Joint Ministerial Declaration:

TOWARDS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE WORLD:
THE NEED FOR A NEW AGENDA

Glossary

The numbering of the paragraphs in this Glossary corresponds to the relevant paragraphs in the Declaration.

1. The nuclear weapon states also known as the P5 are Britain, China, France, the Russian Federation and the US. Nuclear weapons-capable states are: India, Pakistan and Israel. They are not declared nuclear weapon states.

2. The Canberra Commission was an initiative of the Australian government and reported in 1996. The conclusions of the Report are considered a moderate and authoritative presentation of the case for nuclear disarmament in the post Cold War era. There are many parallels between its approach and that of the present Declaration.

3.(a) The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1993.* It represents a model for nuclear disarmament. The CWC is a total ban on development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of CW and includes a comprehensive verification mechanism to oversee its implementation by States Parties.

(b) The Biological Weapons Convention (BTWC) which was concluded in 1972 bans biological weapons but lacks a verification mechanism. Currently negotiations are taking place in Geneva to develop this Treaty in depth. Ireland is an original State Party to both the CWC and the BTWC.

4. The nuclear weapon states interpret their obligations under Article VI of the NPT as requiring nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament. The non-nuclear states reject this. The language of the Treaty supports this interpretation. However, in view of the nuclear weapon states' interpretation, there is required - in addition to what is contained in the Treaty but without amending the Treaty - a statement of political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, as such a political commitment would require a novel approach to nuclear force reductions - each step being premised on elimination.

5. The adherence to the NPT and the halt of nuclear weapons development by the vast majority of states represented a restraint which was premised on rapid nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapon states are clearly in default in the performance of their obligations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

6. The ICJ agreed that the nuclear weapon states were obliged to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. This obligation is not couched in terms of general and complete disarmament as the nuclear weapons states have attempted to interpret Article VI of the NPT, and it is therefore a landmark statement.

7. Nuclear weapons like other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons will have to be prohibited in due course. The ICJ Opinion has undermined the arguments for the retention of nuclear weapons. The possibility of the use of nuclear weapons consistent with humanitarian law, the laws of neutrality etc, are presented in the Opinion as unreal and implausible. However, to adopt an approach that foresees the rapid abolition of these weapons will require a political decision, on the basis of which a legal framework giving effect to that inevitable conclusion can be begun.

8. The United States and the Russian Federation have by far the largest arsenals and they must therefore begin the process of force reductions premised on their rapid elimination. However, Britain, France and China will have to be integrated into this process at the appropriate time as once the US and RF reduce their nuclear forces to a certain point, the security of all the nuclear weapon states becomes interlinked in a more fundamental way. The most unstable period in nuclear disarmament will occur when nuclear arsenals are a minimum. It is therefore necessary to integrate the smaller nuclear states and the nuclear capable states into that process from the start. Appropriate arrangements relating to India, Pakistan and Israel will also have to be included in this process.

9. The Declaration does not follow recent approaches to nuclear disarmament which call for a programme with fixed time-frames for the complete dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons negotiated multilaterally. Instead, the Declaration proposes the use of existing bilateral machinery and its development to take account of the need to incorporate the other nuclear weapon states at an appropriate stage in the process.

10. The nuclear weapon states themselves have been considering what measures should be taken to stabilize existing nuclear weapon deployments. The most urgently needed of such measures are called for in the Declaration.

11. This paragraph is addressed expressly at the nuclear weapons-capable states, India, Pakistan and Israel to secure their renunciation of nuclear weapons. It includes a call to join the NPT - clearly with non-nuclear weapon status - as South Africa and the Ukraine have done in the wake of democratization and to take the necessary measures, such as submitting to full-scope safeguards and dismantling their nuclear weapons capability. They are also called upon to sign and ratify the CTBT without conditions. Israel has signed but not ratifed the CTBT.

12. The control of fissile material has always been central to the process of nuclear disarmament. In a nuclear weapons-free world, all fissile material will be controlled by the IAEA as is now the case with the fissile material in Ireland and other non-nuclear weapons states. The negotiation of a cut-off of the production of fissile material is an obvious first step.

13. This paragraph develops paragraph 12 and emphasizes that the verification regime which will be required to secure the world free from nuclear weapons will require controls on all fissile material and controls over all other relevant components of nuclear weapons and weapons systems. The emergence of any new nuclear weapons-capable states (or the acquisition of a nuclear device by terrorists) during this process clearly jeopardizes the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, leaving as it does a state or entity with a capacity to threaten at the same time as that capacity is being relinquished by the existing nuclear weapon states.

14. Negative security assurances or guarantees by the nuclear weapon states that they will not attack any non-nuclear weapon state, are considered important as interim measures which should be in place during the process of nuclear disarmament. There are currently different approaches by the nuclear weapon states in this regard and indications from some that they are moving away from earlier more comprehensive assurances in this regard.

15. The conclusion of nuclear weapon-free zones is considered to be an important contributory step in preventing proliferation at regional level. The two areas of tension where there are no such zones are the Middle East and South Asia. Nuclear weapon-free zones are an incremental means of preventing nuclear armaments' development and deployment.

16. The multilateral negotiating structures required to elaborate the treaty or treaties that will make up the regime to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons for all time, is not outlined here in detail. However, there is clearly a role for multilateral diplomacy in nuclear disarmament. The final abolition and prohibition of nuclear weapons will require a non-discriminatory Convention prohibiting these weapons, and this will have to be negotiated by sovereign states in equality and in a multilateral environment.

17. While the Declaration does not define the types of treaty or conventions required, it is clear that there will be a legal instrument or set of instruments to prohibit these weapons. Many proposals have been put forward, including the possibility of amending the NPT or adding protocols, or even the elaboration of a single nuclear weapons convention.

18. This Declaration represents a call for the launching of a reinvigorated process. It acknowledges the efforts that have been made but it also recognizes that these have been inadequate and that the international community needs to proceed with a novel commitment to nuclear disarmament. This initiative will be followed up at the General Assembly of the United Nations later this year.

*[This in incorrect. The CWC opened for signature in 1993 but did not enter into force until 1996.]

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Thanks to Robert Green for providing this text.

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