1 APRIL 1997 · NUMBER 57 · ISSN 0966-9175

• After Helsinki, Russians Warn Against "Premature Optimism"

• UN Register Experts Argue Over Expansion

• Helsinki Statetment on Nuclear Forces

• NATO's CFE Proposal

After Helsinki, Russians Warn Against "Premature Optimism"

By Andreas Zumach

Joint statements released at the Helsinki Summit on 20-21 March and remarks made there by President Clinton and President Yeltsin implied that they had made significant progress towards START III negotiations and the establishment of a Russia-NATO charter. However, Russian officials say that the summit did little to resolve fundamental disagreements over NATO expansion. In an interview with BASIC Reports after the summit, a high-ranking member of Yeltsin's delegation warned against "premature optimism." A continued impasse over expansion of the alliance could jeopardize progress on bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations.

A Russian official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told BASIC Reports that many of the most contentious issues "were neither mentioned in the joint document nor at the press conference" but are "still very controversial." In addition, with regard to other key issues, he said that "formulations that go beyond the text of the [summit] document" were introduced in the Presidents' public statements, implying a level of agreement not evident in the joint statements.

NATO Expansion Remains Controversial
In the run-up to the July 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid, the question of NATO membership for former Soviet republics could emerge as a point of friction between NATO and Russia. On the eve of the Helsinki summit, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia requested that at least one of the Baltic states be allowed to join NATO in the first round. All three have formally applied for accession to the Western alliance. For historical and strategic reasons, their request for membership is likely to create a wave of controversy in Russia. Just a few days before the summit, Ukraine also expressed its strong interest in joining NATO. At the Madrid summit, NATO plans to announce the first round of candidates to be included in expansion negotiations, and intends to formally admit new members by 1999. Both Clinton and Yeltsin skirted the issue of Baltic and Ukrainian NATO membership, making no specific references to it in their public statements.

The final summit document contains only a passing reference to a decision agreed at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Lisbon in December 1996. According to this decision, all OSCE member states have the "inhrent right to choose the means to ensure their own security." But in Helsinki, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov expressed a clear warning: "I hope the Baltic States will not join NATO because this would shatter the whole relations [sic] between Russia and NATO," he told journalists.

Expansion Controversy May Threaten START Process
While Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin made progress on strategic arms control at the summit, their efforts could be negated by the Russian Duma, which, together with the US Senate, must ratify any agreements that might result. The Duma is threatening to hold START II hostage by not ratifying it if NATO expansion proceeds. According to Sergei Karaganov, a leading member of President Yeltsin's advisory council on arms control, "...the main reason for the Duma's unwillingness to ratify START II lies in its opposition to NATO expansion." He added, "I am deeply skeptical that the Duma will ratify the START II treaty."

Difficulties over START II could also prevent progress on START III. Washington had earlier insisted that START III negotiations could only begin after the Duma had ratified START II. If the United States maintains this position, the Duma can paralyze the bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control by effectively stalling any progress on both START II and START III.

Charter Elements Unresolved
Diplomatic sources in Brussels suggest that many controversial aspects of the Russia-NATO charter are unresolved after Helsinki. German NATO sources familiar with the negotiations described the content of the draft charter in interviews with BASIC Reports.

Article 5, which addresses limitations on NATO military activities on the territory of future East European member countries, is the most contentious element of the proposed charter. The Helsinki final document mentions only that President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include in the charter specific reference to the NATO Council policy statement of 10 December 1996. According to that statement, NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states. Yet in his remarks at the Helsinki press conference, Yeltsin said that the charter would also rule out "any increase of conventional forces and weaponry in new member states of NATO as well as the use of military infrastructure left from the times of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation."

The remaining four articles of the draft charter are likely to be somewhat less controversial, but still include a host of unresolved issues. Article 1 of the charter describes the transition of Europe to a pan-European security structure and defines NATO's role in that process. Russia wants a precise formula for NATO's development into an organization predominantly responsible for peacekeeping. Russia is also demanding that NATO redraft its strategic concept from 1991 to emphasize this peacekeeping role.

Article 2 lists the principles that will serve as the foundation of the NATO-Russia relationship. Russia's hesitance to include language specifically stating that NATO is no longer an adversary may indicate a fundamental disagreement about the nature of future NATO-Russian relations. To date, Russia has also categorically rejected any formulation implying joint NATO-Russian control over Europe, fearing that such an arrangement would make the OSCE superfluous.

