|
|
|
 |
Research Reports | BASIC Reports | BASIC Papers | BASIC Notes | Joint Publications |
|
BASIC REPORTS
NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
14 APRIL 1995 • NUMBER 44 • ISSN 0966-9175
Ambassador Graham on US policy and the Non-Proliferation Treaty The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference begins in New York on 17 April. Dan Plesch and Stephen Young interviewed Thomas Graham, Special Representative of the President for Arms Control and Disarmament, on US policy towards the Conference. BASIC Reports (Q): Many countries will be concerned about agreeing to a permanent Treaty if they don’t see that action will be taken against those countries with nuclear weapons that remain outside the treaty. Thomas Graham (A): We are certainly prepared to address the issue of universality. We know that this is going to be a major issue at the Conference. We have been working hard with Egypt and Israel. Within the next year there will be five countries that will be clearly labelled as outside the mainstream of the civilised world. [India, Israel, Pakistan, Oman, United Arab Emirates]. That is already putting a lot of pressure on them. I have no doubt that Israel will eventually join the Treaty. Q: You are not intending to propose that measures be taken against countries outside the treaty that have nuclear weapons, yet it becomes a major issue when countries who are party to the Treaty are found to be in breach. Why is it that countries who are outside the Treaty are treated better, no instruments or process against them are being proposed? A: It is very difficult to get an international consensus against countries for not signing a treaty. Q: The International Atomic Energy Agency is very short of money to do its job. Why is the United States not ready now to increase its contributions? A: I strongly support a major increase in the IAEA budget, but that is not the view of the Administration. There is not the political support for it in Congress. The US will eventually have to increase its contribution. Q: Do you see the US as having done a good job in fulfilling its obligations under Article VI? A: There is actually very little left on the arms control agenda that was envisaged when Article VI was drafted. What was envisaged at that time was a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, fissile material cut-off, substantial reductions leading in the direction of a nuclear-free world and positive and negative security assurances. Q: Do you expect an announcement on START 3 during the Clinton-Yeltsin summit? A: It is not being discussed, there are too many other things to do. It hasn’t been addressed yet. Maybe there will be more at the next summit. We need to bring START 2 into force first. Q: Many countries remain critical of your Article VI performance. A: We do not want to override the sensibilities or views of any country. With all due respect to some significant countries it seems to me that some of the criticism is essentially based on obsolete Cold-War views. Some foreign affairs bureaucracies are still enmeshed in the argument and counter-argument that perhaps were relevant in the Cold War but which no longer are. They have not adjusted to the fact that there are new threats. I’m not being critical. I know how difficult it is to turn large bureaucracies around, I work in one of those bureaucracies. Once, perhaps, it was valid to threaten the viability of the NPT to try to pressure the US and USSR to make progress in nuclear disarmament. It no longer makes sense to do that. It is in my opinion clear beyond question that further nuclear disarmament depends on the nuclear-weapons states that are to do the nuclear disarmament having the security of a permanent NPT. If we fail to secure a permanent NPT, nuclear discussions will dramatically slow down, if not stop altogether. (Ambassador Graham cited France’s linkage of indefinite extension of the NPT to agreeing a CTB as an example of this reality). Q: Is the US prepared to consider opening talks on a nuclear-free world? A: To say that we have to have a timetable for a nuclear-free world is disingenuous; it is nothing short of ridiculous. Of course everyone agrees that it would be better to have a truly verifiable and enforceable nuclear-free world. How to get one is very difficult. Q: Why then could we not open negotiations? A: We are doing that. We will move to a START 3 of some kind, then the others will be involved. When you get down to a few hundred the whole business changes. Q: Some see the Chemical Weapons Convention as a precedent, in terms of the strong verification, the length of the negotiation. A: I would, number one, dispute that they’re strong. Number two, it took twenty years to complete the negotiations and it never had a timetable. Number three, it was almost a fluke to achieve it. Four, there are vast differences between chemical weapons and nuclear weapons. Five, it is just disingenuous. Countries are not telling the truth if they really think that we can have a serious negotiation about getting to a nuclear-free world. It is not possible under any foreseeable circumstance, not because it is a bad thing or that we don’t want it but we don’t know how to get there. No-one is willing to give up the necessary degree of sovereignty to accomplish it. The US supports the objective. President Clinton said so in his communique with Prime Minister Rau [of India]. President Reagan said it