

BASIC REPORTS

NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

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NEW FORUM "SMALL GROUP" MEETING PRODUCES MEAGRE RESULTS

by Dr. Natalie J. Goldring

Washington D.C. **Diplomats expressed disappointment with the lack of progress made in a 13 November meeting in London of the "small group on arms", a subgroup of the New Forum. Progress was reportedly inhibited by several factors, including the reluctance of the French and Russian Governments to agree to prior consultation for certain weapons deliveries, participants who had little negotiating flexibility, and participants who lacked background in national security issues.**

The small group on arms consists of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and Italy: the major exporters among New Forum members. The New Forum, with 28 participating countries, is being designed to take the place of the now-defunct Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM), which controlled weapons and dual-use exports to Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War. The New Forum's membership is much broader than COCOM's, reflecting the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of traditional East-West divisions.

Establishing blame

US Government officials said the French Government was primarily responsible for the failure to make progress during this meeting. The discussions reportedly bogged down in disagreement over whether participants should agree to have "meaningful consultation" in ad-

vance of weapons transfers, and what "meaningful consultation" meant. One administration official said that "the French were very reluctant to provide information in advance, and they received some support from Moscow". A second administration official concurred: "... the French are the single most important stumbling block. They're balking at any real information exchange. They had no appropriate direction or guidance or authority to agree to anything beyond the UN Register".

A Western official was less negative about the French role, and said that they were unlikely to block establishment of the New Forum. He was also cautious about blaming the Russians for a lack of progress in the talks, saying: "It's taken some time to get the Russians involved. They're very defensive because of their own internal situation". In turn, when asked if the French had hindered progress, a Russian official said: "In some ways, but each country has its own position and sometimes it is difficult to make them match".

Differing agendas, backgrounds and objectives are barriers to progress

There is significant disagreement within and among the participating governments with respect to the appropriate agenda for the small group and the New Forum as a whole. For example, US officials disagree strongly about whether "meaningful consultation" should be a core issue of discussion for the small group. One administration official described meaningful consultation as an old

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agenda, while another official argued that meaningful consultation was absolutely key to the success of other efforts.

The Russian official suggested quite a different agenda, highlighting the Russian desire for market sharing arrangements. He stressed the importance of Russia as an equal partner in the group, and when pressed on the meaning of equal partnership, said: "We used to export some years even more than the United States. Why should we go down so rapidly?" Later on he softened his remarks somewhat, saying "I'm just talking about equal partnership, not increasing arms sales. . . . If we have agreement that each country should not cross a certain level of \$5[billion] or \$6 billion then that would be O.K."

Participants also varied in their objectives for the group. The Russian official stated the objective most broadly, "We would agree, for example, that we should not export arms to the region where conflicts are going on We should promote solution of conflict and not aggravation by our exports. . . . Whenever we have concerns we should meet, discuss, make some measures to prevent conflicts". The Western official suggested beginning with a more modest approach and limited objectives: "It's our view that once it's started it can be reviewed, modified, what have you". Other officials were concerned that unless the group agreed at the beginning to discuss arms transfers to countries and regions of concern, it would never happen.

Several officials argued that the talks would proceed more smoothly if the participants were better versed in national security issues. The first US official said, "With the exception of the US, these delegations are not national security delegations, they're economic delegations. They are not sensitive to this as a proliferation issue -- there's some educating going on. . . . They see export controls as an economic issue". A Western official expressed a similar sentiment: "This particular issue, the US and the UK deal with more as non-proliferation/arms trade. Other European countries tend to have it in their export control sections".

Light weapons issues

Most discussions of arms transfer restraint have focused on major conventional weapons, such as those covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. However, in recent years, analysts and academics have paid increasing attention to the issue of light weapons transfers, and the fact that they have been responsible for much of the killing in recent conflicts.

US Government officials said that the small group on arms might address light weapons issues, particularly if the focus were on illegal transfers. The first administration official said, "The President in his UN speech made a clear statement about the steps we should take to deal with the illegal arms trade", and argued that the United States could and should play a leadership role on this issue in the New Forum. He also said that paying attention to illegal transfers would naturally produce a focus on light weapons, since most of the illegal trade is in weapons of this type. The second official was more cautious about the prospects for dealing with light weapons: ". . . it's a question of whether anyone makes it a political push from the highest levels It would probably take a substantial push from the Japanese or the Netherlands". He added, "To substantially broaden the focus of the group to grasp small arms is difficult to imagine when we've had a difficult time getting them to do anything on 'big' arms".

