

# BASIC REPORTS

NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

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## WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT IN LIMBO

by Dr. Natalie J. Goldring

**Just two months remain before the scheduled 11-12 July resumption of the April 1996 plenary meeting of the "Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies" in Vienna. The April 1996 plenary session was suspended in disarray, and press coverage featured US diplomats blaming Russian diplomats for the failure of the meeting. However, further analysis indicates that the US-Russian disagreement was only one of a number of issues under dispute at the April sessions, ranging from whether there should be a list of "states of serious concern", to the preferred size of the arrangement's secretariat. Little progress has been made toward resolving these substantive and administrative problems, raising concerns about the viability of the Wassenaar Arrangement. (See *BASIC Reports* #49 and #50 for additional details on the development of the Wassenaar Arrangement.)**

"Ad referendum" -- when an agreement isn't necessarily an agreement

Delegations from 31 countries met in Vienna to inaugurate the Wassenaar Arrangement on 2-3 April 1996. In December 1995, 28 countries had agreed to an initial framework for the arrangement "ad referendum", meaning that they needed only final approval from their governments. The original 28 countries were the NATO

countries except Iceland, as well as Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and Switzerland. Argentina, South Korea and Romania joined the arrangement between the December and April meetings, and other countries under consideration for membership reportedly include Bulgaria and Ukraine.

Russian diplomats had apparently highlighted several problems with the text at the December meeting, even though they accepted the compromise language on the initial elements of the arrangement. A Russian official said, "... we made some important reservations and we expected further discussion ... our attempts to have such discussions were rejected, and that led to the failure of the April meeting". A US government official said, "People took a high-risk approach ... which was to base it all on one roll of the dice there in Vienna". A second US government official concurred, "We did hope that we could box them in and roll them in effect on the basis of 'everybody else has agreed'".

Once the talks stalled over the US-Russian dispute, other countries took advantage of the opportunity to reopen other issues. The first US official said, "When there's no momentum it's easier for people to jump ship", and cited Swiss and Belgian concerns about how machine tools would be treated under the Wassenaar Arrangement and Italian concerns about handguns as examples. The second US official said, "We eventually shut off that drift. It got to be pretty unnerving". By the

### INSIDE

EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES MAY  
IMPEDE PROGRESS AT CFE REVIEW  
by Sami Fournier and Tasos Kokkinides

CTB OR NOT CTB  
by Stephen W. Young

GERMAN LAND MINE BAN UPDATE  
by Otfried Nassauer

UNITED NATIONS REGISTER  
documents reprinted:  
Composite table of replies to date  
United Kingdom submission  
United States submission

BASIC REPORTS

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

end of the April meeting, these specific issues had apparently been resolved, but participants and observers expressed concern that similar issues could be raised later on. The phrase, "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed," once a prominent feature of US-Soviet arms control negotiations, has apparently been used with some regularity in this setting as well.

Dispute over notification

The most significant dispute seems to be over how to deal with proposed sales of items that other participants have rejected. The group of 28 had agreed in December to notification soon after issuance of a license if a country wanted to sell an item whose sale had been rejected by another participant. The Russians, however, said in the April meeting that they would not provide such notification until after the transfer had taken place, and this dispute remains unresolved. A British official put the burden on the Russian delegation, saying, "We hope the Russian authorities can see their way to adjust their procedures to join consensus".

Additional disagreements over transfers to pariah states

But even if the dispute over notification is resolved, several other important disagreements remain. For example, in contrast to the publicly stated perception of US officials, there does not seem to be consensus on barring transfers to pariah states Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The Russian government official said, "Iran is our partner. It was our partner, it is our partner, it will be our partner". He stressed that the written framework for the arrangement does not restrict transfers to these four countries, and said that the French government also objected to any implication of restraint on transfers to the four pariah states. The first US official agreed that the French were reluctant to bar transfers to those countries, "If you were talking about restoring ties to a traditional military client, you'd try all sorts of dodges to avoid it". A French official refused to comment on the possibility that his government wanted to keep its options open for future weapons sales to Iraq. A third US official questioned these interpretations, saying that three of the four countries were under UN embargo anyway, and that people agree on which countries are "states of serious concern".