The dispute over how to incorporate the OSCE agreement on the rights of states to choose their defense and security arrangements will likely play out in negotiations over Article 2 as well. According to Russian officials, in Helsinki President Clinton rejected Yeltsin's request for a clause in the charter that would formally rule outNATO membership for the former Soviet republics, for at least several years, if not indefinitely. The officials said that Clinton was also unwilling to give Yeltsin less formal political assurances to this effect.

Article 3 outlines the institutional structure for future NATO-Russian relations and foresees the establishment of a "NATO-Russia Council." Differences of opinion on this article are relatively minor, though Russia appears unwilling to deal with NATO on the same legal grounds as it would with a sovereign state and therefore is unlikely to accept the posting of a NATO ambassador in Moscow. This will likely be the source of some controversy, especially since Russia wants to be represented on an ambassadorial level at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

Article 4 lists the areas of future cooperation between NATO and Russia, and is less problematic than the other articles, as these issues were largely resolved by Primakov and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana in negotiations in February.

May Summit Expected
Primakov and Solana are scheduled to continue negotiations on the full charter at a meeting in mid-April. Sources in Brussels expect the agreement to be signed by President Yeltsin and the heads of the 16 NATO governments at a special summit in late May. Possible locations for the meeting include Paris, Brussels, and the Hague.

Andreas Zumach is a journalist based in Geneva.

UN Register Experts Argue Over Expansion

By Dr. Natalie J. Goldring

In interviews with BASIC Reports, members of the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Register of Conventional Arms made it clear that they will need to overcome major obstacles in order to expand or strengthen the UN Register. The panel, which held its first meeting in New York from 3-7 March, includes 25 members representing a cross-section of the UN's membership and is charged with evaluating the register's performance to date. The register consists of countries' annual reports on their imports and exports of seven categories of major conventional weapons. One of the most significant issues is whether it should be extended to include new categories of weapons or more information about the weapons already covered.

Members of the 1997 panel interviewed by BASIC Reports stressed the importance of the review and their intention to avoid repeating the experience of the 1994 review panel, which failed to reach consensus on measures to strengthen or expand the register. Panel members were also very optimistic about the panel's first meeting. Despite these good intentions, the obstacles they detailed and the vehemence of their opinions suggest that success will be very difficult to achieve.

Optimistic Intentions
The panel's chair, Rafael Grossi of Argentina, was optimistic about the first meeting, "We've had a very frank and encouraging first session, that allows us to hope for the best." The Egyptian representative, Maged Abdel Aziz, said, "I think we put our hands on the problem....I think there is much greater understanding than in 1994." A Western representative concurred, "...unlike 1994, the first week we immeditely rolled up our sleeves and got down to work." Shamin Shaik, the South African representative, added, "It has been exciting; at last we can come out and do an evaluation of the arms register some years later and see whether it has value to stability."

Major Issues Facing the Panel
Grossi described the panel's mandate as: "a general review of the operation of the register; an independent evaluation of the extent and nature of participation; how states have been reporting exports and imports; and to what extent use was made of the possibility to add additional background information." Other panel members provided additional detail and advocated several controversial changes to the register and its implementation, including:

• expanding the register to include new categories of weapons, ranging from light weapons and landmines to weapons of mass destruction;

• changing the definitions of the categories of weapons included in the register, for example, by including smaller ships, smaller calibre artillery, or trainer aircraft, or by separating the category for missiles and missile launchers into two parts;

• requiring countries to submit data on their procurement through national production and their national holdings (currently optional);

• requiring countries to indicate the specific types of weapons being transferred (e.g. Leopard tanks, rather than just "tanks;" also currently optional);

• defining what constitutes a transfer, and when it takes place;

• more actively promoting participation by all UN member states; and

• allowing the UN Secretariat to help resolve inconsistencies in country reports. (For background on the register and these debates, please see "Chronicling an Absence of Restraint: The 1995 UN Arms Register," BASIC Paper #13, 3 November 1995.)

Controversy Over Expansion Proposals
Expansion of the register remains highly controversial. As in earlier negotiations, several issues are becoming intertwined. In this case, the debate over adding categories is now being joined with discussion of whether countries should be required to disclose information on their national production of weapons. Countries that support new categories tend to oppose disclosing information about national production, while countries that oppose new categories tend to support disclosing national production information. This could produce either a quid pro quo in which both changes were made or a stalemate after extensive negotiation.

Shamin Shaik criticized the current register for not including either light weapons or weapons of mass destruction, "The arms register is obviously not addressing two-thirds of the world's security," adding that the register, "...does not address the fears and phobias of the African nations....The Middle Eastern guys' fears are of Israel's nuclear capability." Shaik also chided the United Nations for its focus on major conventional weapons, saying, "According to their definition of how instability is caused -- by excessive and destabilizing accumulations of heavy weapons -- Africa must be a very peaceful and blissful place." Shaik suggested that South Africa would support including national production if others were willing to include light weapons, and made the alternative clear, "If they don't want to support us then we will sit back and say, 'Fine, we will keep it as it is.'"

