US-UK Nuclear Cooperation and
the Future of the UK Trident System

Presentation by Dr Ian Davis

Meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Global Security and Non-Proliferation

5 February 2002, Westminster, London

1. Introduction  

Firstly, I would like to thank Malcolm Savidge and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation for hosting this timely meeting, and for inviting me to speak on this important topic.  The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), with its offices in London and Washington, has been providing information and analysis on US-UK nuclear cooperation for over 15 years. As the newly appointed Director to BASIC, I am eager to continue this long-standing work of analysing government policies and promoting public awareness of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures in order to foster informed debate.  

When the cold war ended at the beginning of the 1990s the world was judged, briefly, to have become a ‘safer place’. In particular, there was genuine progress towards nuclear sanity – real reductions in actual force levels between the US and the former Soviet Union, combined with commitments by the nuclear five within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – the NPT – to work towards the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament. In 1996, for example, 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads inherited by Ukraine were successfully transferred to Russia to be dismantled. To mark the completion of the Ukraine’s change in status, from the world’s third largest nuclear weapons state to a nuclear weapons free country, the defence ministers of the United States, Russia and Ukraine met at a former Ukrainian missile base in June 1996 for a ceremony of scattering sunflower seeds. Then US Defence Secretary William Perry, indicated that: “sunflower seeds instead of missiles in the soil would insure peace for future generations”.  

While the scattering of sunflower seeds is not the usual business of defence ministers, it was a symbolic act that represented real security for Ukrainians and for all Europeans. Such optimism was short-lived, however. Old threats had receded only to emerge in new forms, and the initial zeal to tackle nuclear weapons proliferation also waned very quickly. Somehow I cannot quite envisage the current US Secretary of State for Defence engaging in a sunflower ceremony any time soon.  

Despite this somewhat gloomy opening prognosis, BASIC believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be prevented and that a nuclear-weapon-free world is not only desirable, but achievable as well. We also consider that the UK can play a prominent part in achieving these goals. Which brings me to our most recent report: ‘Secrecy and Dependence: The UK Trident System in the 21st Century’. The secrecy within British nuclear weapons policy-making and our long-standing dependence on the United States for both the Trident missile system and warhead are the two key themes of my presentation.

2. UK-US nuclear co-operation

The first British nuclear bomb – a straight fission bomb – was tested in 1952. Thus, as we enter our Golden Jubilee as a nuclear power, it is worth remembering that for most of those 50 years there has been close cooperation with, and reliance on, the United States.

The scope of this cooperation currently includes:  

• warhead design and safety - the UK Trident warhead is closely based on one of the US Trident warheads (the W76);
  
  

• leasing of missiles - the UK has access to (but does not own) a pool of Trident II D5 missiles manufactured by US defence company Lockheed Martin;
  
  

• research - Britain has cooperative programmes with all three major US nuclear weapons laboratories, including assistance with stockpile stewardship;
  
  

• doctrine - since the purchase of Polaris, Britain’s strategic nuclear force has been “committed to NATO and targeted in accordance with Alliance policy and strategic concepts under plans made by the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR)”. NATO’s concept of nuclear deterrence, is in turn, based predominantly on US nuclear doctrine.  NATO nuclear targeting strategy, for example, is carried out in accordance with US nuclear doctrine.

While this cooperation can be seen as an integral part of the ‘UK-US Special Relationship’ and a means by which Britain enjoys access to advanced technology ‘off the shelf’, there are concerns as to the extent of leverage this gives the United States over UK foreign and defence policy in general, and nuclear decision-making in particular. For example, while in opposition, the Labour Party supported “a negotiated, multilateral no first use agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states and strengthened security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states in the form of an international legally-binding treaty”.  Amidst rumours of pressure from the Pentagon to drop the issue, the publication of the Strategic Defence Review in 1997 followed NATO strategy to the letter by avoiding any mention of ‘No first use’.  

Given, therefore, that Britain’s nuclear doctrine has largely kept in step with that of the United States over the years via close cooperation through NATO, one of the key factors shaping UK nuclear policy in the coming years will be developments in US policy.

3. The US Nuclear Posture Review

Since coming to office the Bush administration has been engaged in a major review of all aspects of its nuclear policy.  This has included radical proposals regarding the size, composition and role of the US nuclear arsenal as well as a major rethinking of Washington’s policy on arms control and non-proliferation.  In December 2001, the Bush administration released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress.  The report itself remains classified but briefings given by DoD officials give a good indication of the main recommendations.  

The latest NPR heralds a paradigmatic shift in US strategic thinking.  Whereas current US strategic forces are based almost exclusively around the nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombers and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the NPR envisions a “new triad” consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear forces, defensive forces and a reserve of de-alerted nuclear forces, better known as the ‘nuclear hedge’.

