at a minimum, Romania would like a
commitment from NATO that it is a candidate for future membership as
well as a more concrete pledge that NATO will invite Romania to
participate in accession negotiations at the North Atlantic Council
meeting in late spring 1998. He added that Romania would like to see
language contained in the final Summit declaration setting a clear
timeline for a second phase of the first round of expansion.
Slow Progress on
NATO-Russia Discussions
Although Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will likely be in
Madrid to represent Russia, President Yeltsin has declined the
invitation to attend the Summit himself. NATO planners had hoped
that the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Council established by
the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian Federation" would take place in
Madrid. However, an official at NATO headquarters in Brussels told
BASIC Reports that, "It will not be appropriate to have a
Council meeting if President Yeltsin does not attend the
Summit."
A US official predicted
that the first meeting of the Joint Permanent Council will not take
place until September, just before the deadline established in the
Founding Act. This extended timeline may also provide the Russian
Duma with more time to ratify the agreement.
Specific rules and
procedures for the NATO-Russia Permanent Council have yet to be
finalized, but may be decided before the NATO Summit begins. In an
interview with BASIC Reports, a Russian official confirmed that
there are "two or three substantive disagreements" about
the Council that remain unresolved. According to the official, the
first meeting of the Council could take place in July after the
Madrid Summit or in September.
According to the
European NATO official, transparency issues will be of particular
significance in the Permanent Joint Council's deliberations. NATO
and Russia must determine the extent of transparency and procedures
for information-sharing. The official told BASIC Reports that,
"NATO is still unsure on how to release information to the
partners." "We also need to make sure that what we agree
and discuss in one forum does not contradict decisions in other
forums," he added.
NATO, Russia to
Discuss Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear issues will play a leading role in the Council's work.
NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea told BASIC Reports that the High Level
Group (a subgroup of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group), is tasked
with developing ideas and proposals on nuclear issues that will be
discussed with Russia. Areas for consultation and cooperation listed
in the Founding Act include "nuclear safety issues,"
"nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and
strategy," and "preventing the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons." Shea said that specific
proposals could focus on a range of issues, including: concerns
about the dismantling of old Russian nuclear submarines,
environmental consequences of nuclear testing, and the
decommissioning of nuclear warheads.
At the signing of the
Founding Act, President Yeltsin referred to the removal of warheads
from missiles aimed at NATO countries. While his statement was later
amended in press reports to refer to the more symbolic step of
de-targeting, the mention of de-alerting had already sparked the
interest of NATO officials.
In response to the
original statement referring to de-alerting, NATO spokesperson Jamie
Shea suggested that Yeltsin's proposal would be an excellent topic
for discussion by the Joint Council. Western and Russian officials
have indicated that de-alerting issues, including the removal of
warheads from missiles, are part of a multi-step process that begins
with de-targeting. According to Russian officials, they would pursue
the next steps only as part of a negotiating process with NATO. In
an interview with BASIC Reports, Shea confirmed that the Council
will consider this type of issue as a topic for discussion.
NATO-Ukraine Charter
In Madrid, NATO leaders will also sign a "Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and Ukraine." The Charter defines areas for
consultation and cooperation between the Alliance and Ukraine. By
going beyond the parameters of NATO's Partnership for Peace Program
in a number of areas, it may provoke a negative reaction in Moscow.
In particular, the Charter lays out plans for armaments cooperation,
defense cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbors, and
Partnership for Peace exercises on Ukrainian territory that would
pull Ukraine closer to NATO.
Other Issues on
Summit Agenda
NATO officials are keen to stress that discussions at the Madrid
Summit will not be limited to enlargement and relations with Russia
and Ukraine. Rather, the agenda will also include the future of
operations in Bosnia and the process of NATO's internal adaptation.
With regard to internal
adaptation, issues to be addressed include: implementation of the
Combined Joint Task Forces, development of the new NATO military
command structure, and enhancement of relations with the Western
European Union. Since it is unlikely that the Summit will yield
decisions on all of these complex issues, some officials are already
bracing themselves for disappointment in certain areas. One European
NATO official told BASIC Reports that "The ideal Summit would
be one which would complete NATO's internal adaptation."
