1 JUNE 1995 • NUMBER 45 • ISSN 0966-9175

• A Permanent Non-Proliferation Treaty

• Reprinted Documents:  NPT Conference Final Documents

• UN Register Submissions
  Available in the pdf version of BASIC Reports #45

A Permanent Non-Proliferation Treaty

By Stephen W. Young and Daniel T. Plesch

On 11 May, at a conference in New York, the countries party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty made it permanent. Twenty-five years after it was first agreed, and after almost four weeks of intense and sometimes bitter debate at the Treaty’s Review and Extension Conference, the parties agreed to a carefully crafted formula in which the Treaty was made permanent without a vote. To overcome the opposition of some countries to extending the Treaty indefinitely, the decision was specifically tied to strengthening the review process originally created in the Treaty and to a set of principles and objectives that call for further nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996, and a cut-off of the production of fissile material.

The Extension Decision
The Conference opened on 17 April in a contentious atmosphere, with the states parties having been unable to decide whether the extension decision should be by secret or open ballot. Some countries, seeking to avoid external influence, called for a secret ballot. Rumours of economic and political pressure being brought to bear by the United States, the United Kingdom and France circulated throughout the Conference. In an interview with BASIC Reports, Amb. Ralph Earle, who headed the US delegation to the Conference day-to-day, flatly denied that the United States had applied any economic coercion: "I know of absolutely no economic pressure that was put on any country. Not one bit". In the event, the secret ballot issue could not be resolved, and was only overcome by adopting the extension package without a vote.

As the decision on how to vote was being discussed, Canada sought co-sponsors for a resolution backing indefinite extension, and over 90 countries -- a majority of the Treaties’ 178 parties -- signed on by Thursday 4 May. On Friday 5 May, Canada formally proposed the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and cited 103 countries supporting that position. Indonesia, speaking for 11 countries, submitted a proposal calling for 25-year rolling extensions, under which the Treaty would continue indefinitely unless a majority of the states parties voted to end it. The Non-Aligned Movement, which met in Bandung, Indonesia during the Conference, was unable to unify around a single extension option.

The Review
Apart from the extension decision, the second task of the conference was to conduct a review of the Treaty. Conferees were ultimately unable to agree on a review document for this meeting. At Review Conferences, issues are divided up into three Committees. Broadly, the first committee considers disarmament issues, the second safeguards on nuclear materials and the third peaceful uses of nuclear technology. States parties reached agreement in the second and third committees, but could not agree to terms on disarmament issues. Much discussion in that committee centred on whether the nuclear arms race had ceased or merely abated. The European Union was not able to take a unified position in the Committee. Austria, Ireland, and Sweden made separate statements that, while endorsing the progress on disarmament, called more strongly for additional steps.

The issue of compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty, under which the nuclear-weapon states pledge not to provide other countries with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire them, was also raised in the first committee. Countries debated whether US -- UK nuclear cooperation and North Atlantic Treaty Organization war plans calling for nuclear weapons use by non-nuclear-weapon states violated the letter or the spirit of the Treaty. The issue was first raised at the Conference by Australia, then pursued by Mexico and many other countries.

A New Process
While the majority of countries supported making the Treaty permanent, a number of countries had strong reservations, fearing that an indefinite extension would reduce the pressure on the nuclear-weapon states to fulfil their pledge in the Treaty to get rid of their nuclear weapons. Several Western countries, including New Zealand, Switzerland and Sweden, called for time-bound programmes for further nuclear disarmament. The Philippines, in its statement publicly supporting indefinite extension, made an impassioned call for the Conference to endorse a convention eliminating nuclear weapons.

The new enhanced review process and the set of principles -- based on proposals originating from South Africa -- are designed to hold the nuclear-weapons states accountable. The review process calls for almost annual Preparatory Committee meetings -- the first in 1997 -- leading up to future Review Conferences. Unlike earlier Preparatory Committee meetings, the new mandate allows states parties to consider substantive as well as procedural issues, and to look forward as well as backward. The Preparatory Committees will also be able to call for the creation of consultative bodies to consider relevant issues, such as the universality of the Treaty or progress on nuclear disarmament.

In an interview with BASIC Reports, Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, President of the Conference, explained why the stronger review process was important: "I believe that the focus of attention will be much more heavily placed on the review mechanism than ever before. I am convinced that states parties now will be more determined than ever -- because the Treaty was extended indefinitely -- to ensure that states parties are held to their commitments both in the Treaty and the commitments made at the conference. Unless there is substantial progress -- evidence in the nuclear disarmament field -- we are going to have very serious erosion of the confidence of states parties to the Treaty. This could be quite dangerous for the future, and so I would hope that the nuclear-weapon states in particular and the other supporters of the indefinite extension of the Treaty when it was first proposed (at the Conference) would bear this in mind and work together with other states parties to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty are fulfilled, and soon".

Along with a stronger review mechanism, the Conference endorsed a set of principles and objectives that can serve as a "yardstick," as South Africa called them, for future review conferences to measure progress on disarmament and other Treaty obligations. The principles call for a "programme of action" that includes one time-bound goal -- a Comprehensive Test Ban by 1996 -- and several other steps, including a cut-off of fissile material production and further steps towards nuclear disarmament, that are not tied to a specific time frame.

