The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, April 2005
 
"Towards A Breakthrough at the 2005 NPT Review Conference"
Report from an off-the-record consultation hosted jointly with
UNIDIR Palais des Nations, Geneva, 13 April 2005.
Rapporteur: Nigel Chamberlain, BASIC[1]
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Introduction
This report is a brief summary of the main points and conclusions
of an off-the-record consultation for delegates to the NPT Review
Conference held in Geneva on 13 April 2005. It reflects the rapporteurs'
personal interpretations of the proceedings - as such they do not
constitute any institutional policy of BASIC, ORG or UNIDIR nor
do they necessarily represent the views of the rapporteurs.
The consultation was well supported by States Parties delegations,
both in terms of numbers and in willingness to engage in debate.
The following four themes were the focus of the debate:
- The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
- Strengthening Verification and Compliance
- Fulfilling the Disarmament Obligations
- Achieving a Successful Outcome in 2005
UNIDIR co-hosted the consultation at the Palais des Nations and
we are indebted for their invaluable assistance and support.
This consultation was organised as part of a BASIC-ORG project
to promote concrete, achievable recommendations to strengthen the
non-proliferation, compliance and disarmament functions of the NPT
(see http://www.basicint.org/npt/).
An overview document, Breakthrough or Bust in '05, published
in January 2005 set out the main thrust of the project and 16 topic-specific
briefings were published during the following three months and are
being circulated to government delegations. A final document from
the project, promoting our own final recommendations (which are
informed by the discussions in Geneva), will also be circulated
to government delegations in New York.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
See BASIC-ORG Briefings: 7 (FMCT);
12 (IAEA Safeguards); and 16
(Nuclear Fuel Cycle).
In Breakthrough or Bust in '05? we alluded to the sensitive
balance between Article VI obligations and Article
IV rights and said, with regard to the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle:
...the emphasis by the Non-Nuclear Weapon States on their
'inalienable' right to develop nuclear technology needs to be balanced
by recognition of the further restrictions and controls necessary
to prevent latent proliferation.
Noting that this issue had been the subject of much comment in
the last two years and that diversion from civil programmes to military
programmes had occurred in the past, and could be repeated relatively
easy elsewhere, we restated our belief that enhanced multilateral
efforts are needed to curb nuclear proliferation.
However, we added that it is not clear that nuclear power generation
is advisable, sustainable or can be made proliferation resistant.
Furthermore, any debate about extending access to nuclear power
generation should include consideration of spent fuel and nuclear
waste management, fissile material security and the controversial
Mixed Oxide (MOX) proposal. Greater support for alternative energy
sources should also be a consideration.
During the ensuing debate a number of key ideas were raised:
- The concept of balance:
- Potential agreement on stricter controls over access to
nuclear power generation must be accompanied by progress on
nuclear disarmament to achieve a balanced outcome
- Discussions about the fuel cycle must be within the context
of the NPT, not with direct reference to specific countries,
and based on general and accepted principles
- Care should be taken with any suggestion of 're-interpreting'
Article VI and its possible implications for upsetting the
balance of the Treaty, which must continue to reflect the
global perspective of all three pillars
- The scope for voluntary arrangements:
- Real incentives should be provided to increase voluntary
involvement in further restrictive conditions
- Exporting countries also have a sovereign right to decide
who to supply and this may restrict the inalienable right
of receiving countries
- The problem of 'guaranteed access':
- Access to the fuel supply market is different from guaranteed
supply as export controls and changing national criteria can
result in denied access to supply
- There may be several ways of dealing with this issue such
as case-by-case criteria, regional approaches and demonstration
of peaceful intent for guaranteed access to fuel supply
- A need for greater fissile material control:
- The FMCT would be a significant disarmament measure as well
as a non-proliferation measure to control and reduce fissile
material, but verification is clearly desirable
- Increased transparency and extra measures, such as the ratification
of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a condition of supply,
are increasingly necessary
Clearly, the world is no longer in an idealised 'Atoms for Peace'
era and the agreements entered into in the 1970s should be updated
(but not re-interpreted), to reflect this reality in a non-discriminatory
manner. Once it is accepted that there are problems that need addressing,
NPT States Parties should be able to objectively consider the multilateral
proposals on the table and move forward collaboratively.
Strengthening Verification and Compliance
See BASIC-ORG Briefings: 1 (Strengthening
the NPT Regime); 3 (Security Assurances);
6 (DPRK); 9 (Illegality);
11 (Universality); 12
(IAEA Safeguards); 13 (Compliance);
and 15 (Iran).