Next Steps

The small group is scheduled to meet again before the next high-level meeting in the Hague from 18-19 December. However, their agenda is still unclear. The British Chairman's paper reportedly said that the group will continue their discussion, that they will meet before the next high-level meeting, and that at that point they will have to agree on ways of exchanging information. However, several officials interviewed for this article were pessimistic about the likelihood of reaching agreement in the near future on any information exchange.

New Forum countries that are not part of the small group may play a key role in the small group's progress. For example, the Japanese Government was praised by participants for its commitment to making the process successful. The Western official also said that the Dutch

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and the Norwegian New Forum representatives had been particularly supportive. These countries could encourage small group members to refocus talks on the prospects for multilateral restraint of the international weapons trade. The first US official said one way of revitalizing the discussions would be to agree on a workplan which "... could be construed very broadly to apply to the more traditional issues of restraint and to some issues that have not gathered attention such as illegal arms networks and the flow of arms in certain regions".

Observers also disagreed on the likelihood of success of the New Forum and the small group on arms. The second US official said "Unless we can turn the French around I'm afraid we're not going to get much beyond some vague understandings". The Russian official said he was not certain the group could reach something substantial by the end of the year. The Western official cautioned that the talks were at a fragile stage, but seemed optimistic that the December meetings would produce a functioning New Forum. *BASIC*

RUSSIAN REGISTER SUBMISSION

As BASIC Reports #48 went to press, the UN published Russia's submission to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms. The Russian entry is reproduced below.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

EXPORTS

Reporting Country: Russian Federation

Calendar Year: 1994

Original language: Russian

Date of submission: 8 November 1995

Background information provided: no

A Category (I-VII)	B Final importer state(s)	C Number of items	D State of origin (if not importer)	E Intermediate location (if any)	REMARKS	
					Description of item	Comments on the transfer
I. Battle tanks	Angola	10				
	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	20				
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Angola	138				
	Bangladesh	14				
	Kuwait	4				
	United Arab Emirates	118				
	Turkey	54				
III. Large calibre artillery systems	India	120				
	Finland	9				
IV. Combat aircraft	Romania	1				
	Slovakia	1				
V. Attack helicopters		nil				
VI. Warships	China	1				
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Hungary	342				
	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	94				

Note: There were no arms transfers in category V

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THE FIFTIETH SESSION OF THE UN FIRST COMMITTEE*

by Stephen W. Young

On 22 November, after long and sometimes rancorous debates on disarmament and international security issues, the UN First Committee wrapped up its fiftieth session. In December, resolutions approved by the First Committee will be submitted for what is normally routine approval by the General Assembly. Much of the debate in the First Committee focused on traditional nuclear disarmament issues, such as nuclear testing. Consideration of conventional disarmament issues, including "micro-disarmament", or small arms, continues to grow. The most significant debate centred on the timetable for conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations. The debate ended with only a commitment to seek agreement by September 1996.

Many diplomats were dismayed by the lack of progress in the session. In an interview with *BASIC Reports*, Ambassador Michael Weston, who headed the British delegation, noted that "there was rather more confrontation and less search for consensus than in the past". The Egyptian Head of Delegation, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, concurred that little progress was made. Ambassador Richard Starr, Head of the Australian delegation, said that he was dismayed by the lack of reference to the results of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference, held in spring 1995. At that conference, the NPT was made permanent, a stronger review process for the Treaty was created, and a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" was agreed (see *BASIC Reports* #45).

Nuclear Testing

Two resolutions were introduced on nuclear testing. The first "strongly deplored" all current nuclear testing and "strongly urged" its immediate cessation (A/C.1/50/L.3). It was co-sponsored by 26 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway, the Republic of Korea and South Africa. Canada

was a co-sponsor, but withdrew its sponsorship for reasons it did not specify in public, although it did vote for the resolution.