in the joint communique of Schultz and Gromyko in January 1985. But to have a timetable or to seriously negotiate to zero is not being honest, no-one is ready for that. When we get down to truly low levels then we can discuss the next step. No-one has an idea how to do that. Serious strategic thinkers, Paul Nitze, General Goodpaster, are beginning to think about this. Maybe in a long time we will know enough and the world will have evolved enough that we can begin to seriously think about it. Q: A lot of countries see the bargain in the NPT as the countries with nuclear weapons agreeing to get rid of them if the countries without them agree never to get them. They see it as a literal bargain and are extremely disappointed by the idea that there is no serious intention of having a negotiation. A: I think that if a country holds that view it is either being disingenuous or it's being completely naive. I don’t think that many countries are in that category. I think that any country that proposes a negotiation for a nuclear-free world at this point when we still have tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia and the US, this is just propaganda. Any country that knows about arms control, and I would certainly put Indonesia in that category, is just engaging in propaganda, it has nothing to do with reality. Other than General Goodpaster’s papers I have never seen any serious discussion of this. I have talked to now-retired senior US military officers about the prospect of a nuclear-free world, some were quite positive about that idea. They thought that it was achievable, and all you needed to do -- and they were serious -- was to have an agreement that everyone was on zero and you would have continuous monitoring of all countries by the IAEA, and you would have US Strategic Command bombers and submarines around the world and as soon as there was a problem they would go in. But what country is ready for that? Is Indonesia, for example, ready for US Strategic Command to be the guarantor that they won’t develop nuclear weapons? Of course not, but it has got to be something like that. And nobody’s ready to even think about that. So when a country -- Iran, Nigeria -- steps forward and they say, ‘we are ready to have a serious negotiation about zero nuclear weapons and we are ready to agree that, for example, the French Foreign Legion or some other force can come in and make sure we are abiding by the Treaty’, then it becomes more serious. Q: Isn’t declining US influence shown by the inability to get Britain and France in line over the CTB and the fissile cut off? A: The decision by President Clinton in July 1993 was, to put it mildly, not received with open arms. But I absolutely believe that we will have a CTB. It is very difficult. There has never been a serious negotiation for a CTBT before. The negotiations in the 1970s were not serious. The US military was not on board. The Joint Chiefs of Staff never agreed to it. President Carter and Paul Warnke thought that they had the mandate to proceed, but they didn’t. Q: What yields would be permitted within the scope of a CTB? A: Experiments around 2-4 lbs might be allowed. During the 1958-1961 moratorium we carried these out -- they are consistent. This is effectively zero yield. If someone wants us to make a statement to the effect that we are not considering any position other than zero yield within the US government, we would be willing to do that. (Ambassador Graham rejected the idea that support reported in the New York Times of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a 300-ton limit was comparable to their non-support of the Carter policy). Q: With respect to security assurances, there are qualifications to the assurances offered by the US. Is it accurate to say that you extend the security umbrella to non-nuclear states? A: That is a term from nuclear doctrine. It does apply in the case of allies such as Japan, but I would have to say that is incorrect. Q: You reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against countries that are in flagrant breach of the NPT? A: Yes. Our security assurances apply to countries which are not building nuclear weapons; that is, countries that adhere to the basic norms of the NPT. In sum: A lot can happen between now and 12 May. We’re not counting on anything. There could be outside events that could affect the Conference. We are prepared for a very difficult and volatile situation in New York. We are counting on nothing until the button of each country is actually pushed. Western States Weigh Indefinte Extension and a Consensus Decision By Stephen W. Young While Western countries have been unanimous in their support of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, they acknowledge they face a difficult task at the Review and Extension Conference, which takes place from 17 April to 12 May in New York. BASIC Reports asked Michel Miraillet, First Secretary of the French Mission to the United Nations, if France could support rolling 25-year extensions with a negative vote provision. He said "I think France would look closely at that if it could get a near consensus". France’s potential support for a compromise solution may be the result of Western concern about the outcome of the Conference. While Western officials continue to state that they believe they will achieve indefinite extension, they are not certain of that result. During an interview published in this issue of