US-German quarrels

Issues on which the US and German governments were unable to agree included who would head up the secretariat, and whether German transfers to supposed civilian end-users in Iran were appropriate. The first US official said that these disputes were largely a way of playing out other disagreements, "This is some weird dynamic between the US and Germany over the management of Atlantic relations". German officials could not be reached for comment.

At present, there are two candidates to head up the secretariat for the Wassenaar Arrangement. One is Waldemar Gaymann, Director of the Export Controls Division, German Ministry of Economy, who has apparently been endorsed by all of the EU member countries, and the other is a US candidate, Paul Hurley, from the US Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The most likely compromise seems to be that both candidates would withdraw in favour of someone who was acceptable to both countries.

The outlook for July and beyond

The new chair of the proceedings is Staffan Sohlman, Inspector General of Military Equipment in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He succeeds Frans Engering, Director-General for Foreign Economic Relations in the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, whom the first US official said, "had had more than enough". He also said that Sohlman had not yet committed to the July meeting, "He's not going to have a meeting that would not be a success". Sohlman is currently sounding out key participating countries on administrative as well as substantive issues.

Participants and observers concurred on the importance of the arrangement, and seemed in general agreement that if the July meeting is not a success, the entire arrangement could collapse. The first US official warned, "It's kind of at a dangerous moment. You could lose the thing if you're not careful". The Russian official said, "Such an agreement will be the first after the Cold War. . . . This is an important thing and it has great political value. I think that is understood by all partners". The first US official also pointed to the importance of these

BASIC REPORTS

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

issues, "Non-proliferation controls are great, but the bulk of the wars are conventional. We're gonna say we have a regime for the stuff that nobody uses but we don't have a regime for the stuff that everybody uses?" He did not mention the fact that the arrangement's reporting requirements would not apply to the light weapons that are responsible for most of the killing in today's conflicts.

Assuming that the arrangement is inaugurated in July, the next test will be how soon the information exchange on transfers can be established. US officials have apparently argued for an immediate exchange and

pointed out that countries are already supposed to have submitted reports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms on their transfers of these systems. Others want to move more slowly. According to the second US official, British officials have said they would not be able to begin such an exchange until at least October 1996, and French officials have not even been willing to commit to that schedule, saying instead that they could accept October as a target. The British official confirmed his country's reluctance to begin the exchange before October, but did not provide details. *BASIC*

## EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES MAY IMPEDE PROGRESS AT CFE REVIEW

by Sami Fournier and Tasos Kokkinides

**Russia and the NATO states have significantly different expectations of the Conventional Forces in Europe Review Conference which opens in Vienna on 15 May. Western diplomats are warning that the refusal of CFE signatories to support the Russian proposals for modernising the Treaty may jeopardise compromise on implementation issues. One official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that Moscow "will use the conference to undermine NATO's policy of enlargement". The official claimed that most of Russia's proposals are "a red herring".**

The CFE Treaty came into force in July 1992. It limits the numbers of tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, helicopters and combat aircraft throughout Europe. This is the first review of the Treaty and is scheduled to be completed by 31 May.

A Russian official said his country wants the conference to be "a future-orientated exercise". Moscow has distributed proposals which call for the "modernisation" of the CFE Treaty, meaning by this the adaptation of the Treaty to the realities of post-Cold War Europe. NATO countries, however, are concentrating on a more limited agenda dealing with unresolved implementation issues. These include equipment levels on the Russian flanks, Belarus's non-compliance with its CFE obligations, the

storage of materiel east of the Urals, and the division of the Black Sea fleet between Russia and Ukraine.

Russia has long argued that the bloc-to-bloc approach which is inherent in the CFE Treaty is outdated. The possible addition to NATO of former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia would change the balance of conventional forces in Europe which the Treaty achieved. NATO's view is that complex issues dealing with future non-bloc arms control measures in Europe should not be dealt with by this conference. "It is a review conference and this means that by definition the emphasis is at looking in the past. Only then can we draw lessons for the future", said Dr Piet de Klerk, Head of the Arms Control section of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Netherlands is the Treaty depository state.

The Russian official acknowledged the need to look at implementation issues but he argued that "in order to preserve the vitality of the Treaty, countries should adapt it to the present reality in Europe". Russian diplomats say that the Treaty is not "written in stone" and they point to Article XVIII of the Treaty which urges states to "continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same mandate and with the goal of building on the Treaty. . . . The objective of these negotiations shall

BASIC REPORTS

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

be to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe”.