Resolution L.3 attracted 95 votes in favour, 12 against and 45 abstentions. As expected, France, China and the United Kingdom voted against, while Russia and the United States abstained. Much of francophone Africa also abstained, as did a number of east-European countries that are seeking closer ties with the West. Ten European Union countries, however, voted for the resolution: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Germany, Greece and Spain abstained. The European voting record echoes the splits that hindered the EU during the NPT Review and Extension Conference, where it was unable to make a unified statement on progress on nuclear disarmament.

Six days after the First Committee vote, France conducted its fourth nuclear test since it broke a three-year moratorium in September 1995. In an interview with *BASIC Reports* before the latest French test, Ambassador Starr said Australia was "disappointed that the nuclear weapons states have not come forth with a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons".

The second resolution dealing with the CTBT negotiations called for the final text of the treaty to be completed "not later than 30 June 1996". Earlier in the conference, US Ambassador John Holum called for completion of the treaty by April 1996. Even the 30 June date, however, was too early for some states, and a revised version of the resolution was issued, calling for conclusion of negotiations in time for signature at the September 1996 United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/50/L.8/Rev.1). According to Ambassador Weston, the 30 June date had to be removed from the resolution "to placate the Russians and the Chinese". An American official, however, indicated that it was a close Western ally that objected to the date. In reference to the American timetable, Ambassador Weston indicated that the United Kingdom "did not think it was a terribly good idea to set an early deadline", fearing that some states might use it as leverage for their demands. As allowed under UN procedures, China called for and was granted a separate vote on the paragraph in

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the resolution which set the September deadline. China abstained in that vote, and then the full resolution passed without a vote.

African nuclear-weapon-free zone

A resolution endorsing the African nuclear-weapon-free zone also passed without a vote, but UK and US representatives stated afterwards that their support did not mean they would sign the relevant protocols as soon as requested in the resolution (A/C.1/50/L.23/Rev.1). One point of issue for the UK and the US is that the British territory of Diego Garcia is included in the zone. This island in the Chagos Archipelago lies some 3,600 km east of the African continent and is used by the US as a military base and prepositioning depot for military equipment. It is unlikely that the United States stores nuclear weapons on the island on a permanent basis, but the military may want to have that option. The Treaty is expected to open for signature in February 1996 and to enter into force by mid-1996. An African official who is very familiar with the Treaty was confident that any American delay in signing was due only to bureaucracy, and that the US would be able to sign on by February. In an interview with *BASIC Reports*, Ambassador Ralph Earle, Deputy Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, confirmed that the United States has not completed its review of the Treaty, but that it supports the Treaty in principle.

Light weapons

Work on conventional weapons in the First Committee continues to expand, with a new emphasis on light weapons. Argentina, Ecuador, Japan and South Africa introduced a resolution calling for the Secretary General to prepare a report on "the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons" and ways to prevent this (A/C.1/50/L.7/Rev.1). The resolution passed without any votes against it, although 16 states abstained, including Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kuwait, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion

The session ended with a divisive vote on whether to have a fourth Special Session on Disarmament in 1997. Most Western countries were opposed to the idea, but

eventually a weak resolution calling for the Session to take place "if possible" passed by 98 votes to 2 (the United States and Israel) with 46 abstentions. It appears that many countries are hesitant to commit to further negotiations on disarmament issues as a result of the large areas of disagreement demonstrated in the First Committee. *BASIC*

*The texts of the UN resolutions discussed in this article are reproduced below. The Editor thanks Nicola Calvert for her assistance in obtaining the texts and in preparing them for publication.

Clarification / Correction

In "Intelligence agencies fail to supply information to war crimes tribunal" (*BASIC Reports #48*) we reported that elements of our 16 October story, "US intelligence knew Serbs were planning an assault on Srebrenica" (*BASIC Reports #47*), had been confirmed by US Government officials to the *Washington Post* and *New York Newsday*.

We said: "... the US intelligence services obtained information about Serb preparations for the attack against Srebrenica and about the massacre of Muslim civilians which followed. This information was obtained by intercepting telephone communications between the Serbian Army Chief of Staff, General Momcilo Perisic and Bosnian Serb military leader, General Ratko Mladic, and by aerial photography. This story ... has subsequently been confirmed by US Government officials in interviews with the *Washington Post* and *New York Newsday*".

