A Brief History of the NPT

"Unless there is substantial progress – evidence in the nuclear disarmament field – we are going to have very serious erosion of the confidence of states parties to the Treaty. This could be quite dangerous for the future, and so I would hope that the nuclear-weapon states in particular and the other supporters of the indefinite extension of the Treaty . . . would bear this in mind and work together with other states parties to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty are fulfilled, and soon."

UN Under Secretary General Jayanatha Dhanapala, President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, speaking shortly after the Treaty was made permanent.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. All but four countries have ratified the NPT.

The NPT divides parties into two classifications: those that tested nuclear weapons before 1968, and those that did not. The former states -- known as "nuclear-weapon states" -- are China, France, Russia (then the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States. These states were allowed -- temporarily -- to maintain their nuclear status. Other countries joined the NPT as "non-nuclear-weapon states". In return for committing never to develop or receive nuclear weapons, these countries were given two promises:

• Commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to nuclear disarmament

• Access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology

The NPT entered into force in 1970, and for most of its history, the nuclear-weapon states ignored the commitment to nuclear disarmament. With the end of the Cold War, nuclear arsenals have declined in size. However, most non-nuclear-weapon states have expressed frustration at the slow pace of disarmament.

As called for in the Treaty, in 1995, 25 years after its entry-into-force, a Conference was held to determine the fate of the NPT. States parties could agree to make the Treaty permanent (indefinite extension, the position supported by the United States and most Western states), extend it by one or more set periods, or end the Treaty entirely (an outcome no one viewed as remotely possible). After months a heavy diplomatic lobbying before the Conference, and intense negotiations during it, states parties agreed to three interlinked decisions: indefinite extension of the Treaty; a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; and an enhanced review process for the Treaty. See BASIC's page on the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for more information.

After the 1995 meeting, three Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings were held under the strengthened review process, in 1997, 1998, and 1999. Although the PrepComs undertook substantive debate (as called for in the 1995 agreement), no definitive results were obtained. This was primarily because the nuclear-weapon states have refused to agree to any substantive statements at the PrepCom. For example, at the 1998 PrepCom, Canada proposed that the PrepCom issue a declaration endorsing the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and calling for its entry-into-force. This proposal was rejected by the nuclear-weapon states.

Despite lack of agreed outcomes from the PrepComs, the 2000 Review Conference went forward under the strong guidance of Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria.  His proposals for a work plan were quickly endorsed by the participant states.

The 187 states parties to the treaty undertook rigorous debate and negotiations on a variety of nuclear issues, including export regulations, technology transfers, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, regional instability from nuclear weapons possession, and weapons non-proliferation and disarmament.  Both the process of negotiation itself and the agreements reached were unprecedented in moving disarmament efforts forward.  The conference reached unparalleled levels of consensus, and was notable for a new agreement on steps toward nuclear disarmament.  Of particular note was the fact that the New Agenda Coalition of non-nuclear states took a leading role and negotiated with the “nuclear five” directly.

The conference’s final document broke new ground in the regional issues and disarmament arenas.  The meeting’s final report acknowledged by name, for the first time ever, the states who are not parties to the treaty, and strongly urged India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the treaty as non-nuclear states.  Nuclear weapon states agreed to language on disarmament measures that emphasized the goal of “total elimination” of nuclear arsenals through progressive steps, such as a ban on fissile material production, a moratorium on nuclear testing pending entry into force of the CTBT, reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security policy, and greater transparency regarding nuclear capabilities. 

While many of the measures were vaguely worded and a timeline for action on these concepts was notably absent, the NPT Review Conference made significant progress in prodding nuclear weapon states to increase accountability for their arsenals and encouraging concrete steps toward global nuclear disarmament.  The conference’s unexpected success provides a checklist of accountability that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments can use in the coming five years to advance the political process in a variety of institutions.

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