Concerns
Throughout the Conference, some countries expressed fear that the incentive among the nuclear-weapon states for nuclear disarmament in general and a comprehensive test ban in particular would dissipate once indefinite extension was achieved. Three days after the Conference ended China conducted a nuclear test, providing some justification for this concern. Reports about US plans to support a much higher threshold for the test ban treaty -- of 100 to 300 hundred tons -- also circulated during the Conference. Amb. Earle denied those reports, saying "As far as I know, the position of the United States is we seek a comprehensive test ban, not a threshold test ban and a hundred tons would certainly, in my view, be a threshold".

Some countries also voiced concern that the stronger review mechanism and the set of principles, unlike the extension decision, were not legally binding instruments. Amb. Dhanapala, who drafted the extension proposal finally adopted, attempted to address this concern by referring specifically to both documents in the extension decision language. Amb. Earle told BASIC Reports that the United States took the principles seriously: "We’ve entered into these principles as political commitments and we are prepared now to begin their implementation as if they had the same standing as the Treaty itself". In his closing speech to the Conference, Amb. Earle endorsed the Conference’s outcome, and listed the commitments made there, including endorsing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s "93+2" plan for strengthened and cost-effective safeguards, increased cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and agreeing to pursue the creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones, universal adherence to the Treaty, and the early attainment of a CTBT.

In Conclusion
Western countries, and particularly the nuclear-weapon states, were highly satisfied with the result of the Conference, after achieving their goal of indefinite extension of the Treaty. Amb. Dhanapala, however, reserved judgement on the outcome: "Whether the conference is a success or a failure will depend on how far down the road we will have the fulfilment of the commitments made in the Treaty and at the Conference by all states parties. I think it is only then we can decide, and history will be our judge". 

Editor’s note: A detailed report of the NPT Review and Extension Conference will be available from the Acronym Consortium in late June.

Reproduced over the next five pages are the texts of four of the NPT Conference Documents. Number L4 is the decision on strengthening the review process, L5 is the resolution on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, L6 is the extension decision, and L8 is a resolution from the US, UK, and Russia on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Of particular interest are the first two documents as they establish, respectively, the new review process and the contents of the review. The strengthened NPT review enhances the non-proliferation regime in general, and, more concretely, it underlines the obligations of the nuclear-weapon states, making them more accountable for their actions. Although not legally binding, the documents afford the opportunity for international political pressure on the nuclear-weapon states. A Western diplomat, cited in The Independent, 10 May 1995, commented that "[The programme of action] may give us quite a headache in years to come".

The Editor thanks Nicola Calvert for her contribution to the above note and her assistance in preparing this issue. Thanks also to Alex Colas for the UN Register tables.

Reprinted Documents:
NPT Conference Final Documents

• Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty

• Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

• Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

• Resolution on the Middle East

NPT/ CONF. 1995/ L.4

10 May 1995

STRENGTHENING THE REVIEW PROCESS FOR THE TREATY

Decision proposed by the President

1. The Conference examined the implementation of article VIII, 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, 3, of the Treaty, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.

3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.

4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 10 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of the three main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.

6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

7. The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

NPT/CONF. 1995/ L.5

9 May 1995

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

Resolution proposed by the President

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the preamble and the articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be rigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII (3) of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

1. Affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

Universality

(1) Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

Non-Proliferation

(2) The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the States party to the Treaty

Nuclear Disarmament

(3) Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States that have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear weapons States reaffirm their commitment, stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

(4) The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

(5) The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of a region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

(6) The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

(7) The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

Security Assurances

(8) Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

Safeguards

(9) The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and ensure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency’s safeguard system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III 1 of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

(10) All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

(11) Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

(12) New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope Agency safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(13) Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

(14) Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

(15) Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

(16) In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

(17) Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

(18) All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

(19) Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

(20) Attacks or threats on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which would warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Requests that the President of the Conference bring this resolution, the decision on strengthening the review process of the Treaty, the decision on the extension of the Treaty and the Final Declaration of the Conference to the attention of the heads of State or Governement of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

NPT/ CONF.1995/ L.6

9 May 1995

EXTENSION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Resolution proposed by the President

The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with articles VIII, 3 and X, 2 of the Treaty,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and international control,

Having reaffirmed article VIII, 3 of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the resolution on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament also adopted by the Conference,

Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X, 2 of the Treaty,

Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension in accordance with its article X,2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

NPT/ CONF. 1995/ L.8

10 May 1995

Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America: Resolution

The Conference,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that, the Security Council in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 adopted on 15 December 1994,

Further recalling the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC (XXXVIII)/RES/21 of September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation especially in areas of tension,

Bearing in mind Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and particularly paragraph 14,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 9 May 1995,

Also bearing in mind the Decisions adopted by the 1995 Revision and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

1. Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

2. Notes with satisfaction that the report of Main Committee III (document NPT/ CONF. 1995/ MC. III/ 1) in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has recommended that the Conference "calls on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities";

3. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation in paragraph VI/3 of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept fullscope IAEA safeguards;

4. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under fullscope IAEA safeguards;

5. Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate fora aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological and their delivery systems and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in particular the nuclear weapon States to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

UN REGISTER SUBMISSIONS

Available in the pdf version of BASIC Reports #45

This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Bronwyn Brady in London.

Back to BASIC Publications home page