For clarification: intelligence information gained via aerial photography showing Serb preparation for the attack and the subsequent massacre was confirmed to the *Washington Post*. Confirmation about the telephone intercepts was given only to *New York Newsday*. We apologise for any confusion which may have arisen.

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A/C.1/50/L.3
31 October 1995
ENGLISH
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Fiftieth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 70

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Japan, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa and Uruguay: draft resolution

Nuclear Testing

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war,

Reaffirming that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security,

Convinced that the cessation of all nuclear testing will provide a favourable climate for the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Considering that nuclear testing is not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Deeply concerned about the potential negative effects of underground nuclear testing on health and the environment,

Sharing alarm expressed, internationally, regionally and nationally, at recent nuclear tests,

1. Commends those nuclear-weapon States observing nuclear testing moratoria, and urges them to continue these moratoria pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

2. Strongly deplores all current nuclear testing;

3. Strongly urges the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing.

A/C.1/50/L.8/Rev.1
15 November 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH / SPANISH

Fiftieth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 65

COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY

Afghanistan, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela and Viet Nam: revised draft resolution

Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/70 of 16 December 1993 and 49/70 of 15 December 1994, in which the entire international community supported the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Reaffirming that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that will attract the adherence of all States and will contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,

Noting the aspirations expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 1/ to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all tests explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, which are recalled in the preamble to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2/

Welcoming the further elaboration of the rolling text in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, as reflected in the report of the Conference

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and its appendix, 3/ and the decision of the Conference to continue its work in inter-sessional meetings,

1. Welcomes the continuing efforts in the multilateral negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, the significant contributions to the rolling text made by States participating in those negotiations and progress in key areas;

2. Calls upon all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to conclude, as a task of the highest priority, a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which contributes to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, so as to enable its signature by the outset of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly;

3. Also calls upon participants in the Conference on Disarmament to advance work on the basis of the rolling text during the inter-sessional negotiating period so as to proceed to the final phase of the negotiation at the beginning of 1996;

4. Further calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the commencement of its 1996 session, and to renew its mandate in order to complete the final text of the treaty as soon as possible in 1996;

5. Urges all States to support the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and their prompt conclusion;

6. Declares its readiness to resume consideration of this item, as necessary, before its fifty-first session in order to endorse the text of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the provision to the Conference on Disarmament of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session an item entitled "Implementation of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

2/ Ibid., vol. 729, No. 10485

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 27, chap. III, sect. A.

Fiftieth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 78

FINAL TEXT OF A TREATY ON AN AFRICAN
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

South Africa* : revised draft resolution

Final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty)

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, in which they solemnly declare their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of atomic weapons,

Recalling its resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, in which it endorsed the above-mentioned Declaration and expressed the hope that the African States would initiate studies, as they deemed appropriate, with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa and take the necessary measures, through the Organization of African Unity, to achieve that end,

Recalling also article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2/ which acknowledges the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Bearing in mind paragraph 60 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 3/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure,

Bearing in mind also the provisions of resolution CM/ Res.1592 (LXII/Rev.1) 4/ on the implementation of the Treaty declaring Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its sixty-second ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 June 1995,

Noting the adoption by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at their thirty-first ordinary session in Addis Ababa, from 24 to 28 June 1995, of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty),

Noting also that the Treaty contains three Protocols open to the signature of States which, de jure or de facto, are internationally responsible for territories which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Pelindaba Treaty and to the signature of States possessing nuclear

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weapons, and convinced that the cooperation of such States is necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty,

Recognizing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime,

Considering that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East, would enhance the security of Africa and the viability of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. Welcomes with special satisfaction the adoption by the African leaders of the final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty), which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which, at the same time, recognizes the right of African countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;

2. Invites the African States to sign and ratify the Pelindaba Treaty as soon as possible;

3. Calls upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. Also calls upon the States contemplated in Protocol III to the Pelindaba Treaty to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they are, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible, and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty;

5. Further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to bring the necessary support to the Pelindaba Treaty by signing the Protocols that concern them as soon as the Treaty becomes available for signature;

6. Expresses its profound gratitude to the Secretary-General for the diligence with which he has rendered effective technical advice and financial assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the six meetings of the Group of Experts to Prepare a Draft Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, set up jointly by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations;

7. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to extend assistance to the African States in 1996, in order to achieve the aims of the present resolution;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session an item entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty".