Modernisation

Some Central European states, having co-ordinated their conference strategy with NATO, are prepared to go slightly beyond this limited discussion and agree, in principle, to discuss the issue of modernising the Treaty. A compromise proposal shown to *BASIC Reports* refers the modernisation issue back to the Joint Consultative Group. The JCG, which meets regularly in Vienna, is a body established under the provisions of the CFE Treaty to deal with implementation issues. Representatives designated by each Party to the Treaty participate. The compromise suggestion is that this group could initiate discussions on how best to approach possible modernisation of the CFE Treaty. The proposal also suggests, however, that negotiations on modernisation “may not start earlier than after the Lisbon OSCE Summit”. This meeting is scheduled for December 1996, and it is unclear whether Russia would accept this delay.

Diplomats argue that moving from a “group ceiling” approach to “national ceilings” cannot be done during the two-week conference. “It is easy to design a bipolar treaty, but much more difficult to construct a multipolar treaty”, said Dr Piet de Klerk. States are showing reluctance to enter into full negotiations immediately. Gabor Iklody, Deputy Head of the Department for Security Policy and European Cooperation at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said “Hungary will be ready to negotiate a treaty which will supersede the CFE Treaty, but not now. We do not know yet the course that NATO enlargement will take and it is premature to discuss lowering our national ceilings . . . . We are prepared to change the bloc-to-bloc approach of the CFE Treaty to a national approach, but this cannot be done now”.

Implementation

By far the most serious problem facing negotiators in Vienna is the Russian flank issue. Moscow has not yet met its obligations under Article V of the Treaty, which specifies the amount of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) that Russia is allowed to deploy in defined geographical

districts. The United States and Turkey proposed re-drawing the map of the flanks in order to accommodate Russian concerns. At the G-8 summit in Moscow from 19-20 April this year, Russia and the United States appeared to reach an agreement to shrink the districts in which the disputed limits apply, but to retain the numerical limits within those smaller zones. This agreement has, however, now been called into question. A British official commented that “it is not clear whether the Russians accepted that. Their position is rather vague. It is possible that the flank issue will not be solved and would be referred back to the Joint Consultative Group for further negotiations”. Russian diplomats in Vienna dispute that agreement was reached. “They should compare their notes” commented a central European official.

The question of how to deal with countries that have yet to honour their obligations by destroying the required number of weapons will also be addressed. Belarus is the most clear-cut violator and has failed to destroy a large amount of its TLE. A diplomat from a neighbouring state expressed his country’s concern at Belarus’s non-compliance. The other states that have failed to comply are Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Russia has also failed to destroy its excess equipment beyond the Urals. Moscow maintains that this equipment, which has been withdrawn from the Treaty’s area of application, is being left to rot. This contradicts the provisions of the Treaty and Western officials are worried that it may establish a precedent. The division of the Black Sea fleet between Russia and Ukraine is another thorny issue. The two sides report progress in bilateral negotiations but diplomats in Vienna complain that “we have seen little progress to date”.

Most of the implementation problems surrounding the CFE Treaty involve Russia. Moscow may unblock progress toward full implementation of CFE if a commitment to modernising the Treaty is explicitly stated in the final declaration of the Review Conference. Despite Western reluctance to be drawn into discussions which would revise CFE, an equal reluctance to openly oppose President Yeltsin ahead of the Russian elections may effect such a compromise. *BASIC*

BASIC REPORTS

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

## CTB OR NOT CTB

by Stephen W. Young

**Negotiators at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty talks, which will resume 13 May in Geneva, face what all admit is an extremely difficult task. In 1995, both at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference and at the UN General Assembly, states committed themselves to achieving a test ban in 1996. In order to attain that goal, most countries believe negotiations have to be completed by 28 June, the end of the upcoming session of the Conference on Disarmament. Over 1,000 brackets - areas of disagreement - remain in the rolling text of the treaty, and there are several issues that some negotiators are calling "treaty-breakers". In Western circles, there continues to be "cautious optimism" as one diplomat put it, but other negotiators are decidedly more pessimistic. In an interview with *BASIC Reports*, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada said, "the key to it all is whether the right decisions are made in key capitals in the next three to four weeks".**

The first session of 1996 negotiations took place from January to March. The main development was the introduction of a draft text of the treaty from the Chair of the Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Committee, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands. China, India, and Pakistan strongly opposed any attempts to drop the rolling text, so Ambassador Ramaker's text was submitted as a working paper, not a formal text on which negotiations would be based. However, as a senior Western official put it, "we won't get there plugging away on the existing text. Everyone realizes that Ambassador Ramaker's working paper must become the basis for negotiations at some point". How and when that might happen is as yet unclear.

