

BASIC REPORTS

NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

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WESTERN POLICY IN BOSNIA

by Andreas Zumach

Geneva. The fall of the UN safe enclave, Srebrenica, into Bosnian Serb hands has been described variously as a "surprise", as "shameful" for the UN, and as the organization's "biggest failure yet" in the three-year-old Bosnian drama. But indications are that this latest development is part of a deliberate plan to reach a settlement of the Bosnian crisis, and that the alleged failure of the UN is attributable to those member states that have most influence over Bosnian policy.

In Spring 1994, the Bosnia Contact Group (USA, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany) presented a map allocating 51 percent of Bosnian territory to the Government in Sarajevo, and 49 percent to the Karadzic Serbs. Coming after a number of failed peace plans from the EU- UN-sponsored International Yugoslavia Conference in Geneva, the Contact Group emerged as the key body to deal with the conflict. Its map is still the only existing proposal on the table. The Contact Group declared that further negotiations should only resume after both sides had accepted the map unconditionally. The Government in Sarajevo did so within two weeks -- even though the map legitimizes more than half of the Serbs' military conquests and ethnic cleansing. The Karadzic Serbs continue to reject the map, even though Serbia's President Milosevic came out in support of it in August 1994.

One main reason for the Serb rejection of the map is that it accords the three eastern enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde -- originally inhabited by about 200,000 Muslims -- to the Sarajevo Government, connecting them to Sarajevo by a small land corridor. Officially the five member governments of the Contact Group still support the map and claim to have a common position. But there is less unity behind the scenes. Since the map was proposed, the Bosnian Government has repeatedly called for a strengthening of the UNPROFOR units in the three enclaves to ensure their protection. These calls

were supported by UN local commanders in the enclaves and by the US and Germany (neither of whom have troops on the ground), but were rejected by France, Britain and Russia. France and Britain supply the largest troop contingents and much of the logistical support for UNPROFOR. By also providing the supreme commanders of UNPROFOR both in Sarajevo for Bosnia (currently General Smith, formerly General Rose) and in Zagreb for the whole mission in former Yugoslavia (currently General Janvier, formerly General de Laprelle), London and Paris effectively control the policies, the daily operations, and the public relations work of UNPROFOR. According to diplomats from some Contact Group member states, since late last year the Group has had a number of internal discussions about revising its map. France, Britain and Russia described the enclaves as "undefendable" both for UNPROFOR currently and for Bosnian Government troops after a political settlement. In these discussions, Paris, London, and Moscow suggested urging the Bosnian Government to give up on the enclaves in return for some international guarantees for the Sarajevo-Tuzla region. This would result in a clear West-East territorial division of Bosnia. Washington and Bonn have so far rejected such a revision of the Contact Group map. How deep the divisions in the Group actually are was revealed by Germany's former Ambassador in New York, Detlev Graaf von Rantzau, President of the UN Security Council, in June this year. According to Rantzau, the UN's Bosnia policy "would have been even worse without the US and Germany in the Council".

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But developments on the ground have led in the direction of the French/British/Russian proposal. After the Karadzic Serbs had taken 400 blue helmets hostage in late May, France and Britain proposed the so-called Rapid Intervention Force, and described it as the very last chance to save the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia. After weeks of tough rhetoric, the "intervention force" emerged as simply additional UNPROFOR units with exactly the same mandate as their colleagues. At a meeting between Generals Janvier and Smith, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali and Special Envoy Akashi on 8 July in Geneva, the option to withdraw UNPROFOR was at the top of the agenda. According to Western diplomats, this option was "discussed more seriously than ever before". Plans to open and permanently secure a supply route into Sarajevo over Mount Igman, which French President Chirac had announced just days before, were given up at the Geneva meeting in favour of negotiations with the Karadzic Serbs for another route for humanitarian convoys.