Maged Abdel Aziz reiterated Egypt's support for including weapons of mass destruction, "We have been calling for that since the inception of the register; we have not een heard out." He also said that if the panel decided to continue the register's focus on conventional weapons, the group should recommend that the UN establish another register to deal with weapons of mass destruction. A delegate from a developing country said that this issue, "has great potential for impeding the work of the experts' group."

In part because of this controversy, the developing country representative endorsed more modest proposals, "It is a distinct possibility that at least for the big proposals it will be very difficult to reach agreement. That is why we are insisting on technical improvements -- the question of the definition of when an arms transfer takes place...the question of qualitative information, types of weapons....The big issues are expansion of the register, weapons of mass destruction, and military holdings and procurement through national production."

Setting the stage for a stalemate, the Western representative virtually ruled out expansion of the register, "There's an agreement in terms of fixing the seven [existing categories], but not on expanding the categories....Light arms, small arms, won't be an issue, because we won't be expanding the categories." He was optimistic about "fixing" the existing categories by including smaller ships and smaller calibre artillery.

Questioning Motives
Several panel members questioned other countries' motivations. According to the Western participant, China is a key obstacle to strengthening the register, "The Chinese don't feel the military environment at this time is conducive to further transparency....The Chinese question the universality principle, the quality of the data, and they're not happy with the regional participation." China argues that the register must be universal in order to have value. While more than 130 countries have submitted information for at least one year of the register, many countries participate only intermittently. Each annual report has contained submissions from about 90 countries.

Other members argue that China is not the main problem. For example, Shamin Shaik argues that United States is participating in part to obtain information for its weapons marketing efforts, "The objective of confidence-building was to ensure that the export of armaments would decrease. While America participates in all these marvelous forums it has increased substantially its market share." He does not hold the United States solely responsible, however, "You can almost say those countries that support disclosing local production -- Germany, Israel, America, Japan -- support disclosing local production because they want to see what the Chinese are doing, what the Russians are doing."

Panel's Schedule Set
Panel members are being invited to a regional workshop on 12-14 May in Tokyo, which will include two days of discussions with academic experts and analysts on various aspects of the register and one day of closed panel meetings. The panel's two remaining formal sessions are scheduled to take place in New York from 16-27 June and 4-15 August. The panel will then report its findings to the Secretary-General, who is expected to issue a report to the UN General Assembly in fall 1997.

Country submissions on exports and imports for calendar year 1996 are due by 30 April 1997. However, many countries report far after the deadline, and because of budget cuts, the UN will not be sending its usual reminder to missions about compliance with reporting requirements such as the register. This increases the likelihood that the panel will not be able to take into account the full set of 1996 returns.

Helsinki Statement on Nuclear Forces

Editor's Note: The following is the text of one of the agreements signed by President Clinton and President Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit on 21 March 1997.

Joint Statement on Parameters on 
Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

• Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

• Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

• Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

• Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confdence-building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

Documents from the Helsinki Summit may be found on at www.whitehouse.gov.

NATO's CFE Proposal

Editor's Note: The following is a reprint of a declassified NATO document (HLTF (97) 2 (Final)) presented last month in Vienna. It outlines NATO's proposal for adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

Basic Elements for Adaptation of the CFE Treaty

A Revised Structure for Limitations

1. The Treaty's current structure of limitations, based on the past system of two groups of States Parties, will be revised. As a result of this process, the group structure will be abolished. There will be no increase in total numbers of TLE within the Treaty's area of application. Adaptation of the Treaty's structure of zones and regional limitations should continue to preclude any potentially destabilising buildup of forces in different regions. Reflecting the new political context, that of an undivided Europe, the structure of nested zones contained in Article IV of the Treaty will be eliminated and the provisions of the Flank Agreement (Annex A of the Final Document of the CFE Review Conference, May 1996) and related Treaty obligations will be retained in full. Adaptation should establish a structure of Treatylimited equipment ceilings comprised of:
   
   

   1. National Ceilings. Limits on the total amount of equipment in all TLE categories which each State may hold in the area of application. National ceilings will not exceed notified national maximum levels for holdings as of signature of the CFE adaptation agreement.1
      
      

   2. Territorial Ceilings. Territorial ceilings in the three categories of ground equipment will be set at the total of national and stationed equipment permitted on the territory or territories of each State Party in the area of application. Territorial ceilings will be set for every territorial unit.
      