Ambassador Ramaker's paper highlights six areas of disagreement. Of those, four are particularly important: the preamble; the scope of the treaty, including peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs); elements of the On-Site Inspection (OSI) regime; and the requirements for entry

into force (EIF). The other two issues are the composition of the Executive Council and some of the functions of the International Data Centre (IDC).

One of the potential "treaty-breaking" issues is the goal of the treaty, a question that is tied up in the debates on the preamble and on scope. Agreement on the scope of the treaty was significantly advanced in April, when Russia announced it would support the Australian formulation already endorsed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Australia's text bans "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear test explosion", and it now has the support of the wide majority of states.

This language, however, is neither explicit nor broad enough for all states. India, in particular, has sought additional language both on what the treaty will ban and, in the preamble, on linking the treaty to a timetable for complete nuclear disarmament. Few other countries have supported that position, but some have sought to specify what the treaty will achieve. This is reflected in bracketed preambular text in Ambassador Ramaker's paper, which emphasizes "that the principal objective of this Treaty is to end the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems". The nuclear-weapon states are vehemently opposed to this language. The goal of the treaty, as Sir Michael Weston, UK Ambassador to the CD told *BASIC Reports*, is to "ban the bang", and in his view the scope of the treaty, as outlined in the Australian text, does that explicitly.

The only available compromise, according to several Western officials, is to include some language in the preamble that would specify not the goals of the treaty but its effects. Some of those effects were spelled out by John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at a well-received speech to the CD in January. In that speech, Holum stated that the impact of the test ban would be "to end development of advanced new weapons and keep new military applications from emerging". The question remains whether this step would be enough to satisfy India and other non-aligned countries.

## BASIC REPORTS

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

China, without support from any other country, continues to insist that the treaty allow PNEs. A senior official from a Western nuclear-weapon state said that it might be possible to find language that would enable PNEs to be allowed by an amendment to the treaty. However, other states are adamantly opposed to any mention of PNEs in the treaty. Ambassador Moher said, "we do not want any excuse for countries to pursue the viability of PNEs. We do not believe there is any place for PNEs in a CTBT".

On the issue of OSI, the key remaining question is whether or not information gathered from national technical means (NTM) can be used when the Executive Council considers calling for an inspection. The United States has insisted that NTM must be included if the US Senate is to ratify the treaty. Supported by the United Kingdom, the US has sought language similar to that in the Chemical Weapons Convention, which allows "all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the concern" to be used. China, India and Pakistan, however, are strongly opposed to any use of NTM, and the G-21 non-aligned countries at the CD are officially opposed.

A Western official noted that NTM were the "wild card" in the verification system. In this view, the capabilities of the international monitoring system will be well known, theoretically making cheating possible, though not easy. If NTM are allowed, however, any country tempted to cheat would be less certain of what capabilities other countries might have to detect a clandestine test, throwing in a "wild card". For this reason, many countries, including some G-21 countries, see the rationale behind allowing some form of NTM data under the treaty.

Ambassador Moher, appointed by Ambassador Ramaker as a Friend of the Chair on this issue, has indicated that he believes a solution is possible. The United States must, however, compromise on how NTM

are used in the decision-making process to allow an inspection, and China must compromise on the general use of NTM. One solution might be allowing countries to provide unprocessed data from NTM to the Technical Secretariat, which would then evaluate it and determine if an on-site inspection were called for.

Another issue that defies easy solution is entry into force of the treaty. As Ambassador Ramaker's paper puts it, the EIF requirements "would have to strike a balance between ensuring on the one hand that certain states ratify the Treaty in order for it to enter into force, and on the other hand that the goal of timely entry into force is not lost". Many alternatives have been put forth, but the two drawing the most support would either involve a simple number of countries, perhaps 65, or some percentage of the 68 countries on the IAEA's list of states with nuclear programs. One issue is how to treat the three threshold states, India, Israel and Pakistan. Many outside observers are concerned that India's recent moves may be laying the groundwork for a decision not to sign the treaty, a move that might cause Pakistan to stay out as well. How this would affect the nuclear-weapon states is unclear. A Western official noted, however, that the NPT was able to enter into force without having all the nuclear-weapon states signed on.

