NPR Point-Counterpoint

[The key components of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review are drawn from the Pentagon press briefing held on Jan. 9, 2002.  The key briefer was J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

A transcript of the briefing and slides accompanying the briefing may be found at the DefenseLink website. 

BASIC has produced a response to some of the main themes to emerge from this briefing along with a list of issues it failed to tackle.]

1) Operationally deployed force vs. responsive force

POINT:  The December 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) indicates that the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be reduced to roughly 3,800 operationally deployed warheads by 2007, towards a goal of 1,700-2,200 warheads in the active stockpile by 2012.  The review indicates that short-term reductions will include retirement of 50 MX (Peacekeeper) missiles, which each carry 10 warheads; shifting four Trident submarines, which each carry 96 warheads, from strategic to conventional use; and promising that the B-1 bomber would not be reinstated in a nuclear role.

The NPR also states that some of the weapons that are cut will be destroyed, while others will be moved to a new category called Responsive Force.  Enabling nuclear weapons in reserve to be replaced into the operationally deployed arsenal offers the president greater flexibility in shaping options to counter a threat. 

COUNTERPOINT:  The Bush administration’s review uses deceptive counting rules that make reductions in the U.S. arsenal a mere mirage.  Weapons moved into a responsive capability will enlarge the U.S. active stockpile, also known as the nuclear ‘hedge.’  With roughly 2,500 weapons already constituting the U.S. hedge, the United States is not being truthful about the reductions it so earnestly promises.  Instead, storing the weapons so that they may be available for future use sustains the enormous lethality of the U.S. arsenal, but just under a different name.

While downloading nuclear weapons from the operationally deployed force is a welcome step that should be matched by other nuclear powers, the reductions should also dismantle and destroy both the warheads and the missiles that deliver them.  Only then can they truly be considered “cut” from the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

“The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit” by Hans M. Kristensen, Arms Control Today, Dec. 2001.

“Nuclear Posture”, Editorial, Financial Times, Jan. 11, 2002

2) “Unilateral reductions preserve flexibility, transparency”

POINT:  According to the new NPR, unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons “preserve flexibility, transparency” for the U.S. government as it assesses its options to counter multiple potential opponents and unprecedented challenges.

COUNTERPOINT:  The unilateral 'reductions' as currently proposed by the U.S. government are a sure way to fostering distrust and stymieing motivation for other nuclear powers to reassess their own arsenals. 

Early evidence pointed to the path the Bush administration preferred in a report published by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) in January 2001.  The report, authored in part by present members of the Bush administration, emphasized:

Adaptability requires the capacity to both augment and reduce U.S. defensive and offensive forces to fit a changing strategic environment and rapid possible shifts in technical, operational, and political variables… Further adjustment to the U.S. strategic forces must not be rendered practically or legally “irreversible” via codification in the traditional arms control process. [Italics are report’s own emphasis.]

However, this approach to configuring U.S. nuclear weapons arsenals does not take into consideration several key components to international security:

• the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which urges States Parties to undertake measures to move toward irreversible nuclear disarmament;
  
  

• arms control measures, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, as means to address technology transfers, sensitive materials supplies, and cooperation with unscrupulous parties;
  
  

• irreversibility, since other nuclear weapon states are less likely to reduce their own arsenals if the United States is perceived to be temporarily storing, rather than permanently destroying its warhead stocks; and 
  
  

• codification of reductions in a treaty, which is essential for maximum transparency and verification of cuts to a nuclear arsenal.

While the authors of the NPR sought “to give the president and future president a broader portfolio of responses and options,” as Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch indicated, there are some essential components missing from the toolbox that would amplify the ability to deal with aggressor states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

"Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces", Vol. I, Executive Report, National Institute for Public Policy, January 2001 (Adobe PDF format)

3) Development of ‘mini-nukes’

POINT:  There has been widespread speculation that the Bush administration is considering development of low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as ‘mini-nukes,’ that could defeat hardened and deeply buried targets, such as bunkers housing biological or chemical weapons facilities.  In the post Cold War world the value of nuclear weapons has been consistently questioned.  Recent studies conducted by Bush administration-friendly groups have advocated the use of low-yield and high-precision mini-nukes. For example, the NIPP Report (see above) argued that nuclear weapons could provide “unique targeting capabilities” against chemical and biological weapons facilities in “states of concern.”  It is argued that “precise” nuclear strikes with low yield warheads could be critical in preventing the spread and development of biological weapons. 