* On behalf of all the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the African Group of States.

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

2/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

3/ Resolution S-10/2

4/ A/50/647, annex.

A/C.1/50/L.7/Rev.1
17 November 1995
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fiftieth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda Item 70

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Mali, Malta, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela: revised draft resolution

Small arms

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps in order to strengthen that role,

Realizing the urgent need to resolve underlying conflicts, to diminish tensions and to accelerate efforts towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments,

Taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter,

Realizing that arms obtained through the illicit arms trade are most likely to be used for violent purposes, and that even small arms when so obtained, directly or indirectly, by terrorist groups, drug traffickers or underground organizations can pose a danger to regional and international security, and certainly to the security and political stability of the countries affected,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council entitled "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" 1/ which stressed the urgent need for "practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands", 2/ and which identified light weapons as including, inter alia, small arms and anti-personnel landmines,

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Recalling its resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1994, in which it welcomed the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected States of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion, as well as the action taken by the Secretary-General in implementation of this initiative,

Taking note of the work of the Disarmament Commission on international arms transfers,

1. Requests the Secretary-General, within the existing resources, to prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel group of qualified governmental experts to be nominated by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, on:

(a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations;

(b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade;

(c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict;

with particular attention to the role of the United Nations in this field and to the complementary role of regional organizations, and taking into account views and proposals of Member States and all other relevant information, for submission to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session;

2. Also requests the Secretary-General to seek the views and proposals of Member States on the matters contained in paragraph 1, to collect all other relevant information and to make them available for consideration by the panel of governmental experts referred to in paragraph 1;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session an item entitled "Small arms".

1/ A/50/60-S/1995/1

2/ Ibid., para. 60.

THE WEU ALLOWS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES BUT KEEPS ITS MILITARY FORCES

by Mariano Aguirre

Madrid. **On the eve of the European Union Intergovernmental Conference to review the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU) has set out its position on European security. On 14 November 1995, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Madrid and published *European Security: A common concept of the 27 WEU countries*. This report was adopted by the ten WEU states and 17 other west-European countries. The report is a position paper elaborating the security policy of the European Union. It is a catalogue of risks, a description of the current levels of European organization and capacities, a list of the needs of the WEU, and a diplomatic exercise directed at NATO, Russia, and other CIS states. "We have to deal step-by-step to build up the so-called European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, with many challenges, few resources, and patience", said an official close to the process.**

Risks and threats

The report states that in the strategic framework of the post-Cold War "Europe's security is not confined to security in Europe" (para.4), and goes on to examine a wide range of issues and regions. The report finds a role for the WEU in situations that range from rescuing European citizens from "situations where their security is endangered" (para.28), to protecting European energy supplies, developing conflict prevention and peacekeeping roles, tackling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal immigration and environmental risks. In regional terms, it examines the transatlantic relationship, Russia and the CIS, south-eastern Europe, the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America. The report enumerates political, economic and military stability as prime concerns for the WEU in terms of regional analysis. For instance, the report claims that "[i]ncreased instability and the weakness of democratic institutions in parts of

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North Africa are today sources of great concern for Europe as a whole" (para.107). During interviews with the author, officials from north African countries were unanimous that they did not want to see either political or military intervention in the region, and that European anxieties were exaggerated. A researcher at the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris said: "we don't believe these kinds of problems need to be confronted by military means". He went on to say that strengthening international legal mechanisms of arms control, inter-State agreements, and economic cooperation are some of the preferred instruments for tackling these issues.