Many Western officials are quietly optimistic that agreement can be reached; that, as one put it, "it is doable". The official argued that no international agreement had ever been reached without having the intense pressure of an approaching deadline. The question now is whether the deadline will hold. *BASIC*

Rebecca Johnson of Disarmament Intelligence Review provided background and information for this report. A full review of the first session of the 1996 CTBT negotiations is published by DIR in *Acronym 9*, available from DIR, 24 Colvestone Crescent, London E8 2LH.

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

**UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS**

Country submissions to this year's UN Register were due on 30 April. The details contained in the submissions are for the calendar year 1995. As of 8 May 1996, 44 countries had deposited their Register entries at the UN. Reproduced below is a composite table from the UN summarising details of the replies received as of 8 May, and the full submission for the United Kingdom.

**Composite table of replies of Governments**

This composite table is provided for ease of reference. As regards the information contained in the table, it should be noted that a 'yes' denotes a submission of data regarding imports and/or exports in relation to the seven categories of arms covered by the Register, during the reporting period (1995). For the purpose of uniform tabulation, responses by Governments that contained either "nil", "none", "0", or a dash (-) are presented in the table as "nil" reports. A blank space under imports and/or exports in the composite table indicates that no information was supplied for that particular item. In some cases, however, an explanation is provided in the note verbale of the country in question.

Number of replies: 44 (as of 8 May 1996)

State	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information
Armenia	nil	nil		yes
Austria	yes	nil		yes
Belgium	nil	yes		yes
Brazil	yes	nil		no
Chile	yes	nil		no
Czech Republic	nil	yes		yes
Denmark	nil	nil		yes
Dominica	nil	nil		no
Estonia	nil	nil		no
Ethiopia	nil	nil	yes	no
Finland	yes	yes		yes
France	nil	yes		yes
Germany	nil	yes		yes
Hungary	yes	nil		no
Iceland	nil	nil		no
Ireland	nil	nil		yes
Israel	yes	yes		no
Italy	yes	yes		yes
Kazakstan	yes	yes		no
Latvia (Partial report)	yes	nil		no
Lithuania	yes	nil		no
Luxembourg	nil	nil		no
Malta	nil	nil		no
Mongolia	nil	nil		no
Namibia	nil	nil		no

*Cont.*

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

State	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information
Netherlands	yes	yes		yes
New Zealand	nil	nil		yes
Papua New Guinea	nil	nil	yes	no
Phillipines	yes	nil		no
Poland	yes	yes	yes	yes
Portugal	yes	nil		yes
Republic of Moldova	yes	nil		no
Saint Kits and Nevis	nil	nil		no
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	nil	nil		no
Samoa	nil	nil		no
Singapore	yes	nil		no
Slovakia	yes	yes		no
Slovenia	nil	nil		no
Spain	yes	nil		yes
Trinidad and Tobago	nil	nil		no
Turkey	yes	nil		yes
Turkmenistan	nil	nil		no
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	yes	yes		yes
United States of America	yes	yes	yes	yes

**UNITED KINGDOM SUBMISSION**

UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

IMPORTS

Report of international conventional arms transfers  
(according to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36L)

Reporting Country: United Kingdom

Calendar Year: 1995

A	B	C	D	E	REMARKS	
Category (I-VII)	Final Exporter State (s)	Number of Items	State of Origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate Location	Description of Item	Comments on Transfer
I. Battle Tanks						
II. Armoured Combat Vehicles	Belgium	21				Upgrade, refurbish & resale
III. Large Calibre Artillery Systems						
IV. Combat Aircraft						
V. Attack Helicopters						
VI. Warships						
VII. Missiles & Missile Launchers	USA France	114 3				For re-export as part of Cat VI equipment to Oman (1) and Qatar (2).

Note: Equipment purchased from programmes in which the United Kingdom is a collaborative partner is declared as "Procurement from National Production".