A recent study issued to Congress by the Pentagon states that, while the Department of Defense “has not defined a requirement for a nuclear weapon for WMD Agent Defeat missions,” nuclear laboratories are currently researching options into development of such usable nuclear weapons as a military solution to the proliferation threat.  Crouch does not deny that the administration is considering mini-nuke development, stating, “At this point, there are no recommendations in the report about developing new nuclear weapons… Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives.  One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against… hard targets and deeply-buried targets.”  

COUNTERPOINT:  There are strong doubts that a mini-nuke strike could be as “surgical” as some argue.  Robert W. Nelson, in a recent report for the Federation of American Scientists, concluded, “No earth-burrowing missile can penetrate deep enough into the earth to contain an explosion with a nuclear yield even as small as one percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshima weapon.  The explosion simply blows out a massive crater of radioactive dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense and deadly fallout.”  In addition, employing these weapons would break the taboo against nuclear first use which has developed since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The threshold for nuclear attack would be significantly lowered, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be critically undermined, and the potential for nuclear destruction – either through accident or intent – would increase seriously.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

"Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons", by Robert W. Nelson, FAS Public Interest Report, January/February 2001

"Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets", courtesy of Nuclear Watch of New Mexico (Adobe PDF format) 

Friends Committee on National Legislation, Mini-Nukes Index

"Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century", by Stephen Younger, Los Alamos National Laboratories, Jun. 27, 2000 (Adobe PDF format) 

"Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21^st Century", by C. Paul Robinson, Sandia National Laboratories, March 2001.

4) Accelerating test site readiness

POINT:  The United States Department of Energy will accelerate the amount of time required to prepare a site for a nuclear weapon test.  Crouch, citing a recent study on test site readiness, explained, “Two to three years from a decision to test is too long… if you were to have a problem with a weapon system that you needed to rectify using a test, you would want to be able to do that faster.”

Crouch points out, however, that the NPR continues the Bush administration’s policy of maintaining the moratorium on nuclear testing put in place in 1991 under President George H.W. Bush.  It also does not change the administration’s policy opposing U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

COUNTERPOINT:  Accelerating nuclear test site readiness time endangers the testing moratorium already in place, and makes a mockery of the CTBT, signed by over 165 countries, including the United States under the Clinton administration.*  

It also gives a dangerous edge to nuclear planners who may be interested in designing a ‘usable’ nuclear weapon with a yield of 5 kilotons or less.  Decreasing the time for nuclear weapons testing preparations is a clear precursor to what the Bush administration has considered all along:  testing of new nuclear weapons designs that would add a low-yield “mini-nuke” to the U.S. arsenal.

* Legislatures in 65 countries have approved ratification of the CTBT; efforts to do so failed in the U.S. Senate in 1999.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization

“CTBT Rogue State”, by Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Today, December 2001

“US Testing: Changes to Nuclear Testing Policy”, by David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire, January 2001

5) New triad includes missile defense

POINT:  Under the New Triad outlined in the NPR, three new “legs” are proposed:  non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, which shows the review’s interest in folding high-tech conventional weaponry into the deterrence posture; responsive infrastructure, the stockpile of downloaded weapons that acts as the ‘hedge;’ and defenses, which would include the controversial efforts to develop a missile defense system.

In the new triad, according to Crouch, “defensive systems… may also reduce our reliance on offensive systems… and a responsive infrastructure.”  He continued, “We need a broader array of capabilities… to deter and, if deterrence were to fail, to defend against potential adversaries.”

COUNTERPOINT:  Throughout the missile defense system development, many governments have openly expressed concern about its potential impact on global security.  With strong statements from China, Russia, and even some European allies, the United States still has yet to convince the world that a defensive system is a technologically-feasible, cost-effective way of promoting security that does not threaten the non-proliferation regime.

China’s response is the greatest concern to date since the Bush administration has not been able to engage that country in productive discussions about the system.  A new National Intelligence Estimate by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency points to a nuclear weapons buildup by China between 2002-2015.  Many of China’s new weapons will be located on mobile launchers, which will not be easily tracked and monitored by the United States.  China may also have the capability to mount multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on current silo-based missiles, greatly enhancing the targeting and destructive power of their present systems.

The new buildup in China comes as a direct response to U.S. missile defense development.  China openly threatened renewed nuclear arms race in May 2001, when Sha Zukang, Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, stated, “To defeat your defenses we'll have to spend a lot of money, and we don't want to do this. But otherwise, the United States will feel it can attack anyone at any time, and that isn't tolerable… We hope [America] will give this up. If not, we'll be ready.”

