The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 16, April 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The “Achilles Heel” of the Non- Proliferation
Regime?
Background
Under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), all States
Parties have the “inalienable right to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with Articles I and II”. Also under Article IV,
all states have “the right to participate in the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. Thus a party
to the NPT in good standing is allowed the means to produce highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium - key nuclear weapons (“fissile”)
materials that also have commercial uses - and stockpile them without
limit as long as they are placed under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
While exact quantities are unknown, estimates put the total global
quantity of fissile material at more than 3,700 metric tons, theoretically
enough for hundreds of thousands of nuclear weapons, in about 50
countries. This stockpile grows each year, along with the difficulty
of ensuring that such material is not diverted. In short, the development
of nuclear power as a source of energy makes it more likely that
materials are diverted into nuclear weapons programmes.
Worries about dual-use enrichment and reprocessing technology are
not new and received much attention in the 1970s, soon after the
NPT was signed. However, Iranian pursuit of a broad nuclear technology
programme, and nuclear weapons developments in India, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea and Pakistan (all of which involved the use of civil
nuclear energy as cover), have prompted many states to re-think
the basic nuclear technology bargain.
The balancing of rights of States Parties to have nuclear technology
(under Article IV) while addressing the proliferation threat posed
by the development of such technology will be a key issue at the
2005 Review Conference. But while attention has been drawn to the
dangers involved in the widespread proliferation of uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing technology, there is no international
consensus on how to deal with the problem.
Recent Developments
The proposal that adherence to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards
should be the compliance norm for any country seeking nuclear technology
for commercial purposes was discussed and endorsed in Briefing
No.12. A number of key actors have put forward further far-reaching
proposals:
- In February 2004, President Bush proposed to cap the group
of enriching states, and the G8 responded by declaring a one-year
moratorium on supply to no non-possessing states.
- In February 2005, Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA Director General,
proposed a five-year moratorium on building new facilities for
uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, with guaranteed supply
of nuclear fuel for bona fide uses. He also suggested that the
five-year hiatus be used to develop better long-term options for
managing these technologies, such as regional centres under multilateral
control. Multilateral ownership of all civilian enrichment facilities
and possibly other sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle was
backed by a recent IAEA Expert Group study.
- The UN High Level Panel recommended a combination of voluntary
action and multilateral control. It called for a temporary moratorium
on the construction of enrichment and reprocessing facilities,
with fissile materials supplied at current market prices, while
a new multilateral agreement is negotiated under which the IAEA
would act as guarantor for the supply of fissile materials for
non-military use.
Some proposals envision different rules for different states depending
on their non-proliferation and security records. Such new rules
could be imposed through supplier cartels such as the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, but would inevitably exclude many export capable states.
Any permanent renunciation of certain fuel cycle capabilities would
amount to a formal change in the “bargain” of the NPT. As the IAEA
Expert Group notes:
A new binding international norm stipulating that sensitive
fuel cycle activities are to be conducted exclusively in the context
of Multilateral Nuclear Approaches and no longer as a national
undertaking would amount to a change in the scope of Article IV
of the NPT.
Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An Oxymoron?
In the 1960s, nuclear power was seen as clean, safe and efficient.
And ‘Atoms for Peace’ formed a key foundation stone for the NPT.
But atti- tudes towards nuclear power have changed over the ensuing
decades and many countries have started to phase it out of their
energy mix or have avoided it altogether. Despite a recent renaissance,
owing to the decline of fossil fuels, climate change and the lobbying
power of the nuclear industry, nuclear power remains a highly controversial
energy choice for longstanding economic, environmental and security
reasons.
Although the reactor does not directly produce any greenhouse gasses,
the nuclear fuel chain, and especially the production of construction
materials, is a significant source of such emissions. Problems of
the disposal of radioactive waste, and radioactive contamination
of the air, water and land at all points in the life cycle of a
nuclear reactor, are major disincentives to reviving the industry’s
fortunes.
An alternative, proposed by Leonard Weiss of the Arms Control Association,
would be to explore how to develop an ‘Energy for Peace’ Programme,
that would “...include cooperative assistance in energy planning
to help determine the best, most efficient mix of energy technologies
for individual countries. ...nuclear energy would be used only if
it competed with alternative sources, taking into account environmental
and other costs, including security”. (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Weiss.asp)
However, given the potential of solar power and other renewable
technologies there may be no need to use nuclear power at all.
This suggestion could be extended to the development of an International
Sustainable Energy Fund (ISEF), of a scale of at least the equivalence
of the G8 Global Partnership Programme (designed to safeguard the
weapons complex of the FSU). As a substitute for ‘Atoms for Peace’,
the ISEF would promote in the NNWS renewable technologies, energy
efficiency and new applications that are clean, safe and inexhaustible
in supply. Part of the funding for the ISEF could come from monies
saved from phasing out subsidies for conventional and nuclear energy
production and consumption in industrialized countries. Such a Fund
would help assure a safer, cleaner world with access to more affordable
and more reliable energy.
Future Prospects
The 2005 Review Conference provides a unique opportunity to establish
greater levels of international cooperation in setting a higher
universal norm in controlling dangerous fissile materials. Past
initiatives failed because proliferation concerns were not seen
as serious enough and economic incentives were insufficient. Concerns
about security of fuel supply were also central, especially among
NNWS. Most NNWS regard access to nuclear technology as their right
under Article IV of the NPT, and further resent what they regard
as the implication that developing countries are not to be trusted
with technology possessed by some developed states.
While most NNWS, for several reasons, are reluctant to give up
this right, they might be prepared to entertain a “new bargain”,
provided that:
- it is realised by universal principles applying to all States;
- the NWS take additional steps towards nuclear disarmament and
commit to similar constraints; and
- a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is included
in the agreement (since this would eventually bring NWS and non-NPT
States Parties to the same level as NNWS).
The new restrictions would then apply to all States and facilities,
without exception. Thus, delegates at the Review Conference have
an opportunity to strengthen the non-proliferation regime at a time
when it is under serious stress. Multilateral controls on the nuclear
fuel cycle would also buy time in which to consider more sustainable
ways to meet our energy needs. The conversion to a renewable energy
economy is not a problem of limited technologies but of political
priorities.
Recommendations
States Parties should:
1. Take steps to strengthen overall controls on the nuclear fuel
cycle and the transfer of technology, including safeguards and export
controls;
2. For reasons of effectiveness, legitimacy and promotion of global
norms generally, seriously develop proposals for multilateral controls
over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle; and
3. For reasons of cost, sustainable development and non-proliferation,
seriously develop proposals for an ‘Energy for Peace’ Programme
and establish an International Sustainable Energy Fund.
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