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

**UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS EXPORTS**

Report of international conventional arms transfers  
 (according to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36L)  
 Reporting Country: United Kingdom  
 Calendar Year: 1995

<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>	
Category (I-VII)	Final Importer State (s)	Number of Items	State of Origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate Location	Description of Item	Comments on Transfer
I. Battle Tanks	Oman	12				
II. Armoured Combat Vehicles	Botswana	10				
	Indonesia	27				
	Pakistan	5				
	Bulgaria	23				
	Haiti	2				
	Gabon	1				
	Kuwait	66				
III. Large Calibre Artillery Systems	Oman	3				
	Brazil	18				
	Austria	34				
IV. Combat Aircraft	Botswana	3				
	Oman	4				
	Malaysia	4				
V. Attack Helicopters	UAE	4				
	Pakistan	1				
VI. Warships	Brazil	1				
VII. Missiles & Missile Launchers						

Note: The United Kingdom regards the transfer of title to and control over the equipment by the importing state as the appropriate criteria for recording its arms transfers.

**UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT, IMPORT AND EXPORT POLICIES**

The United Kingdom's policy is to procure defence equipment that represents the best value for money. Whenever possible, within normal security constraints, and subject to international commitments and obligations, we do this by means of international competition. There is no policy of buying British where an overseas bid, or international collaborative development, would represent better value for our Armed Forces and the taxpayer.

It is an advantage for the United Kingdom to have a healthy, technologically capable and broadly based defence industry, and defence and industrial issues are taken into account in individual procurement decisions. However, the United Kingdom does not have an industrial strategy which aims to develop such a capability; for example by seeking to control centrally the size or range of the UK's defence industry. The United Kingdom believes that, within

the framework of national and European Community competition law, it is primarily for industry and the market to determine production capacities and capabilities. Dialogue does take place to ensure that industry is aware of the Government's likely procurement intentions for defence equipment, and of its support for research and development and export promotion.

The primary legislation for the control of both imports and exports of defence equipment in the United Kingdom is the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. This legislation enables orders to be made imposing restrictions on both imports and exports. The current orders are:

- a. The Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954
- b. The Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 (as amended)

Restrictions created by the above legislation are enforced by means of provisions within the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

The United Kingdom Government imports defence equipment for use by its Armed Forces and Police Authorities for the legitimate purposes of self-defence and maintenance of public order. Defence equipment (including firearms) imported for commercial use requires an import licence.

It is the policy of the United Kingdom Government to support the sale of British defence equipment overseas to meet legitimate defence needs whenever this is compatible with our political, strategic and security interests (and there are no compelling reasons for not doing so). All proposed defence equipment exports are considered on a case by case basis and are subject to stringent licensing procedures. Many factors concerning the national security of the United Kingdom, our policy towards a particular country and our international obligations, are taken into account. Particular attention is paid to the use to which the equipment might be put. For example, the United Kingdom Government would not permit the export of equipment if we considered it was likely to be used for internal repression or would increase tension or instability in a region.

The United Kingdom supports international efforts to control the excessive accumulation of arms, to reduce tension and to ensure

transparency in the international arms trade through measures such as this Register.

In observing its own national guidelines the United Kingdom Government also adheres to the criteria governing arms transfers agreed at the European Councils in Luxembourg in June 1991 and at Lisbon in July 1992; to the guidelines of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council agreed in London in October 1991; and to the principles governing conventional arms transfers agreed by the Forum for Security Cooperation in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 1993.

In order to enhance the transparency of the United Kingdom's declarations under the UN Register of Conventional Arms, a copy of the 1996 'Statement on the Defence Estimates' will be forwarded as soon as it is available. The Statement is the Government's formal announcement to Parliament about its defence expenditure plans for the year in question. Because, in the United Kingdom, the financial year runs from April to April the statistical information it contains will not conform exactly with the statistics provided for the UN Register which is based on the calendar year. There are also differences in the criteria used for inclusion in the two documents.

**UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS  
REPORT OF MILITARY HOLDINGS AND PROCURMENT FROM NATIONAL PRODUCTION**

*Reporting Country:* United Kingdom

*Reporting Year:* 1995

A	B	C
<i>Category (I-VII)</i>	<i>Military Holdings</i>	<i>Procurement from National Production</i>
I Battle tanks	586	30
II Armoured Combat Vehicles	3841	21
III Large Calibre Artillery Systems	521	24
IV Combat Aircraft	663	2
V Attack Helicopters	418	0
VI Warships	96	1
VII Missiles and Missile Launchers	49173	6678

1. The figures in Column C are included in Column B.
2. A military holding is defined as equipment in the seven Register categories owned by the Government on 31 December 1995.
3. Procurement from National Production is defined as complete weapon systems purchased by the Government during 1995 from suppliers within the United Kingdom or from programmes in which the UK is a collaborative partner.