In the recent past terrorist threats, illicit trade, compliance
evasion and withdrawal from the NPT have posed serious threats to
the integrity of the Treaty. Compliance is not limited to non-proliferation
but also applies to nuclear disarmament obligations. Yet the NPT
has no secretariat, no annual decision-making body and no executive.
This 'institutional deficit' constrains effectiveness. UNSC Resolution
1540 does have a reporting requirement, something that could be
adopted as a confidence-building measure by NPT States Parties.
Effective verification measures provide the tools through which
compliance is monitored in other treaties and should be applicable
to the NPT.
UNSC Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative,
if implemented correctly and made universal, could be seen as a
logical expansion of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
Accurate and timely intelligence is a critical element in detecting
illicit activity and potential threats. Additionally, how to avoid
and respond to declarations of NPT withdrawal is a key problem that
needs to be addressed Discussion on international inspection and
verification is also essential, as non-compliance must be seen to
attract punitive action.
During the ensuing debate, the following issues were aired:
- Proposals for improving institutional effectiveness:
- The 'institutional deficit' of the Treaty requires remedial
action and cannot be deferred indefinitely. 'Permanence with
accountability' is required
- Annual meetings could replace the PrepComs and be charged
with decision-making. Extraordinary meetings could be called
to address possible violations
- Further discussion on the need for new mechanisms is required,
in particular would new mechanisms be any more effective and
how much might new institutional arrangements cost?
- Compliance and accountability:
- Accountability could be enhanced by systematic and mandatory
annual reporting of activity
- There remains real difficulty in assessing compliance and
who should decide. State Parties need to give further thought
to devising a non-discriminatory mechanism or procedure for
dealing with this compliance deficit
- The role of the NNWS is not passive as active vigilance
on compliance is needed to ensure non-proliferation, peaceful
use and progress on nuclear disarmament
- Care needs to be taken to ensure that enhanced compliance
measures do not conflict with the rule of international law
- Compliance should not be seen as a la carte but as
referring to both Treaty obligations and Review Conference
commitments
- The preference among some States Parties for the 2005 Review
Conference to downplay or re-interpret Article VI commitments
while simultaneously seeking to strengthen discipline in non-proliferation
compliance is a recipe for failure
- Non-compliance:
- A corrosive message has been sent out to the international
community by two years of inactivity in response to the DPRK's
violations
- It is time to develop a set of intermediate mechanisms to
deal with non-compliance before resort to the UNSC. For example,
it would strengthen the NPT regime if there were a clear and
universally understood regime of incentives for moving towards
full compliance and progressive disincentives for moves towards
non-compliance and withdrawal
- Objective criteria are needed for assessing non-compliance
- Existing verification tools must be brought to bear via
the IAEA Additional Protocol
If States Parties find the status quo satisfactory, then they will
perceive no need for change. However, many States Parties conclude
that the Treaty has received substantial shocks and see a clear
need for new approaches. Many see the need for interim mechanisms,
or benchmarks for compliance monitoring, between what can be realistically
dealt with by the IAEA before referral to the UNSC. A standing bureau
could offer consistent, appropriate and timely responses to events.
Past Review Conferences have endorsed other external mechanisms
such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The same could be possible
for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Fulfilling Disarmament Obligations
See BASIC-ORG Briefings: 1 (Strengthening
the NPT Regime); 2 (NWFZ); 4
(CTBT); 5 (Mutual Defence Agreement);
8 (NATO Nuclear Sharing); 9
(Illegality); 10 (Nuclear Disarmament
by the NWS); 11 (Universality); and
14 (Qualitative Developments in Nuclear Weapons).
The 2000 Review Conference Final Document was an important political
declaration and remains the benchmark for progress in meeting disarmament
and non-proliferation commitments and expectations. Re-affirmation
of the disarmament commitments from 2000 is significant. Establishing
criteria for monitoring compliance under Article VI would be valuable,
as would agreements on the next multilateral and bilateral steps
on nuclear disarmament.
The Moscow Treaty is a helpful confidence-building measure, not
a disarmament measure. But the process needs to advance from de-alerting
to elimination and delegitmise the embedded concept of a non-deployed
nuclear 'hedge' arsenal. Washington and Moscow have both indicated
a willingness to discuss their tactical or sub-strategic warhead
holdings. A declaration of a moratorium on the research into and
development of new nuclear weapons deployment would be a welcome
step given earlier disarmament agreements. The re-affirmation of
the testing moratorium is a minimum requirement followed by the
entry-into-force of the CTBT. The establishment of a NWFZ in the
Middle East also requires further discussion at the Review Conference
with the development of interim recommendations to work towards
a NWFZ.