However, he also noted that "it may be counterproductive to
rush things. There is still work to be done."
NATO leaders will also
be reviewing NATO's New Strategic Concept, the NATO strategy
document adopted in 1991 when the Soviet Union was still in
existence. In Portugal in June 1997, NATO ministers agreed "to
examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent
with Europe's new security situation."
Lockheed Martin Executive Serves as President of US Committee to
Expand NATO
Editor's note:
BASIC has learned that a small group of prominent political and
business leaders has established the US Committee to Expand NATO
with the express purpose of advocating enlargement of the Alliance
in the US Congress. The Committee's mandate is to "promote the
admission of certain Central European countries to NATO, thus
enhancing the likelihood that such countries will develop democratic
institutions and market economies." Working out of the offices
of the American Enterprise Institute, the self-described bipartisan
Committee will focus its lobbying efforts primarily on the US
Senate.
According to a Committee
publication obtained by BASIC, the Committee was established as a
non-profit corporation in November 1996. The work of the Committee
is overseen by a Board of Directors, with Lockheed Martin
Corporation executive Bruce Jackson acting as President. A list of
the Committee's board of directors and their affiliations are
reproduced below as they were provided to BASIC by the Committee.
Board of Directors
Fact
Sheet
Jenne Britell,
Former CEO of Homepower, Inc., advisor to various public and private
organizations and institutions active in Central Europe, and holder
of senior positions with Republic New York Corporation, Citicorp,
and Dime Bancorp. A former Trustee of the Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association (TIAA-CREF) and the Women's Campaign Fund,
currently President and General Manager of G.E. Capital Mortgage
Services, Inc.
Sheila Burke,
Former Chief of Staff to Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Deputy
Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Finance. Currently serves
as Executive Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
Landon Butler,
Former Deputy Assistant to the President in the Carter
Administration; coordinated the ratification of the Panama Canal
Treaty and SALT II Treaty ratification efforts and for liaison with
organized labor. Currently Vice-chairman of Poland Partners, L.P., a
venture capital fund investing in Poland and President of Landon
Butler & Company.
Julie Finley
(Treasurer), Former Co-chairman of the Dole for President
National Finance Committee. Currently board member and trustee for
numerous philanthropic organizations and Chairman of the D.C.
Republican Committee.
Dave Gribben,
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in the
Bush Administration and former Chief of Staff for Congressman Dick
Cheney and for Senator Dan Coats. Currently Vice President for
Government Relations for The Halliburton Company.
Stephen J.
Hadley (Secretary), Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy in the Bush Administration and
former member of the National Security Council staff in the Ford
Administration. Currently a partner in law firm of Shea &
Gardner.
Bruce Jackson
(President), Former staff officer in the Office of
Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy.)
Served as co-chairman of the Dole for President National Finance
Committee and on the Platform Committee of 1996 Republican National
Convention. Currently Director of Strategic Planning, Lockheed
Martin Corporation.
Sally A. Painter,
Former Deputy Director, Office of Business Liaison of the Commerce
Department in the Clinton Administration. A member of the Board of
Advisors of the Democratic Leadership Council. Currently Director of
Government Relations, International for Tenneco Corporation.
Paige Reffe,
Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Advance in
the Clinton Administration and former Chief of Staff to Congressman
and Senator Tim Wirth. Currently a partner in law firm of Cutler and
Stanfield.
Peter Rodman,
Former Deputy Assistant to and Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs in the Reagan and Bush Administrations and former
Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Currently
Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace
and Freedom.
James Rowe,
Former Chief Counsel and General Counsel for several House and
Senate committees, including Chief Counsel for the House Judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. Former Vice
President, Washington, for NBC Inc. Currently Vice President for
Government, Community and Public Affairs for Harvard University.
Paula Stern,
Former Commissioner and Chair of the U.S. International Trade
Commission and Senior Legislative Assistant to Senator Gaylord
Nelson. Currently President of the Stern Group, an economic analysis
and trade advisory firm in Washington, D.C.
Gregory F.
Treverton, Former Vice Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council and former member of the National Security
Council Staff in the Carter Administration. Currently Director of
the Center for International Security and Defense Policy at RAND.