BASIC Reports, US Ambassador Thomas Graham, Special Representative of the President for Arms Control and Disarmament, said "[w]e are prepared for a very difficult and volatile situation in New York. We are counting on nothing until the button of each country is actually pushed". Some officials express concern about the possible negative impact of achieving indefinite extension by a narrow majority vote. Sri Lankan Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, who will preside over the Conference, has stated on a number of occasions that a simple majority is not enough and that he would prefer to see a "moral majority" of countries in favour of whatever outcome the Conference decides. Ambassador Christopher Westdal, who will head the Canadian delegation to the Conference, told BASIC Reports that "A bare legal sufficiency would not constitute the kind of agreement we would like to see". Although both the United States and Russia state publicly that they would like a substantial majority in favour of indefinite extension, officials have indicated they would be satisfied with a simple majority. Senior Counsellor Andrey Granovsky, of the Russian Mission to the United Nations, said "we would prefer a large majority, but the main thing is the ultimate result". France may believe the West will not be able to get indefinite and unconditional extension. Secretary Miraillet said "I think the Americans are too optimistic. Unconditional extension is not guaranteed. Some countries support indefinite extension but do not say unconditional". In efforts to build support for indefinite extension, some countries and international organizations have suggested broad programmes that would enhance the non-proliferation regime. The European Parliament this week passed a resolution that criticizes France and the United Kingdom for not publicly supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban talks as strongly as the United States has. The resolution also "[c]alls on the member states of the European Union to take an initiative for a negotiation in the UN Conference on Disarmament for a nuclear weapons convention leading to global nuclear disarmament as stated in the objectives of Article VI of the NPT" (paragraph 4; for the full text of the resolution, see p. 6). Germany also proposed a set of non-proliferation initiatives, but dropped the programme when other Western countries did not indicate their support. In the last few months there has been a flurry of unilateral moves by nuclear-weapon states to address non-nuclear-weapon states’ concerns and secure indefinite extension. The US abandoned its 10-year opt-out clause in the CTB negotiations, and removed 200 tons of fissile material from its stockpile. The UK and France announced last week that they would withdraw their insistence on safety tests from the CTB rolling text. In the same week the UK also announced that it would phase out its remaining free-fall nuclear bombs (WE-177) by 1998. Finally, the P5 have reiterated the security assurances they offer NNWS. Beyond this, however, the Western allies and Russia appear reluctant to take any further initiatives. Counsellor Granovsky stated, "We are not going to come to the conference with a very loud and attractive programme of initiatives like we did in the 1970s and early ’80s". Secretary Miraillet had a similar response when asked about French goals for the conference, saying "indefinite extension is a sufficient goal. We will not introduce new programmes into the conference". When asked about strengthening the overall non-proliferation regime, Ambassador Graham mentioned the IAEA 93+2 programme to strengthen safeguards. He went on to say "we do not have any [other] new ideas [but] it's an issue we want to address at the conference". Lack of Western initiative and continuing concern about the outcome of the extension decision may result in a compromise. Privately, European officials have indicated they may be willing to compromise if this would create a near-consensus decision. The French statement may reflect a tide in that direction. European Parliament Approves Wiersma Report on the NPT By Martin Butcher The European Parliament (EP) voted by an overwhelming majority on 5 April to approve a report on the Non-Proliferation Treaty by Dutch member Jan Marinus Wiersma (the full text is reproduced below). All three main political groups in the Parliament -- the Socialists, Christian Democrats and the Liberals -- voted to accept the report. The Greens and the communist Left Unity Group abstained, with only a few fringe right-wing deputies voting against. The member states of the European Union (EU) are not bound by the report’s recommendations, but it is influential especially because the majority for acceptance was so large. Very senior European Commission officials had first tried to persuade key parliamentarians to tone down the report in the Foreign Affairs Committee and later to persuade Christian Democrat parliamentarians to reject it altogether, convinced that it would embarrass the EU and provide ammunition for non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) seeking disarmament concessions in return for NPT renewal. EU member states have pursued a common policy on NPT renewal since agreeing their position last June at the Corfu European Council. Heads of State and Government agreed to work for indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT; to persuade states parties