The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 15, April 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Addressing the Challenge of Iran
Background
Iran is developing an extensive nuclear programme with the aim
of installing 6,000 MW of generating capacity over the next 20 years.
This includes completion of the Bushehr reactors by Russia, which
will supply and take back used fuel. Iran also wishes to diversify
nuclear generation with different types of reactors and eventually
achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle.
Iran has the ‘right’ to develop these facilities under Non Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) safeguards. However, recent revelations about dual-use
aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme have heightened long-standing
concerns over Tehran’s ultimate intentions.
Nuclear weapons developments in India, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan
all involved the use of civil nuclear energy as cover. This must
not be allowed to happen again. Iran must be held to its promises
under the NPT. At the same time, and for reasons of equity and regional
security, Israel’s nuclear status, which encourages nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East, must be addressed. (See Briefings
2 & 11).
Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran’s nuclear energy programme originally began under the Shah
in 1967. Iran ratified the NPT in 1970 and concluded a comprehensive
safeguards agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in 1974. However, since the Shah was overthrown in
1979, Iran has been under a virtual embargo on the provision of
nuclear equipment and technology by the West because of unease about
Tehran’s intentions. Concern focused on Iran’s desire to complete
construction of the Bushehr reactors, allied to a history of suspicious
procurement efforts in Europe and elsewhere and alleged attempts
to clandestinely develop a centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran’s
medium and long-range missile development programme further added
to these worries.
Disquiet was heightened considerably in August 2002, when secret
underground uranium enrichment at Natanz and heavy water production
facilities at Arak were exposed. Both of these processes and facilities
are dual use and could be used in civil or military programmes.
This sparked an intensive round of discussions and inspections by
the IAEA in February 2003. The Director General of the IAEA has
since reported, at three monthly intervals, to the IAEA Board of
Governors.
Each successive report has provided instances of undeclared nuclear
fuel cycle activities. They detail secret and sophisticated uranium
enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium separation activities
over a period of 18 years, along with “extensive concealment activities”.
The IAEA is today uncertain whether Iran possesses any undeclared
nuclear materials or activities that could be used for weapons purposes.
While latterly Iran has cooperated with the IAEA inspections in
most respects and agreed in December 2003 to sign and act by the
terms of an additional protocol (AP), it has yet to ratify the protocol.
Moreover, some of the initial information provided by Iran has subsequently
been found to be partial or even false and Agency access has often
been delayed or circumscribed.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN041123.htm
The International Dimension
There is no international consensus towards Iran. The United States
has generally been uncompromising, convinced Iran is pursuing a
clandestine nuclear weapon programme and repeatedly calling for
a finding of ‘non-compliance’ by the IAEA Board and reference to
the UN Security Council (UNSC) for further punitive action.
The Europeans, particularly France, Germany and the UK (EU-3),
have been more conciliatory. While also having doubts they have
argued that Iran needs incentives rather than the threat of sanctions
from the UNSC. To this end they have offered Iran help with regional
security concerns as well as access to nuclear technology and fuel
and a special trade agreement if Iran ceases uranium enrichment
pending a negotiated agreement on its nuclear programme as a whole.
Iranians question whether the Europeans are able to deliver their
side of the bargain, given the US reluctance to negotiate.
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), led by South Africa and Brazil,
firmly supports Iran’s right under the NPT to develop civil nuclear
technology.
Prospects
Under the NPT Iran has the ‘inalienable right’ to develop nuclear
technology for commercial purposes and needs to give only three
months notice to withdraw from the regime and develop a military
dimension. It is unlikely to agree to a full suspension of its enrichment,
and discussions in Geneva appear stalled. There is no lawful mechanism
for either preventing Iran from following this course of action
or for making it accountable to international non-proliferation
norms once such a declaration has been made. This situation presents
a serious challenge to the credibility of the non-proliferation
regime.
But the Iranian government is also signalling a willingness to
compromise. Could a bilateral agreement be reached between the IAEA
and Iran on intrusive voluntary verification measures that go beyond
the AP? If Iran is serious about showing that it possesses no nuclear
weapons, it should accept the concept of such inspections.
The option of referral to the UNSC may not be a panacea as it is
likely to be divided about the appropriate action to take, especially
given significant Russian and Chinese investment in Iran’s oil and
gas fields.
Certainly, the underlying hostility between the United States and
Iran will have to be addressed, Iran’s security needs will have
to be met, and its desire to be treated as a responsible international
player respected, if a sustainable and credible long-term solution
is to be achieved. Continued US economic sanctions and veiled threats
of unilateral air strikes are counterproductive, precipitous and
destabilising in both Iran and the wider Middle East. The threat
of punitive action may simply hasten the very result it is intended
to prevent. Following the military strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor
at Osirak in 1981, for example, Saddam Hussein simply diversified
and accelerated his clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The same
result can be expected should the United States or Israel attempt
a military strike on Iran.
How the issue is played at the 2005 NPT Review Conference will
be an important indicator of the international community’s resolve
to dissuade a resourceful and determined country from acquiring
nuclear weapons capability. The situation is serious and the precedent
that is set will likely have long-lasting consequences for the NPT
and non-proliferation generally.
The international community needs to respond with determination
to any serious cases of non-compliance, be it diversion, clandestine
activities or breakout. States violating treaties and multilateral
arrangements should not be permitted to do so unimpeded.
Recommendations
1. Iran needs to ratify the AP as a matter of urgency and improve
the transparency of its nuclear activities. If it does so to the
satisfaction of the IAEA, then the international community should
assure Iran of its ‘right’ to a secure supply of electricity from
nuclear technology without threat of military action.
2. The IAEA must be permitted time to verify Iran’s compliance
with its NPT obligations.
3. Iran’s record of violating its safeguards obligations and pattern
of deception to date has made it unadvisable for the international
community to permit Iran to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium.
Iran should rely on guaranteed international supplies of fuel to
meet its energy needs.
4. The case of Iran should be part of a broader review of the rules
governing access to sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (Briefing
16) and the first steps towards a nuclear-free Middle East (Briefing
11).
5. The UNSC should consider a positive resolution endorsing any
agreement between the EU and Iran that “objectively guarantees”
that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for commercial purposes.
6. The United States needs to build on its recent offer to support
Iranian membership of the WTO and open a constructive dialogue with
Iran, which recognises its legitimate security needs.
7. States Parties need to:
- reassert the supremacy of the UNSC in all matters related to
military intervention and refrain from preventive, unilateral
military action to resolve concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme;
- establish formal mechanisms for assessing compliance with the
NPT;
- treat cases of non-compliance consistently and non-discriminatorily;
- call on the UNSC to agree specific penalties for any state that
leaves the NPT, including the surrendering of all nuclear technology;
and
- consider alternative ways to address the case of a state leaving
the treaty (breaking out). Under the Open Skies Treaty, for example,
if a state invokes the withdrawal clause, parties can convene
a conference that considers the effect of the withdrawal on the
treaty.
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