The Mediterranean

The WEU is seeking a higher profile in the developing relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean. The report was published a week before the EU-Mediterranean Ministerial meeting in Barcelona which is to discuss the creation of a permanent forum for negotiations on political, economic, and social issues. The WEU's official position is that it is necessary to have a political and economic approach to the region's problems, rather than a military one. "It was difficult at first to convince Germany that, along with eastern Europe, this region is crucial for our long-term security", said a high-ranking official in the Spanish Foreign Ministry. A policy-maker at the WEU, however, confirmed that some of the WEU states actively support the process, while others are content to let it develop without their direct participation.

Relations with institutions

The WEU situates itself clearly within the European Union, but sees itself working alongside and in cooperation with NATO, the OSCE and the UN. The debate over the expansion of NATO has caused something of a storm in recent months. The WEU researcher said that Russia is still less distrustful of the WEU than of NATO, and that Russian officials fear that the West could be launching a new Cold War. In the report, the WEU supports NATO's approach to enlargement, stating that it "is part of an evolutionary process that takes into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe and maintains an undivided continent. It will threaten no-

one and be part of a broad European security architecture based on true co-operation throughout Europe" (para.76).

The report says that the OSCE, "thanks to its inclusive membership, its comprehensive approach to security and the scope of its competences . . . plays a fundamental role in creating an enduring cooperative security space in Europe" (para.134). This enthusiasm is tempered in an earlier paragraph where the OSCE's role is described "[w]ithout prejudice to the efforts and responsibilities of the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance" (para.16).

The military role

The WEU report has an open and flexible approach to definitions of security, and the variety of ways in which risks to security can be addressed. It continues, however, to envisage a prominent role for the military. The WEU sees itself as both "the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance" (para.170). The report endorses (with the exception of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent (para.158). The report points out that "a lot of work remains to be done in enhancing WEU's operational capabilities and thus WEU is not yet able to undertake large-scale operations either in response to the EU or on its own initiative" (para.172), and looks forward to this position being rectified. As well as proposals for improving access to intelligence, crisis mechanisms and standardisation and interoperability, and proposals for gaining strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities, the report includes a recommendation for "enhancing the defence industrial base" (para.184). *BASIC*

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SELECTED BASIC PUBLICATIONS

NEW RELEASES

- **Study on NATO Enlargement: Destabilizing Europe** (95.2) This research report, published with the Centre for European Security and Disarmament, argues that expanding NATO will cost billions, and will risk destabilizing Europe. As a result, NATO expansion plans should be shelved until Alliance parliaments have debated the matter.
- **Chronicling an Absence of Restraint: The 1995 UN Arms Register** (*BASIC Paper* No. 13, 3 November 1995). This paper uses the 1995 UN Arms Register, *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, and Monterey Institute of International Studies' evaluation of the UN Arms Register to analyze the discrepancies between importer and exporter submissions to the UN Arms Register and suggests ways to strengthen the register.
- **The Role of British Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War** (95.1) Written by Professor Paul Rogers, Bradford University, this report examines Britain's strategy for a limited nuclear war and Britain's reluctance to eliminate its' nuclear weapons.
- **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or Never** (October 1995). The eighth and final report in the series published by the Acronym Consortium. This report gives an overview of the 1995 session of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, with particular emphasis on the state of negotiations towards a CTBT. *The Acronym Consortium is comprised of BASIC, the Verification Technology Information Center, Dfax, and the International Security Information Service.*

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- **A Nuclear Weapons Convention** (*BASIC Paper* No. 9, March 1995). Within the context of pursuing a nuclear-weapon-free world, this Paper outlines the key issues and obstacles to be tackled in negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention.

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- **Government Proposals on Non-Proliferation** (25 April 1995). A compilation of excerpts from proposals made to the Conference by delegations seeking to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime.
- **Stability or Balladur Pact? French Domestic Politics and Regional Security in Europe** (March 1995).

ALSO AVAILABLE

- **Current Projects on the Light Weapons Trade** (12 October 1995). An informal guide compiled by BASIC outlining current projects in the field of light weapons.
- **Research Sources on the International Trade in Light Weapons** (24 March 1995). Draft, Project on Light Weapons Working Paper. This paper outlines the available sources of data on the trade in light weapons. Co-authored by Natalie Goldring of BASIC, Otfried Nassauer of BITS, and Michael Klare of Hampshire College.

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