to the Treaty to attend Preparatory Committee meetings and the Extension Conference; and to persuade states that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so. This "joint action" under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) meant the country holding the EU Presidency (Germany from July to December 1994, France from January to June 1995) made a statement on behalf of the EU at the 3rd and 4th PrepComs and at the UN General Assembly. Secondly, during 1994 the Troika (of past, present and future Presidency holders) began to make diplomatic demarches to persuade countries to join the NPT, and to support the EU line on extension. In September 1994 the EP Foreign Affairs Committee began preparation of a report on the NPT. Rapporteur Jan Wiersma decided to support EU policy on indefinite, unconditional extension and to suggest policy elements which the EU could use to encourage non-nuclear states to support indefinite extension and which would contribute to a stable, durable non-proliferation regime. Wiersma regarded indefinite extension as unlikely if elements such as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cut-off and further nuclear disarmament were not achieved. He also felt extension was not enough to fight proliferation, that stronger policies were needed and that to get these the nuclear powers would have to accept further disarmament in compliance with Article VI of the Treaty. This approach directly addresses the limitations of the EU policy’s focus on extension and participation only. While the statements made on behalf of the EU called for quick conclusion of a CTBT and offered support for a fissile material cut-off, in the CD negotiations in Geneva the EU is not acting as one. Deliberations have stuck strictly to the limits of the agreed joint action. Indeed, a French Foreign Ministry official, M. Parfait, told the European Parliament in February that as long as 50 percent plus one of the NPT states parties agreed with indefinite extension there was no need to discuss anything else. The EP has tried with its report to redress this complacent attitude. EU member states, which, in the past, have made similar proposals to those included in the Wiersma Report, have not pressed them recently. In giving a new official focus to a series of proposals the report could be very positive. Indeed, the Wiersma report supports exactly the EU NNWS' interpretation of the joint action. While France and the UK have interpreted "unconditional extension" as meaning that no disarmament measures should even be discussed (beyond welcoming and supporting CD work in progress) the NNWS believe that only measures legally linked to the NPT itself are excluded. Therefore some countries, including Sweden, Finland and Germany, feel themselves free to make or support proposals in New York that go beyond the joint action. It is possible that the EU joint action and caucus in New York could disintegrate acrimoniously, as was the case during the 1990 review conference when the differences between the nuclear and non-nuclear member states were simply too large to reconcile. However, senior diplomats have said it is more likely that the Presidency statement will be very bland, and that member states will work together where possible, and pursue their own line where not. This reflects very much the different aims and responsibilities of the EU nuclear two, and the 13 EU NNWS, as well as exposing the weakness of the CFSP. Martin Butcher is Director of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament, a Brussels-based NGO. Reprinted Document: European Parliament Report on the NPT: Editor's Note: Reprinted below is Part A of the European Parliament Report on the Conference on the Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995. The report was drawn up by the committee on foreign affairs, security and defence policy. The rapporteur was Mr Jan Wiersma. Part B, the explanatory statement, is available on request. DOC EN\RR\270\270301 PE 211.396/A/fin. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION Resolution on the Conference on the Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995 The European Parliament, - having regard to its resolutions of 11 March 1993 on stopping nuclear tests by the nuclear powers1, of 24 June 1993 on the moratoria on nuclear testing2, of 29 September 1994 on illegal trafficking in nuclear materials3 and of 17 November 1994 on nuclear testing and the UN General Assembly’s debate on disarmament4 - having regard to the Corfu decision and to the Council decision of 25 July 1994 (94/509/CFSP) concerning joint action in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view to bringing about the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, - having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament entitled ‘The illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials’, (COM(94)383 final), - having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy (A4-0054/95),
Discussions Start on the Future of European Security By Tasos Kokkinides At the OSCE Senior Council held in Prague on 30-31 March, participating states began discussions on "a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century". The Russian proposal for these discussions was endorsed by all OSCE states at the December 1994 Budapest Summit. The discussions will lead to an OSCE-sponsored seminar in September 1995 whose recommendations will be debated at the OSCE ministerial meeting in December 1995, in Budapest. Despite a commitment to transparency, with the exception of Russia and Poland, no other country made its thoughts public. The Russian and US proposals, printed below, were made available to BASIC Reports together with papers by the UK, Canada, Poland and France. Delegation