During the ensuing debate, the following issues were aired:
- Emphasis on the '13-steps':
- Re-affirming existing commitments is a crucial confidence-building
measure
- Agreements reached in 2005 must build on, not replace those
reached in 1995 and 2000
- Alternatively, history has moved on since 2000 and too much
emphasis on the 13 steps could be constraining
- Political will is needed to make progress and set further
objectives
- On the issue of 'balance':
- A balanced approach is necessary but trade-offs between
the pillars is likely to be damaging to the integrity of the
Treaty as whole, even if the difficulties of negotiating either
small clusters of thematic bargains or a grander 'new bargain'
could be overcome
- 'Balance' and 'success' are general and vague concepts
that may contribute to suggestions of failure if target policy
outcomes are not realised
- Alternatively, a balanced outcome is important as it respects
the essential bargain at the heart of the Treaty
- Differing threat perceptions lead to differing interpretations
of what is required at the Review Conference
- On 'success':
- Success can be marked by a reasonable, consensual evaluation
of what has happened in the last five years and where to get
to in the next five years
- Success will reaffirm the primacy of the NPT as the international
non-proliferation framework: the integrity of the Treaty is
the key common concern
- The objective of the Review Conference should be to achieve
a Final Document but it is not crucial for the outcome to
be declared a success
- Success can be achieved if the authority and effectiveness
of the NPT has been enhanced
- Reaffirmation and implementation are the keys to a successful
outcome.
- Negotiations should avoid confrontation at the Review Conference
but recognise differences
This was a complex and philosophical debate, which went some way
towards laying the groundwork for shared understanding on concepts
and interpretation in preparation for the negotiations in New York.
It was suggested that the French word 'equilibre' is a much better
way of exploring what is meant by 'balance'. The NPT is in a process
of dynamic equilibrium and the negotiations need to find the balance
point within it. To achieve 'equilibre' at the Review Conference,
delegations must accept the principle of compliance by
all States Parties, for all States Parties.
Civil society and the NPT
ORG Director John Sloboda's concluding remarks are incorporated
here to indicate the growing importance of civil society engagement
with governments in helping to shape the direction and pace of non-proliferation
and nuclear disarmament. This particular dialogue process with,
and between, civil servants and civil society is a case in point.
The responses from delegations to our work have generally been upbeat,
and it is our hope that this work has assisted dialogues which could
add to the possibility of positive outcomes at the Review Conference
by the end of May 2005.
Closing remarks by John Sloboda, Director, Oxford Research
Group
The aim of the seminar in Geneva was to add value to the NPT review
process. If it has achieved this, then it did so as a result of
a co-operative will between governments and NGOs. This will to co-operate
is, perhaps, stronger than it has ever been. Ten years ago, typical
government-NGO relations were characterised by mutual suspicion.
Many governments attempted to manage NGOs by keeping them at bay.
NGOs responded by protest and confrontation. Today we see many more
examples of co-operation and mutual respect. This benefits both
government and NGOs.
Government benefits because:
- NGOs bring expertise and fresh ideas;
- NGOs are a conduit between government and civil society; and
- NGOs provide channels for public awareness and education, filling
gaps left by the mainstream media.
NGOs benefit because:
- Positive engagement encourages NGOs to develop mature and constructive
activity; and
- Openness by governments allows NGOs to catalyse a nuanced government-civil
society dialogue (rather than a polarised mud-slinging exchange,
which benefits no one).
NGOs and civil society will be with government delegations in New
York - in unprecedented numbers and with unprecedented levels of
organisation. They will be watching them, debating with them, projecting
their words and actions to a worldwide constituency. They do this,
not because they mistrust the delegations, or want to thwart them,
but because they recognise the profound importance of their work,
and the momentous consequences of the decision they take, and the
agreements they reach, or fail to reach. Like the vast majority
of the delegations, NGOs and civil society want the conference to
succeed.
What is success? This was well expressed by one of the seminar's
participating state representatives as: "an outcome which reconfirms
the validity of the NPT in all its aspects as a central political
element for international stability with a view to its universalisation".
Notes
[1] Preserving the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Mohamed ElBaradei, Disarmament Forum, UNIDIR four 2004.
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