Nuclear Weapons and Transatlantic Security
Meeting with a delegation from the Defence Committee of
the WEU Assembly - The European Security and Defence Assembly
17 June 2008
On June 17, 2008, BASIC hosted a meeting with delegation
members from the Defence Committee of the Assembly of the
Western European Union - The European Security and Defence
Assembly at the Washington, D.C. Home of Stewart R. Mott.
Below are the briefings delivered by Washington-based peace
and security experts Ambassador James Leonard, John Isaacs,
Shervin Boloorian, and Dr. Joanna Spear.
How We Will Get to Zero. How You Can
Help.
By Ambassador James Leonard (brief
biography)
The process of eliminating nuclear weapons will take many
years - decades - and it will go through several distinct
phases.
Phase I: Includes U.S.-Russian bi-lateral negotiations
with two linked objectives: reducing the total number of warheads
held by each side, and eliminating the possibility of an accidental
firing of even one nuclear weapon. The objective of reducing
warhead numbers is a continuation of the process that began
in Helsinki in December 1969. It led through SALT I and SALT
II and START and the Moscow Treaty of 2001. I have no doubt
that the next U.S. administration and the Russian government
will resume this reduction process next year. I hope the two
governments will also take up the task of eliminating quickly
the dangerous postures of both nuclear forces that have missiles
that could be targeted on each other and fired unintentionally
by mistake in a matter of minutes. The Clinton administration
addressed this problem with the Russians and proclaimed that
it had been solved. It has not and it obviously should be.
Phase II: When the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces
have been reduced to levels close to the nuclear forces of
the United Kingdom and France - 200 to 300 warheads  deployed
or deployable, then a second, Five-Power phase of nuclear
disarmament should start, bringing in China. This second phase
can and should start in five years or less, but I am not predicting
any such good sense or good fortune. The object of this Phase
II should be the complete elimination of deployed and deployable
weapons by the five governments. It could take a number of
years to work out the procedures for the safe and verifiable
elimination of warheads and of the means of delivering them,
but once all five governments have removed their deployed
weapons to storage and promised to destroy them, there is
no great rush to finish the job.
Phase III: Includes addressing the other nuclear-weapon
states and would-be NWS like Iran. These other problem states
should not be neglected while the five major states are reducing
their nuclear forces. But the politics and the security calculations
of the Middle East, the Subcontinent and elsewhere are relatively
independent of the strategic relations among the Five. The
nuclear Five are not very effective at preaching disarmament
to others unless they practice what they preach. But all five
could go to zero and India and Pakistan could still say: "So
what? We still need our deterrent." It is nevertheless reasonable
to expect that the good example of the Five plus and the even
better example of the fifty or more non-nuclear states who
could have gone nuclear but chose not to will protect and
preserve the non-proliferation regime and will enable the
international community to bring pressure on India, Pakistan
and Israel to solve their security problems without nuclear
weapons and agree to join in getting nuclear weapons down
to a true zero.
What can you do to help?
When the United States and Russia sit down to discuss
further reductions in strategic weapons, they should also
take up the problem of non-strategic weapons. The Russians
will certainly want us to withdraw our nuclear weapons from
Europe. We will want them to pull their nuclear weapons back
behind the Urals, or better yet, eliminate them.
If I were the next President, I would be tempted to pull
all our weapons out of Europe unilaterally; but some people
warn that our allies would be very upset and that some could
even contemplate starting to build their own nuclear deterrent.
I don't believe this for a moment. But please tell us what
you think. It would contribute to getting a good start down
this long road to zero if our allies would tell us clearly
and publicly that these weapons are no longer needed. They
are simply survivals of the past and should be eliminated
ASAP.
A Brief Synopsis of U.S. Nuclear Policy
By John Isaacs (brief
biography)
There are many uncertainties about U.S. politics. We can
never be sure that what candidates say during elections will
be implemented when the winners take office. At least in this
country. But one thing I can assure all our European guests.
As of January 20, 2009, George W. Bush will no longer be in
office. That, I guarantee you. And if you are polite enough
not to issue an audible sigh of relief, I can assure you that
the great majority of Americans are going to.
The good news on nuclear weapons policy is that both of the
major contenders for President of the United States == McCain
or Obama == have promised major changes in U.S. nuclear weapons
policies.
We had expected that from the Democratic nominee.
Barack Obama has made important pledges of seeking expanded
nuclear non-proliferation policies. Senator Obama has:
- Endorsed bringing back the CTBT for a Senate ratification
vote.
- Talked of expanded nuclear non-proliferation programs.
- Proposed extending the START I agreement.
- Endorsed the concept of zero nuclear weapons advocated
by Mssrs. Kissinger, Shultz, Nunn and Perry.
