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The Future of Arms Control and Non-ProliferationBASIC’s response to the Speech on Arms Control by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, at King’s College, 6 February 2002. Extracts from the Foreign Secretary’s speech are shown in italics below. The full text of the speech can be found on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office web site. Contents: The Need for New Thinking in Arms Control
The
Foreign Secretary’s review of the role of arms control is an important
and timely undertaking. With the growing threat of terrorist attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), there is an urgent need to
reconsider international arms control and non-proliferation structures and
how they can best function in the modern world.
It is also important to recognise, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out in his speech, that sometimes it will be necessary to take direct action, including in extreme circumstances military action, to stop the rules being broken. However, it was disappointing that he did not qualify this statement by confirming that such action should only be undertaken within the rules of international law, and whenever possible, with the agreement of the United Nations. Indeed, under US leadership, the balance between cooperation and coercion (or ‘counter-proliferation’) in international arms control appears to be shifting dangerously towards the latter, and it would have been useful for the Foreign Secretary to have addressed this issue in more detail. It is an issue that BASIC will be returning to later in the year. Having said this, it is important to recognise that the United Kingdom has displayed a strong and effective commitment to multilateral arms control over recent years. Much political capital has been devoted to supporting key international initiatives such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the draft verification protocol of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Jayantha Dhanapala, Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, noted that “Britain's leadership in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation has been impressive indeed.” Now more than ever, Britain needs to continue in this role. Britain must be poised to accept the new challenges that today’s extraordinary circumstances bring, and become an international leader in drawing attention to, and finding answers to, problems in these difficult issues. UK leadership on combating weapons proliferation could help bridge Cold War-era thinking to help solve new global concerns. FOR MORE INFORMATION BASIC Submission to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 11 December 2001 “Multilateral Approaches to WMD Threats After September 11”, speech to the Arms Control Association, by Jayantha Dhanapala, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs: Foreign and Commonwealth Office – Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Qualitative Arms Control Modern developments, like plastic anti-personnel mines, present new challenges for arms control. Others, such as the spread of harmful know-how through the Internet, and of new techniques for producing biological agents, have undoubtedly made proliferation cheaper and easier. The sheer pace and complexity of scientific developments today means that Treaty negotiations alone may not be fast enough, or cost-effective enough, to deal with them. In the context of exploring new thinking in arms control, we should question whether we are trapped in a technological arms race, or can we build new international agreements based on cooperative security approaches and the peaceful use of science? The emphasis in the United States, and to a lesser extent in other NATO states, including Britain, has been on high technology weapons. Driven by US strategic doctrine, which predates the current administration, and the Revolution in Military Affairs, which stresses the need for superiority in a variety of threat scenarios and on a global basis, the pressure for qualitative improvements in military technology continues unabated. Most arms control agreements to date have dealt with existing rather than future weapons, and the number of such weapons as opposed to their qualities. The Ottawa Convention and the ABM Treaty are notable exceptions. The question of controlling the weapons innovation process itself, however, continues to be ignored – largely because Western democracies are unwilling to give up their technological edge. Proposals for limiting the military use of research and development (R&D) were discussed in some depth within the UN in early 1980s and elsewhere since. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Military Research and Development failed to complete a study on this issue, but its chairman’s draft report suggested that selective bans, particularly at the testing stage, were indeed possible. Issues of international and humanitarian law and may have already influenced some countries not to develop certain weapons. The suspension of the development of the neutron bomb and the prohibition of the dum-dum bullet in the late 1970s, for example, may have been motivated in part by such considerations. So while the possibility of an agreement among the leading technological nations not to develop new destabilising weapons is often treated with disdain, it is not an impossible idea. Given the considerable changes in both technology and within the international political system since the early 1980s, the UK government should support the establishment of a new UN Expert Group to explore a number of options, including:
FOR MORE INFORMATION Chairman’s draft, UN Group of Governmental Experts on Military Research and Development, United Nations, 1 July 1984. Comprehensive study on the military use of research and development: report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, 6 November 1984 Brauch et al, Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology, VU University Press, 1992. UNIDIR, ‘(R)evolution in Military Affairs’, Disarmament Forum, Volume 4, 2001. Missile Defence ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty allows for both the United States and Russia to have “the right to withdraw from this Treaty if [either country] decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests”. In announcing its withdrawal in December 2001, the United States asserted that some countries and non-state entities “are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction” and long-range ballistic missiles and that “it is clear, and has recently been demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons against the United States.” The US withdrawal will become effective on June 13, 2002. However, there are considerable doubts over whether these “extraordinary events” warranted withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Intelligence assessments regarding the capabilities of “rogue states” remain highly contentious and were largely driven by a Republican controlled Congress that was eager to justify missile defence spending. In addition, the latest National Intelligence Estimate stated for the first time that “U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked” with weapons of mass destruction by countries or terrorist groups using “ships, trucks, airplanes or other means.” In addition, much of the technology involved in missile defence remains largely unproven, indicating that the United States could have proceeded with a robust testing programme without violating the ABM Treaty. Philip Coyle, former director of Operational Test and Evaluation, said in August 2001, “For the testing that has yet to be done for many, many years the ABM system will not be a problem. Kwajalein is a test range that is permitted under the ABM treaty, so is White Sands missile range in New Mexico, so we can continue to test there.” There is a strong impression that Washington based its decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty less on security and technical necessity than on political ideology. In being the first nation to pull out from an arms control agreement since the Second World War, and doing so on such questionable grounds, the United States has set a dangerous precedent which other nations may choose to emulate, with disastrous consequences for international law. On December 17, 2001, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov questioned whether other countries would abide by any international agreement, “thinking, logically, that if one country does not abide, why should we?” FOR MORE INFORMATION Text of Diplomatic Notes to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, US Department of State, December13, 2001 “The Missile Trail: An Intelligence Turnaround”, by Michael Dobbs,Washington Post, January 14, 2002 “US National Intelligence Estimate on the Ballistic Missile Threat”, US Central Intelligence Agency, January 10, 2002 “An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System”, Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper, November 30, 2001 “Bush Announces U.S. Intent to Withdraw From ABM Treaty”, Wade Boese, Arms Control Today, January/February 2002 .
The United States has wooed world leaders with the claim that protection from a ‘limited’ missile attack is all that Washington seeks. However, the basic infrastructure of missile defence could be rapidly expanded to provide a far more comprehensive system than the administration currently promotes. Pentagon plans already envision a multi-layered system comprised of a combination of boost-phase, mid-course and terminal interception, which could easily develop into a ‘shield’ around the United States. Such a move would seriously threaten the strategic balance by undermining the Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrent. The desire for such an expansion in capability is clearly present in the United States. According to a June 2000 report by the Welch Commission, a review team appointed to evaluate missile defence, the US program should encompass a “layered defense-in-depth” for greater efficacy than a simple perimeter defence around the US border. The report also endorsed a continued, robust program to develop a Space-Based Laser, part of “the advanced technology program… essential to maintaining the continued effectiveness of both TMD and NMD in the face of threats that will surely advance over time.” The use of space-based interceptors in missile defence would break an internationally observed taboo against spaced-based weaponry, and could spark a new arms race for control of the ultimate military high ground. The potential weaponisation of space is another worrying corollary of US missile defence plans. The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (chaired by Donald Rumsfeld prior to his appointment as for Secretary of Defense) concluded in January 2001: “We know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities…The U.S. has not yet taken the steps necessary to develop the needed capabilities and to maintain and ensure continuing superiority.” FOR MORE INFORMATION Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 2001 .