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

**UNITED STATES SUBMISSION**

The US submission to the UN Register was accompanied by an explanatory letter from Edward Gnehm, US Charge d'Affaires *ad interim*, to the UN Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The text of the letter is as follows:

I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the 1996 United States submission to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in response to the UN note verbale No. CDA/5-96/TA-I of 19 January, 1996.

With reference to the relevant paragraphs of UNGA resolutions 46/36 L, 47/52 L, 49/75 C, and 50/70 D, as well as to both your note verbale No. CDA/5-96/TA-I of 19 January, 1996 and the report of the 1994 panel of experts on the working of the Register, the government of the United States of America transmits herewith the following:

- Data on U.S. international transfers (exports and imports) of conventional arms during calendar year 1995; in the recommended format (attachment A);
- Available background information regarding U.S. military holdings and procurement through national production for calendar year 1995 (attachment B);
- Available background information regarding relevant U.S. policies, arms import and export policies, legislation, and administrative procedures (attachment C).

Each year, the U.S. provides background information regarding relevant U.S. policies, legislation, and administrative procedures. The 1996 U.S. submission includes updates to this material.

It is possible that there will be discrepancies in the numbers of transferred arms as reported by exporting and importing states, due to differences in recorded dates of transfer and in what each country determines to constitute a reportable transfer.

The U.S. considers that its transfers of military equipment occur at the time ownership title for the equipment is transferred between the U.S. and another country. The 1996 submission therefore includes equipment whose title was transferred during the 1995 calendar year.

I would be grateful if you would add the U.S. submission to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

Attachment A

**REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS**

(according to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L)

**EXPORTS**

Reporting Country: **United States of America**

Calendar Year: **1995**

A	B	C	D	E	Remarks	
Category (I-VII)	Final Importer State(s)	Number of Items	State of Origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate Location (if any)	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
I. Battle tanks	1) Egypt	274				
	2) Kuwait	16				
	3) Portugal	13				
	4) Saudi Arabia	89				
	5) Taiwan	21				
	6) Thailand	24				
II. Armored combat Vehicles	1) Egypt	299				
	2) Greece	91				
	3) Israel	28				
	4) Kuwait	46				
	5) Lebanon	319				
	6) Saudi Arabia	306				
	7) Taiwan	1				

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

*US Exports continued:*

A	B	C	D	E	Remarks	
Category (I-VII)	Final Importer State(s)	Number of Items	State of Origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate Location (if any)	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
III. Large Caliber artillery systems	1) Australia	1				
	2) Egypt	7				
	3) Greece	10				
	4) Israel	6				
	5) Japan	9				
	3)[sic] Republic of Korea	90				
	4)[sic] Spain	28				
	4)[sic] Thailand	1				
IV. Combat Aircraft	1) Argentina	40				
	2) Australia	1				
	3) Egypt	31				
	4) Finland	4				
	5) Greece	8				
	6) Israel	2				
	7) Republic of Korea	8				
	8) Portugal	1				
	9) Saudi Arabia	4				
	10) Spain	6				
	11) Switzerland	3				
	12) Thailand	20				
V. Attack helicopters	1) Bahrain	6				
	2) Colombia	2				
	3) Greece	5				
	4) Taiwan	10				
	5) United Arab Emirates	12				
VI. Warships						

*Cont.*

**BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL**

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

*US Exports continued:*

A	B	C	D	E	Remarks	
Category (I-VII)	Final Importer State(s)	Number of Items	State of Origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate Location (if any)	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
VII. Missiles & missile launchers	1) Australia	32				
	2) Denmark	3				
	3) France	30				
	4) Germany	1				
	5) Greece	2208				
	6) Israel	6				
	7) Italy	246				
	8) Japan	85				
	9) Republic of Korea	125				
	10) Malaysia	12				
	11) Netherlands	40				
	12) New Zealand	2				
	13) Spain	2				
	14) Taiwan	254				
	15) Thailand	2				
	16) Turkey	84				
	17) United Kingdom	114				