of the Russian Federation REF.SC/9/95 31 MARCH 1995 English Only REGARDING THE WORK ON A MODEL OF UNIVERSAL AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY FOR EUROPE IN THE 21st CENTURY In accordance with the Decisions of the Budapest CSCE summit (section VII) Russia presents the following considerations as a contribution to the discussion of a model of universal and comprehensive security for Europe in the 21st century. 1. Europe is getting ready to enter the 21st century freeing itself from the legacy of the Cold War. At the same time the European security is facing new challenges. There is an obvious threat of new divisions. European structures established in the past are all undergoing the process of transition. The transformation affects not only East-West relations, but also relations between Eastern and Central Europe, Western Europe and the United States and Western and Central Europe. The shaping of a common model will be accompanied by the continuous process of transformation, while taking it into account and orienting it towards a mutual rapprochement. The strategic task of the model, and of the work to develop it, is to create a common space of security, stability and cooperation free from dividing lines, and to establish a system of the broadest possible interaction among all the countries. 2. The goal of the work is to find adequate responses to major problems jeopardizing the unity and security of the democratic Europe: - weakness or inadaptation to new conditions of mechanisms of consultations, coordination and mutual complementarity of actions by the States and the existing European structures; lack of legally binding norms to deal with local crises and to manage security in situations affecting the interests of individual States or groups of States; - growing disparity between the logic and specific obligations set forth in the disarmament treaties of the "block period" and the realities of the post-confrontational Europe; the CFE Treaty is but one example; - growth of xenophobia and aggressive nationalism attitudes on a mass scale in the East and West of Europe which serve to nourish extremist movements; - disproportions in social and economic development rates and technological disparities which increase the risk of a new split in the continent, aggravate the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts, enlarge the migration flows, contribute to the growth of criminal structures in economy and politics and reduce the economic cooperation potential; - unfavourable ecological situation threatening not only security but the very existence of mankind. 3. Strengthening of the OSCE, its transformation into an instrument of security and stability in Europe does not necessarily secure its formal leading role in any hierarchic system of organizations. It seems that optimum results can be achieved through promotion of coordination and interaction between the OSCE and other European institutions, synthesis of several processes, integration into the framework of EU, CIS; NATO transformation, strengthening and more precise definition of the OSCE role, collective efforts to prevent and settle crises and conflicts, inter alia, within the UN. 4. Development of the model is a process of identification and fulfilment of common concerns of the OSCE nations in political, economic, military, and other fields. 5. We suggest to formulate basic underlying principles for our consideration of the model. Among them the following principles could be named: indivisibility of security (no State shall strengthen its own security to the detriment of other States and at the same time security for all), comprehensive security (all aspects of security in military, political, legal,environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other fields shall be provided for in close relationship); and mutual complementarity (security shall be built through mutually complementing efforts by individual States and multilateral institutions). 6. We suggest to consider the following priority issues: How to develop efficient tools designed to meet the interests of all OSCE member States in the process of taking decisions of concern to them (a system of consultations leading to binding decisions, participation in decision-making by regional organizations, and regional "round tables")? What are the adequate forms for achieving interdependency of democratic States (a Euro-Atlantic (or Eurasian) cooperation treaty (or Charter)? How to establish an optimum balance between global, regional and subregional approaches to the solution of European problems (what are the specific ways to draw closer various processes, such as the integration within the EU and the CIS, transformation of NATO, strengthening and further defining the role of the OSCE; how to combine, in a harmonic way, the collective efforts to prevent and settle crises and conflicts, undertaken within NATO, the CIS and the UN)? How to adapt and supplement, in conformity with the realities of a new Europe, the existing treaty basis of military security (inter alia, through the elaboration of a