But what is most encouraging was the speech by Republican
nominee Sen. John McCain at the end of May. Senator McCain
has:
- Endorsed legally binding and verifiable reductions on
U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, something that the Bush
Administration was allergic to.
- Endorsed expanded nuclear non-proliferation programs.
He talked about reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
- Proposed strengthening the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
- Proposed pursuing negotiations for a Fissile Material
Cut off Treaty.
- Even used the dirty word "negotiations" - or at least
quite often dirty word to the Bush Administration.
Now there were ambiguities in Sen. McCain's speech. And of
course there are uncertainties.
But I think it is now fair to expect that either a President
McCain or a President Obama will put nuclear weapons issues
high on the agenda for the next Administration. 
Copies of analysis that our organization published on the
McCain and Obama positions are available: Obama
vs. McCain: A Side-by-Side Comparison on Arms Control.
But a cautionary note.
The next President will enter office with a long, unfinished
agenda. There is the matter of a recession. High gasoline
prices. Housing foreclosures. Forty-five million Americans
without health insurance. A little war in Iraq from which
we need to extricate ourselves. Uncertainties in the Middle
East and with Iran and North Korea. Which means that those
of us involved in nuclear weapons issues know that our issues
will have to compete for the time, attention and political
capital of an Administration with much work to do. And there
are major disputes ahead over deploying a third national missile
defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic and other issues
that divide the United States and Russia that could prevent
nuclear cooperation. But all in all, a promising environment
for 2009 on nuclear weapons issues.
U.S.-Iran Policy
By Shervin Boloorian (brief
biography)
The narrative of isolation and pressure has historically driven
U.S.-Iran policy in Washington. This narrative heavily informs
policy documents like the recent National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) and explains why the report's drafters conclude that
a posture more forcefully tilted in favor of hostility is
likely to persuade Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment
program. While the NIE acknowledges a cost-benefit mindset
among Iran's leadership, Iran's behavior in 2003 suggests
that a series of more conciliatory gestures, chief among them
being concrete security guarantees, are likely to produce
more results than the limited P5+1 proposal.
Political Backdrop
The 1979 hostage crisis is still firmly rooted in the minds
of policymakers. Both major political parties score free points
among the U.S. public by appearing tough on Iran. Democrats
are particularly sensitive to being seen as weak on national
security in the forthcoming elections. Practical and rational
policy options that would improve U.S.-Iran relations and
thus lay the groundwork for preventing the possibility of
nuclear proliferation are victimized by these dynamics.
NIE's Findings
The NIE judged with high confidence that Iran halted a nuclear
weapons program in Fall, 2003 and implies that a political
decision would more effectively induce the Iranian leadership
to stop their nuclear energy program than a military option.
The document then suggests that
Iran will respond favorably to a "combination of threats of
intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with
opportunities...," to gain certain carrots. The Bush Administration
uses this conclusion to: save face and justify the current
policy of stepped up pressure on Iran in the UNSC; continue
a hard-line stance on Iran; and accede to the possibility
of talks only after Iran ceases uranium enrichment activities.
This explains why President Bush and Congress continue to
stay the course on Iran, in spite of the intelligence community's
judgment that Iran is not developing a weapons program.
NIE Misses
The threat from Iran's bitter enemy, Iraq, may have been
the principle driving force behind an alleged nuclear weapons
program. With Saddam Hussein's removal, a chief security
threat to Iran was also removed as well as a key motivating
force for any alleged program.
The Grand Bargain floated by Iran in May, 2003. This
Iranian proposal delivered to the United States via the Swiss,
contained various items for negotiation (including Iran's
nuclear program) in an effort to normalize relations between
the two countries. This is important because it indicates
a desire for rapprochement from Tehran. Its rejection by the
United States also raises questions about American regime
change signals, since the United States flatly opted not to
negotiate when given the opportunity.
The failure of unilateral sanctions, over an unfortunate
era of bad blood between the two countries, which has colored
relations and left little in the way of trust and good will.
This is important because the nature of the relationship suggests
that more of the same has not and will not change Iran's behavior.
The U.S. and international community have already applied
the greatest amount of pressure on Iran to date, without the
desired response from Iran. By several accounts, Iran
in 2003 was engaged constructively by the EU3, whose representatives
did not succumb to U.S. pressure, and issued a more conciliatory
joint statement. In the aftermath, Iran accelerated its cooperation
with the IAEA without the introduction of sanctions.
Iranians view themselves as victims of historic pressure
from foreign governments. This suggests that the Iranian people
would react favorably to serious constructive gestures from
the United States and Europe. Iran's population is frequently
referred to as the most pro-Western in the region. A proposal
for unconditional talks with Iran would likely be received
well by the population and would put pressure on the ruling
elite to act.