While the proposed US missile defence system is an unlikely threat to Russia’s expansive nuclear arsenal in the short term, the Foreign Secretary’s comments do not address its potential for sparking international instability. Russia is unable to maintain its nuclear arsenal at its current levels, and must reduce the number of warheads for economic and safety reasons. With a missile defence system in place, Russia will not be comfortable with an ever-shrinking, ageing stockpile. Thus, it may resort to re-deploying Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) weapons, creating the dangerous scenario of Russian forces being on even higher alert status in order to protect its arsenal of fewer, more powerful weapons. In addition, Beijing believes that the US missile defence plans are directed against its own nuclear deterrent, and will seek to expand its nuclear arsenal in order to maintain strategic parity. China is reported to have around 20 DF-5 (CSS-4) missiles capable of reaching the US mainland. However, Beijing is currently engaged in developing a new mobile, solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which would be more effective against US targets, although deployment is at least a decade away. Whether China would have engaged in the build-up irrespective of US missile defence plans is very hard to say. However, in the face of US missile defence plans, China will be able to justify expanding its nuclear arsenal without eliciting strong international reaction. This will have serious impact on stability in South Asia as first India, and subsequently Pakistan, seek to maintain the military balance. FOR MORE INFORMATION “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2001” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2001 “Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear Security”, by Dr. Bruce Blair, Center for Defense Information, 2000 . The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees should conduct a joint inquiry into the implications of participating in a missile defence system for UK defence and foreign policy, and the United Kingdom’s emerging role within US NMD plans, especially the proposed use of RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill. In addition, no further permission should be given for the use of these sites in the NMD program without a full parliamentary discussion and vote. Multilateral alternatives to missile defense do exist. Recent work towards an International Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles is welcome and such control alternatives should be thoroughly explored as providing a more comprehensive and less destabilising solution than missile defense. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) US concerns and the verification protocol
The British government and the international community as a whole will have considerable difficulty in resolving the current BTWC impasse. This is due to a contradictory US stance: while Washington demands an end to non-compliance, it has refused to permit the development of an international regime of declarations, transparency visits and on-site inspections, which would do much to combat illicit biological weapon (BW) research and weaponisation, and would bolster the enforcement of the BTWC regime. Washington’s position, taken following its concerns over national security, corporate intellectual property rights and enforceability, has left a dangerous gap in the international control regime – a crack that must be mended with increased diplomatic activity in the coming weeks, months and years. In the long term, Britain and the EU should seek to persuade the United States that such a limited approach is detrimental to Western security as it fails to provide an effective means of investigating and attacking non-compliance. An approach encompassing national, regional, and multilateral initiatives must be undertaken to provide a comprehensive control regime for biological weapons and their components. However, in the short term, the goal must be to find common ground between the US stance and the position taken by the majority of states parties, so that the reconvened BTWC Review Conference results in the establishment of a progressive framework for enforcing the BW prohibition. Britain and the EU have an important role to play as honest brokers in this process, seeking to build upon the US proposals and setting them in a multilateral context wherever this is appropriate. FOR MORE INFORMATION “Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention RevCon Meeting”, John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, November 19, 2001 “A Turning Point to Nowhere?”, by Jenni Rissanen, Disarmament Diplomacy, July-August 2001 “BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following US Rejection”, by Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, Arms Control Today, September 2001 . Continued British engagement on this issue is crucial. The Foreign Secretary is right to highlight the need for persistence and engagement to work towards common goals through negotiation. His upcoming paper on the issue should be a welcome and constructive addition. However, recent statements by US officials suggest that compromise will remain elusive in the short-term. John Bolton followed his critical remarks at the RevCon by launching another stinging assault on the AHG approach in a speech on 11 January at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. He noted, “The process that we've followed these past seven years of the Ad Hoc Group has led us into a ditch… We're not going to proceed with the draft protocol.” Such sentiments do not bode well for a long term multilateral solution involving the United States. With this in mind, Britain should consider regional alternatives for a BTWC compliance regime. In particular, London could harness the progressive leadership consistently shown by the EU during AHG negotiations to begin discussions to form a regional European BW control regime. Whilst in the short term such a regime could be developed with EU partners and with the closely aligned EU Associated countries, there also exists the possibility of extending this approach to include other states in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, with the possibility of encouraging the Russian Federation to join as well. Such an end goal – to provide a channel for a neighbourly negotiation through which Russia can convincingly demonstrate that it has irreversibly eliminated the last remnants of its illicit BW activities – would have enormous regional and global significance. Furthermore, such an approach if successful could provide a useful template for other regional initiatives and in the future could form the core of a road map for a future global regime, ready for when the international community is ready for such an initiative. FOR MORE INFORMATION The Biological Weapons Convention: Challenges and Opportunities, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, speech at the Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 11, 2002 Disease by Design: De-mystifying the Biological Weapons Debate, by Michael Crowley, BASIC Research Report, November 2001 Countries Confront Obstacles to Strengthened BWC, by David Grahame, BASIC Reports #79, February 2002 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