Like many other incidents over the past two years the fall of Srebrenica has led to almost universal commentary on the failure of the UN on one side, and NATO on the other side ready and willing to act if only the UN would allow it. In fact, between June 1993, when the UN Security Council mandated NATO to carry out air support and air attacks, and April 1995, NATO aircraft struck nine times. Local UNPROFOR commanders had on many more occasions requested their British and French supreme commanders in Sarajevo and Zagreb to call in NATO support. These requests were denied without being passed on to Akashi or Boutros Ghali for a decision. After the Serb offensive against Srebrenica began, the local Dutch UNPROFOR commander, Ton Karremans, requested air support from Sarajevo headquarters on 9 and 10 July. Both requests were rejected by General Smith. Only at noon on 11 July, hours before the city fell into the hands of Karadzic's Serbs, was the request passed on to Akashi, who called in NATO. **BASIC**

MOVING TOWARDS THE NEW FORUM

by Andrew McLean and Paul Eavis

London. **After months of stalemate, a breakthrough has been made in efforts to establish a successor regime to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). The crucial issue of Russian membership has been resolved and negotiations can now focus on the detail of the two main control regimes of the provisionally-named New Forum. The New Forum aims to control exports of dual-use and military technologies and of conventional weapons. Several obstacles remain, however, and a fear is that national export controls have diverged to such an extent in the sixteen months since COCOM disbanded that agreement on an effective control regime will be difficult to reach.**

RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP

The question of Russian participation was resolved at the meeting between US Vice-President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin on 28-29 June. Chernomyrdin reiterated President Yeltsin's earlier pledge that existing arms contracts to Iran would be honoured but that no new ones would be signed. He also handed over details of current Russian contracts with Iran to placate US concerns. This agreement allows Russia to proceed with the sale of a third Kilo-class submarine, and weapons such as MiG-29 and SU-24 combat aircraft and T-72 tanks. Gore said that the US would now support Russian membership of the New Forum. Provided that the other founding members echo this support, Russia will take its seat at the next High Level meeting on 11-12 September. According to a German official connected with the talks, it is likely that other new members will be the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The Visegrad Four Countries were not originally in line for founding membership, but this now seems the case, with agreement on Slovakia's participation close to being reached.

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TECHNOLOGY RESTRAINT

Dual-use and military technologies are expected to be divided into three categories of sensitivity, each subject to a different level of control and consultation (see *BASIC Reports* 43). Although the exact details are still to be decided, a UK official involved in the negotiations said that information exchange and notification amongst New Forum members on licences and transfers will be mainly on an aggregate basis. Individual notification will only occur for exports of the most sensitive items to the most sensitive areas and in these cases there will be a presumption of denial. A Swiss proposal for a no-undercutting rule, whereby members would agree not to grant an export licence that had already been denied by another, has been rejected by many countries as too restrictive. For example, the US would not be party to any organisation that might prevent it from exporting high technology to Israel and Saudi Arabia. A compromise solution, based on the principle of no undercutting without consultation, is being discussed. The suggestion is that a state would immediately notify other New Forum members of the denial of a sensitive licence, and that there would be compulsory consultation before another member could grant the same licence.

ARMS EXPORT RESTRAINT

Talks so far have focused on the dual-use pillar, with comparatively little discussion about conventional weapons. Much is still to be decided, with France unsure even about whether it wants to include a conventional weapons regime. It is likely, however, that the arms export regime will initially focus on the seven categories of major conventional arms covered in the UN Register. Other categories, such as small arms, may be included at a later date. Information exchange is likely to be a two-tier process, with an inner core of the major arms suppliers involved in detailed consultations on transfers (the US want these to include pre-notification procedures), and the broader forum confined to more general discussions. The precise relationship between the two tiers is still uncertain but Japan, along with many other countries, is dissatisfied at being excluded from the full consultations. Japan wants to be able to raise issues relating to specific contracts, and insists that it will not partici-

pate in the dual-use pillar unless it has more influence on the conventional arms side. However, according to a UK official, the main arms exporting countries "are not prepared to sit down with non-producers and discuss details of sales".

