BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
HISTORY
The History of Biological Weapons and Warfare
Biological warfare is nothing new. In 1346, for example, the
bodies of Tartar soldiers who had died of the Plague were thrown
over the walls of the besieged city of Kaffa (now Fedossia in the
Crimea) to infect the populace within. In the 1767 French and
Indian War in North America, the English used blankets contaminated
with smallpox virus to spread the disease among the native
population. However, it was only after the discoveries of Koch,
Pasteur and Lister on the microbial basis of infectious disease in
the 19th century that biological weapons research really
began.
Despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol in 1925
banning offensive use of biological weapons, a number of European
countries developed bioweapons during the 1930s and 1940s.
However, to date the only fully documented modern use of biological
weapons by a state has been in Japan's attacks against China during
World War II. In the immediate postwar period at least three
countries - Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States -
continued large, ambitious programs of bioweapons development,
building on their wartime work.
On 25 November 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon
announced the unilateral and unconditional renunciation of
biological weapons. (Britain had closed down its offensive
bioweapons program in the early 1960s.) Washington's action led to
the negotiation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which
prohibited the development of biological agents "of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective
or other peaceful purposes." Despite ratifying this agreement the
Soviet Union continued to carry out a covert offensive biological
weapons research program, which at its height employed over 60,000
people. Though these activities officially ended in 1992, concerns
about covert offensive Russian programs persist. During the 1990s,
evidence also came to light of the secret biological weapons
programs run by Iraq and the Apartheid regime in South Africa.
The BWC does not prohibit defensive research and development
programs, and many countries have continued activities such as
producing vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics to protect their
citizens. However, concerns are often raised that such programs may
be acting as a cover for offensive development.
The Biological Weapons Convention and the Protocol
In 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibiting the
development, production and stockpiling of bioweapons was opened
for signature. It was the first-ever arms control convention to
completely ban a whole class of weapons. However, it lacked
mechanisms for monitoring or verifying compliance.
Seeking to address this omission, States Parties began to
negotiate a legally binding verification protocol to the BWC in
1995. Over the next six years, the international deliberations
focused on concrete measures to ensure countries comply with and
respect the BWC. Yet on 25 July 2001, the new Bush administration
not only rejected the draft Protocol text but also dismissed the
entire "approach" of the Protocol. The U.S. announcement was the
precursor to the complete collapse of the negotiations, and
effectively stalled the Protocol process.
Worse was to come in December 2001 at the Fifth Review
Conference of the BWC - the latest of the five-yearly meetings of
States Parties to assess and strengthen the working of the
Convention. On the meeting's last day, only two hours before the
scheduled end of negotiations, the United States unilaterally
demanded the termination of the Protocol process. The U.S.
bombshell, announced without prior warning, created a rancorous
atmosphere, prompting the suspension of the Conference for one year
to allow time for "cooling off."
The Review Conference is scheduled to resume on 11 November
2002.
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