      

   3. Zonal Limits. Equipment ceilings and related obligations in the flank zone, consistent with the agreement of 31st May 1996, will be maintained.

Setting National Ceilings

2. The objective of all States Parties should be to achieve overall lower force levels in the area of application. In the context of a revised structure for limitations and in order to encourage reductions throughout the area of application, States Parties should pursue ways by which national equipment ceilings can be lowered, while preserving the ability of each State Party to meet its legitimate defense requirements. The Alliance is prepared to take significant steps in this regard. Specifically. the total of future aggregate national ceilings of ground TLE of its 16 members will be significantly less under the adapted Treaty than their current group ceiling.
   
   

3. In view of this objective, States Parties should reiew their current declared national maximum levels of holdings to assess whether they reflect current and likely future requirements. On the basis of that review, each State Party should reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, final conclusions regarding the scope for reductions. The resulting national equipment ceilings are then codified in the adapted Treaty. This process and its outcome should fully respect and be compatible with relevant obligations under international agreements, in accordance with international law.
   
   

4. DPSS: Changes in the European security environment mean that States Parties can reduce levels of stored equipment. We propose that the special category of "designated permanently stored equipment" be modified to allow States Parties to choose either to:

   • retain their DPSS entitlements; or

   • eliminate, as a minimum, 80% of their DPSS entitlement and add the remainder to their entitlement for equipment in active units.

Setting Territorial Ceilings

5. Individual territorial ceilings do not have to be negotiated, but are derived from the current notified maximum levels of holdings, taking into account changes decided according to paragraph 4. This does not preclude States Parties from notifying lower territorial ceilings. In the setting of territorial ceilings, States Parties will notify the distribution of their entitlements for the various territorial units. A State Party wishing to notify stationed equipment for the territory of another State Party in the process of setting territorial ceilings must first secure the latter's consent. Subsequently, it is the host state's responsibility to notify its resulting territorial ceiling.

Meet New Security Challenges

6. To ensure that national and cooperative military requirements may be fulfilled, a mechanism for revising national and territorial ceilings will be needed. This should be modelled on current Article VII of the Treaty: for one nation to raise its national ceiling, another must lower its ceiling by a commensurate amount, provided territorial ceilings or other provisions are not exceeded and the international agreements referred to in paragraph 3 are not prejudiced. Consultative mechanisms should be developed in case of upward revision of national and territorial ceilings. Any revisions to ceilings must have the agreement of both the States Parties involved. In any case, full respect of the Flank Agreement must be ensured.
   
   

7. A State Party may exceed its territorial limits in order to receive, in accordance with its express consent, forces on its own territory:

   1. for purposes of a notified military exercise; or

   2. in response to a notified peacekeeping operation under a mandate from the UN or OSCE; or

   3. for temporary deployments.

   TLE in excess of a territorial ceiling would be subject to consultation, extensive transparency and specific verification measures. Precise levels would need to be agreed.
   

Specific Stabilising Measures

8. The following measures shall provide additional stability and greater transparency:
   
   

   • Within the Republic of Belarus, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Slovak Republic, the territory of Ukraine which is not covered in Article V of the CFE Treaty as modified in the Final Document of the CFE Review Conference, May 1996, and the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, territorial ceilings for all categories of ground TLE will be set no higher than current national maximum levels for holdings for each State Party/territorial unit and will not be revised upwards. At the next CFE Review Conference, scheduled for 2001, this measure will be reviewed, to take account of new stability requirements.
     
     

   • Additional information requirements concerning stationed forces, including prenotification of any change in the equipment holdings of a stationed forces unit. Publication of information on stationing agreements, including the number of TLE by type and mission of stationed forces, along with OOV and declared site numbers.
     
     

   • Additional information on use of the CFE temporary deployments provision, including a requirement to provide a statement of the purpose and anticipated duration of the deployment, along with the OOV and location of origin and destination of the TLE involved.
     
     

   • Special additional inspection quotas for certain declared sites, as appropriate.

Accession

9. States Parties would add an accession clause to the Treaty, so as to permit accession by individual States who might request it. Accession to the Treaty would be on a casebycase basis and would require the agreement of all States Parties.

Verification and Information

10. Because openness is fundamental to a cooperative concept of European security, we will work to enhance opportunities within an adapted Treaty for more extensive information exchange and enhanced verification. Detailed proposals in these areas will be developed.

Building on the achievements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, States Parties commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations as foreseen in the document in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid that developments in the security situation in Europe would diminish the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations, or to voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests. (Para. 13 of the Lisbon Document on Scope and Parameters.)

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