The current plans to develop and implement a missile defense system by the Bush administration exacerbates proliferation concerns and is likely to become a target for aggressor countries and rogue states.  Not only will the system impact international security, but countries whose cooperation is required for the successful deployment of the system – namely, Greenland and the United Kingdom, which host radar sites that will be needed to detect incoming missiles – may become targets themselves.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

Global Perspectives on National Missile Defense (NMD), BASIC Web Resource

“US National Missile Defense: Views from Asia”, by Dr. Nicholas Berry, Center for Defense Information, 2001

What’s Missing?

• Timeframe for Reductions: While the NPR sets a target of 3,800 operationally-deployed warheads by 2007, and reductions to 1,700-2,200 warheads in the active stockpile by 2012, there are few details of how this will be achieved, according to the initial reports on the NPR’s classified version.  After hearing a briefing on the classified document a Democratic congressional expert on nuclear weapons commented that the destruction of the 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silos were the only concrete plans outlined.  He added, “They did not tell us how the remaining promised reductions would be made; they did not know what the remaining nuclear force structure would look like; and they were not sure how many would be stored or destroyed.” (“Nuclear Arms Plan: Saving, Not Scrapping,” by Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Jan. 9, 2002)
  
  
• Making nuclear policy public: The results from the NPR should be released as an unclassified public document.

According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s comments at a press conference, he called for a declassified version of the review “because I think it's an important document.  It is a significant change in U.S. offensive nuclear weapon approach, and it is a different strategy, as well as the deep reductions that are proposed in it.  And because of its importance and because of the new direction it takes, I think it belongs in the public in some form.” (DoD News Briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, Jan. 3, 2002)

Recent events have made public dissemination of the U.S. nuclear posture all the more pressing.  The Bush administration faces critical issues in the near future that will be informed by the NPR.  A declassified document will help the public understand the political, strategic, and technical aspects of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The timeframe and process for proposed reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces undoubtedly will be influenced by recommendations included in the review.  In addition, the President’s announcement in December 2001 that the United States will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty requires an open assessment of Washington’s nuclear forces as well as the threats the United States is facing.  How the administration plans to address these proliferation threats, “rogue” actors, and the role of nuclear weapons are increasingly key issues for public debate.

The full scope of the U.S. force posture and nuclear arsenal should be made available to the public.  The immediate release of a declassified NPR is essential.

• No First Use: In 1978, President Carter stated that “the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non nuclear state” party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), unless the United States or its interests are attacked “by such a state allied to a nuclear weapons state.”  This negative security assurance has been restated over the last 20 years, and the pledge by Clinton was crucial to achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.  Nonetheless, in private many Washington policy makers view nuclear deterrence as a useful tool to prevent biological and chemical attacks.  In March 1996, Defense Secretary William Perry stated that the United States would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack with chemical weapons.  A year later, a Presidential Decision Directive reportedly sanctioned the use of nuclear force to counter biological or chemical attacks, even by non-nuclear weapon states; this doctrine is presumed to have been accepted in NATO nuclear policy as well.  However, uncertainty remains since the Directive is still classified.

Influential policy makers have argued that the United States needs to move away from this policy of ambiguity and adopt a more explicit stance in favor of nuclear deterrence.  As yet it is unclear what if, any, recommendations the NPR makes on this issue.  While deterrence proponents may support an open policy of countering non-nuclear attacks with the nuclear arsenal, such an approach would undoubtedly cause many stark problems. It would be in violation of the NPT and would thus put more pressure on a treaty already severely strained by the refusal of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  If the NPT were to collapse, proliferation of nuclear materials may increase greatly and the possibilities for nuclear blackmail and attack would increase substantially.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

“The NPT Review – Last Chance?” by Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret.), Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, 2000.

"Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy", by Hans Kristensen, BASIC Research Report 98.2, March 1998

“Nuclear Retaliation:  Perry Contradicts Clinton,” BASIC Press Release, May 7, 1996

Commitment to the NPT: With the upcoming Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2002 to commence work in advance of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the health of the Treaty is in severe jeopardy.  Many of the policies being currently pursued by the Bush administration undermine commitments made at the 2000 review conference to move reinforce non-proliferation measures and move toward nuclear disarmament.  In particular, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the refusal to ratify the CTBT, and the strong objection to verifiable and irreversible arms reductions contradict promises made by the United States under the “13 steps” agreed to by the five nuclear powers in the May 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

"Is the U.S. Meeting Its Disarmament Commitments?" by Christine Kucia, BASIC NATO E-mail Series, May 18, 2001

The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons May 2000

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