In practice this shift will include:  

• arsenal reductions - The NPR indicates that the US nuclear arsenal will be reduced to roughly 3,800 operationally deployed warheads by 2007, towards a goal of 1,700-2,200 warheads in the active stockpile by 2012. While the reductions are welcome, in practice this will mean placing the warheads into storage as part of the ‘hedge’ rather than destroying them, thus excluding the ‘hedge’ from a legally binding arsenal reduction treaty. The ‘hedge’ weapons will be available for re-alerting within weeks or months of a decision by Washington to re-instate them in the active arsenal;
  
  

• conversion of Trident - As well as cutting the size of its nuclear force the US military is also giving conventional weapons a greater role in strategic missions previously reserved for the nuclear arsenal.  This move is illustrated by the US decision to convert four of its 18 Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles. The just-released defence budget for 2003 requests $1 billion to begin this work.  The potential benefits to US strategic planning are illustrated by the fact that a single converted submarine could fire almost as many Tomahawk missiles as were fired by the US Navy during the Kosovo crisis.
  
  

• nuclear testing & new nuclear weapons - The Department of Energy will be asked to reduce the amount of time required to prepare a site for a nuclear weapon test from three years to two years or less.  Along with endangering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), accelerating nuclear test site readiness gives a dangerous edge to nuclear planners who may be interested in designing a ‘usable’ nuclear weapon with a yield of 5 kilotons or less.  There has also been widespread speculation that the Bush administration is considering the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as ‘mini-nukes,’ that could defeat hardened and deeply buried targets, such as bunkers housing biological or chemical weapons facilities.  Voices on the right with the ear of the President, such as the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) have been arguing strongly for this.

The United States is undertaking a radical shift in its nuclear policy.  This will involve a smaller nuclear force with greater roles for conventional weapons, bolstered by a new missile defence system and the ‘hedge’ of nuclear weapons that may be re-activated in a relatively short period of time.  It may also involve new roles for nuclear weapons in targeting hardened and deeply buried targets.  To maintain flexibility for all its options, the Bush administration is determined to remain beyond the bounds of binding arms control agreements, such as the CTBT or an extended START process, which would impede new weapons development or further expansion of the active nuclear arsenal.   

The NPR is the latest evidence confirming the Bush administration’s pursuit of a unilateralist agenda in arms control and non-proliferation. It is an agenda that seriously undermines the existing ‘treaty-based’ framework of international arms control. The decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is the ultimate sign of its intentions to act without restraint, without accountability – and without non-proliferation and disarmament principles that the UK Government has strived to develop and uphold.    

This shift in US policy raises a number of questions for the UK Government.  

First, as Britain looks into future options for its nuclear deterrent, should its Trident submarine fleet be converted to conventional use?  

Second, any suggestion that nuclear weapons could be used as anything other than a weapon of last resort has been strongly resisted by both Conservative and Labour governments.  If the United States presses further with this idea of developing new nuclear weapons for tackling hardened and deeply buried targets how would it impact on existing nuclear agreements between the US, NATO and UK?  

Third, this opposition to existing treaties and a refusal to codify reductions will have serious implications for the long-term health of the NPT, which lies at the heart of the existing treaty based efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.  The recent Foreign Affairs Select Committee report on US-UK relations states that: “the United Kingdom has agreed with the United States to a review of the ‘counter-proliferation toolbox’, with a view to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles”. While this review is welcome, in the face of Britain’s dependence on the United States, as outlined above, will London be able to maintain its existing (and more progressive) stance on issues like the NPT and the CTBT?

4. More openness needed in the UK  

While many may criticise the direction of US nuclear policy, the Bush administration is at least conducting the review with some level of public scrutiny and debate.  In the UK, however, there is very little public and parliamentary debate. Moreover, access to information and parliamentary scrutiny of nuclear policy has, if anything, become more difficult under Tony Blair’s Government than under the Major and Thatcher Governments. Until 1995, the UK Trident programme was subjected to detailed scrutiny by the Defence Select Committee’s annual inquiries on ‘Progress of the Trident Programme’. These annual inquiries were introduced following the misleading of Parliament over the Chevaline programme to upgrade Polaris.  

Since the 1997 election, the UK Government has also abandoned the publication of the annual Statements on the Defence Estimates, which during the 1980s and early 1990s provided regular information on nuclear policy.  Instead, a range of documents are published as part of the Ministry of Defence reporting cycle, including MoD performance reports, MoD investment strategies, and occasionally a Defence White Paper.  

With major changes now taking place in US nuclear policy, and significant developments at Aldermaston concerning the future of the UK’s nuclear force, it is imperative that regular and detailed government reporting to Parliament, together with effective parliamentary scrutiny, are restored. This is necessary both in terms of UK strategic nuclear policy and the government’s policy to eliminate nuclear weapons in line with international commitments made under the NPT.  

On several occasions in the past, BASIC has made headline news by disclosing developments in UK defence policy that it learned through US sources. In 1991, for example, US Congressional documents revealed that Britain was about to purchase its first Trident missiles. It would be a healthy improvement for our democracy if discussion of the Government’s position on a replacement or life extension programme for Trident first took place in this distinguished House rather than in the offices of BASIC or Fleet Street.

Thank you for listening.

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