PROSCRIBED DESTINATIONS

A further unresolved question is whether or not to name specific countries to which exports will be embargoed or strictly controlled. The European countries are steadfastly against this. A German official stressed the role of consultation and said that "targeting will emerge as a result of information exchange". However, this is likely to be too vague for the US, which favours a regional approach similar to that proposed by the P5 countries to control the supply of arms to the Middle East after the Gulf War. A US official explained that they would like to focus attention on areas such as South Asia, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. The small group of major arms suppliers would concentrate their discussions on these regions with arms sales to these areas requiring prior notification. It seems that the likely compromise will be an unwritten agreement with no explicit list published.

THE OUTLOOK

The original target of establishing the New Forum by the end of 1995 has been unofficially revised to the first half of 1996. The problem of Russian participation has been successfully resolved and the early inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland is an unexpected bonus. More substantial problems, however, are now becoming clear. The compromises that seem necessary to reach agreement cast doubt as to the final efficacy of the new regime. *BASIC*

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UN REGISTER SUBMISSIONS

The table below was released by the United Nations on 5 July 1995. It lists the states that have submitted their returns to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The table is reproduced in full.

Composite table of replies of Governments

This composite table is provided for ease of reference. As regards the information contained in the table, it should be noted that a "yes" denotes a submission of data regarding imports and/or exports in relation to the seven categories of arms covered by the Register, during the reporting period (1994). For the purpose of uniform tabulation, responses by Governments that contained either "nil", "none", "0", or a composite table indicates that no information was supplied for that particular item. In some cases, however, an explanation is provided in the note verbale of the country in question.

Number of replies: 59

| State | Data on imports | Data on Exports | Explanation submitted in note verbale | Background information |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Argentina | nil | nil | | yes |
| Austria | yes | nil | yes | yes |
| Bahamas | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Belarus | | yes | | no |
| Belgium | nil | yes | | yes |
| Bhutan | nil | nil | | no |
| Brazil | yes | nil | | yes |
| Canada | yes | yes | | yes |
| Chile | yes | nil | | no |
| China (waiting for translation) | yes | yes | | no |
| Croatia | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Cuba | nil | nil | yes | no |

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| State | Data on imports | Data on Exports | Explanation submitted in note verbale | Background information |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Czech Republic | nil | yes | | yes |
| Denmark | yes | nil | | yes |
| Dominica | nil | nil | yes | no |
| El Salvador | | | yes | no |
| Estonia | yes | nil | | no |
| Finland | yes | yes | | no |
| France | yes | yes | | yes |
| Georgia | nil | nil | | no |
| Germany | yes | yes | | yes |
| Greece | yes | | | yes |
| Guyana | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Hungary | yes | nil | | no |
| India | yes | nil | | no |
| Indonesia | yes | | | no |
| Ireland | yes | nil | | no |
| Israel | yes | yes | | no |
| Italy | yes | yes | | yes |
| Jamaica | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Japan | yes | nil | | yes |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Liechtenstein | nil | nil | yes | no |

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| State | Data on imports | Data on Exports | Explanation submitted in note verbale | Background information |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Maldives | nil | nil | | no |
| Malta | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Mongolia | nil | nil | yes | no |
| Netherlands | yes | yes | | yes |
| New Zealand | yes | nil | | yes |
| Norway | nil | nil | | no |
| Pakistan | yes | nil | | no |
| Poland | nil | yes | yes | yes |
| Portugal | yes | nil | | yes |
| Republic of Korea | yes | yes | | yes |
| Republic of Moldova | yes | yes | | no |
| Romania | yes | yes | | no |
| Samoa | nil | nil | | no |
| Singapore | yes | nil | | no |
| Slovenia | nil | nil | | no |
| Solomon Islands | nil | nil | | no |
| South Africa | nil | yes | | yes |
| Spain | yes | nil | | yes |
| Sweden | yes | nil | | yes |
| Switzerland | nil | nil | | yes |
| Thailand | yes | nil | | no |
| Turkey | yes | nil | | no |
| United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | yes | yes | | yes |
| United States of America | yes | yes | | yes |
| Viet Nam | nil | | | no |
| Yugoslavia | nil | nil | yes | no |