While the Bush administration continues to state that it intends to uphold the testing moratorium put in place in 1992, the latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) intimates that this may not last forever. The Review indicated that the Bush administration will request that the Department of Energy accelerate the amount of time required to prepare a site for a nuclear weapon test. Assistant Secretary of Defence J.D. Crouch, citing a recent study on test site readiness, explained, “Two to three years from a decision to test is too long… if you were to have a problem with a weapon system that you needed to rectify using a test, you would want to be able to do that faster.” In addition, although the Bush administration continues to insist that it will not pursue ratification of the CTBT during its tenure, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz noted in June 2001 that the United States may contemplate resuming nuclear testing “if we develop questions about the reliability or safety of our nuclear weapons”. The NPR also indicates the administration’s continued interest in researching the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. The reduced readiness time for US nuclear test sites gives a dangerous edge to nuclear planners who may be interested in designing a ‘usable’ nuclear weapon with a yield of 5 kilotons or less. Decreasing the time for nuclear weapons testing preparations is a clear precursor to what the Bush administration has considered all along: testing of new nuclear weapons designs that would add a low-yield “mini-nuke” to the U.S. arsenal. Accelerating nuclear test site readiness time endangers the testing moratorium and makes a mockery of the CTBT, signed by over 165 countries, including the United States under the Clinton administration. While the British Government can do little diplomatically until there is a formal shift in the US position, it should urge Washington to ratify the CTBT and avoid any moves that might undermine the testing moratorium. As noted in 1999 in a joint article by Tony Blair, French President, Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, “failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a failure in our struggle against proliferation… rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence within NATO.” FOR MORE INFORMATION NPR Point-Counterpoint: BASIC’s Response to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, February 2002 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization “CTBT Rogue State”, by Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Today, December 2001 “US Testing: Changes to Nuclear Testing Policy”, by David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire, January 2001, UK Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
As noted by the Foreign Secretary, Britain indeed has become more transparent about its holdings of nuclear warheads and fissile material, and has promoted important research in the field of verification. However, access to information and parliamentary scrutiny of nuclear policy has, if anything, become more difficult under Tony Blair’s Government than under the Major and Thatcher Governments. Until 1995, the UK Trident programme was subjected to detailed scrutiny by the Defence Select Committee’s annual inquiries on ‘Progress of the Trident Programme’. Since the 1997 election, the UK Government has also abandoned the publication of the annual Statements on the Defence Estimates, which during the 1980s and early 1990s provided regular information on nuclear policy. This lack of transparency and accountability to Parliament on nuclear policy is reminiscent of the situation in the 1970s, when the lack of detail provided in the Defence White Papers were part of a secretive environment that allowed the Chevaline scandal to unfold. With major changes now taking place in US nuclear policy, and significant developments at Aldermaston concerning the future of the UK’s nuclear force, it is imperative that regular and detailed government reporting to Parliament, together with effective parliamentary scrutiny, are restored. The need for greater scrutiny of British nuclear policy is even more acute in advance of the first PrepCom of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, due to be held in April 2002. Along with the other NPT nuclear weapon states, the UK committed itself at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to a series of 13 steps designed to tighten controls on nuclear weapons and further disarmament, including the landmark goal of “total elimination of nuclear weapons”. In advance of the upcoming PrepCom, the UK Government should produce a programme of action detailing how it intends to fulfil these commitments. This would help to demonstrate the UK’s ongoing commitment to nuclear disarmament and its support for the long-term health of the NPT. FOR MORE INFORMATION Secrecy and Dependence: The UK Trident System in the 21st Century, BASIC Research Report, November 2001 The international community clearly still needs multilateral arms control and non-proliferation agreements to help stem flow of weapons and their components worldwide. The twin threats of WMD proliferation and transnational terrorism are global dilemmas that cannot be combated solely by national means. Nonetheless, there also must be a willingness to embrace new approaches and frameworks. Worries about non-compliance must be heeded and effective verification complemented by a readiness to enforce treaty obligations. The UK Government has been leading by example on a number of policy initiatives, as set out in the speech by the Foreign Secretary. In particular, the UK Government has been working within international institutions to develop a number of progressive arms control and non-proliferation policies, especially in relation to nuclear and biological weapons and small arms control. Given the current uncooperative attitude of the United States on these issues, the UK Government could and must do more, however. New norms and regimes have to be developed by the international community in the coming months and years, otherwise we risk a downward spiral of state defections and non-compliance from existing arms control regimes and a return to arms racing and anarchy within the international system Back to Nuclear and WMD home page |
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