Robert Zoellick,
Former Undersecretary of State and White House Deputy Chief of Staff
in the Bush Administration and former Counselor to the Secretary of
the Treasury in the Reagan Administration. Currently serving as the
Vice President for Housing and Law at Fannie Mae.
Organization of American States Proposes
Pre-Notification of Arms Transfers
Editor's Note:
On 5 June 1997, the Member States of the Organization of American
States (OAS) adopted a resolution on confidence-building measures at
the OAS Summit in Lima, Peru. An excerpt of the draft resolution
considered at the Summit follows. The OAS includes all countries in
the Americas, with the exception of Cuba. Cuba was barred from
participating by a resolution passed in 1962.
TWENTY-SEVENTH REGULAR
SESSION OEA/Ser.P
June 1, 1997 AG/Com.I/doc.22/97 rev.1
Lima, Peru 3 June 1997
Original: English
DRAFT
RESOLUTION MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN THE AMERICAS
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
. . . RESOLVES:
1. That the Permanent
Council, through the Committee on Hemispheric Security consider the
desirability of approving a legal framework on the issue of advance
notification of major arms acquisitions covered by the United
Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as a means to achieve an
effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it
possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic
and social development of the member states, in accordance with
Article 2(g) of the OAS Charter.
2. If the Permanent
Council decides on the desirability if a legal framework then it
will draft it with the goal of adopting such a legal framework at
the next Summit of the Americas to be celebrated in Santiago, Chile.
3. To appeal to the
international community to support this effort.
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
Country submissions to
this year's UN Register were due on 30 April 1997. The details
contained in the submissions are for the calendar year 1996. As of
25 June 1997, 65 countries had deposited their Register returns at
UN Headquarters in New York. The export return submitted by the
United States is reproduced below.
Attachment A
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
(according to United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L)
EXPORTS
Reporting country:
United States of America
Calendar year:
1996
Original language:
English
Background information provided: Yes
|
A
|
B
|
C
|
D
|
|
Category
(I-VII)
|
Final
Importer State(s)
ssssssssssssssssss
|
Number of
Items
|
State of
Origin (if not exporter)
|
|
I. Battle tanks
|
1. Bosnia-Herz.
2. Egypt
3. Jordan
4. Kuwait
5. Saudi Arabia
|
45
60
60
174
124
|
|
II. Armored
combat vehicles
|
1. Bahrain
2. Bosnia-Herz.
3. Egypt
4. Israel
5. Lebanon
6. Norway
7. Saudi Arabia
8. Thailand
9. Turkey
|
100
80
2
1
108
63
340
23
25
|
|
III. Large
Caliber artillery systems
|
1. Australia
2. Japan
3. Pakistan
4. Republic of Korea
|
1
9
24
90
|
|
IV. Combat
Aircraft
|
1. Argentina
2. Australia
3. Finland
4. Greece
5. Italy
6. Peru
7. Saudi Arabia
8. Spain
9. Switzerland
10. Thailand
11. Turkey
|
4
1
7
2
3
11
11
6
2
13
12
|
|
V. Attack
helicopters
|
1. Brazil
2. United Arab Emirates
|
6
10
|
|
VI. Warships
|
1. Bahrain
2. Egypt
3. Thailand
|
1
2
1
|
|
VII. Missiles
& missile launchers
|
1. Australia
2. Canada
3. Egypt
4. Japan
5. Rep. of Korea
6. Malaysia
7. Norway
8. Turkey
9. United Kingdom
|
70
74
16
288
53
21
70
35
110
|
Note: In addition,
during calendar year 1996 transfers to Taiwan took place as follows:
I. Battle tanks 107
III. Combat Aircraft 9
IV. Attack Helicopters 8
Note: Columns on
"Intermediate Location (if any)", "Comments on the
Transfers", and "Remarks: Description of the Item",
which contained no data, were removed to improve the readability of
the table. The full table is available in the pdf version of this
document.
The Editor would
like to thank Katherine Joseph for her assistance in preparing the
above tables for publication.
Back to BASIC
Publications home page
|