new, non-block, full-scale agreement (the CFE-2) designed to bring the military potentials in line with the post-confrontational set-up)? How to supplement the OSCE agreements in the area of military security with regional measures (cross-guarantees, regional "round tables", regional peace-making mechanisms)? How to accelerate economic development in Eastern Europe and, at the same time, to create more favourable conditions for pan-European development (a possible line of action- the implementation of European economic infrastructure projects for the 21st century, such as the establishment of new high-capacity integrated energy supply, telecommunication, rail and road transportation systems)? The Russian side reserves the right to put forward more detailed considerations on each of the above elements taking into account views of other countries. US Delegation MARCH 30, 1995 REF.SC/12/95 31 MARCH 1995 OSCE-RESTRICTED ENGLISH ONLY Security Model for 21st Century Europe In the U.S. view, discussions of a security model for the twenty-first century must be based on OSCE’s comprehensive definition of security, encompassing human rights and democracy; conflict prevention generally, including its economic and environmental aspects; political security; and military security. Such discussions should aim at inclusive, integrated approaches to define new models of comprehensive security, and should convey a sense of OSCE-wide participation in the development of these models. The status of discussions is to be reviewed in December 1995 and at the next OSCE summit in 1996. This first round of discussions should focus on the basic principles that must serve as a foundation: broad, inclusive approaches to comprehensive security in the OSCE sense. What is the way ahead for the next few months? The discussions should not be conceived of as a negotiation. They do not replace ongoing negotiations or negotiating fora. They do not call into question existing treaty obligations in security related fields. What they do touch upon is the evolution of existing security institutions within the new European security architecture. Discussions of models must proceed on the understanding that the functions of existing organizations are important, that their operation is a matter for these institutions to determine for themselves, and that their evolution is not a matter to be determined by OSCE (or any other organization). The discussions will not establish formalized linkages, methods of cooperation, divisions of labor or hierarchies among security institutions. Rather our discussion of models should promote broader efforts at cooperation, including regional and sub-regional agreements to foster good neighborly relations. The aim should be to go beyond any one approach to the future of European security. We will couch our contributions in terms of "possible future models" to avoid creating the impression that we are working toward a single, definitive structure or blueprint. According to the Budapest decision, the security model exercise is not just an arms control undertaking. The security model discussion cannot be limited to, and indeed should not center on, military security, arms control, or fora devoted principally to narrower definitions of security. Based on discussions before and during the Fall 1995 Vienna seminar on the model, a report describing what has been discussed should be presented to the December OSCE ministerial. We foresee continuing OSCE-wide discussions devoted to the model in an informal ad hoc group in Vienna meeting once a month under the lead of the Chairman in Office between this Senior Council meeting and the Fall seminar. Our contribution will stress the close relationship between NATO and the European Union as interlocking security institutions which form the essential foundation for new security structures in Europe. In doing so we all must become accustomed to thinking about security in new ways. We still have a tendency to think of security in military terms, although the recent conflicts in the OSCE area have not been the result of military/arms control problems, even if many of these conflicts have elicited a military response. The threats to security we now face are based on violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, unresolved ethnic and religious tensions, and an imbalance in the tensions between the principle of territorial integrity and that of free expression of self-determination. Europe has evolved form the Cold War period. Our models should reflect an evolution as well: not a deconstruction of what has proven successful, but an adjustment to prepare our successful tools to address the root causes of today’s, and tomorrow’s, conflicts. The most comprehensive of those tools is the OSCE. It is continuing to prove itself indispensable in its preventive diplomacy work, its efforts on behalf of national minorities, and its commitment to enhancing human rights, democracy, rule of law, and protection of fundamental freedoms. We hope these first discussions will center on the important principles of common security in the new era, and the tools available for achieving our goal of truly cooperative security structures. We urge all OSCE countries to use this exercise to air their hopes and concerns, and to approach the process in this spirit. This edition of BASIC Reports was edited by Bronwyn Brady in London.
|
|
|
HOME
| NUCLEAR AND
WMD | EUROPEAN
SECURITY | WEAPONS
TRADE |