Background information provided: yes

**IMPORTS**

Reporting Country: **United States of America**

Calendar year: **1995**

A	B	C	D	E	Remarks	
Category (I-VII)	Exporter State(s)	Number of Items	State of Origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate Location (if any)	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
I. Battle tanks						
II. Armored combat vehicles						
III. Large caliber artillery systems						
IV. Combat aircraft						
V. Attack helicopters						
VI. Warships						
VII. Missiles & missile launchers	1) Israel	18				
	2) Norway	22				
	3) Russia	5				

Background information provided: yes

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

Attachment B

**AVAILABLE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON MILITARY HOLDINGS AND PROCURMENT THROUGH NATIONAL PRODUCTION**

The following information is for the United States of America in calendar year 1995 and is in terms of the same categories as used for Exports and Imports.

Category	Military Holdings*	Procurement through national production
I. Battle tanks	12,337	0
II. Armored combat vehicles	26,972	0
III. Large caliber artillery systems	9,733	154
IV. Combat aircraft	4,232	73
V. Attack helicopters	3,272	37
VI. Warships	367	18
VII. Missiles & missile launchers	124,856	1,642

Notes:

\* Relative to last year's submission (data for calendar year 1994) for U.S. military holding, reductions in Categories I, II, III, IV, and VI reflect continued downsizing actions. The increase in Category V and VII reflect the use of more inclusive definitions and more accurate accounting procedures.

Attachment C

**BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 46/36 L (paragraphs 10 and 18), 47/52 L (paragraph 5), and 49/75 C (paragraph 4) invite all Member States to provide background information on relevant policies, national arms import and export procedures, both as regards arms transfers and prevention of illicit arms transfers.

Accordingly, previous U.S. Submissions contained such information, which continues to be relevant. Additional information submitted below includes the following:

- Address by President Clinton to the United Nations on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Creation of the United Nations (October 22, 1995). [not reprinted here].

**BASIC REPORTS**

13 MAY 1996 • NUMBER 52 • ISSN 0966-9175

**GERMAN LAND MINE BAN  
INCLUDES CLAYMORE MINES**

by Otfried Nassauer

**BASIC Reports 51 stated that Germany's unilateral anti-personnel land mine ban would not include claymore mines. The report was based on information received from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The German Ministry of Defence has confirmed, however, that claymore mines will be included in the ban. The statement issued by the German delegation to the Conference on Disarmament announcing the ban makes this clear. The text of the statement is reprinted below.**

The ban will eliminate almost 400,000 DM-31 AP mines, and about 33,000 DM-51 (MON-50) mines. By including the claymore-type DM-51 the German ban goes further than similar bans in many countries. These mines are mostly excluded from bans by defining them as remotely controlled munitions, or explosives. The United States claims that claymore mines cannot be banned because of their military utility. *BASIC*

**The Federal Republic of Germany's renunciation of anti-personnel mines**

Statement issued by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament.

The Federal Republic of Germany completely renounces anti-personnel mines. This decision comprises the following elements:

1. Germany renounces the use, stockpiling and procurement of anti-personnel mines.
2. Germany will destroy all anti-personnel mines (types DM 31 and DM 51) held by the German armed forces. A timetable is currently being drawn up.
3. Germany's renunciation of anti-personnel mines will be indefinite and unconditional, i.e. independent either of the development of technical alternatives or

of the results of the Conference to review the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention to be held in Geneva (22.4 - 3.5.1996).

4. Germany's total renunciation of anti-personnel mines complements the existing moratorium on their export. The Federal Cabinet already decided on 11 January 1996 to extend indefinitely the three-year moratorium on exports of anti-personnel mines which had been in force since 1 July 1994.

The German decision was preceded by an internal assessment of the military value of anti-personnel mines and of the humanitarian and political value of renunciation, also taking into account the positions and decision-making procedures of Germany's allies.

Germany's renunciation of anti-personnel mines is a consistent step towards the Federal Government's goal of a worldwide ban on such mines. It sends a clear signal to the countries participating in the Geneva Conference that they must demonstrate the flexibility and goodwill required to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion by substantially strengthening Protocol II of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention.

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