Conclusion
Since the NIE's release, the pressure on Iran to abandon its
enrichment program has not abated. While the NIE suggests
that staying the course will yield results, an alternative
analysis of its findings in the context of the U.S.-Iran relationship
suggests that the more pressure applied to Iran, the lower
the chance of Iran's capitulation. Therefore, a departure
from the historical approach to Iran whereby the international
community tips the scales back in favor of more carrots, less
coercion, direct U.S. involvement, and no preconditions would
produce more favorable results.
Recommendation
Members of the EU and others in the international community
should step up pressure on the United States to less coercively
respond to Iran's desire for economic integration and security
needs, and prompt the administration and Congress to adopt
a more conciliatory posture with respect to Iran and its nuclear
program.
Short and Long-term Transatlantic Security
Challenges
By Dr. Joanna Spear (brief
biography)
Short-term challenge
The short-term challenge concerns NATO (and ISAF) in Afghanistan.
There are many tensions in the alliance over force levels
and types of forces needed to mount effective operations in
Afghanistan.
It is no secret that many countries put forces into Afghanistan
in order to avoid having to put them into Iraq-or having to
blanketly refuse U.S. requests to do that. Many countries
assumed that the operations would be relatively short-lived
and straightforward; neither has proved to be the case.
Now, in some ways it is no surprise that NATO is engaged
in a burden-sharing debate (as far as I ever remember, that
is what NATO is best at), but in some senses the stakes are
higher than during past theoretical debates, as there are
troops on the ground and a lot is at stake in Afghanistan.
There is irritation in the Bush Administration that European
NATO allies are not prepared to do more and that what they
are doing is governed by so many national caveats that it
is synergistically harming operational effectiveness.
In some senses this irritation is merited; in some senses
it is not; there are many NATO forces in Afghanistan and a
number of NATO allies - notably some of the newer members
- have really committed many forces to the fight. The Canadians
have now lost 81 troops there and British losses have reached
100 - significant numbers relative to the size of the national
armed forces.
But the challenge in Afghanistan seems to be growing,  not
receding. The Taliban are making increasingly daring tactical
moves and the government in Kabul is still rather limited
in its abilities.
The solution - most seem to agree - lies in development that
helps to build a stronger state. But this is proving a challenging
goal - and is maybe asking too much of development over too
short a timeframe. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are not
working well or coherently.
Any new U.S. administration will face the challenge of policy
in Afghanistan and in all likelihood will be asking the European
NATO allies to do more; so the Europeans need to think carefully
about their response.
Longer-term challenges
The longer-term challenges I want to mention are in some
ways linked together; climate change and nuclear power.
First, an anecdote; a friend of a friend is working for
the State Department and has been tasked with working on the
Bush administration's legacy document - and has been involved
for about eight months on this paper. Number three on the
list of the Bush Administration's achievements is "leadership
in climate change." Leadership? To many of us outside the
government, this seems a ludicrous claim - though it does
point to the fact that their achievements have been few. From
my perspective, the United States has been dragged kicking
and screaming to the table on climate change and does still
not understand the need for serious, concerted action now.
The way the issue is getting a little attention here now
is via conversations about energy prices. "Energy independence"
is really not possible but is increasingly talked about; "energy
security" is the big phrase of the moment. The Administration
(like governments in Europe) is facing criticism because of
petrol prices - primarily due to speculation in the market
rather than market failure.
Talk about "energy security" and security of supply is linked
to discussions about China and India - but also about competition
for resources. This competition could mean that the United
States comes into some conflict with its European allies over
who they buy from and the deals they do. Moreover, the United
States is not really in energy conservation mode - but in
guaranteed energy consumption mode - which is an irritant
vis-à-vis climate change concerns.
One of the ways for many states to decrease energy dependence
is to begin - or increase - civil nuclear power production.
The U.S. stance towards Iran, of skepticism about their civil
nuclear power plans, is sending a negative signal about peaceful
nuclear programs.
Some of the plans out there for dealing with the dangers
of nuclear weapons proliferation and fissile materials smuggling
need to be re-calibrated to ensure that states can get peaceful
nuclear energy, but in ways that do not increase the dangers
of nuclear proliferation.
BASIC would like to thank our Washington participants,
the WEU Assembly Defence Committee, and the Stewart R. Mott
Charitable Trust and staff for making their conference room
available and for their assistance.
Photo credits: D'Ann Grady Lettieri, Security Policy
Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George
Washington University
BASIC's work is made possible by the generous support of
our donors: the Ploughshares
Fund, the Ford Foundation,
the Joseph Rowntree Charitable
Trust, Polden
Puckham Charitable Foundation, and Rockefeller Family
& Associates.
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