SELECTED BASIC PUBLICATIONS

NEW RELEASES

- **Partnerships for Peace: Drifting into Secrecy** *BASIC Paper* No. 11, 7 June 1995). This Paper argues that the lack of transparency surrounding the PfP agreements and the PfP's emphasis on self-determination may undermine regional cooperation and confidence-building in central and eastern Europe. The paper also surveys the possibility of western weapons transfers to CEE in the context of promoting interoperability of defense between NATO and PfP countries.
- **Outstanding Issues in the NPT Review** (8 May 1995). A synopsis of issues still to be agreed in the final week of the review of Treaty implementation over the past five years.
- **Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: Ends and Beginnings** (April 1995) The sixth in a series published by the Acronym Consortium, this report reviews the First 1995 Session of Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. It analyzes the extension options and procedural debates over voting, and provides a full report and analysis of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty fissile material cut-off at the CD during 1994 and the first months of 1995. *The Acronym Consortium is comprised of BASIC, the Verification Technology Information Center, Dfax, and the International Security Information Service.*

RESEARCH REPORTS

- **Extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Endgame** (February 1995). The fifth report of the Acronym Consortium, this booklet reports on the Fourth Preparatory Committee Meeting of the NPT Review and Extension Conference which took place in New York from 23-27 January.
- **NATO and Nuclear Proliferation** (*Issues in European Security*, December 1994). This report examines NATO's nuclear proliferation policy, arguing that in one facet of its current policy, NATO is committing a *de facto* breach of the NPT. A joint publication of BASIC and the Centre for European Security and Disarmament.
- **Deciding the CSCE's Future: Prospects for the 1994 Budapest Summit** (94.3) This report reviews the institutional marginalizing of the CSCE, and examines relations between the CSCE and other international organizations. It describes the organizational overhaul of the CSCE since the 1990 Paris Summit and analyzes current proposals aired by national delegations in Vienna.
- **Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Decisions Made, Decisions Deferred** (September 1994) The fourth report from the ACRONYM Consortium examines the third Preparatory Committee Meeting of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Geneva, 12-16 September 1994.

- **A Comprehensive Test Ban: Disappointing Progress** (September 1994) The third in a series published by the ACRONYM Consortium, this booklet reviews the 1994 Conference on Disarmament negotiations and assesses the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Process.

- **NATO, Peacekeeping and the United Nations** (94.1) This report, compiled by an international team of researchers, analyzes internal documents from NATO and several member states, revealing contradictions between the peacekeeping doctrines of NATO, the United Nations and individual nations. Published jointly by BASIC and the Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security.

- **A Comprehensive Test Ban: Setback for an Early Treaty** (July 1994) This booklet from the ACRONYM Consortium summarizes the second session of negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the CD in Geneva from 16 May to 1 July 1994. This report also analyzes the implications of the unexpected failure of the Chair of the CD's Nuclear Test Ban Committee to table a rolling treaty text, a potentially serious setback to hopes of concluding a CTBT before April 1995.

- **Open Arms for the Prodigal Son: The Future of South Africa's Arms Trade Policies** (94.2) This report examines the legacy of the South African defense industry and looks at arms trade policy options for the new government.

BASIC PAPERS

Occasional Papers on International Security Issues

- **U.S. Policy Leading into the NPT Conference** (*BASIC Paper* No. 10, 10 March 1995). This Paper outlines current U.S. Policy on extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and gives an overview of some of the internal debate that has taken place within the Clinton Administration on these issues surrounding the NPT.
- **A Nuclear Weapons Convention** (*BASIC Paper* No. 9, March 1995). Within the context of pursuing a nuclear weapon-free world, this Paper outlines the key issues and obstacles to be tackled in negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention.
- **Western Strategy for the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference** (*BASIC Paper* No. 8, January 1995). This Paper criticizes the West's narrow approach to the upcoming NPT Review Conference, suggesting that it is solely focused on indefinite extension, and noting that a comprehensive approach could strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.
- **The CSCE Review Conference and Summit: Decisions Made and Deferred** (*BASIC Paper*, No. 7, January 1995). An overview of the results of the CSCE Review Conference and Summit, this paper details decisions and "non-decisions" of the Summit and concludes that significant opportunities to improve European security were lost as a result of East-West politicking.

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